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Abstract 
Although men’s sexual violence is well known as a problem of epidemic proportions 
and a cause of significant harm, effective prevention strategies have yet to be developed 
and the effectiveness of services for victims cannot be guaranteed. Most victims of 
sexual violence choose not to report, but those who do may still incur exacerbation of 
rape’s destructive effects by those who are meant to help. Interested to know how 
responsiveness could be improved, I began this study by examining the literature on 
services for victims in order to identify the ingredients of good practice. Integrated 
specialist services which include support and advocacy with legal/forensic services 
emerged as the ideal. Finding that such systems had been positively evaluated in their 
real-life applications, New Zealand’s responsiveness was analysed with reference to this 
multi-agency model. I was particularly interested to know what supported the 
development of such a model and what the impediments might be to its development in 
New Zealand.  
Since literature indicated that government input was vital to implementation of 
specialist holistic practice, examination of New Zealand government and its Police 
responsiveness became the primary goal of data-gathering. With Police Districts as the 
units of study, data was collected from site visits and semi-structured interviews with 
police in each District. This data was triangulated through prolonged participant 
observation and interviews with medical/forensic and support/advocacy personnel. I 
found that specialist holistic services were regularly available for child sexual abuse 
victims. In contrast, for adult sexual violence victims these were rare and service gaps 
were rife. This was due to governance bodies failing to coordinate nationally or locally 
in funding and supporting service development. Explanations for this failure are found 
in feminist critiques of the patriarchal systems which privilege men’s needs over 
women’s safety. I argue that with women’s movement into public life and with the 
political will, nationally-based reform of services is now possible. Given its small size, 
New Zealand is particularly well-placed to achieve this reform if current governance 
structures are employed in constructing a national framework for nationwide 
development of specialist multi-agency practice.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Systems responses to women who experience men’s sexual violence are the focus of 
this research. My concern with systems responses stems from awareness that the effects 
of sexual violence can be devastating. Instead of being able to regard her body as her 
own, sexual violence forces a woman to understand that her right to control access to 
intimate parts of body does not exist in reality. Since she knows that to one man at least, 
and probably to others her human rights are inconsequential, this woman questions her 
self-worth. She is also no longer able to feel secure in the knowledge that her world is a 
predictable place, and never again will feel that it is safe. From feeling strong, she 
knows now that she is not strong enough to prevent being raped and that nothing 
guarantees it will not happen again.  
If this woman eventually reaches a point where she feels able to try to right the wrong 
and restore feelings of safety and self by seeking help, she may well encounter 
incompetent, uncaring, uninterested, disbelieving, and dismissive responses from those 
in systems meant to help. When systems responses reinforce the messages given to her 
by the rape itself, this secondary victimisation is profoundly disabling to her recovering 
self-belief, belief in justice, and ability to feel safe.  
Incomprehensibly, all of this happens to women with disturbing regularity. Particularly 
since the 1970s, an abundance of feminist research has documented the widespread 
incidence of sexual violence and the destructive nature of its effects. Yet paradoxically, 
also described in abundance are variably adequate systems responses, and within these 
systems sometimes harmful responses from individual service providers. Combined, 
these bodies of research demonstrate that societal systems have not kept pace with what 
research has shown to be necessary in responding to rape. There is a need then for 
systems to develop further so that individuals working within them are better positioned 
to provide professional caring responses.  
That systems rather than the individual responses within them are the concern of this 
study is premised on the quality of a profession’s systems being a strong determinant of 
the quality of its professionals’ responses. If leadership is shown in developing systems 
which define, promote, and sustain professional frontline practice, this guidance will at 
least provide the structure within which good practice is possible and can become 
9 
normative. Good practice is defined as that which promotes, rather than impedes, victim 
recovery. Moreover, it is professional practice to be guided by the individual needs of 
victims and this can be accommodated within negotiated practice guidelines. Without 
that leadership, victims will receive variable responses from service providers which 
may be due to individual differences, for instance in knowledge, philosophy, sensitivity, 
concern, and compatibility with different clients. It is not then the intention of this study 
to examine or be critical of those individual responses. Operational variability is of 
concern, but only in so far as it shows the need for systems to develop processes in 
which people are required, allowed, encouraged, and sustained to perform to their best.  
 
Along with examining systems at frontline levels, an examination of state-level 
involvement with services has been incorporated in the study. This is because when the 
bodies of literature on sexual violence are viewed as a whole, it becomes apparent that 
improvements to systems of responsiveness are unlikely without state commitment. 
Evidence for this is in response inadequacies being well-documented over nearly four 
decades. Although less comprehensively, what victims do need by way of systems 
organisation and responses has also been defined. Yet despite the longstanding 
availability of this knowledge, there have been few evaluations of existing systems in 
order to ascertain whether these meet the needs of victims. Accordingly, few systems 
have been developed based on evidence of need and what works well in meeting that 
need. Those few systems which are evidence-based and do provide a structure which 
enables service providers to implement practice ideals are only now being described and 
evaluated.  
What all of this conveys is that if the evidence basis for good practice is to be more 
widely disseminated and systems based on it are to be implemented more widely, state 
commitment is necessary. The state alone has the machinery and resources to bring 
together and hold together the many systems which the research has shown must 
collaborate in meeting the many needs created by rape. Therefore, the second strand of 
the research is an examination of state involvement in supporting development of 
systems and coordinating responsiveness between them.  
That the state has the resources to engage with service development, but that the 
findings of research have not been implemented more broadly, requires analysis. The 
tension which derives from the mismatch between the demonstrated harm of sexual 
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violence and persistent state indifference is explained by feminist theory. The threat and 
immediate consequences of sexual violence both act as significant barriers to the 
fulfilment of female potential. Systems responses are critical in mitigating the fear and 
consequences of sexual violence but in sometimes exacerbating these, female ability to 
self-actualise is further compromised. Since my own feminist philosophy is grounded in 
women’s right to self-actualise, all aspects of the research are informed by feminism. 
Feminism explains police systems responses to victims and the nature of police 
relationships with other crisis intervention organisations. It also explains the tension that 
exists in understanding rape as a human rights abuse, yet government inertia in 
addressing this through comprehensive rape-prevention measures and through ensuring 
adequate services for its victims. Activist research is a constructive way of resolving 
this tension.  
Research Aims  
Given these feminist concerns, the overall aim of this research is to locate 
New Zealand’s systems on the world stage and by contrasting them with developments 
in international practice at frontline and state levels, suggest how systems here can 
develop further. My motivation in wishing to import and adapt the best of international 
systems stems from the significant effects of system omissions, as well as commissions, 
on victims. Negative effects are felt not only by victims, but by women in general. They 
are also felt by those individual service providers who understand their inability to 
provide adequate responses when victims seek help. In this study, I will use the term 
‘victim’ as an abbreviation of ‘victim of sexual violence’. ‘Victim’ is used because this 
thesis has its foundations within a criminological paradigm of study. In that respect, 
‘victim’ distinguishes the person who has been offended against (blameless) from the 
offender (blameworthy).  
In respect of these victims, I aim to highlight the gaps created by the system-centred rather 
than victim-centred nature of some responsiveness, in the hope that rape victims will 
receive a quality of care which corresponds with the serious effects suffered. Forced sexual 
experience, for which I will use the terms ‘rape’, ‘sexual assault’, and ‘sexual violence’ 
interchangeably, is a traumatic event which is ‘an overwhelming confrontation with another 
individual’s sadism and aggression’ (Notman & Nadelson, 1976, p. 410). As such, it is ‘a 
physical, social, and psychological attack on the person’ (McCombie, Bassuk, Savitz & 
Pell, 1976, p.417). The difficulty of psychological recovery from such an event renders it 
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unacceptable that any woman should encounter unhelpful or traumatising responses. 
Rather, all responses must be based on knowledge of the negative psychosocial 
consequences of rape and reporting rape, as well as how to mitigate these consequences. 
Equally important, when systems responses do become victim-centred I want this quality of 
care to become well-known in the community and in becoming well-known, to encourage a 
rate of reporting which more closely approximates the true incidence of rape. When this 
happens, systems responses will send symbolic messages about women’s worth and about 
sexual aggression being unacceptable in any form.  
In respect of women in general, a secondary but no less important aim is to highlight the 
paradox of the serious epidemic of rape, but the paucity of structured and systematic 
attempts at rape-prevention. This is because I want rape-prevention to become 
structured and systematic so that women are safe and, in feeling safe, can live their lives 
to the full. Equally important, I want women to feel that their safety matters. 
Service providers are also stakeholders in this research. For those who appreciate the 
human pain which sexual violence causes, but know they are part of a system which 
does little to help and may cause further harm, the inability to give appropriate care can 
cause considerable workplace stress. An important aim of the current research is to give 
service providers a voice in expressing this, in the hope of highlighting both their 
commitment to victims and their right to fulfilment in their working lives. 
Internationally, only a small number of studies evaluate sexual assault services and fewer 
still have a national perspective. The study’s first contribution is in providing a 
New Zealand-wide overview of services in order to highlight the need for ownership of 
sexual violence at governmental level. For sexual assault services to be adequately 
resourced, government must take a national view of sexual violence and accept 
responsibility for addressing it through prevention measures and services. While there is an 
increasing evidence basis for holistic practice as good practice, no studies on systems of 
sexual violence responsiveness analyse impediments to the development of holistic 
services. The study’s second contribution is its analysis of historical and contemporary 
factors which impede the collaboration required at both state and frontline levels in 
instigating and maintaining good practice. These barriers need to be understood if the ideal 
of holistic practice is to be implemented in New Zealand.  
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Overview of the Thesis 
This overview demonstrates the steps needing to be taken to meet the aims discussed above. 
The first step is to consolidate my argument that there are systems deficits internationally. I 
will do this in Chapter Two by juxtaposing the body of literature available from the 1970s 
on rape’s widespread and harmful effects, with literature which contemporaneously 
describes secondary victimisation due to shortcomings in some systems responses. 
Following this, I will argue the importance of medical/forensic systems collaborating with 
specialist support/advocates to provide the expertise in response through which secondary 
victimisation can be avoided. However, while specialist responses are necessary, they are 
not sufficient. Along with inexpert care, service gaps have potential to undermine recovery. 
Systems must work collaboratively and in partnership to provide more holistic responses. In 
Chapter Two then ‘care in collaboration’ gains added meaning as I argue that good care can 
only be given through collaboration, and that care is necessary in the establishment of 
partnerships. In arguing this, the steps in implementing effective partnerships are described. 
Lastly, an integrated multi-agency setting which is thought to contribute to the development 
of both specialist and holistic care is provided as an exemplar of practice.  
Having argued for holistic practice, and given that victims of sexual violence are primary 
stakeholders in this research, I need to do more than discuss just the technicalities of 
developing holistic practice. The movement toward holistic practice began with feminist 
community initiatives in the early 1970s. Given that in some places holistic services are 
now provided by state organisations in conjunction with feminist community organisations, 
philosophical differences within this collaboration also need to be examined for their 
potential to undermine practice ideals. In Chapter Three, a brief review of the origins of 
service improvements in the US, Britain, and Australia provides the context which enables 
this analysis. I have claimed that the knowledge exists to progress responsiveness, so this 
review also enables analysis of why specialist holistic practice has not been achieved 
previously and more universally. In considering the politics of collaboration, but in also 
recognising that a holistic response capacity requires state support, I review the arguments 
about community collaborations with state organisations and identify the safeguards which 
are necessary to ensure there is no loss of gains made by feminist community organisations.  
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In wanting to contribute to real-world outcomes for stakeholders, the next step is to 
apply the views in the international literature about what constitutes effective systems of 
practice, to evaluating a real-world setting. In addition to identifying as a feminist 
woman, I identify as a New Zealander. This translates to caring that New Zealand’s 
responsiveness to sexual violence matches the best of systems internationally. As the 
precursor to documenting, describing, and analysing New Zealand services in relation to 
good practice principles, what is already known about New Zealand’s services is 
discussed. This locates where New Zealand stands internationally in its systems 
development and explains the reasons for the study’s areas of focus.   
In limiting the study, I have selected the pre-court investigative services of the 
New Zealand Police as the primary systems focus. Examining these necessitates a 
parallel examination of medical/forensic and support/advocacy services for their 
capacity to partner police in providing holistic services. Unlike police services, these 
services are both community-based and only partially funded by government. In 
conjunction with literature describing the history of service developments, these factors 
determined the second focus of the research. This is the examination of the current 
extent of and need for state involvement with service development.  
The form these two examinations take is discussed in Chapter Four when the research 
methodology is described. Locating its theory in feminist and post-modern 
philosophies, qualitative methodologies subsumed by fourth generation naturalist 
enquiry are employed in data-gathering and analysis. These methodologies require 
collaboration between researcher and respondents in identifying issues and suggesting 
responses.   
The findings of the research are discussed in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. Chapters 
Five and Six present the findings on New Zealand’s frontline systems. In Chapter Five, 
police, medical/forensic, and support/advocacy systems are described and their services 
analysed in comparison to evidenced-based improvements to practice overseas. 
Particular attention is given to the need for specialist responses from all organisations 
and careful collaborations between them at both national and local levels.  
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During data-gathering, I identified philosophical issues between police and community 
support/advocacy organisations which hindered collaborations and created significant 
systems gaps. For that reason, this collaboration was analysed in more depth and is the 
focus of Chapter Six. Firstly, in order to highlight the benefits for victims and for police 
investigative processes of collaboration with specialists, police partnerships with 
specialist support/advocacy organisations are compared to their partnerships with the 
generalist Victim Support. The need for specialists to work together is then underscored 
with examples of the synergy which derives from specialist collaborations. Lastly, I 
analyse the factors which have mediated the formulation and maximising of police 
partnerships with specialist support/advocates.  
Chapter Seven addresses the second strand of the research which concerns the requisite 
conditions in supporting the development of specialist holistic services. Underpinned by the 
discussion on the need for state involvement with service provision, this chapter outlines 
current government input into the development of its own Police system, as well as the 
community organisations which offer specialist services. Findings on the need for support 
from local governance structures are also presented and contrasted with officials’ attitudes 
to facilitating systems coordination. In the second part of Chapter Seven, empirical findings 
on government-funded and coordinated services for sexually abused children are provided 
as an example of the specialist holistic services which can be achieved in New Zealand with 
government and local body support. Feminist analysis of successive governments’ 
willingness to fund, coordinate, and support responsiveness to children, but not women, is 
also offered.  
Chapter Eight discusses the overall meaning of the study findings. In its 
recommendations, it also continues to address the question of what is needed to achieve 
the responsiveness agreed to by New Zealand governments in adopting United Nations 
covenants on responsiveness to violence against women.  
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Chapter Two: The Cost of Sexual Violence and 
the Requirements in Responding  
In this chapter, I argue that what victims need from systems interventions has not generally 
been forthcoming and that systems must be advanced. Firstly, the requirement to develop 
greater effectiveness in systems is underscored through a brief overview of the impact of 
sexual violence on: victims; the systems which respond to victims; and society in general. 
Then, what we have known since the 1970s of what victims need from systems responses in 
the immediate aftermath of rape is identified and contrasted with longstanding problems in 
systems responses. In countering these problems, the benefits of specialist and combined 
systems responses in aiding victim recovery and simultaneously minimising societal cost, 
are identified. Having suggested that holistic responses are necessary, with recourse to the 
literature I discuss the mechanisms contributing to development of the partnerships which 
enable holistic responses to be made. Lastly, a model of specialist holistic practice in an 
integrated multi-agency setting is discussed as an exemplar of practice.  
Costs of Sexual Violence  
According to O’Shea (2006), the seriousness and extent of rape are still not generally 
acknowledged. This may be because its costs, while phenomenal and global, are 
disproportionately borne by women and girls at both individual and broader societal 
levels (Astbury, 2006; Kelly & Lovett, 2005; Kilpatrick & Ruggiero, 2004; Ministry of 
Justice, 2003; Mayhill & Allen, 2002; Roper & Thompson, 2006; US Department of 
Justice, 2006). Achieving improvements in systems interventions makes it essential that 
the costs of men’s sexual violence, both to its individual female victims and to society, 
are widely known.  
Firstly, sexual violence functions to restrict and therefore control the lives of all women 
(Brownmiller, 1975; Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1990; Gordon & Riger, 1989; Heidensohn, 
1985; Kelly & Lovett, 2005; Lurigio, Skogan & Davis, 1990). This is through fear of rape, 
which is attributable to women’s awareness of the qualitative impacts of rape and to their 
realistic awareness of rape’s pervasiveness in society. That women’s fear of rape is realistic 
is underscored by a compilation of European statistics revealing that over their lifetimes 10-
25% of women had experienced sexual violence (Regan & Kelly, 2003). Along with victim 
studies, criminal justice system statistics compiled internationally since the early 1970s also 
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indicate the prevalence of sexual violence. Difficulty in achieving comparative global and 
time-based perspectives on sexual offending due to police recording practices, study 
variability, and gender blindness must be acknowledged (Hagemann-White cited in Regan 
& Kelly, 2003; Kilpatrick & Ruggiero, 2004; O’Shea, 2006). Nonetheless, studies 
universally express a social problem of significant proportions in the number of sexual 
violence complaints processed in the criminal justice system (Bard, 1976; Campbell, 1998; 
Hardgrove, 1976; Kilpatrick & Ruggiero, 2004; Ledray, 1982; Maryland Coalition Against 
Sexual Assault (MCASA), 1997; Myhill & Allen, 2002; Roper & Thompson, 2006; US 
Department of Justice, 2006).  
That rape ensures women are not equal with men in the ability to self-actualise was 
formally recognised in 1979 by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). This acknowledged the 
effects of rape to be life-limiting for women. CEDAW’s General Recommendation 19 
described gender-based violence as a form of discrimination that seriously inhibited a 
woman's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on an equal basis with men (Bond & 
Phillips, 2001). Importantly, as is their intended function, myths about victim 
culpability for rape have consolidated the control achieved through fear of rape by 
adding an overlay of social impacts such as shame (Shapcott, 1988).  
While the broader social impact of sexual violence is an undermining of women’s potential 
for self-actualisation, its acute effects can undermine victims themselves. As identified in 
Burgess and Holmstrom’s (1974) groundbreaking research, the psychological effects can be 
profound. In categorising short and long-term impacts of rape, the authors described these 
collectively as ‘Rape Trauma Syndrome’. The initial phase was one of acute stress 
characterised by reactions which could include hysteria, shock, disbelief, vulnerability, 
disgust, fear, guilt, confusion, and powerlessness. These effects were analysed as having 
potential to cause complete disorganisation of victims’ lives.  
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Some acute rape effects relate to the loss of the autonomy normally exercised over the 
most intimate aspects of body. Others relate to the force, threats of force, weapons, 
harm threatened to others, psychological duress, and intimidation employed by 
perpetrators (Shand & Milford, 1994). These forms of coercion contribute to a 
heightened awareness of vulnerability and often to a fear of death (Burgess & 
Holmstrom, 1976; Notman & Nadelson, 1976). All of these psychological effects, but 
particularly guilt and confusion, are potentially exacerbated by victims’ subconscious 
adherence to rape mythology in which blame is shifted onto women (Shapcott, 1988).  
The second phase of ‘Rape Trauma Syndrome’ was a recovery phase, characterised 
overall by long-term reorganisation of life. During this phase prevalent responses 
include: depression; decreased level of function; continued anxiety; sleep disturbances; 
mood swings; denial; sexual dysfunction; phobic reactions; preoccupation with the 
event; and either fear of solitude or withdrawal and social isolation. Disruption to 
relationships has also been recorded as contributing to an overwhelming sense of 
isolation (Blythe & Vernon, 1992). For some women then, sexual violence has the 
potential to limit not only their own lives but also their contributions to society. 
Compromise to the ability to function in usual work and social roles means economic 
and social disadvantage at individual and community levels (Smith, 2004). As an 
example, childhood sexual abuse has been found to be associated with greater 
likelihood of prostitution (Chesney Lind & Sheldon, 1992). Alternative coping 
mechanisms such as drug or alcohol addictions also have costly individual and social 
consequences (Victoria Health Department study cited by Smith, 2004).  
Resick’s (1993) review of many studies which replicated Burgess and Holmstrom’s 
research confirmed the possible disabling effects of sexual violence. At the very least, 
the time and energy invested in recovery has potential to prevent making, let alone 
meeting, other more life-affirming goals (Ferraro, 1990). However while Burgess and 
Holmstrom’s research provides a helpful perspective in understanding the possible 
extent of rape’s effects, it would be wrong to read the typology as suggesting that sexual 
violence has deterministic outcomes. As Kelly and Lovett (2005) have commented, 
victims have many resistance and survival strategies. All victims cope and react 
differently and this depends in part on the circumstances of the rape and others’ 
reactions.  
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A personal experience illustrates this and other points made in relation to sexual 
violence effects. In the mid-1970s, I returned to my hostel to hear frightening sounds 
from a friend’s room. I entered to find an attack in progress by an intruder who later 
became a notorious serial rapist. My friend had injuries which had been inflicted over 
some time. I believe that my friend’s recovery was greatly assisted by the nature of the 
sexual violence as a home invasion, corroborated by a witness and physical evidence. 
These factors allowed police/forensic belief and, more importantly, my friend’s ongoing 
self-belief since the circumstances did not permit any aspect of rape mythology to 
undermine this.  
Nonetheless, the impact of the incident was severe. Respect for my friend’s privacy means 
some of my own responses will be mentioned instead. I have never lacked courage but my 
immediate reaction was one of terror translated into immobilisation, albeit vocal. His fear 
caused him to flee. Sleeping was out of the question for many nights and initially was 
possible only if others were in the same room. When it came, sleep was beset by 
nightmares. For some time I was unable to return to the floor where the attack took place 
and soon after negative associations forced me to move to alternative accommodation, 
despite its much greater expense. The investigative processes and waiting for court enforced 
preoccupation with an event which I was more than ready to be distanced from. I was 
surprised at how much I struggled to look around the courtroom when asked to identify the 
offender.  
As is evident, the toll on individual women and on women’s lives in general is 
considerable and if women seek assistance after rape, the costs to the systems which 
respond are considerable too. For instance, sexual violence is a heavy burden for health 
systems, some of which take responsibility for the immediate forensic examination. As 
illustrated by my friend’s injuries, the health system burden is also incurred through 
managing the immediate physical consequences of sexual violence. Carrow (1980) has 
identified that physical health can be undermined in the short and sometimes long term 
by injuries estimated to accompany 49% of sexual assaults. Immediate injuries could 
include bruises, cuts, fractures, head injuries, chest wounds, intra-abdominal trauma, 
eye injury, and dental injuries. Ongoing physical effects related to sexually transmitted 
infections; side effects of emergency contraception; pregnancy; or miscarriage (Carrow, 
1980; Kelly & Lovett, 2005; Shand & Milford, 1994).  
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The physical consequences of sexual violence are not always limited to what is 
immediately evident. Other physical disorders associated with rape can be somatically 
induced through the effects of severe stress on the immune system (Blythe & Vernon, 
1992; Kimmerling & Calhoun, 1994). Associated disorders include: allergies; back 
pain; tension headaches; skin disorders; menstrual symptoms; sexual dysfunction; 
irritable bowel syndrome; and migraines. Long-term psychological problems can 
include a variety of major affective and anxiety disorders (Kimmerling & Calhoun, 
1994; Koss, Heise & Felipe Russo, 1994; Lurigio et al., 1990; O’Shea, 2006; Smith, 
2004).  
Unsurprisingly then, sexual violence has been found to contribute to overall poorer 
general health in its victims (Kelly & Lovett, 2005; Kimmerling & Calhoun, 1994; 
O’Shea, 2006). A perspective on this has been given by an Australian study, the 
Victoria Health Promotion Study (1996), which implicated sexual crime in 9% of the 
total disease burden carried by the State’s women. The study also classified sexual 
crime as the top-ranking cause of preventable disease and premature death in Victorian 
women aged 15-44. As a physically and psychologically brutal event, the corollary of 
rape is that its victims access medical services in greater numbers than non victims and 
this has significant ramifications for health resources (Astbury, 2006).  
It is apparent from this brief summary of evidence mounting since the 1970s, that sexual 
violence is a considerable problem for individual women and one of epidemic 
proportions internationally. As a significant social problem, it requires an equally 
significant systems response. What victims need from within these systems is discussed 
next and contrasted with what victims have received and sometimes still receive.  
Systems Interventions for Victims: The Requirements and the 
Responses 
Literature on rape’s effects makes it apparent that acute phase systems interventions require 
more than just being nice to victims and showing care in responses. Those who respond 
must also be skilled and this requires specialist knowledge of both the possible 
psychological effects of rape and the range of victim presentations. For these reasons, I 
looked for research on the specialist knowledge which should guide and be contained 
within responses to victims.   
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According to Astbury (2006), the evidence basis for what victims need from sexual assault 
interventions is still incomplete. This is unsurprising given the dearth of research until the 
1970s when the basis for much of what is now known was produced. By the late 1970s, 
Chapman and Gates had collated from literature the essentials in immediate police, medical, 
and support interventions if trauma effects were to be mitigated (cited in Ledray, 1982). 
Necessary were: emotional support; understanding of emotional disequilibrium as a normal 
and temporary response; treating the victim as separate from the rape; a non-judgemental 
response; assistance to maintain or regain control; informing the victim of her right to make 
choices in her own time; assisting the victim to identify social support systems; and 
addressing issues of her personal safety. A decade later, Quina and Carlson (1989) added to 
this the need to understand and respond to issues around: privacy; powerlessness; fear; 
belief; empathy; the stages of trauma responses; and addressing the guilt engendered by 
blaming attitudes which emanate from rape mythology. These management strategies 
reinforce the need for specialist intervention and support in official systems in order to 
manage the psychosocial effects of rape and assist victims in developing coping strategies.  
Since police and medical/forensic systems are examined in this study, victims’ needs in 
these are considered more specifically. The need for specialist police investigators was 
regarded as particularly significant due to the unusual degree to which the normal right 
to privacy in respect of intimate aspects of body was lost during questioning. For this 
reason, belief, empathy, and validation were said to be important (Anstiss, 1995; 
Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Hazelwood & Burgess, 1999; Koss, 1990; Roberts cited in 
Lees & Gregory, 1993). Rape victims were also said to have special needs in medical 
settings and a corresponding need for particularly sensitive care from medical/forensic 
examiners (McCombie et al., 1976). This was due to the invasive and uncomfortable 
nature of an examination in which the victim’s body was treated as a crime scene 
(Carrow, 1980). It was also due to the possibility that victims might perceive the 
forensic aspect of the examination as another assault (Lovett, Regan & Kelly, 2004; 
Parrot cited in Campbell et al., 1999).  
In examining systems responses in comparative countries overseas, since the 1970s US, 
British, and Australian literature has shown that the traumatic effects of rape have not 
always been understood in the medical and legal systems. This means that victims have 
often been confronted with negative or unthinking responses in the appropriate official 
reporting forums. For instance, before medical/forensic practice was informed by 
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specialist knowledge, mythology-induced staff prejudices about rape jeopardised 
attitudes to victims and the treatment of victims (McCombie et al., 1976; Leane cited in 
O’Shea, 2006). At first, since rape was not seen as a legitimate health issue, there was a 
lack of forensic training for doctors and this contributed to avoidance of examinations 
and reluctance to testify in court (Blair, 1985). Rape myths also contributed to 
underestimation of the emotional crisis (McCombie et al., 1976). Accordingly, in 
Britain early medical responses were predominantly forensic (Blair, 1985) which meant 
rapid processing of victims without consideration for their psychological health 
(Campbell & Raja, 1999). This was in contrast to contemporary understanding that if 
forensic examinations are combined with sensitive medical care this gives an 
opportunity to begin the victim’s recovery.  
Many other practical problems with forensic examinations and medical care have been 
documented over the last three decades. In the US, they included inadequate facilities 
and hospitals not working to standard operating procedures (Bryant & Cirel, 1977). 
Haphazard collection and preservation of evidence was aggravated further by a lack of 
coordination with police (Ahrens, Campbell, Wasco, Aponte, Grubstein & Davidson, 
2000). Victims were often even denied care in hospitals (ibid). If they were attended to, 
in the absence of other physical injury, this was often after lengthy unattended waits in 
uncomfortable public emergency departments, sometimes while victims were only 
partially dressed (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974; Carmody, 1988; McCombie et al., 
1976; Spott, 1980). Moreover, examinations were at the victim’s cost, often rushed, 
perfunctory, and conducted by reluctant doctors. Referral to follow-up services was also 
overlooked (Campbell et al., 1999; McCombie et al., 1976). These gaps in 
medical/forensic care continue in some places (Campbell et al., 1999; Martin cited in 
Ullman & Townsend, 2007).  
However, although progress is not universal or linear there is an evident move towards 
specialisation in medical/forensic systems overseas. In some Australian states such as 
New South Wales (NSW), a 24-hour acute rape service operates in hospitals or 
community health centres and this incorporates a seamless follow-up service in all 
regions (Carmody, 1988). In parts of the US and Canada medical/forensic 
responsiveness has evolved through sexual assault nurse examiner programmes 
(SANEs).1 Now widely established in US emergency departments, the majority of 
                                                 
1
 ‘Programme’ is a US term denoting sexual assault services. 
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sexual assault examinations are conducted through these SANEs (Regan, Lovett & 
Kelly, 2004). Importantly, SANE protocols have become hospital accreditation 
requirements and SANE programmes are subject to ongoing evaluation (Ahrens et al., 
2000; Ledray, 2001). Past evaluations have found: higher quality evidence collection; 
significant reductions in waiting times; higher prosecution rates; and a 50% increase in 
accessing counselling (Ahrens at al., 2000). Significantly, also found has been an 
increase in rape reports and removal of some barriers to prosecuting sexual assault cases 
(Ledray, 2001).  
These evident benefits of specialisation have been documented in parts of Britain. 
In 1985, Blair noted systems advantages in care being transferred from regularly 
employed independent police surgeons to selected hospitals with ‘effective’ medical 
protocols:   
‘The effect of this all-inclusive medical attention is of great significance for the 
investigator. The victim feels herself supported by state agencies and the 
detective therefore meets a victim who is medically reassured and able to 
concentrate fully on giving evidence.’ (Blair, 1985, p.39) 
More recently, Forensic Nurse Examiners in British Sexual Assault Referral Centres 
(SARCs) have addressed victims’ needs for: timely skilled examinations; female 
examiners; privacy; non institutional settings; time to communicate about the process; a 
caring but professional manner; and follow-up support (Regan et al., 2004). However, 
progress in Britain is also variable, with the absence of national protocols and minimum 
standards causing comment. Lovett et al. (2004) have found that where SARCs were not 
available, this meant: delays in locating forensic examiners; lack of female examiners; 
problems with the environment and manner of examinations; inconsistency in evidence 
gathering; absence of medical follow-up and support; and lack of coordination between 
agencies.  
Problems were also found with police responses and in the US, Britain, and Australia, 
these appear to have incurred even more criticism than early medical responses. Many 
of the problems with police responsiveness listed below indicate that police have been 
particularly susceptible to pernicious rape mythology, especially the myth that many 
complaints were false. As a result, police regularly:  
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• ‘unfounded’ complaints (Clark & Lewis, 1977; Kerstetter, 1990) 
• misunderstood victims (Independent Police Complaints Authority, 1988) 
• delayed taking women to hospital (ibid) 
• cross-examined victims as though they were suspected of serious crime (ibid) 
• displayed ‘routine scepticism in the face of distressed rape victims’ (ibid, p.2) 
• used unduly lengthy methods of taking complainants’ statements (ibid) 
• held the victim responsible (Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Gilmore & 
Pittman,1993; Katz & Mazur, 1979)  
• dismissed ‘date rapes’ (Rossi & Freeman, 1987; Clark, 2002) 
• defined only a narrow range of rapes as legitimate for investigation (Feldman-
Summers & Palmer, 1980; Hanmer, Radford & Stanko, 1980; Williams & 
Holmes, 1981) 
• defined only a narrow range of women as worthy of assistance (Kerstetter, 1990; 
Myers & LaFree, 1982; Sanders, 1980; Spohn & Horney, 1993; Williams & 
Holmes, 1981) 
• held the victim to a higher standard of conduct than required by the law (Galton, 
1976; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Myers & LaFree, 1982; Renner, Wackett & 
Ganderton, 1988; Spohn & Horney, 1993; Vito, Longmire & Kenny, 1984) 
• were suspicious of victims’ motives in reporting (Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; 
Katz & Mazur, 1979; Myers & LaFree, 1982; Sanders, 1980) 
• displayed insensitivity or tactlessness in interviews (Holmstrom & Burgess, 
1983; Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Katz & Mazur, 1979; Madigan & 
Gamble, 1989) 
• asked voyeuristic or unnecessary questions (Holmstrom & Burgess, 1983; 
Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Katz & Mazur, 1979;  Sanders, 1980; Winkel, Vrij, 
Koppelaar & Steen, 1991) 
• kept victims ignorant about legal procedures (Adler, 1991; Holmstrom & 
Burgess & Holmstrom, 1983; Lees & Gregory, 1993) 
• discouraged prosecution (Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Kerstetter, 1990; 
LaFree, 1989) 
• required evidence of injury in order to believe that a victim was raped (Weiss & 
Borges, 1971) 
• gave unsympathetic and unsupportive responses (Gilmore & Pittman, 1993) 
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As with early medical/forensic responses, police responses showed little understanding 
of the need for specialised services.  
In both medical and legal systems, the importance of the failure to develop effective 
systems responses through specialisation was that responses could have significant negative 
impacts on victims. Crucially, long-term health effects could be significantly mediated by 
the quality of support which a victim received after sexual violence (Anstiss, 1995; Astbury, 
2006; Bard & Sangrey cited in Winkel et al., 1991; Koss, 1990; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; 
Green, 1988; McCombie et al., 1976; Roberts cited in Lees & Gregory, 1993).  
‘…minutes of skilful support by any sensitive person immediately after the crime 
can be worth more than hours of professional counselling later.’ (Bard & 
Sangrey cited in Winkel et al., 1991, p.2) 
In contrast, negative health effects could be exacerbated by unenlightened, inadequate, 
or negative social and professional responses, such as those discussed.  
‘…it is imperative to understand rape as an individual experience which is 
compounded by the reactions of significant and generalised others who respond 
to the victim’. (Williams & Holmes, 1981, p.21)  
This secondary victimisation was understood as significantly prolonging recovery time 
(Geis, 1990; Gordon & Riger, 1989; Mills, 1977; Shapcott, 1988; Williams & Holmes, 
1981). For instance, Campbell, Sefl, Barnes, Ahrens, Wasco, and Zaragoza-Diesfield 
(1999) found significantly higher levels of post-traumatic stress in victims who received 
minimal or victim-blaming assistance from professionals, than victims who received no 
professional assistance. Sustained psychological assistance was able to reduce this 
systems-induced post-traumatic stress (Campbell et al., 1999).  
Negative systems responses can also be said to mediate health outcomes for victims in 
another way. One impact of rape mythology is that in encouraging victims to feel 
culpable for the rapist’s violence, they are already reluctant to report (O’Shea, 2006). 
To the extent that inadequate professional responses are known in the community and 
anticipated by victims, disclosures become even less likely (Wyatt et al., 1990). If there 
is no disclosure, there is no assistance in dealing with the short-term psychological and 
physical effects of rape (Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Krahe, 1991; Renner et al., 1988; 
25 
Young, 1992). This renders chronic effects more likely (Golding, Siegal, Sorenson, 
Burnam & Stein, 1989; Kimmerling & Calhoun, 1994; Popiel & Susskind, 1985; 
Russell cited in Wyatt, Notgrass & Newcomb, 1990). If there is no crisis intervention, 
there is also lesser likelihood of timely referrals for the longer term counselling which 
prevents or mitigates chronic health effects. Significantly, most victims never report to 
legal authorities, medical, or support services (Kimmerling & Calhoun, 1994). This 
means that secondary health agency resources sometimes provide the first institutional 
responses in treating chronic conditions which can result from victims of sexual 
violence receiving no early specialist interventions.  
Ultimately then, societal health costs are substantially increased when rape’s 
psychological effects have been compounded because system responses are negative, 
inadequate, or not sought (Kimmerling & Calhoun, 1994; Koss et al., 1994). In contrast, 
effective interventions within systems impact greatly on women’s ability to recover and 
can limit the social and financial costs of sexual violence. Achieving positive outcomes 
for victims requires specialisation and suggestions for advancing specialisation through 
collaboration are discussed next.  
Improving Legal/Forensic Services: Collaboration with 
Support/Advocates 
Once sexual violence was understood as having not only legal but also physical and 
psychosocial ramifications, it was evident that victim needs could no longer be 
delivered by legal/forensic systems alone (Bard & Ellison, 1974; Campbell & Ahrens, 
1998; Campbell et al., 1999; Carrow, 1980; Ledray, 2001; Lievore, 2005; Miller 
Burgering, 1994; O’Shea, 2006). Accordingly, feminist writers argued not only for 
specialist responses but also for these to be delivered in collaborative systems which 
incorporated psychosocial support. Holistic approaches were recommended and for 
some writers this meant nothing short of an integrated socio-legal approach (Roberts & 
Mohr, 1994). 
These recommendations were based on police systems in particular being unable to 
offer such support. Firstly, the dictates of the investigative role and heavy workloads 
meant police had little time to be accessible to victims, let alone care for their emotional 
needs (Blair, 1985; Golding et al., 1989; Jordan, 1996; Lovett et al., 2004; Mawby & 
Gill, 1987; Miller Burgering, 1994; Young, 1983). A second and related reason was that 
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police systems were predominantly aimed at accomplishing the legal tasks associated 
with evidence gathering. Accordingly, Police were described as a system-centred 
(unresponsive) rather than a victim-centred (responsive) organisation (Boles & 
Patterson, 1992, 1997; Campbell & Raja, 1999). Rather than treating victims’ needs and 
recovery as paramount, police were said to subjugate these by emphasising 
organisational requirements such as case wins. Thirdly, as early as 1974, Bard and 
Ellison found that training generally offered police few tools for dealing with their 
increasing array of human service functions and this included trauma interventions for 
sexual violence. Two decades later Gilmore and Pittman (1993) noted that police still 
did not have the specialist knowledge to assess the requirement for either medical care 
or crisis intervention. All of these factors made collaboration with formal 
support/advocacy agencies necessary in preventing secondary victimisation.  
As collaborations developed, arguments for fuller integration of formal support systems 
were able to be based on identifiable and practical benefits of partnership as 
summarised below:  
‘The experiences of the professionals interviewed for this report suggest that 
co-operation and close co-ordination among law enforcement officers, 
prosecutors, counsellors, doctors and victim advocates results in a faster, less 
intrusive, and more effective response to rape victims.’ (Epstein & Langenbahn, 
1994, p.85) 
These more effective responses were significantly attributable to police collaboration 
with support/advocates. For instance, collaboration during investigative processes meant 
that in being supported, victims were better equipped to go through the legal processes. 
Accordingly, support also impacted positively on the quality and outcomes of police 
investigations (Bard & Ellison, 1974). For this to work, specialist support needed to be 
available from the outset and throughout all processes including: initial questioning by 
investigators; the medical examination; giving the full statement; and returning to the 
crime scene to answer further questions (Carrow, 1980; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993).  
Improving investigations was not only assisted by support/advocates supporting victims 
but also by their working alongside police. Incidental knowledge and attitude transfer, 
as well as more formal on-job training, meant police were more likely to appreciate the 
nature of the trauma and respond empathetically (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Lord & 
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Rassel, 2000; Lovett et al., 2004). Police empathy was also encouraged by early 
specialist support/advocacy explanations of rape’s effect on individual victims to 
police/forensic personnel (Campbell et al., 1999). This empathy assisted communication 
with victims and helped to maintain their cooperation (Bard & Ellison, 1974; Bryant & 
Cirel, 1977; Kelly, 1990). As noted, this support and empathy were particularly 
important in rape investigations given the sensitivity surrounding disclosures and that 
the victim’s cooperation was crucial to evidence gathering (Bard, 1976; Blair 1985; 
Carrow, 1980; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Harvey, 1985; Lord & Rassel, 2000). 
Beyond collaborations over individual investigations, partnership also benefited police 
investigations through third party reporting from support/advocates augmenting the 
police database of offenders (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994).  
As Hornibrook and Myers (1996) realised, partnerships provide not only the direct benefits 
of holistic services for victims, their synergy provides advantages for professionals which 
benefit victims indirectly. For instance, increasing the knowledge and understanding of the 
functions, needs, and responsibilities of each agency fostered a sense of community 
between agencies (Bard, 1976; Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Hardgrove, 1976; Martin, 
Dinitto, Byington & Maxwell, 1992). Systems of mutual interagency support reduced the 
likelihood of burnout in many ways. For instance, specialist support personnel assisted 
police to resolve emotional issues that arose out of handling sexual assault cases (Epstein & 
Langenbahn, 1994). In addition, each agency became only part of a process for which 
others shared responsibility (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998). Attending interagency meetings 
had the potential to re-energise professionals who were feeling discouraged (Epstein & 
Langenbahn, 1994). Lastly, the enhanced ability to provide a better quality of service and 
avoid duplication increased staff satisfaction (Hardgrove, 1976; Hornibrook & Myers, 
1996).  
Improvements in investigations meant the police public image became one of greater 
psychological and technical competence, resulting in potential gains in public 
cooperation (Bard, 1976; Blair, 1985). Accordingly, requests for public education 
furthered understanding of the reality and incidence of rape (Carmody, 1997; 
Hardgrove, 1976). The result was higher reporting rates and this had rape-prevention 
possibilities (Carmody, 1997; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Harvey; 1985; Lord & 
Rassel, 2000). Related also were improvements in outreach capacity and the greater 
likelihood of establishing links with organisations in minority communities (Epstein & 
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Langenbahn, 1994). In this regard, the US Department of Justice has identified a 
correlation between communities with coordinated rape services, and greater likelihood 
of victims obtaining needed resources and assistance. This was partly through 
facilitation of referrals (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Hardgrove, 1976). Finally, lobbying 
benefits were identified through the possibility of developing a common agenda and a 
united front for political action (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Martin et al., 1992).  
All of these positive findings relate to: a sense of community amongst rape-responsive 
organisations; a more seamless service delivery; and importantly, the opportunity for 
police to develop greater knowledge and expertise through working with specialists. Yet 
despite the evident gains of collaboration, the move towards partnership in the US, Britain, 
and Australia has been irregular. With growing evidence of rape’s effects and that 
collaboration can mitigate these, today it is untenable that police should expect, or be 
expected to provide investigative services without incorporating formal support/advocacy 
systems. From this perspective, the following discussion indicates how collaboration can be 
achieved so they do not have to and victims can receive the benefits which victims 
themselves have reported (Campbell et al., 1999; Golding et al., 1989). Focussing on the 
mechanisms of collaboration is also important in that these mechanisms are crucial to 
developing egalitarian partnerships in which the goal of victim recovery is the sole 
determinant of the processes and interactions between partner organisations. In sharing this 
goal, the transition is made from collaboration to partnership.  
The Means to Establish Multi-Agency Collaboration and 
Specialisation 
Due to the recent nature of developments in sexual assault services, there is little 
literature which discretely addresses how to develop collaboration. However, from the 
related research it is evident that a range of workplace strategies including: specialist 
police teams; contact beyond caseload; interagency training; protocols; evaluations; and 
integrated data collection, will aid collaboration and the giving of services. That these 
strategies are important has recently been confirmed by service providers (Violence 
Against Women Specialist Unit (VAWSU), (2005). How each of these assists is 
elaborated on below.  
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Specialist Sexual Assault Police Teams  
Specialist police units have been recommended for their positive impact on partnership 
development and maintenance (Lord & Rassel, 2000). Specialisation has allowed a 
developing competence and confidence which enables police to make their boundaries 
more permeable to other professionals. This was further aided by the prestige of the 
units, which promoted the staffing stability through which relationships could 
consolidate, allowing partnerships to develop more professional and integrated services 
(Blair, 1985; Clark & Hepworth, 1994). Active relationships with support/advocacy 
organisations typically meant that specialist teams contacted these as soon as a rape 
complaint was verified (Lord & Rassel, 2000). In addition, specialist US teams were 
found to collaborate extensively with victim-supportive agencies during and after 
investigations (Blair, 1985). In some cases, partnership development was assisted by 
selection into the units based on officers expressed interest in handling rape cases, 
demonstrated sensitivity to victims of violent crimes, and good investigative skills 
(Harvey, 1985). This would have mitigated the significant issue of tensions which can 
exist between victim-supportive organisations and those police who are primarily driven 
by investigative requirements.  
For those police who were less informed by victim requirements, regular and ongoing 
interaction with victim-supportive organisations in specialist units meant they too began 
to operate within a paradigm shift (Mawby & Gill, 1987). 
‘Police have had to adjust their perception of their own position in regard to the 
process of investigation. In some respects the investigation of the crime is now 
seen as part of the treatment of the victim and police appear to be eager to co-
operate with other agencies assisting the complainant.’ (Blair, 1985, p.71)  
Challenges to the immutability of narrow police priorities meant policing could be 
redefined as protecting victims from the impact of crime (Blair, 1985) and this required 
avoidance of harm during investigative processes. Congruent with this, Boles and Patterson 
(1997) too have argued that the criminal justice system has an obligation to reorient its role 
in accord with the right of everyone to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Due in part 
to partnerships forged in specialist units then, policing itself has been deconstructed and its 
philosophy challenged.  
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Others who have found positively for the effect of specialist investigative teams on 
partnership include Epstein and Langenbahn (1994) who incorporated these in their 
four-part model for law enforcement reforms. Lord and Rassel (2000) found that due to 
their active relationships with external centres, specialist teams typically contacted these 
as soon as a rape complaint was verified. Wilson (2002) too has acknowledged 
specialist teams for their capacity to facilitate partnerships, thereby enabling the 
coordinated input of all partners in developing service levels throughout the processes.  
Contact Beyond Caseload  
Establishing the good working relationships vital to improving the response to victims 
requires those involved to spend time together beyond the investigation processes 
(Carmody, 1988; Edelson & Bible, 2001; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Hoffman, 2002). 
Since communications during investigations might be less considered and more fraught due 
to workplace pressures, this investment of time offered many opportunities. For instance, 
Carmody (1988) found that meetings enabled information-sharing and formulation of the 
mechanisms requisite to resolving interagency difficulties. Meetings also enabled effective 
case coordination and management. This meant that for victims, unnecessary duplication of 
questions and procedures was avoided.  
In relation to health and counselling partnerships, Hornibrook and Myers (1996) also found 
that case debriefing developed teamwork and that the discussion of ideas and sharing of 
information created significant changes in practice. For Edelson & Bible (2001) the benefits 
included the opportunity to: find agreement on basic standards for research and practice; 
clarify role responsibilities; and develop approaches to problem solving. They also noted 
that meetings were especially important to communication due to the frequent turnover of 
staff in non-profit organisations. In terms of processes for this ongoing and regular formal 
contact, Edelson & Bible (2001) advocated meetings in each other’s domains and neutral 
settings. 
Writing about sexual assault services on US university campuses, Waryold (1996) 
identified other specific purposes of formal contact, many of which were aimed at pre-
empting the development of later problems. For instance, meetings were required for 
organising: interagency introductions for new staff; clearly defined departmental goals and 
missions; effective on-call systems; joint crisis management teams; advisory committees; 
social opportunities; and joint community education. Other formalised contacts aimed at 
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improving communication suggested by Waryold included: making staff rosters and 
organisational charts available between agencies; identifying a department liaison person; 
having representatives from other agencies attend internal meetings; and attending 
conferences together. Ultimately these measures benefited victims directly through 
organising case management as well as indirectly through consolidating relationships 
between individuals and organisations. 
Training 
Agency and interagency training are often advocated as a means of advancing 
professionalism through their impact on partnership. Their importance is recognised at 
institutional level in the US with the 1994 Violence Against Women Act incorporating 
training funding (Campbell, 1998; Wilson, 2002). Out of this funding, the Interdisciplinary 
Rape Science Training Institute was established in Florida to provide comprehensive 
interdisciplinary training for all agencies dealing with rape (Harvey, 1985).  
Major gains of training were said to be coordination between organisations (Bard & 
Ellison, 1974; Carrow, 1980) and collegiality (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Carmody, 
1988; Carrow, 1980; Clark & Hepworth, 1994; Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). Other 
gains were: giving each organisation a stake in the others (Epstein & Langenbahn, 
1994); accuracy of information; insight into the expertise and operations of other groups 
(Carrow, 1980); and combined community education (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; 
Carmody, 1988). Joint training sessions in particular provided a common knowledge, 
philosophy, concern, and a spirit of cooperation (Hardgrove, 1976; Lord & Rassel, 
2000). Littel (2001) comprehensively summarised these training possibilities in finding 
that they enabled: the problem of sexual assault to be established; meetings on common 
ground; development of skills for working as part of an interagency team; renewal of 
enthusiasm; support from other agencies; developing understanding of agency roles 
within the team; and establishing new policies and procedures.  
Underscoring the value of such training initiatives, Blair (1985) noted a correlation between 
a lack of funding for Rape Crisis Centres (RCCs) to develop higher education courses in 
crisis intervention and counselling, and the relative absence of professional and integrated 
services in Britain. He predicted that with funding for training, active liaison and 
cooperation between police and these community-based RCCs would develop to replicate 
the US experience. Training is clearly a vital aspect of partnership then, in bringing 
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agencies together in a shared understanding of victims’ needs and the roles of service 
providers in meeting these. 
Protocols  
Protocols have been argued to have many positive functions for victim services and for 
interagency liaison. In terms of victims, where interagency protocols exist they are 
evidence of consideration given to the needs of victims through ensuring that 
interagency liaisons are professional, effective, and victim-focussed. Direct benefits for 
victims derive from protocols determining service quality and providing a written basis 
for monitoring service provision. In terms of agency relationships, protocols may not 
only reduce the likelihood of one agency being subsumed by another, but also mitigate 
power imbalances which have sometimes enabled police to prevent effective advocacy 
(Campbell, 1998; Spott, 1980). Protocols also make it possible for organisations with 
different ideologies to work together. This has been endorsed through Lord and Rassel’s 
(2000) finding that the existence of protocols correlated with effective relationships 
between law enforcement agencies and Rape Crisis advocates.  
The process of protocol formulation can also have positive outcomes. Construction of 
protocols involves a degree of dialogue beyond day-to-day casework. This gives 
knowledge of the workplace ethics and operational requirements of other agencies and 
has potential for engendering greater respect between agencies. Formulation of 
protocols will also hone the individual philosophies of participating agencies through 
recourse to core agency focus and beliefs, and in doing so will assist in setting 
professional boundaries between agencies. This will mitigate concerns such as Nelson’s 
(1995) that in relationships becoming close, victims’ rights might be breached by 
inappropriate sharing of sensitive information. For these reasons, clearly documented 
policies and procedures were advocated (Bard, 1976; Carmody, 1988; Epstein & 
Langenbahn, 1994; Gilmore & Pittman, 1983; Hoffman, 2002; Martin et al., 1992). 
Despite these advantages, and although protocols have been a feature of multidisciplinary 
teams in US child abuse services (Boles & Patterson, 1997), early on they were noted as 
difficult to find in the adult field (Spott, 1980). Later when protocols were found, they 
were not always observed by police (Campbell, 1998). For instance in Australia, State-
mandated protocols which dictated notification prior to arriving at medical/forensic 
examination sites were found to be ignored by some police. The outcome was harrowing 
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waiting times which caused attrition of nearly 20% of victims before they could access 
support and medical care systems (Gilmore & Pittman, 1993). This suggests that to be 
effective, protocols must be accompanied by ongoing evaluation. 
Ongoing Evaluation 
Evaluation is important in that it too is preceded by thoughtfulness about service aims, 
standard setting, and how these are to be achieved. Edelson and Bible’s (2001) outline 
of the processes of evaluation indicates the opportunities these present for interagency 
collaboration. This can be over: identifying service standards; deciding on methods to 
monitor standards’ achievement; identifying areas for continuous improvement; and 
developing mechanisms for improvements to practice and overall service delivery. 
Victim surveys and tracking of individual cases are other opportunities for collaboration 
through evaluation (Martin et al., 1992; Lovett et al., 2004). 
That evaluations can contribute to the development of partnerships is manifest in 
Gilmore and Pittman’s (1993) suggestion of quarterly evaluations of the overall quality 
of care by representatives of each of the professional groups involved. This suggestion 
was based on recognition that standards of interagency liaison impact on service 
delivery. The baseline for their own evaluation of police and counsellor/advocate liaison 
was whether victims’ needs for information and control over the processes were met. 
Control was achievable through victims having the earliest possible contact with a 
counsellor/advocate, so that the forthcoming processes and accompanying choices could 
be explained. However, their comments reported earlier about police not meeting 
protocols reinforce the need for: combined goal setting; agreed standards; and 
evaluations to have the backing of official sanctions in order to encourage compliance. 
Hornibrook and Myers (1996) support this view with their finding that US state funding 
enabled programme evaluation which led to continuous improvement and 
approximations toward best practice.  
Integrated Data Collection 
Integrated data collection has possibilities for facilitating partnerships in providing a 
focal point for separate organisations and giving these a stake in cooperative interaction. 
This aspect of collaborative practice requires considerable care due to attendant victim-
based privacy and reporting issues, and will not be feasible unless preceded by the 
creation of enforceable protocols. Since police partnerships in sexual violence 
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responsiveness are relatively recent, Bard’s (1976) suggestion for collaboration in 
recording systems is unusual. Hornibrook and Myers’ (1996) recommendation for 
integrated data collection systems between the medical and counselling fraternities, 
where data-sharing is less controversial, also reflects the newness of collaboration 
between legal and health systems.  
Nonetheless, to the extent that the process and benefits of integrated data collection 
bring organisations together and give each a stake in the other, this can have a positive 
impact on partnerships. Benefits accrue from the recidivist nature of much sexual 
offending which suggests that formal information collection and sharing will make 
offending patterns more quickly evident, particularly given under-reporting to police. 
With regards to serial offending, the more data police have about a rapist’s 
characteristics and offending style, the easier detection and prevention will be. In 
addition, resource allocations will be facilitated by knowing the real parameters, both 
geographic and social, of sexual offending. Integrated data collection will be of benefit 
then when interagency partnerships are more advanced and victims’ interests are 
safeguarded by victim-centred protocols. 
In reflecting on the practical means to establish collaboration, it is apparent that where 
collaboration has been achieved, overall this has been assisted by articulating a common 
purpose in sexual violence responsiveness. In other words, as Blair (1985) has 
suggested, a philosophy of protecting victims from the consequences of the crime has 
provided clarity around the need for partnership. Once rape-related work was defined as 
a victim-centred endeavour, understanding of the shared goal of victim recovery meant 
that the mechanisms for sharing the work towards that goal could also be agreed, and 
care established in collaboration.  
As discussed, advances in legal/forensic systems are not regularly implemented. The 
evolution in sexual violence responsiveness began and continues with research 
debunking rape mythology and articulating rape’s human consequences. In addition, 
working alongside support/advocacy specialists has been critical to legal systems’ 
understanding of the need for a paradigm shift. Many of the strategies explored above 
were advantageous to this collaboration in providing opportunities for organisations to 
communicate. It is unsurprising then, that where collaboration has been taken a step 
further by placing different organisations in integrated settings this has accelerated 
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communication about what makes for effective interventions. As will be apparent in 
following chapters, tensions between some police and support/advocacy agencies exist. 
Resolving them is prerequisite to achieving agreement on the philosophies underpinning 
frontline practice and this will take time and work. Significant advantages of services 
integrated in multi-agency settings then are not just the elimination of service gaps, but 
also facilitation of the communication necessary in establishing the relationships which 
allow for joint re-conceptualisation of the purpose and philosophies of services. For 
these reasons, although no one model is a panacea in advancing systems’ responses, 
sharing premises as one service focussed solely on responding to sexual violence is an 
important step in systems development. 
 
At the outset of this study, I was unable to confirm these benefits of integrated services 
owing to the recency of advances in sexual assault responsiveness, and correspondingly, 
the paucity of sexual assault service descriptions, let alone evaluations (Astbury, 2006). 
Although these have begun to appear as the US, Britain, and Australia move towards 
providing services in integrated centres, there are still very few, if any, examples of full 
service integration. In parts of the US, Sexual Assault Response Teams (SARTs) now 
enable one-stop service provision and linkage of victims with community resources. 
However, evaluation of these shows their composition ranges widely (Lonsway, 2001). 
Basic forms comprise law enforcement, support/advocacy, and sexual assault nurse 
examiners (SANEs). Others incorporate: prosecution offices; public health departments; 
victim witness programmes; state forensic labs; crime victim compensation offices; and 
child/adult protective services (Littel, 2001). In Australia, a specialised Centre Against 
Sexual Assault (CASA) in Victoria now accommodates police and support/advocacy 
services and provides specialist medical/forensic services on call (Attorney General’s 
media release, 26.04.2007). In parts of Britain, Sexual Assault Referral Centres 
(SARCs) provide all necessary interventions in custom-built multi-agency venues 
(Lovett et al., 2004).  
 
Although all three examples of holistic services share the significant advantages of 
integration, I have selected British SARCs as the case study and point of comparative 
analysis. There are a number of reasons for this, some purely practical. I elected not to 
discuss the Australian CASA due to its very recent development and the US SARTs due 
to their variable composition. SARCs are discussed due to one having been evaluated by 
Orr-Munro (2001) and three others having been more comprehensively evaluated by 
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Lovett et al. (2004) in a Home Office report. In addition, there are several indications of 
a significant London Metropolitan Police buy-in for working in partnership in London 
SARCs. Lastly, having spent a data-gathering week in London which included a visit to 
the Haven Camberwell, I had the opportunity to form first-hand impressions of systems 
in the London Metropolitan District. The following case study provides evidence of the 
practicability and advantages of implementing both specialist and holistic practice in an 
integrated setting.  
Partnership in Specialist Integrated Sexual Assault Referral 
Centers: A Case Study 
SARC development stemmed from the British Government’s responsiveness to the 
WHO dictum - that early proactive intervention, in limiting the impact of sexual assault 
also limited health sector costs. With this awareness, in 2000 the Home Office Crime 
Reduction Programme funded multi-agency victim-focused pilot projects through its 
Violence Against Women Initiative (VAWI). These were aimed at implementing an 
integrated approach from medical/forensic, crisis, and legal personnel in reducing 
sexual violence and providing services.  
Integrated approaches in SARCs have now been identified as having many benefits. 
Both Orr-Munro (2001) and Lovett et al. (2004) found that SARCs enabled victims to 
be interviewed in a more appropriate clinical environment away from the busyness and 
lack of privacy of police stations. SARCs also brought all service providers to a single 
location, preventing the attrition which otherwise resulted from victims having to seek 
out different services. Importantly, improved communication in shared facilities meant 
not only consistently good practice through the enhanced possibility of implementing 
clear protocols, but also that problems between agencies were also more easily dealt 
with. Common facilities meant there was potential for sharing information with the 
police for intelligence purposes. For instance, Orr-Munro (2001) found a better picture 
of the incidence of sexual offences through self-referral to the Haven Camberwell 
SARC by victims who did not wish to report to police. Her related finding was of an 
improvement in clear-up rates. The possibilities of improving communication further 
have been signalled in the suggestion to develop service integration beyond the 
management committees and contact necessitated by individual cases (Regan et al., 
2004). 
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Other benefits of SARCs included an increase in services and support. This was through 
routine access to crisis workers and the case trackers who kept victims updated with the 
progress of their cases through the justice system. Respectively these were found to 
reduce the need for later counselling and withdrawal from the criminal justice system. 
Importantly, feedback by service users indicated particular appreciation of the proactive 
approach taken in the automatic provision of support staff in the short and longer terms. 
Ultimately:  
‘SARC services seek to combine the needs of survivors and those of the criminal 
justice system, whereas in areas without SARCs the latter tends to drive service 
provision.’ (Lovett et al., 2004, p.74) 
Accordingly, the necessity for government involvement in SARC development has been 
made clear:  
‘The extent to which SARCs can develop and achieve consistent good practice 
will partly depend on a strong steer from government to create national 
protocols and standards.’ (Lovett et al., 2004, p.xv)   
In Britain, a newly formed Inter-Ministerial Group on Sexual Violence has created 
optimism about the prospect of that government steer, and to date 16 SARCs have been 
developed in Britain, with an expectation of 40 by the end of 2008 (HM Government, 
2007).  
Contributing to practice in London is the latest London SARC, the Paddington Haven, 
being custom-built to victim-based specifications. Its design enables victims to move 
through the facility without retracing steps and encountering physical reminders of the 
trauma. At least symbolically, this conveys a sense of progress which continues through 
follow-up visits to an adjacent building. Its facilities include: reception and waiting 
areas; forensic examination room; shower and toilet facilities; interview room equipped 
with video recording equipment and refreshments; private telephone room; evidence 
storage area; and door security and monitoring. 
Also contributing to London practice is recent London Metropolitan Police commitment 
to improving care for rape victims. This derived from the understanding that only an 
estimated 10% of victims reported rape and few convictions (180 of 2270 reported in 
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2000) result (Project Sapphire Strategy, 2002). Accordingly, Metropolitan Police 
practice is now informed by a comprehensive victim-centred policy which defines 
investigative procedures, how these will be implemented, and the philosophies 
underpinning them. Recognising the need for strong leadership and coordination, the 
Policy has been implemented through a Project Sapphire Headquarters which has 
oversight of district operations. Although Project Sapphire will take some time to create 
change in culture and attitudes, it embodies a rational redefinition of Police success then 
in emphasising the police contribution to victim recovery as the primary goal for police. 
Ironically, this shift in focus may ultimately increase reporting and decrease attrition of 
victims from the justice system, thereby increasing conviction rates.  
In practice, Metropolitan Police Policy (2002) now mandates victims to be taken to 
SARCs on reporting. In addition, specialist dedicated Sexual Offences Trained Officers 
complement the medical/forensic specialists and social workers working in SARCs. 
These officers receive three weeks of training, three days of which comprise practical 
skills training for interviewing victims of sexual violence (Sexual Offences 
Investigative Techniques Course). Hendon Police College evaluations of these interview 
skills mean that established standards are met and that police are not practicing their 
first interviews on traumatised victims (visit to Hendon).  
As with SARC evaluations, ongoing evaluations of Project Sapphire allow further 
progress to be made. These have highlighted the need for a centralised ongoing training 
review for all Metropolitan Police sectors since Sexual Offences Trained Officers are 
not the first contact. Other suggestions include improving the physical environment for 
reporting and transportation of victims, and early provision of urine kits and mouth 
swabs. Indicating a commitment to refining investigations, a judicial disposal rate of 
25% has been set as a performance indicator. The strategic plan to meet this target 
includes: improving and disseminating intelligence on rape through networking; 
working with Child Protection Teams; liaising with the academic community; 
appointing dedicated Sex Offence Liaison Officers in every Borough; forging links with 
Community Safety Units and establishing dedicated investigation teams of Sexual 
Offences Trained Officers and investigator. These strategies demonstrate respectively 
the need for both collaboration and specialisation.  
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Reflecting on SARCs, the preconditions for developing this holistic model were: 
research demonstrating service shortfalls; governmental preparedness to underwrite 
total service provision; and willingness of different services to work together to provide 
a seamless service. On the part of police, that willingness was enabled by 
deconstructing the police role and reconnecting police with original policing philosophy 
aimed at protecting citizens from the effects of crime. Since in his comparative analysis 
of US and British systems Blair had found positively for the feminist-inspired victim-
oriented and more collaborative systems of parts of the US, it may be that this was 
influenced by him in his role as Metropolitan Commissioner. This is congruent with my 
attributing change to early research, evidence of the importance of leadership taking the 
initiative in systems development. It also suggests greater ease in making change from 
within.   
The result was the infusion of the investigation function with a service ideology. I had 
personal experience of this on my research trip to London. When I mentioned to Project 
Sapphire officers that I had been the recipient of an attempted indecent assault by a 
police officer,2 despite none of the officers witnessing this incident, they encouraged me 
to report it. I received a prompt professional response and although no prosecution 
followed, this decision was explained in conjunction with affirmation of my original 
decision to report. The response I received confirmed my impressions from earlier in the 
week that Project Sapphire headquarters and frontline staff were committed to and 
immensely proud of offering a victim-oriented service.   
Although power differentials create difficulties in achieving partnership, integrated 
systems in multi-agency facilities can provide the structure in which discussions on 
partnership strategies, protocols, and service aims are able to take place. The SARC 
model allows this and incorporates many other features collated from the literature as 
essential to effective practice. They are: specialist police officers and medical/forensic 
examiners; proactive crisis intervention; case trackers; and some data-sharing. 
Significantly, the model also gives evidence of the commitment to victims through 
ongoing evaluative research, and the preparedness in recognising limitations to 
continually adapt and improve.  
 
                                                 
2
 Not Project Sapphire. 
40 
Of some concern is the meaning and significance to specialised support and advocacy of 
Rape Crisis organisations not being involved in the early formulation or ongoing 
staffing of SARCs.3 The incorporation of an RCC feminist/human rights perspective 
translates to informed victims retaining some choice over the processes, including the 
choice to exit these. This is particularly important in integrated centres where victims 
may perceive processes as happening too quickly for them to call a halt. While not 
suggesting that the victim-centred SARCs currently undermine victim control, or that all 
RCCs should be integrated into SARCs, the therapeutic necessity for victim 
empowerment is more likely to be understood, integral, and lasting if underpinned by a 
feminist perspective.  
In this chapter, evidence has been given of sexual violence as a significant and 
widespread social problem and this has been argued as warranting an equally significant 
response. The chapter also shows that problems with responses to victims have been 
well-defined and that in their solution, specialist collaborative responses have been 
recommended. Yet holistic systems structured around victim-centred responsiveness are 
far from universal and this warrants analysis.   
                                                 
3
 See Chapter Three for in-depth discussion on this point. 
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Chapter Three: Origins and Progression of 
Systems: Toward Mobilising the State 
In Chapter Two, I argued that holistic practice was essential in responding to victims of 
sexual violence. I also examined the technical requirements of partnership which would 
protect victim-centred ideology and practice. Given that what is suggested is partnership 
between a male-dominated state organisation and feminist community organisations, it is 
also necessary to consider the implications of the power differential that this denotes. 
Firstly, examining the political differences between police and feminist organisations is 
necessary in assessing whether the synergy of their partnership is sufficient to shift Police 
from a system-centred to a victim-centred organisation. If not, then issues could arise for 
victims which might undermine the potential benefits from holistic services. Accordingly, 
in this chapter I consider whether technical safeguards, such as protocols and evaluations, 
are sufficient to protect victim-centred responsiveness in holistic practice. In analysing 
whether the ideology underpinning victim-centred practice needs to be safeguarded at 
political as well as technical levels, I offer a view on whether feminists need to engage in 
state-level political activity. I discuss these questions with reference to the origins of 
support/advocacy services and the move to collaborative practice with the state. 
Reviewing this history has a second function in addressing the paradox of the 
considerable attention given to the problems of sexual violence and secondary 
victimisation, yet that these problems persist since the systems recommended for 
victim-centred practice remain unusual. This paradox needs to be understood if research 
identifying practice principles is to come to fruition in more universal specialist holistic 
services. Since the literature is relatively silent on the contemporary impediments to 
developing holistic systems, recourse to literature discussing the origins and path of 
service development has been useful to understanding the irregularity and slowness of 
progress. From it, I argue that failure to develop holistic services more universally is 
due to the relative and ongoing powerlessness of feminists who began the momentum 
and have continued to advocate for service improvements. Notwithstanding the 
considerable influence and successes of the feminist rape crisis movement at many 
levels, their efforts being concentrated largely at frontline level could only take the push 
towards specialist multi-agency partnerships so far.  
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From this perspective, I will argue that what is required in achieving integrated holistic 
services is central and local government commitment to coordinating and resourcing 
these. In the following discussion, I will invoke US, British, and Australian government 
initiatives in developing services, as examples of what can be achieved. These examples 
will be contrasted with what New Zealand literature has revealed about government 
input into sexual assault services. In the remainder of the chapter, I justify the refining 
of the research focus to the New Zealand Government and in particular to its Police 
service, and in doing so further contextualise the research decisions.  
The Background: Feminism and Rape Crisis Centres 
The first proponents of the need to develop the best of practice possible were feminists 
who, from the 1970s, sought to address service gaps and improve sexual assault 
interventions. As discussed, previously systems responses had been inadequate in 
meeting the many needs created by sexual violence. There was no official funding for: 
information; accompaniment through the legal processes; counselling for victims or 
family members; or provision of referrals (Hardgrove, 1976). In failing to understand 
rape effects, official reporting forums also contributed little to victim recovery and 
sometimes supported and perpetuated abusive behaviours (Gilson, 1997). For these 
reasons, alternative reporting forums based on a client-centred ethos were developed so 
that victims did not have to face the possibility of secondary victimisation within 
perceptibly flawed official channels (Carrow, 1980; Davis & Henley, 1990). It was 
identifying and rectifying through the provision of victim-centred RCCs this 
compounding of a significant social injustice which made for the early philosophical 
differences between RCCs and official reporting forums. 
From their beginnings as agencies staffed by untrained volunteers, many being survivors of 
sexual assault, RCCs developed into specialist support/advocacy service providers (Blair, 
1985; Campbell & Martin, 2001; Harvey, 1985; Mathews, 1994; Mawby & Gill, 1987). 
Practice ideals were developed and met through training in crisis intervention and the 
incorporation of professional counsellors (Brodyaga, Gates, Singer, Tucker & White, 1975; 
Campbell & Martin, 2001). Services offered included around-the-clock telephone hotlines 
for victims (O’Sullivan & Carlton, 2001). Also provided were: sympathetic listening; 
encouragement throughout the crisis; special advice in dealing with official systems; and 
long-term follow-up, sometimes through referrals to other services including crisis 
counselling (Campbell & Martin, 2001). If victims decided to report to police, RCC 
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personnel supported them through police interviews, medical processes, and court sessions 
(Campbell & Martin, 2001; O’Sullivan & Carlton, 2001). Police responses to victims 
having been one stimulus for the development of specialist support, some RCCs monitored 
police/victim interactions and interceded if official responses were perceived as victimising 
(Brodsky & Walker, 1976). As Mawby & Gill (1987) have noted, RCC services became 
increasingly holistic. 
Importantly, RCC activities also involved rape-prevention through community 
education. Rape was defined as a significant social problem supported by victim-
blaming rape myths. Educational efforts were therefore aimed at changing rape-
supportive attitudes and behaviours (Campbell & Martin, 2001; Epstein & Langenbahn, 
1994; Harvey, 1985; O’Sullivan & Carlton, 2001). As Carmody has argued, RCC 
feminists acted as ‘… agents of resistance to dominant power relations’ (1997, p.1). 
Systems-level education was also a feature of RCC activism. Changes in official 
practice were achieved through increasing police/forensic understanding of the special 
needs of rape victims (Campbell & Martin, 2001; Harvey, 1985; Kelly, 1990). In the 
US, it was through RCC efforts in consulting with the community, police, emergency 
departments and prosecutors’ offices that state funding was obtained to establish the 
SANE programmes (Ahrens et al., 2000). These were further supported by RCC 
training and programme coordination. In addition, RCC-initiated protocols dictated that 
forensic examinations should incorporate medical care related to: injuries; sexually 
transmitted diseases; emergency contraception; and psychiatric interventions (Ahrens et 
al., 2000; Ledray, 2001). Although psychiatric intervention was a controversial aspect 
of this medical model, the medical/forensic response did become increasingly holistic 
due to attention to medical, emotional, and legal needs.  
The ideological commitment of feminists was also responsible for creating state-level 
changes through lobbying. Gilson (1997) acknowledged profound political successes, 
notwithstanding that RCCs were under-resourced and staffed by unpaid personnel. 
US advances included revision of statutes on sexual assault by all States (Campbell & 
Martin, 2001; Lord & Rassel, 2000). Interestingly, legislative initiatives defined some 
rapes as gender-based hate crimes (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994). RCC lobbying also 
produced the Violence Against Women Act (Campbell & Martin, 2001; O’Sullivan & 
Carlton, 2001). Other feminist successes were the establishment of a National Coalition 
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Against Sexual Assault and in 1973 a National Centre for the Prevention and Control of 
Rape located in the National Institute of Mental Health (Blair, 1985; Harvey, 1985). 
By 1985, finding that RCCs contributed an ‘extraordinary array’ of services for rape 
victims, Harvey was able to identify considerable progress in US rape-responsiveness. 
This included:  
• an impact on local law enforcement, medical, and mental health agencies  
• ideological clarity and planning of processes based on that ideology  
• dual programme goals of rape awareness and elimination in conjunction with 
crisis intervention and victim advocacy  
• contributions to law reform  
• comprehensive training programmes for volunteers  
• influence on programmes at state and national levels  
• a relationship with the community 
• ongoing agency and client evaluation, in conjunction with the local community, 
to identify unmet needs  
These impacts owed something to the proliferation of RCCs. By the mid-1980s, they 
were in almost every large city and similar services had been specifically designed for 
smaller communities (Blair, 1985). By 2000, US RCCs were estimated to number more 
than 1200 (Campbell & Martin, 2001).  
Yet notwithstanding their many successes, a significant feature of US RCCs is that from 
their advent until the present these have had little structural uniformity (Campbell & 
Ahrens 1998; Carmody, 1997; Gilson; 1997; Harvey, 1985; NASASV, 2000). Initially, 
variability was attributable to the origins of RCCs, which Gilson (1997) has described 
as emanating from a broad array of circumstances and strategies. The essence of this 
was that as feminist grassroots organisations run by untrained volunteers, RCCs had 
developed independently and with adaptations to local requirements (Campbell & 
Ahrens, 1998).  
Later, it was the increasing requirement for services and the necessity to obtain funding 
which contributed to variability and an expanding range of RCCs. Harvey (1985) found 
that most were independent, private, non-profit organisations sponsored partially by 
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public funds but with significant reliance on private organisations and local fundraising 
activities. Others, in being affiliated with hospitals, courts, or police, were supported by 
either state or county mental health funds. Campbell and Martin (2001) found even 
more variety due to some RCCs applying for US Justice Department funding. 
Competition for this public funding sometimes necessitated affiliation with other 
community organisations and further adaptations in order to achieve this (Mawby & 
Gill, 1987). Accordingly, some RCCs evolved from isolated collectivist structures into 
loosely amalgamated bureaucratic state-funded enterprises (Mathews, 1994). This 
change was often accompanied by requirements for professionally certified personnel 
and provision of minimum basic services - usually a 24 hour hotline, counselling, and 
legal and medical advocacy.   
In Britain, agency variations were also present at the outset. These too were caused 
initially by adaptations to the local environment and later by conditions which 
accompanied funding (Mawby & Gill, 1987). However, variability was exacerbated by 
the advent of government initiatives, with British Home Office victim support schemes 
at times rivalling grassroots feminist organisations in providing sexual violence 
services. As noted, later rivals were the London SARC crisis workers and case trackers. 
Ironically, it seems that the variety of funding sources both exacerbated service 
variability and provided the conditions for limiting it later as practice improvements 
were sought.  
Carmody (1997) has argued that variability derives from the philosophical differences 
of those who built services. History shows that it also derives from adaptive responses 
necessitated by grassroots feminist organisations being distanced from power and 
resources in male-dominated society, but needing to survive in order to continue rape-
resistance and service improvements. Support for this interpretation is in variability 
residing in organisational structures rather than the core services which have been noted 
for their similarity.  
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That RCCs were the originators of and contemporary activists for practice 
improvements explains the ongoing variability in systems development. Most 
obviously, the variable manner in which RCCs evolved resulted in their variable 
associations and roles within official structures, and therefore variable influence within 
these structures in dictating the pace and distribution of reforms. The structural 
variability of RCCs is also likely to have hampered recognition amongst the population 
of RCCs of the need to build their own collaborations and coordination in order to 
develop a stronger power base. In addition, their grassroots origins equated with few 
resources with which to conduct the research to provide an evidence basis for both 
service inadequacies and the need for these to develop. Also, volunteer community 
origins and the corresponding distance of most RCC feminists from power have equated 
with limited and irregular political influence in advocating for the development of 
integrated centres as a national ideal. These factors explain why official appreciation of 
the need to develop comprehensive holistic services is also uneven. Accordingly, the 
holistic ideal is irregularly approximated due to RCCs, which were the instigators and 
architects of service reforms, being handicapped in this endeavour by their own 
structural variability and limited power base. 
Local authorities with whom there was limited influence included Police. It was 
difficult to harness Police-as-government-agency support in strengthening the power 
base from which RCCs could argue for holistic services, let alone persuading police into 
partnership in holistic services. This was exacerbated by the sometimes fraught 
relationship between RCCs and police. As Krugman has noted, a degree of conflict is 
inevitable when diverse agencies combine around a single issue (cited in Boles & 
Patterson, 1997). At the frontline level of rape-responsiveness, disparate backgrounds, 
roles, and ideologies compromised the ability of police and the RCCs to work together. 
RCC monitoring of, and sometimes interceding in, police/victim interactions resulted in 
a sometimes hostile police response (Bard & Ellison, 1974). Due to police 
understanding neither rape effects nor how these might be mitigated with specialist 
support, support/advocacy interventions were sometimes misinterpreted as being anti-
police rather than pro-victim.  
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Police resistance to RCC interventions meant that ‘turf wars’ resulted (Bard & Ellison, 
1974; Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; MCASA, 1996). Evidence that power imbalance was 
a feature of these is in Spott’s (1980) recommendation for unilateral compromise by 
support/advocates in order to remain within partnerships. That this persists is apparent 
in Campbell’s (1998) finding that support/advocates were occasionally so intimidated 
by police that they were unable to advocate for victims.  
‘The police were adamant. … You don't want to anger the police so badly on one 
case that it may hurt the next victim who comes through.’ (Advocate cited by 
Campbell, 1998, p.367) 
Feminist work on gender equality and rape mythology has meant that in recent years 
commentators like Campbell have been able to argue instead for partnerships to be 
developed around victims’ needs, rather the system-based priorities of police as Spott 
suggested.  
In this regard, it is noteworthy that police attempts to exclude specialist RCCs contrasted 
markedly with their responses to partnership with specialist medical/forensic examiners. 
Although initially generalist forensic examiners were retained by Police, increasingly 
partnership has been with specialist medical/forensic examiners outside Police auspices. 
That this did not see the level of resistance to collaboration with independent 
support/advocacy organisations was because police understood that they could not 
prosecute without forensic evidence and that there was a relationship between increasing 
forensic expertise and case wins. On that basis, police had system-centred reasons for 
partnership with medical specialists. In contrast, police not understanding the meaning of 
sexual violence meant that the relationship between specialist support and investigative 
efficacy was not recognised and specialist support agencies had little traction in determining 
collaboration.  
Given Spott’s 1980 recommendation of a unidirectional deference from community to 
government organisations, it is heartening to perceive a general trend towards 
understanding of the need for equality in the conduct of partnerships. Although the trend 
has not been linear, it is increasingly understood that victim-centred decision-making 
requires genuine cooperation and coordinated working relationships.  
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Yet while their grassroots origins were problematic in terms of contemporary 
understandings about holistic responsiveness, arguably there were advantages to RCCs 
being distanced from a patriarchal bureaucracy in their formative years. Early RCC 
origins being unfettered by bureaucratic support or intervention, this meant that feminist 
aims were able to be developed and consolidated in relation to problems emanating 
from rape itself. Although structural uniformity was not a feature of RCCs, their 
responding to the problem of rape from grassroots level was an important factor in the 
considerable homogeneity both in the services offered to victims and the ideology 
which informed social change activities aimed at prevention. Supporting this, 
O’Sullivan and Carlton (2001) found that US agencies which had their origins in the 
feminist anti-rape movement were regarded as a contemporary source of expertise in the 
community and accordingly were well-placed later to enter partnerships as equals.  
Collaboration: The Contested Terrain 
Variable contemporary service developments also relates to the rocky path followed as 
the need for holistic services became more recognisable and official bodies attempted to 
incorporate RCC services. As feminist-promulgated reforms in rape-responsiveness took 
hold, the need for state organisations and some RCCs to work together was recognised on 
both sides. State organisations increasingly sought to offer support services, but justifiably 
or otherwise, some victim contact with RCCs was thought to have potential to be counter-
therapeutic (Campbell et al., 1999). Some state-initiated collaboration appears to have 
been aimed then, at subjecting support services to quality assurance mechanisms. For 
instance, the need for professionally certified personnel was emphasised and funding was 
sometimes contingent on provision of minimum basic services - usually a 24 hour hotline, 
counselling, and legal and medical advocacy. Ironically, given that improvements had 
been sought by feminists, closer collaboration was sometimes sought by the state in order 
to achieve greater control over proficiency in support.    
RCC reasons for amalgamation most often related to the need for state funding. 
Minimal resources and the need to spend considerable time searching for funding, 
limited the provision of immediate victim services (Mathews, 1994). These constraints 
on the ability to offer services were compounded by RCCs being: small; dependent on 
volunteers; and having little time for formal evaluative research (Campbell & Martin, 
2001). As increasing numbers of women reported rape, this further threatened the ability 
to meet the ‘primary’ and ‘enduring’ goal of providing services (Campbell & Ahrens, 
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1998). As a result, there was a trend toward collaborations and this was not only to 
maximise resources but also to assure the role of RCCs as the community experts. 
However while the benefit of RCC grassroots origins was in honing feminist 
philosophies, the corollary of this was that feminists regarded opportunities for mergers 
with other organisations with some distrust. This related to the impoverished history of 
responsiveness from the state and its organisations, as well as the enshrining in 
legislation of rape-supportive cultural beliefs. Along with the feminist origins of RCCs 
then, rape mythology and the early (mis)treatment of rape victims contributed to some 
RCCs contesting working alongside state agencies. Feminist opposition was also based 
on RCC transition from: 
‘…extreme voluntary bodies which are shaped by a fundamental critique of state 
involvement (ultimately defining the role of the state as either compounding or 
creating the problem)…to …voluntary services which complement statutory 
services.’ (Mawby & Gill, 1987, p.73) 
Similarly, Amir and Amir (1979) placed RCCs on a continuum from political to service-
oriented centres with a comment which encapsulated the problems associated with 
RCCs working with state-linked services.  
‘An idea becomes a movement 
The movement becomes an organisation 
The organisation becomes an institution 
And there lies the death of an idea.’  
(Amir & Amir cited in Mawby & Gill, 1987, p.81) 
The issue then was one of balancing the needs for both political radicalism and financial 
security (Byington, Martin, Dinitto & Maxwell, 1991).  
Responses to this funded-but-controlled/independent-but-under-resourced conundrum 
cover the spectrum. Some commentators urged a considered and informed path towards 
partnership, while others questioned whether any degree of collaboration was viable. 
Underpinning all of the following concerns was the power imbalance between the male-
dominated state and feminist community organisations. One concern was whether 
affiliation with mainstream organisations would undermine the radical focus requisite to 
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recognising new rape-supportive practices and therefore to recognising where new 
challenges lay. The risk to social change activities, through the loss of both an 
independent voice and the ‘integrative potential’ of community involvement, was a 
related and major concern (Mawby & Gill, 1987; Campbell, Baker & Mazurek, 1998; 
Ullman & Townsend, 2007). Innovative activities mentioned as being at risk were: rallies; 
presentations in educational institutions; and political lobbying (Campbell & Martin, 
2001; Mathews, 1994).  
Risks to victim services and ability to keep the real needs of victims in focus were also a 
concern. Partnership maintenance requirements could dilute the limited energy available 
for victims and sometimes necessitated the adoption of compromise positions. 
Accountability measures and conditions which accompanied funding curtailed self-
determination, took time from victim services and were occasionally at odds with 
RCCs’ original purpose and ethics (Campbell & Martin, 2001; Mathews, 1994; Mawby 
& Gill, 1987; Ullman & Townsend, 2007).). For instance, record-keeping could 
discourage disclosure, and consequently was in conflict with the therapeutic aims of 
crisis counselling (Byington et al., 1991; Mathews, 1994). Records were also potentially 
problematic in the political and legal use to which these could be put (Mathews, 1994). 
Another concern was the compromise to RCC organisational stability through 
adaptations to the demands of funders (Mawby & Gill, 1987).  
In addition, Gilson (1997) argued the possibility of revictimisation through increasing 
professionalisation and the therapeutic ideology of professionals. The risk of such a 
paradigm shift was creating psychiatric diagnoses for women who suffered men’s violence. 
This redefined a social and political issue into one of the mental health of women who were 
victimised (Astbury, 2006; Brodyaga et al., 1975; Bryant & Cirel, 1977).  
‘Throughout the country most services come from grassroots women’s 
organisations which often view psychiatry as a male-dominated pathology- 
oriented profession that stigmatises the victim by labelling her a mental patient.’ 
(McCombie et al., 1976, p.419)  
The result was that social workers tried to change the woman instead of the situations in 
which they were trapped. Endorsing traditional RCC structure, Gilson was clear about 
the way to obviate this.  
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‘The best defence against creating a structure that revictimises service 
participants is to maintain an alternative social organisation and a feminist 
administrative focus.’ (Gilson, 1997, p.21) 
Yet acknowledging resource shortfalls and the evident strength of RCC purpose, Gilson 
softened his call for total independence. Rather than collaboration with state 
organisations, he suggested collaboration with philosophically compatible community 
organisations in order to maximise community resources. This compromise position 
endorsed the pragmatic and politically astute position which many RCCs had already 
adopted, and which Mawby and Gill (1987, p.81) had noted succinctly in terms of the 
number of RCCs which had ‘died in order to survive’.  
Some social commentators conducted empirical research to resolve their theoretical 
concerns about RCC affiliation with other community organisations. For instance, 
O'Sullivan and Carlton (2001) evaluated the impact of organisational links on rape- 
responsiveness by comparing multi-service centres with independent RCCs. Multi-
service centres incorporated domestic with sexual violence responsiveness as a way of 
reducing costs and increasing resources. Based on measures of accessibility, 
acceptability, and legitimacy, they found that multi-service centres: heard from the 
fewest rape victims; did not regularly receive police or hospital referrals; and did not 
provide systematic community education. Ultimately, the authors concluded that since 
domestic violence was found to dominate identity and culture, independent centres 
which focused solely on sexual violence were best positioned to help rape victims. 
Although pragmatism has dictated amalgamation with other feminist agencies, concerns 
persist about losing a specialist focus on sexual assault, particularly when amalgamation 
was with domestic violence agencies (National Sexual Violence Resource Centre 
Newsletter, 2002).  
Byington et al. (1991) also demonstrated the impact on RCC effectiveness of affiliation 
with other social service and social movement organisations. Effectiveness was 
operationalised as the ability to maintain both rape service and prevention activities. As 
theorised, affiliation was viable but came with trade-offs. Benefits for the RCC were: a 
permanent funding base; more stability; greater access to paid staff; assured office space 
and facilities; job security; and the attraction of highly skilled and talented staff. Most 
important for victims was the ability to offer almost all services at one site. Attributable to 
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increased demands for bureaucratic record-keeping and accountability, trade-offs included 
reduction in the time and commitment for rape prevention and social change goals.  
While independent RCCs were the most active in terms of social change goals despite 
funding and staffing difficulties, RCCs affiliated with other organisations had not totally 
foregone prevention activities. Analysis of this finding was that: 
'…changes in RCC service provision emphases between the mid 70's and mid 
80's may not indicate diminished commitment to rape-prevention, but rather 
heightened awareness that a range of activities is necessary to intervene 
effectively on rape victims’ behalf.’ (Byington et al., 1991, p.92) 
It appeared that operating from combined premises could meet more of the needs of 
those currently reporting rape, provided the philosophical origins of feminist RCCs in 
respect of social change remained to the forefront.  
Yet the findings of the same authors (in Martin et al., 1992) demonstrate that even for 
apparently feminist researchers there can be difficulty maintaining a feminist 
ideological focus when analysing findings. Martin et al. suggested, as Spott (1980) had 
previously, that it was the responsibility of RCCs to make partnerships work through 
maintaining a fluidity of their own structure and functions in order to preserve goodwill 
and co-operation between rape-related services. This was concluded from the success of 
one RCC which had approached related services asking for ideas, support, and help in 
setting up a task force. Project success was analysed as dependent on RCC fluidity and 
cited as an example other RCCs should follow rather than ‘standing outside and 
allocating blame’. 
Given the advice that RCCs should be accommodating within mainstream systems, the 
historical context for ‘standing outside and allocating blame’ needs to be understood. 
Initially, being outside the criminal justice system was a rational response to the 
likelihood of secondary victimisation yet minimal likelihood of conviction. Providing 
alternative reporting forums also meant RCCs had the credibility to work with victims 
who were wary of the system and did not report to the authorities. Moreover, critiquing 
the justice system (allocating blame) was one prerequisite to improving services. When 
law enforcement reform signalled that it was safer for victims to report, some RCCs did 
suggest a joint approach in order to prevent secondary victimisation (Davis & Henley, 
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1990). Instead of the ‘stand outside and allocate blame strategy’, some RCCs transferred 
to a strategy of ‘occupy and indoctrinate’ (Campbell & Martin (2001).  
Analysis of Martin et al.’s advice is important since the authors’ recommendation is an 
example of the concerns which they (in Byington et al., 1991) and others had expressed 
about RCCs losing ideological purity. Encouraging malleability by decrying agencies 
whose structures remained true to original ideology was the very reason for the fears of 
those who cautioned against partnerships. Also anti-feminist was their suggestion of 
measuring a programme successful by the fact that all participants could take credit for 
seminars even though these were organised by the RCC. This infers that ego- 
management by RCCs is an acceptable strategy to ensure partnership. Of particular 
concern then is that Martin et al., and before them Spott, were working toward equality 
through improving rape-responsiveness, but seemingly blind to the implications of their 
advice.  
To suggest that feminist women expend energy to ensure other agencies think they 
control proceedings underscores the inequality which is anathema to feminists and 
theorised by them as partly causal in rape. The advice perpetuates ideas of 
subordination, such as that in earlier decades when liberal women, the core of the 
women's movement today, occupied subordinate positions to liberal men to achieve 
what they defined as mutually desirable ends (Geis, 1990). Several years earlier, Lerner 
(1983) had pithily exposed the irony of the cap-in-hand approach. 
‘The weaker sex must protect the stronger sex from recognising the strength of 
the weaker sex lest the stronger sex feel weakened by the strength of the weaker 
sex.’  
Rather, when there is a demonstrable need for collaboration in order to improve 
services, partnerships which acknowledge the strength and contributions of RCCs will 
foster equality, thereby maximising the potential of future RCC contributions.  
Care is evidently crucial in preserving ideology and victim-centred services when 
feminist and other organisations are working in situations of power imbalance. As 
Byington et al. (1991) and others have argued, necessary collaborations can be 
managed.  
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‘Organisational stance may not necessarily curtail social change efforts but 
instead may suggest different strategies to some centers.’  (Campbell et al., 
1998, p.120)  
For instance, while Mathews (1994) endorsed working within the system to increase 
effectiveness, she suggested a need for at least some RCCs to remain independent and 
vigilant in order not to forget their radical roots or the political aspect of their dual 
function. This supposed that the major contributions of RCCs might still lie outside 
direct victim services. Congruent with this, Gilson’s (1997) review of RCC involvement 
with state organisations found compromise but also ongoing feminist suspicion of the 
state which was translated into strategies to maintain ideology and manage the controls 
which public funding agencies attempted to exert. Protective RCC strategies included: 
overt opposition; apparent accommodation; and active engagement. Gilson’s own 
suggestions were protocols, reflective self-examination, critique, and programme 
evaluation. There is a place then for both ‘standing outside’ and ‘occupation and 
indoctrination’ as strategies in improving rape-responsiveness. 
It is the considerable successes of the feminist anti-rape movement in broader society 
which have made ‘occupation and indoctrination’ tenable. Concern about losing original 
foci is based on the notion of bureaucracy being a monolithic entity capable of 
consuming RCCs and their ideology in a unilateral process. Yet feminism as the: 
‘…single most powerful social movement of our time’ (Epstein, foreword)… is 
part of the political landscape and has a voice that is listened to by government.’ 
(Jones, 2004, p.5) 
Since the state has undergone a significant ideological shift towards equality, some 
protection is in its incorporating feminist philosophy. This resonates with Astbury’s 
(2006) finding of increasing bureaucratic involvement in social change activities. 
One rape-specific manifestation of radical feminist influence is the many officially-
sponsored studies which, in regularly mentioning the dual RCC concerns of prevention 
and services as being important, indicate state uptake of formerly radical concerns. 
Examples include studies by Littel (2001), Lovett et al. (2004), MCASA (1997), and 
Young (1983). Other evidence of a merging between formerly radical feminist and 
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contemporary government objectives is international victim legislation. The UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women requires governments to: 
'…exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of violence 
against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private 
actors. …’. (Bond & Phillips, 2001, p.491)  
As already evident, in response to feminist initiatives some governments have accepted 
the definition of rape as a social ill for which the state is responsible.  
Some governments have also accepted that enacting feminist philosophies is necessary 
in improving responsiveness to all women and victims in particular. Hence: 
‘…victim service and social change perspectives [are] quite compatible, and 
many reported that the program’s feminist views had not prevented effective 
interaction with established law, medical and mental health systems’. 
(Harvey, 1985, p.10)  
In being instrumental in the evolution in mainstream thinking about sexual violence, 
these successes of feminism not only underscore the possibility of RCCs maintaining 
their own radical focus, but are evidence of the ability to also ‘indoctrinate’ from within. 
Working within and being faced with the immediate and human consequences of 
thoughtless practice in state organisations is arguably more, not less, likely to radicalise 
views on the need for change. At grassroots level, an insider perspective will also 
position RCCs to know where the systems deficits are and then to work with partner 
agencies to eradicate them. If some RCCs remain separate, if there are ongoing service 
critiques and protective protocols, and if there is vigilance about the trending of 
philosophical shifts, concerns about collaboration can be overcome.  
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In contrast, if they do not collaborate with state organisations, RCCs risk becoming less 
relevant.  
‘In the current climate where rape is becoming more widely condemned and  
identified as a serious social problem it could indeed be that centres will in the 
long term be successful in maintaining their principles and receiving 
government grants. On the other hand it is also likely that faced with the 
politically embarrassing accusation that they are not doing enough to help rape 
victims, the government will channel funds into more politically acceptable 
organisations.’ (Mawby & Gill, 1987, p.84) 
That RCCs may become less relevant has been manifest in their not being consulted 
over early SARC development or included in SARC operations (Lovett et al., 2004). 
They have also been excluded from some multi-agency centres in Ireland (O’Shea, 
2006). This government power to sideline RCCs gives another perspective to Mathews’ 
(1994) call for ongoing vigilance. It also underscores the need for more, rather than less, 
feminist involvement with the state. If feminist involvement increases, particularly at 
state level, this can become another of the range of strategies in redressing power 
imbalances between grassroots feminist RCCs and male-dominated state organisations.  
Jones’ (2005) highlighting of risks to feminist anti-rape work which are due to political 
expediency shows that feminist involvement at state level is indeed critical. Jones 
articulates the balance which RCCs are still trying to strike between independence and 
financial problems, or collaboration and potentially jeopardised identity, autonomy, and 
feminist principles. In weighing the options, Jones found collaboration to be potentially 
de-radicalising yet still accompanied by funding insecurities, due to RCCs having to 
tender services and apply for grants. These insecurities were manifest when the Rape 
Crisis Federation became a casualty of political funding decisions, despite working 
internationally and having had a consultancy role with Britain’s Government, Police, 
and Crown Prosecution Service. In addition, due to ‘incoherent, ineffective, and 
unsustainable’ funding, 52 of the 84 RCCs available in England and Wales in the 1980s 
have now closed. With Government withdrawal of Victims Fund grants from RCCs, 
half of the remaining 32 centres providing ‘critical, not optional, services’ risk closure 
over the next year (Bennett, Times online, 6.8.07). In concluding that funding should be 
obtained centrally from government, Jones also identified that responsibility for Rape 
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Crisis groups was frequently passed from one department to another, but prioritised by 
none. This echoes prior identification of a ‘world-wide problem’ of the lack of 
consensus over who should take primary responsibility for rape victims (Hornibrook & 
Myers, 1996).  
These concerns about the political basis for funding insecurities, when considered in 
conjunction with state failures to develop comprehensive systems nationwide, show that 
RCCs can only go so far in instituting systems reforms even when working with state 
agencies. Feminists in the anti-rape movement must collaborate with the state well 
beyond partnerships at frontline level. The work and knowledge of the feminist anti-
rape movement gives feminists respectively the right and the obligation to see their 
work through by influencing change at state level also. In order for comprehensive anti-
rape measures and holistic services to be developed at state and frontline levels, 
feminists need to move beyond concerns about rapprochement and make state 
machinery equally their own. Permanent rape-responsive structures which last beyond 
the political will of the day must be instituted so that instead of the ongoing subjection 
of services to the variable ‘dominances of state power’, the ideological and funding 
integrity of RCCs are assured. The alternative, lobbying for handouts, leaves RCCs 
exposed and insecure, but will continue while feminist influence is absent from state 
decision-making apparatus, rather than a ‘significant presence within state institutions’ 
(Randall cited in Jones, 2004, p.7).  
If RCCs become redundant, or if many choose not to work within mainstream systems 
due to concerns about the compromises which may derive from association on an 
unequal footing, the accompanying loss will be the philosophies and knowledge which 
have informed progress. Therefore, decisions about the future forms that services take 
may not be equally informed by important victim-oriented considerations. An example 
is a recommendation by Wilson (2002) which emanated from his concern about quality 
assurance in forensic examinations. Writing for the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, he 
suggested that forensic examiners become members of law enforcement teams and that 
medical care should be separated from the forensic examination and returned to the 
emergency department or the victim’s doctor.  
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While Wilson is right to be concerned with forensic expertise, given rape-effects and 
also the court experiences of victims, his recommendation is system rather than victim-
centred. The history of medical services described in Chapter Two makes clear the 
requirement for a holistic response in which all physical needs arising out of rape are 
attended to in one medical examination. The fragmented response suggested would 
extend the process and double the intimate examinations endured. Moreover, the 
possibilities of injury, infection, and pregnancy are intrinsic to rape and cannot be 
treated in isolation from the forensic requirements. As discussed, forensic examinations 
focussed solely on a law enforcement function further dehumanise the victim by treating 
her as a crime scene like any other. Instead, when the medical response is sensitively 
conducted through the attendant medical care, this is associated with the ability to 
recover. Wilson’s alternative paradigm of forensic medical examiners working for the 
Police is at odds with the notion that both agencies work for the community, and that 
maintaining a separate forensic capacity is essential in maintaining reporting choices.  
Wilson’s suggestion of reverting from police and medical/forensic services to 
legal/forensic services is of considerable concern and highlights the need to maintain 
knowledge of the historical context so that progress is not reversed.  
‘Troubling to these researchers was the finding that in many settings newer staff 
did not share and/or were unable to interpret the original premises of their 
programmes. …this kind of philosophical shift may ultimately undermine or 
limit the effectiveness of individual programmes.’ (Harvey, 1985, p.10) 
Recent empirical evidence for this is in Ullman and Townsend’s (2007) finding of 
victim-blaming amongst newer non-feminist staff.  
Along with vigilance about the shape of rape-responsiveness, specialist knowledge 
about rape remains necessary in targeting resources aimed at prevention. Of concern is 
that as rape-responsive systems become more mainstream, language identifying the 
problem of sexual violence increasingly loses its gender specificity (Jones, 2004). This 
trend could be considered to reflect an increasing appreciation of women’s right to full 
citizenship, except that rape remains a problem of epidemic proportions and with an 
ineffective justice response. Instead, a correlation between gender-neutral language and 
increasing societal acceptance of sexual violence as a serious crime requiring a well-
resourced comprehensive response, suggests again that political power does not yet 
59 
equally reside with women. If improving rape-responsiveness has been achieved 
through language selected to conceal that the majority of victims are women and 
assailants are men, this is also a practical concern. Prevention efforts cannot be targeted 
as effectively if men are not identified as the prime perpetrators.  
To counter the influence of less informed but influential thinking of ‘newer staff’ within 
state agencies, there is a need for feminist ‘occupation and indoctrination’ at all levels. 
The impact of the feminist anti-rape movement while outside the ‘system’ indicates the 
potential of challenging taken-for-granted assumptions and proactively defining broader 
societal reality at state level and within the ‘system’. When feminists are no longer seen 
as ‘other’, feminist thinking is no longer resisted as radical. Therefore, concerns about 
losing radical perspectives and the momentum for change through becoming 
domesticated by government funding, can be mitigated by understanding that there are 
myriad sites of resistance. The solution is not to retrench and withdraw from 
mainstream organisations, but in recognising that the resources underpinning them 
belong equally to women and men, position ourselves to assert the justice of their 
distribution on that basis.  
Recognition of the need to access state resources also gives pragmatic grounds for 
feminists to work at state level. An important government resource is the capacity for 
research which, in introducing new knowledge and awareness to systems, is the first 
step in achieving social change (Glidewell cited in Harvey, 1985). In contrast, there is 
little likelihood of positive social transformation in a vacuum of information and 
understanding (Posavac & Carey, 1997). Notwithstanding progress made, sexual 
violence services have been handicapped by a longstanding and ongoing dearth of 
evidence-based practice (Astbury, 2006; Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Dartnall, PlusNEWS, 
2007; Gilson, 1997). In addition rape-prevention efforts have been characterised as 
confused, scattered, sporadic, and with little scientific underpinning (McCall cited in 
Bachar & Koss, 2001). Recognising this, demands have been made for sexual violence 
responsiveness to be based on, developed, and supported by research (Campbell & 
Ahrens, 1998; Hazelwood & Burgess, 1999; Lord & Rassel, 2000).  
Since community-based RCCs have acknowledged their inability to conduct this research, 
government underwriting of research is vital in improving rape-responsiveness (Bachar & 
Koss, 2001; Blair, 1985; Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Byington et al., 1991; Epstein & 
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Langenbahn, 1994; Harvey; 1985; Littel, 2001; Lovett et al., 2004; NASASV, 2000; 
Wilson, 2002). This has been recognised at international level by the 1993 UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. Adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1994, the Declaration called on governments to promote research, collect 
data, and compile statistics relating to violence against women (Bond & Phillips, 2001).  
US feminists have had the earliest and greatest success in lobbying for government-
funded research (Dartnall, PlusNEWS, 2007) and this research was often coordinated 
through legislative intervention. As a result:  
 ‘…law enforcement agencies in the US have expended very considerable 
amounts of energy and finance in an examination of rape investigations … [in 
order to] examine its procedures and practices objectively and to be able to 
respond effectively to social changes’. (Blair, 1985, p.6) 
In contrast, Blair (1985) found that the British Social Research Committee was still 
comparatively inactive on the subject of rape. The results of US government input are 
evident.  
‘Service development, funding, and pursuit of excellence in the centers for 
sexual assault in the USA have grown from a focus on research and networking 
at a national and international level.’ (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996, unpaginated) 
The identified association between research and continuous service improvements led to 
a National Research Council for Research on Violence Against Women 
recommendation for government research structures to become permanent (Bachar & 
Koss, 2001; Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). The US and Australia now have permanent 
research capacities respectively through the National Centre for the Prevention and 
Control of Rape and the Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault (ACSSA).  
There is evidence then of significant developments due to feminist lobbying for state 
involvement and subsequent partnership with the state in research initiatives. Yet as 
O’Sullivan and Carlton (2001) found for frontline services, despite these developments, 
sexual violence is still frequently overlooked when other violence against women is 
studied (Dartnall, PlusNEWS, 10.2.2007). In addition, collaborations over research have 
been variable and this evidently impacts on the services which result. For instance, it is 
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likely that the early feminist impetus for and collaboration with government research in 
the US, was a factor in the partnership of RCCs and state agencies in SARTs (Ahrens et 
al., 2000). In contrast, as noted, RCCs have not become an intrinsic aspect of SARCs. 
While SARTs indicate that partnership with the government sector is essential to service 
development, SARCs show that collaboration must be early and ongoing if RCC 
knowledge is to be retained.  
Ultimately, decision-making over alliances with the state and its organisations must 
depend on what serves victims best in the short and long terms. At the frontline level, 
ideological and practical reasons have been given for maintaining separatism as well as 
for forging carefully managed partnerships. Supporting both options ensures that 
victims have a choice in support services, and that radical ideology and an independent 
voice are preserved at the coalface. However, material and ideological support for both 
options is a stronger possibility if there is state-level feminist involvement and state 
policy underpinned by feminist philosophy.   
Locating the Issues in New Zealand 
The argument that government-funded research conducted in partnership with RCCs 
and other relevant community organisations is necessary to the development of effective 
sexual violence services, has been demonstrated in New Zealand. Here, commentators 
have identified a state of services which reflects an ongoing lack of government interest. 
Until very recently there has been just one government-funded evaluation of services. 
This 1983 Rape Study was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice with the aim of 
ascertaining the extent to which problems of responsiveness to victims identified in 
overseas studies were also in evidence here (Young, 1983). Noting that little systematic 
research on rape had been done in New Zealand, the study took a victim-oriented 
approach to studying criminal justice responses to reported rape, including those of 
police, medical/forensic specialists, lawyers, and judiciary. In addition, evaluations were 
conducted of the need for psychosocial support for victims and of the current services 
providing that support. These evaluations were through victim and psychological 
services personnel surveys.   
Of particular relevance to the current study were the findings of problems with police 
and medical responses. In addition, psychosocial support was found to be variable and 
to include inexperienced support from family and friends. This was due to: 
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‘…the [limited] availability of victim support services…and perhaps more 
importantly the level of funding that was provided to them.’ (Young, 1983, p.13)  
Yet there was:   
‘…strong support for experienced and sympathetic advice from people outside 
the official system to support the complainant at various stages of her passage 
through the CJS.’ 4 (Young, 1983, p.57) 
On that basis, the study reported that victim services were high on respondents’ lists of 
needed improvements.  
Despite the study, follow-up research has confirmed ongoing issues with services. 
Again, the police response has been found to incur secondary victimisation during 
initial interviews and during the lengthy and arduous formal statement taking (Anstiss, 
1995; Jordan, 1996, 2001). Jordan also commented that although the input of 
support/advocacy agencies was ‘vital’ at the crisis stage, these agencies remained 
disparate and only some provided crisis support. In contrast to these findings, medical 
services had improved from a situation where: 
 ‘The Police doctors were seeing them, mainly males, mainly in police stations 
and that was increasingly being seen as not the most sensitive and appropriate 
place to have a female examined.’ (DSAC National Coordinator, 2004) 
Rather than through government initiative (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996), 
medical/forensic improvements were at the initiative of female doctors in creating a 
national body, Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care (DSAC), through which to address 
service quality and deficits.5 This response underscores the efficacy of research if it 
reaches the attention of those who are responsive and able to make a difference.  
In addition to improving medical services, in 1996 DSAC organised a national 
interdisciplinary Rape Symposium, presentations from which were collated into The 
Proceedings of RAPE: Ten Years Progress?. In accord with contemporaneous academic 
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 See Chapter Five. 
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comment, these proceedings gave a strong indication of government failure to 
adequately respond to its own 1983 Rape Study findings.  
 ‘…we wish to express our concern at the ad hoc approach currently taken to 
rape prevention and treatment and ask that a planned comprehensive and 
collaborative approach be developed and incorporated in government policy, 
and the government find additional funding for the areas of treatment and 
prevention.’ (Cagney in DSAC, 1996, p.170) 
‘The piecemeal current situation…leaves many gaps. (Gellatly in DSAC, 1996, 
p.171) 
Through presenting a wish list endorsing the need for interagency collaboration, others 
verified the uncoordinated nature of services (Brackenridge, ibid). Congruent with 
Milford’s (1990) earlier suggestion of the form services should take, a multi-agency 
approach was suggested.    
'In ten years time we would like to be able to applaud the establishment of 
multidisciplinary centres…. These centres would be fully Government funded….’  
(Broadmore in DSAC, 1996, p.172)  
Instead, an address by the Minister of Justice described a situation of government 
reliance on community agencies but minimal funding support for them.   
‘…Government provides assistance through health and welfare systems [and] it 
is also in partnership with the community…funding community providers of rape 
and sexual abuse counselling and education to the sum of more than 1.75 
million dollars in the present financial year…’. (Graham in DSAC, 1996, p.6) 
Yet this ‘assistance through health and welfare systems’ had never been formally evaluated 
in its ability to support, much less provide, comprehensive services, despite the accessibility 
of support/advocacy services having been found wanting in a government Rape Study. In 
this study, Young (1983) had found that support/advocacy services lived from hand-to-
mouth and were in constant fear of closure. During his address at the 1996 Symposium, he 
remarked that not a lot had changed. This was still the case two years later when the then 
national Rape Crisis collective and two major support/advocacy agencies in Auckland were 
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reportedly placed in a position of service cutbacks and threatened closure. This was partly 
due to cuts in grants from Health budgets, despite agencies providing a ‘critical health 
service’ (Read cited by Crawshaw, 1998).  
In 1996, an explanation given for the inaction of successive governments was that the 
reality of sexual violence seldom reached the public agenda and therefore the attention 
of politicians.  
‘…over the last five or six years it has been very much the forgotten area in 
public awareness and education campaigns…’ (Young in DSAC, 1996, p.164)    
Another explanation is that because the research was conducted by government without 
collaboration from community organisations, government was at too great a distance 
from the findings for these to have meaning and impact. The need for researchers to 
collaborate from the outset with the population researched has been suggested as crucial 
in research design and implementation (House, 1993; Shapiro & Rinaldi, 2001). As 
noted, combining the knowledge and experience of specialist community organisations 
with the resources and influence of the state is crucial in effecting prevention and 
developing holistic systems of responsiveness. This is recognised in Britain in VAWI-
created guidelines for ‘Partnerships’ and ‘Agencies Collecting and Managing Data’ 
(Home Office, 2004). These guidelines derived from the understandings that effective 
resource allocations must be based on evidence of the actual parameters of domestic 
violence, and that grassroots agencies should be involved and supported in this data 
collection. This government partnership with community organisations which are close 
enough to accurately interpret and feel the significance of the findings, and as a result 
push for and guide the development shown to be necessary, is a more likely route to its 
implementation. 
Grounding research through partnership with the community it examines will also give 
those at the coalface more power and place them in a better position to hold government 
to account in respect of acting on the findings. Premised on governments prioritising 
their retention of power, this is particularly necessary when research covers a ‘forgotten 
area’ which governments have little vested interest in supporting. Congruent with the 
earlier gains in parts of the US where, unusually, feminists did occupy influential 
positions (Bryant & Cirel, 1977), an important reason for limited implementation of 
Rape Study findings was governments’ distance from the community studied. Again, 
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feminist involvement at state level is necessary in pushing for: research to include RCC 
input; findings to be implemented; and sexual violence to be kept in the public/political 
domain.  
Combined with my awareness of the costs of rape, it was these 1996 New Zealand 
issues of government, police, and support/advocacy responsiveness, which piqued my 
interest in studying New Zealand systems. Given the enormous toll taken by sexual 
violence, I wanted to know why the New Zealand Police had not made the progress in 
responsiveness made by other sectors. In keeping with the standpoint methodology 
which underpins this research, in the remainder of this chapter I will explain how my 
decision-making developed in respect of the steps taken in this research. International 
literature is referred to in contextualising and further explaining why government 
services, particularly Police, are the primary focus of the research. Features of the New 
Zealand context which became apparent during background data-gathering are referred 
to in explaining which elements of the Police operational setting were included.    
Explaining and Contextualising the Refinements to the 
Research Focus 
Government involvement with services was included for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
analysis of the extent to which New Zealand governance structures are involved in 
service provision was prompted by literature which identified that in signing up to the 
1993 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, governments 
internationally accepted their responsibility for violence. According to the Declaration:  
‘In cases in which the state does not directly commit a human rights violation, it 
is still possible to hold the state responsible if the state has not made diligent 
efforts to prevent or protect against the human rights violation in question.’ 
(Bond & Phillips, 2001, p.491) 
In the event of the failure of preventative measures, the UN noted that responsibility 
extended to responsiveness after the fact through:  
‘…developing laws and procedures to create just and effective remedies for 
women victims of violence and informing women of their rights to these 
remedies’. (ibid) 
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None of the countries whose literature has been reviewed has comprehensively 
implemented integrated specialist services. A national service strategy has yet to be 
implemented in US, Britain, and Australia and all three countries have variability in the 
distribution of government-provided resources for investigations, care, training, and 
evaluation (Campbell, 1998; Lovett et al., 2004; Hoffman, 2002; O’Shea, 2006). The 
size of the US, and its multitude of law enforcement agencies with very little central 
coordination, mean that policies and effectiveness are far from uniform (Blair, 1985). 
However, despite these difficulties, in the interests of nationally-based improvements to 
practice, the US has considered a national protocol (Hoffman, 2002). In committing to 
their obligations under UN covenants, US, British, and Australian Governments have 
also developed research capacities, and as noted, these have corresponded with 
developments in sexual assault services. In this, it is most often Health Departments 
which have been instrumental (Lovett et al., 2004). Comparing these initiatives 
overseas, where governments have responded to UN covenants with sometimes 
considerable funding, underscores the inertia of successive New Zealand governments. 
Crucially, because governments here have yet to instigate a permanent sexual assault 
research capacity, research has been limited and, as noted, governments have been 
largely unresponsive to its findings (Young in DSAC, 1996). As a result, the combined 
findings of 1990s New Zealand research has revealed that our services match neither 
local expectation nor overseas advances. 
Beyond international comparisons, a focus on government is supported on moral and 
practical grounds. The commitment, work, and political successes of the resource-poor 
feminist RCCs are notable. Juxtaposing these against the inertia of relatively resource-rich 
central governments suggests a moral imperative for the state to employ its greater 
resources in preventing sexual violence and developing systems within which secondary 
victimisation is relegated to the past. In this, specialist holistic practice must be supported, 
as must the work of independent RCCs. This would simultaneously contribute to the 
corresponding moral imperative of achieving gender inequity in the distribution of state 
resources. Practical imperatives reside in the need to disseminate and coordinate both 
prevention efforts and practice improvements since this has been beyond the capacity of the 
RCCs which were instrumental in their development. In doing so, government will reduce 
the heavy cost of the long-term health care associated with sexual violence and inadequate 
responses to it, particularly if RCC knowledge is harnessed. 
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By implication, examination of the New Zealand Government’s responsiveness to 
issues of sexual violence necessitates an examination of its Police service. A related and 
important reason for examining Police systems is that if comprehensive interagency 
processes are to be established in New Zealand, it seems likely that this will be through 
coordinating other services with Police. This is because Police is the largest and only 
government organisation of the three organisations providing acute victim services.  
The literature has also provided solely police-related reasons for focussing primarily on 
Police systems. Factors affecting police ability to be victim-responsive are important 
and possible psychosocial consequences of police interventions have already been 
referred to in suggesting that police collaborate with specialists. Police responsiveness is 
also important to formal and positive justice outcomes for victims. Firstly, impoverished 
police responses contribute to negative perceptions in the community about the worth of 
reporting (Clark, 2002; O’Shea, 2006). In this regard, an early study reported by Carrow 
(1980) cited victims’ fear of treatment by police or prosecutors at 52% and their 
perception of lack of police interest at 28%. Victim reluctance to report has meant that 
sexual violence is characterised by a huge dark figure (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974; 
FBI Crime Reports, US Department of Justice; Golding et al., 1989; New Zealand 
Ministry of Justice, 2003; O’Shea, 2006; Popiel & Susskind, 1985; Vito et al., 1984; 
Williams & Holmes, 1981; Young, 1992). Reporting rates are variously suggested in 
research and range between 26% (Kilpatrick & Ruggiero, 2004) and 5% (Golding et al., 
1989).  
Secondly, if victims do decide to report, in being the first criminal justice system 
contact, police act as its gatekeepers. Accordingly, the quality of the initial police 
response can determine whether women decide to proceed through the criminal justice 
system and achieve a justice outcome. Underreporting and obstructing access are 
particularly important in their implication that most sexual violence goes unpunished. 
‘The perpetrator can draw confidence not only from the low odds that his crime 
will ever be reported but also from the general limited ability of the CJS to 
respond effectively to reported rapes.’ (Carrow, 1980, p.1) 
This means that the potential deterrence effects of the law are undermined and 
perpetrators are free to repeat their violent offending (Lonsway, 1996).  
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‘…unreported rapes pose a serious threat to women in particular because 
recidivism amongst rapists is high.’ (Bachman cited in Lonsway, 1996, p.1)  
As well as direct and indirect responses to victims by individual police, New Zealand 
Police system responses are of concern. Although substantial attention has been directed 
to problematic police responses and some progress in these has been documented, 
Police progress generally has not kept pace with improvements in medical/forensic 
systems (Carrow, 1980; Mathews, 1994; Golding et al., 1989). This reflects the tardy 
evolution of systems which has been observed in respect of Police in general.  
‘…change when it does occur tends to come about when forced on the 
organisation…as a result of public enquiry.’ (Ainsworth, 1995, p.158) 
In New Zealand, Police tardiness became evident at the 1996 DSAC Symposium when 
mention was made of the advances in medical/forensic and support/advocacy care since 
1983. In contrast, Police were criticised for their non-responsiveness to the need for 
change.  
Having explained the reasons for the primary focus being government and Police 
systems, background research is now referred to in order to explain further refinements 
to the research focus. Firstly, in 1996 and in response to the 1996 Symposium showing 
police were comparatively slow to incorporate victim-centred systems, I had examined 
Police mechanisms by which quality assurance in sexual assault victim-responsiveness 
could be attained and found these were not systematically employed. Training was my 
particular focus and I found this to be minimal (Beckett, 2000). Because my own 
training as a nurse incorporated the possible psychosocial impacts of each physical 
disorder, and because police too worked with people in situations of stress, I was 
surprised to find that police were not similarly taught. Other findings were that police 
discretion was also only marginally limited by internal regulation, supervision, selection 
processes, and legislative interventions, and these mechanisms were often in conflict 
with longstanding police culture (Beckett, 2000). On the basis of those findings, internal 
regulatory mechanisms were incorporated in the current research in order to ascertain 
whether, and if so to what extent, they now contributed to advancing police practice. 
Later, during the proposal formation in 2001, it became apparent that as well as these 
internal reasons for Police not keeping pace with the specialist care developed by other 
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agencies their relative professional isolation was also a contributing factor. In their 
criminal justice role, New Zealand police had less contact with other crisis 
interventionists than those in professional caring organisations. For instance, 
medical/forensic examinations were often conducted by a DSAC-trained doctor 
working with a nurse or a support/advocate. Support/Advocates were often teamed in 
their organisational structure with professional counsellors. In contrast, since Police did 
not regularly work with professional caregivers there was less opportunity for Police to 
assimilate caring responses. The nature of police work as responsive to justice but not 
intrinsically caring sometimes also meant the very need for due care was less apparent.  
This was articulated by a support/advocate who commented in 2001 that police did not 
know what they did not know. The comment referred to police not understanding the need 
to know about either the psychosocial effects of sexual violence, or how to respond to 
complainants in a manner which was not victimising. Confirming this, another counsellor 
expressed unease with the way in which some police conducted interviews due to their 
stereotyping of women and their general lack of understanding of rape trauma. Other 
criticisms included conducting interviews with exhausted victims and telling prostitutes 
there was no point in making a complaint. Also while stranger rape was felt to be well-
investigated by police, particularly after the spate of violent serial rapes committed in 
Auckland in the 1990s, the same energy was not felt to be given to acquaintance rape 
(Counsellor, 2001). In underlining what support/advocates did know, the comment about 
what police did not know led to my conjecture that working alongside support/advocacy 
agencies on a regular and ongoing basis could be a strong mediating factor in the police 
response to rape victims. This potential looked significant given the relative isolation of 
police and my knowledge that internal mechanisms for quality assurance had not been 
developed.  
During background data-gathering, service gaps were also articulated as a reason to 
develop effective working partnerships between all relevant agencies in New Zealand. 
‘I think that the first thing is that we want to build on the links…we want to look 
at our relationships with counsellors…We also want to keep building good 
relationships with the police…The piecemeal current situation…leaves many 
gaps.’ (Gellatly in DSAC, 1996, p.171) 
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This confirmed my belief that along with being an essential ingredient in developing 
police practice, careful collaboration between all three crisis intervention services was 
important to effective victim-centred practice. In evaluating New Zealand’s Police 
systems of responsiveness, these were the two main reasons for including an 
examination of the partnership between the Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB), 
support/advocacy organisations, and medical/forensic services. Ascertaining the merits 
of holistic service delivery in relation to both police and victims also made examining 
police responsiveness in its broader setting of partnership with medical/forensic and 
support/advocacy partner agencies, a priority.  
What was evident in the partnerships prior to the formal data-gathering was that 
although New Zealand police accessed the specialist DSAC doctors whenever possible, 
in contrast police had not responded in uniform fashion to a request that:    
‘…crisis workers will automatically be called in by the police to be the advocate of 
the woman in crisis instead of the hit-and-miss effect that we have at present. We 
will be an integral part of the crisis team.’ (Brackenridge in DSAC, 1996, pp.170, 
171) 
Support/Advocacy informants confirmed in 2001 that this ‘hit-and-miss’ approach 
persisted. They were not always called or called too late to be of maximum support for 
victims. In addition, reasons given for passive resistance to this aspect of the Adult Sexual 
Assault (ASA) Policy were spurious. These included that support/advocates hindered 
investigations and that police could either handle disclosures themselves or call in the 
generalist but less qualified Victim Support. Victim Support’s use caused one 
support/advocate to wonder if this was so that police did not have to call a specialist agency 
in. Some agencies were also denied a role in training police, yet elsewhere in New Zealand, 
and as Blair (1985) has noted overseas, they had an intrinsic role in educating police about 
rape effects.   
In 1999 at a two day Sexual Assault District Coordinators’ (SADC) seminar, I had 
witnessed denigration of the political values and activities of support/advocacy agencies 
by some police. Criticism of the ‘watchdog’ role did not resonate with 
support/advocates who thought their advocacy and support for victims should be 
appreciated as freeing police to proceed with the investigation, and that police needed to 
realise that they were not adversaries. Owing to these difficulties, one support/advocate 
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later expressed a wish for systems and structures to be in place so police knew they 
were just a link in the processes.   
For their part, some police felt that support/advocacy organisations were: not always 
needed; not always available; and fragmented and needing to amalgamate in order to 
rationalise their approach (SADC conference, May 1999). Additionally, the feminist 
nature of the agencies was problematic for some police, and agencies were indeed 
resented on the basis of their monitoring function. This friction contrasted with the 
positive police partnership with DSAC-trained doctors and needed to be explained 
further. For the current study, this meant there was a need to ascertain the extent to which 
police and support/advocacy difficulties continued in New Zealand, and if so what 
practical measures could be taken in overcoming them in order to develop the 
partnerships necessary to holistic services.  
Given that advocacy for closing service gaps is not new in the New Zealand context, but 
that gaps persist, it was essential for the study to incorporate research into the wider 
support which might be required in closing these. Historically, choices about taking 
collaboration to the level of partnership, and even collaboration itself, appear to have 
resided with the generalist Police organisation rather than the specialist community 
crisis intervention organisations. The evident power imbalance between Police and 
other organisations derived from being respectively government and grassroots in 
origin, and this suggested a role for official support in developing collaborative systems. 
The need for this was identified at the Rape Symposium.  
‘Violence against women is a major community issue requiring responses to be 
co-ordinated across Police, government agencies, and the community.’ (Rosier 
in DSAC, 1996, p.153) 
Along with governments’ moral obligations then, that a power imbalance manifestly 
interfered with agencies collaboratively responding to the problem of sexual violence in 
New Zealand, was another reason for taking the research into the political sphere. What 
was required was to examine the possibility of official bodies developing the capacity of 
community agencies so that they were better positioned in partnerships with police. 
Research was also needed on the capacity and willingness of official bodies to facilitate 
collaboration between all three agencies.  
72 
Having demonstrated the need for specialist holistic practice and that this ideal has not 
been met in the historical New Zealand context, the current study now examines the 
extent to which contemporary New Zealand sexual assault services approximate the ideal. 
Highlighting service strengths and weaknesses will allow analysis of impediments to 
good practice and suggest how service gaps might be addressed. What is specifically 
required to achieve this is: documentation and description of New Zealand’s: service 
coverage; the degree to which services are specialist and holistic; and the processes of 
interagency liaison. Necessary in analysing service development requirements is 
knowledge of: the funding and support requirements of the agencies; structural 
impediments to collaboration; and the specific forms that Government support should 
take in New Zealand. The methods by which this data will be gathered are described next. 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
Since feminism is the theoretical foundation of this research, its ethos of equality has 
informed the selection of the research strategies. ‘Naturalistic’ interpretative 
methodologies are compatible with this humanistic ethos and it is fourth generation 
naturalistic enquiry which provides the framework in which all of the individual 
methodologies of current research are subsumed. ‘Fourth generation’ denotes the 
evolution of social science methodological philosophy and practice through 
methodological critique and critiques of the claims which can be made through 
implementing the social ‘sciences’. On that basis, fourth generation naturalistic enquiry 
is not only selected for its humanism but also for its subscription to integrity as an 
integral part of its research processes.  
In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the theoretical foundations of naturalistic 
enquiry. These are discussed in conjunction with their application in the feminist 
standpoint and activist methodologies and the multiple case study methodology 
employed in this research. In the second part of the chapter, I describe the progression 
of the research through data-gathering and analysis.  
Fourth Generation Naturalistic Enquiry: Theoretical 
Underpinnings 
Logic and Integrity: Implementation in Multiple Case Study and Feminist 
Standpoint Methodology  
The fourth generation of naturalistic enquiry derives much of its philosophical basis 
from post-modern discourse analysis (Warren, 1988). Facilitated by improved 
communications and the increasingly cosmopolitan nature of most societies, this 
analysis is based on the understanding of social life as complex and based on multiple 
social realities (House, 1993; Posavac & Carey, 1997; Stecher & Davis, 1987). Since 
‘truth’ was now defined as a social construct and a matter of consensus (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989), this rendered void the possibility of absolutes (Smart cited in Naffine, 
1996; Papineau, 1993). Such deconstruction meant that social research could no longer 
be viewed as having the capacity to be scientific and objective (Campbell & Salem, 
1999; Ferraro, 1990; Patton, 1987; Renzetti, Davis & Henley, 1997). Instead, based on 
the Bohr complementarity principle, research findings were understood as:  
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'…based on relativism, a unity between knower and known, and a subjective 
epistemology…’. (Guba & Lincoln, 1985, p.6) 
By implication, findings were situation-specific to people, places, and time (Palumbo, 
1987) and therefore questionably generalisable (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Patton, 1987; 
Ward, 1995). My subscription to this relativism dictated that for me to maintain the 
integrity of this study, its people, contexts, and processes would be identified in the 
findings as much as possible.  
To enable this, I implemented a multi-procedural qualitative methodology which 
incorporated the three methods most frequently employed in naturalistic enquiry 
(Wilson & Wright, 1993). This combination of methodologies not only provided the 
context which explained the pertinent issues of service delivery but also facilitated 
credibility through enabling triangulation of the data (Campbell, 1998; Gilson, 1997; 
Harvey 1985; Patton, 1987). The specific methodologies were participant observation, 
in-depth semi-structured interviews, and descriptive case studies. In respect of the semi-
structured interviews, these were conducted through site visits, during which I also 
collected source documentation and had the opportunity to form an impression as to the 
facilities and resources available for working with rape victims.  
In respect of case studies, these are qualitative in-depth studies based on the theory that 
social life is best understood through being studied holistically and in its natural setting 
(Wilson & Wright, 1993). In enabling data to be contextualised by its place and time of 
study, case studies enable answers to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Campbell & 
Ahrens, 1998). In doing so: 
'fourth generation evaluation moves beyond science - to include the myriad of 
human, political, social, cultural, and contextual elements that are involved.’ 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p.6) 
The New Zealand Police is divided into relatively autonomous policing Districts with 
separate budgets and management structures. Consequently:  
‘The 12 Districts operate as fiefdoms’ (Superintendent Fitzgerald, Dominion, 
12.5.2003) 
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On that basis, the police study population lent itself easily to case study methodology 
with each District providing the basis for a case study. In addition to each District 
having a discrete police population, with only three exceptions known to me, the 
District’s rape-related service collaborations with community agencies were also 
within-District. The exceptions were Northshore/Waitakere/Rodney 6 and Auckland 
City Districts’ police both liaising with Auckland’s support/advocacy agency, HELP. 
Also, these Districts’ police and Counties Manukau police all liaised with one group of 
DSAC-trained doctors due to the relatively small geographical size of the three 
Auckland Districts.7 The third exception was Tasman District complainants 
occasionally being taken to the Canterbury District for medical/forensic examinations if 
the sole trained medical/forensic examiner in the Greymouth and Westport Areas8 was 
unavailable. Since there were few instances of between-District collaborations, Districts 
therefore provided a framework for the data-gathering, analysis, and some presentation 
of the findings of this study.  
Because there were 12 Districts, the case studies could be subsumed within a multiple 
case study paradigm. This research design has: 
‘…all the advantages of a single case design in capturing real world contexts, 
but in repeating the procedures on multiple cases this replication enhances the 
validity and generalisability of the findings’. (Galloway & Sheridan cited in 
Campbell & Ahrens, 1998. p. 541) 
Accordingly, across Districts and in the Areas where District Headquarters were based, 
interviews were sought with District Commanders, Sexual Assault District Coordinators 
(SADC), detectives (CIB); police child abuse team (CAT) managers, Child, Youth, and 
Family (CYFS) managers; specialist support/advocacy and medical/forensic agencies, 
Victim Support, and Safer Community Council (SCC) representatives. Subsequent to 
data-gathering in each District, individual District case studies were written and these 
enabled comparative analyses of services and processes between the Districts.  
   
                                                 
6
 Renamed Waitemata. 
7
 See Appendix One. 
8
 Districts are divided into Areas 
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While case study methodology is a response to the relativism created by the influence of 
places and time, standpoint methodology is the response to the relativism brought to 
research by researchers. Accepting this, prior generations of research have pursued 
increasingly complicated experimental designs to eliminate the researcher-as-a-
contaminant and maintain research integrity. Fourth generation naturalistic enquiry 
brings the understanding that this is impossible (Campbell & Salem, 1999; Carrow, 
1980; Ferraro, 1990; Naffine, 1996; Stecher & Davis, 1987; Warren, 1988). Rather, 
acknowledging within the research influences which limit the ‘objectivity’ of findings 
has become the means to maintaining research integrity (Cronbach cited in House, 
1993). Accordingly, ethical considerations are an intrinsic aspect of fourth generation, 
with honesty and integrity characterising the research. 
Influences include the values of the researcher (Edelson & Bible, 2001; Haggis, 1987; 
Warren, 1988). Political forces can also provide the motivation to study particular social 
questions (Guba & Lincoln, 1985, 1989; Hippensteele, 1997; House, 1993; Palumbo, 
1987; Posavac & Carey, 1997; Pugh, 1987; Rossi & Freeman, 1987; Shapiro & Rinaldi, 
2001; Wilson & Wright, 1993). These will also impact on: which aspect of a question is 
researched (Campbell & Schramm, 1995); how the research question is defined; how 
information will be collected and interpreted; and which of the information uncovered is 
thought relevant to the research question. Unless influences are acknowledged, findings 
can be distorted as much by the data included as by data left out.  
Feminist standpoint methodology manages these researcher-effects through researchers 
articulating their own: standpoint; decision-making processes; and the possible impacts 
of these. This requires researchers to incorporate self-reflexiveness in regard to their 
own perspectives and position in relation to the subject matter researched (Code, 1991; 
Howe, 1994; Haggis, 1987; Hippensteele, 1997; Naffine, 1996; Wilson & Wright, 
1993). Women’s experiences within societies defined by patriarchal values facilitate 
their self-reflexiveness. Aided by feminist consciousness-raising, women are now more 
aware that ‘mainstream’ (malestream) values and definitions of social reality do not 
reflect all values or their own lived reality.  
The effect of standpoint methodology is to make research decisions and findings more 
transparent in their conception (Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1990). When the political 
purposes of the research; influences on the researcher; and influence of the researcher 
77 
on those researched are reflected on and disclosed, the reader then has the conceptual 
tools to place the findings in perspective and evaluate them. The importance of this is 
underscored by the social consequences of traditional research which has obfuscated the 
basis for findings. For instance, Lombroso’s influential positivist criminological 
research contributed to negative stereotyping of women through finding that women’s 
inferior biology was causal in female offending (Smart, 1976). Yet female offending is 
recorded at significantly lower levels than male offending, making apparent the illogic 
of Lombroso’s position. Incorporating transparency into research makes it less likely 
that such research ‘findings’ can be misused in making generalisations about categories 
of people (Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Smart cited in Naffine, 1996).  
The need for self-reflection as well as transparency is also evident in relatively recent 
criminological study. Research by male researchers has been characterised by an 
absence of self-reflexiveness in being conducted without reference to the impact of 
assigned gender roles (Campbell & Schramm, 1995; Ferraro, 1990; Hippensteele, 1997; 
Smart, 1976). This is despite gender being the single biggest variable in criminal 
offending statistics (Heidensohn, 1985). As a result, claims about criminality in society-
as-a-whole have been made, when what has actually been studied is offending by men 
only. Again, this is the result of a male-defined social world, which in rendering women 
invisible has nullified awareness of self as a male researcher (Smart cited in Naffine, 
1996; Warren, 1988; Code, 1991). In other words, limited self-consciousness prevents 
researchers from understanding their own standpoint as men, allowing the findings from 
studies of male behaviour to be generalised to include women.  
Humanism – Implementation in Feminist Activist Research 
Feminist research principles inform and share the philosophical and methodological 
ideals of fourth generation naturalistic enquiry in respect of humanism as well as 
integrity. Feminist research is further defined as being research on women’s social 
issues in order to promote the humanistic aim of gender equality (Ward, 1995, 
Hippensteele, 1997). As a ‘political exercise, involving power, control, and hierarchy’, 
this has been necessitated by traditional research pursuing a self-serving agenda (Urban 
& Bennett cited by Edelson & Bible, 2001, p.83). Those examples already given show 
that feminist research is needed to correct the inaccuracies in what has passed for the 
‘knowledge’ which traditional research has produced (Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1990; 
Smart cited in Naffine, 1996; Haggis, 1987). 
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The first step in counteracting this flawed knowledge has been consciousness-raising 
through discourse analysis of traditional research ‘findings’ about women and of the 
role these have in controlling women. In patriarchal society, since knowledge 
production has been controlled predominantly by men (Chesney Lind & Sheldon, 1992) 
this has allowed men’s determination of reality and control over societal outcomes 
(Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Heidensohn, 1985; Naffine, 1996; 
Worrall, 1990). As evident already, gender classifications have been embellished 
through research findings of positive attributes imbued in men and negative attributes 
imbued in women (Andre Bertrand, 1990; Carlen, 1983; Diamond & Quinby, 1988; 
Greer, 1970; Hekman, 1996; Hindess, 1996; Howe, 1994; Martin et al., 1992; Rella, 
1994). Such denigration of women has served to disable protests about their treatment 
and consolidate male privilege (Campbell & Schramm, 1995; Greer, 1970; Naffine, 
1996; Smart, 1976).  
A particularly relevant aspect of the male-defined positive men but negative women 
dichotomy is rape mythology which attributes culpability for rape to individual victims 
(women) (Elias, 1990; Shapcott, 1988). One example is Freud’s research which found 
widespread sexual offending against females, but eventually attributed this to 
fabrication by young girls with a subconscious desire to have sex with male relatives. 
This Oedipal explanation served patriarchal political purposes by discrediting 
complainants of child abuse, while simultaneously hinting that if sexual activity did 
occur it was initiated by female children. Although Freud’s research has been critiqued 
as owing more to male imagination than to any legitimate sociological study (Naffine, 
1996), its influence remains pervasive and evident in contemporary rape mythology. 
This is particularly in respect of women lying about rape, but also asking for it, 
deserving it, and loving it (Shapcott, 1988). In combination with more general negative 
perceptions of women’s worth, mythology also contributes to a view of rape as 
unworthy of government commitment of resources for either prevention or building 
services. Hardgrove (1976) has made this connection by directly relating secondary 
victimisation to men’s traditional ‘treatment’ of women. Since rape mythology has had 
such a powerful negative influence on women’s treatment as victims it is little wonder 
that prior generations of research have been referred to as ‘intellectually inadequate and 
morally distasteful’ (Smart, 1976, p.36).  
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The second step in correcting knowledge about women has been new research to 
counteract the power of prior ‘realities’ (Garland, 1985; Gelsthorpe & Morris, 1990; 
Heidensohn, 1985; Hippensteele, 1997). 
‘…one of the major goals of feminist participatory research (fpr) is the 
generation of usable knowledge, not the production of knowledge for 
knowledge's sake. In a fpr project, the knowledge created should enrich practice 
and inform policy making. … In my view what sets this research apart is that it 
is good social science; that is, it seeks to give voice to, and to improve the life 
conditions of the marginalised, and it transforms social scientific inquiry from 
an academic exercise into an instrument of meaningful social change.’ (Renzetti 
in Schwartz, 1997, p.143)  
Accordingly, feminist research has identified the realities of women’s lives (Walklate, 
1989). As a result, societal perceptions of sexual victimisation are increasingly 
understood as mediated by myths which exacerbate rape effects and hinder victims’ 
recovery. Sexual violence by known men is also increasingly understood as common 
and at one end of a continuum of violence by men against women (Dobash & Dobash, 
1992; Kelly, 1989; Smart, 1976). This knowledge has vastly different implications for 
how both victims and perpetrators are perceived. Having begun to alter the treatment 
individual women receive, it also has implications for self-perception and ability to 
recover. A considerable difference has been made then through feminist research 
articulating the social reality of rape.  
Contemporary social realities dictate that feminist activist research is ongoing, since: 
sexual violence against women remains prevalent; men’s definitions still control some 
rape outcomes; and government still neglects this preventable women’s health issue. As 
Palumbo (1987) has identified, evaluative research has an intrinsic role during goal 
setting processes. In evaluating New Zealand’s systems in comparison to the best of 
systems overseas, the current research has a political purpose. That purpose is to 
highlight the need for government to understand the social reality of rape and 
understanding this, for its organisations to reframe their goals to include greater 
commitment to professionalism in responsiveness. In the interests of women’s equality, 
I hope that the research will also make it evident that government goals should also be 
reframed to include greater commitment to a rape-free social environment since: 
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‘The special function of evaluators is to focus on and make all participants 
aware of the broader public interest involved in public policies and 
programmes.’ (Palumbo, 1987, p.35) 
Activist research can have other positive impacts. When questions are asked and 
discussions take place during data-gathering processes these may act in a 
consciousness-raising fashion, prompting further thought about the form which services 
might take. 
‘So you coming makes me think about a few things and think I must find out 
about that and just see what happens.’ (DSAC 10) 
This makes the process simultaneously part of the impact (Ward, 1995; Wilson & 
Wright, 1993).  
The current research also became activist in a more immediately proactive sense. 
Through attendance at meetings and seminars, it became apparent that passive 
observation was unrealistic in all settings. Rather, participant observation reflected:  
‘...an alternative paradigm for research that acknowledges the social 
relationships involved in research, that recognises the interest of the researcher 
in her topic and attempts to mitigate the hierarchical and exploitative relations 
that characterise traditional social science research.’ (Mathews, 1994, p.xix) 
Losing the arbitrary boundaries between researcher and respondents has lengthy 
precedent, and particularly in research on violence against women is becoming more 
standard practise (Edelson & Bible, 2001). To the extent that I became a participant as 
well as an observer in discussion forums, victim-centred feminist activism occasionally 
ran parallel to the research processes. On other occasions, I assisted in processes aimed 
at improving responses to victims in the longer term. Hippensteele (1997) supports this 
work by identifying that in providing direct assistance it adheres to a ‘feminist ethic of 
care’. At police request, considerable time was spent assisting the development of police 
training. Congruent with the thesis that collaboration by specialists in holistic services is 
good practice, and having made many contacts around the country, suggesting and 
arranging contacts between all three organisations has been another contribution.   
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Since this research pursues an issue of social justice, philosophical congruence 
demanded, and my in-depth contact with all three organisations reinforced, that the 
research strategies were similarly cognisant of the rights of respondents. Care in my 
collaboration with respondents was felt to be as important as the care required by police, 
medical, and support professionals when collaborating with each other. Moreover, 
fourth generation enquiry explicitly states that research requirements are secondary to 
respondents’ rights and should incur no harm (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; House, 1993; 
Posavac & Carey, 1997; Small cited in Edelson & Bible, 2001; Wilson & Wright, 
1993). Accordingly, a non-hierarchical relationship between investigator and those 
investigated is advocated (Hippensteele, 1997; Ward, 1995; Wilson & Wright, 1993). 
This is denoted in ‘subjects’ becoming ‘respondents’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1989).  
Ideally, respondents’ rights are protected through consultation over research processes. 
Input is solicited from respondents as to the issues to be studied and the form an enquiry 
might take (House, 1993; Shapiro & Rinaldi, 2001). Doing so is based not only on the 
need for equality, but also on combining the extensive knowledge of those studied with 
the knowledge of researchers.  
‘…collaborative partnerships strengthen rather than weaken the process of 
scientific enquiry and program development….’ (Edelson & Bible, 2001, p.74) 
Thereafter, feedback is ongoing in a hermeneutic process facilitated by the researcher. 
This incorporates respondents’ reactions to findings from other parts of the study (Guba 
& Lincoln, 1989; Posavac & Carey, 1997). Translating equality into practice also means 
that original data and respondents’ views are represented as fully as possible in the final 
product.  
In the current research, the methodology was always compatible with the humanistic 
tenets of naturalistic enquiry. However, personal resource constraints and university 
ethics requirements meant that in three respects the methodology could not include all 
the consultation opportunities described. Respondent input into: the issues to be studied; 
the research design; and data unrelated to their own input were not included. Time 
constraints were not only my own, but importantly also those of respondents, with many 
having already volunteered their time to the work.  
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‘One of the most commonly cited challenges of collaborative research is the 
intensive time commitment required by all involved…and even more so when the 
process is shared among collaborators from different disciplines, who often 
have different values. …Time spent in the research endeavour often means time 
away from critical work.’ (Edelson & Bible, 2001, p.76) 
Instead of engaging professionals in dialogue about the research issues and design, I 
attended agency and interagency meetings in order to understand which data was 
important to gather. Because it posed a risk to confidentiality, rather than seeking 
feedback on responses from other parts of the research, philosophical discussion on 
ideal practice was incorporated at the end of the interviews as a variation of the 
hermeneutic process. This enabled respondents’ ideas to directly inform the 
recommendations. In avoiding the need for repeat approaches, these measures preserved 
the professional time of respondents and obviated the risk of inadvertent disclosures. 
When the first draft was completed, one representative from each organisation was 
approached to read it for accuracy and this contributed to the validity of the 
interpretations (Carmody, 1997).  
However, the requirement to accurately and fully represent the views of respondents 
was instrumental in selecting data-gathering techniques which best enabled these to be 
heard. I rejected surveys with Likert-type scales because these prematurely foreclosed 
on respondents being able to give the information they felt to be most pertinent 
(Campbell & Schramm, 1995; Leyland, 1987; Walklate, 1989). This has been noted by 
others researching in the sexual violence field.  
‘Many staff reported they were frustrated with 1-5 scale type questions. Open- 
ended questions would be preferable. They emphasized that they wanted to talk 
about their centres in their own words….’ (Campbell et al., 1998, p.464) 
Patton (1987) too has noted the advantage of open-ended questions which can be 
answered by respondents in their own way. Although ‘other’ comments can be invited 
at the end of questionnaires these do not counteract the data distortion which 
accompanies fitting responses into foreordained categories. Postal surveys were also 
discounted because the language of surveys can be confusing, with questions sometimes 
not interpreted as meaning what the researcher intended. For their part, respondents 
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have been reported as being concerned about researcher ability to assign true meaning 
to their responses in the absence of contextual knowledge (Hippensteele, 1997).  
In the current research, these problems were avoided by implementing inductive enquiry 
through personal contact and semi-structured interviews comprised of open-ended 
questions. This enabled respondents to clarify questions and qualify their replies. In 
turn, it allowed me to clarify their replies and ask subsidiary questions when necessary. 
Additionally, respondents could initiate discussion on related matters which allowed 
pertinent issues to be explored until they were meaningful and understood in their 
context. This was easier to achieve as data-gathering progressed and interviews became 
more relaxed. The written schedule, minus prompts, was given to respondents who then 
dictated the pace of the interview from it, thereby minimising the possibility of 
influences related to the way in which questions were asked. Respondents were also 
requested to give: feedback on the questions; views on incorporating defined elements 
of overseas practice; and input into future service directions. In this way, the interviews 
became more of a dialogue which operated synergistically to stimulate ideas.  
Including the ideology of respondents was a deliberate implementation of the politics of 
inclusion of ‘rival discourses’. The philosophical basis for this was in there being no   
‘single monolithic philosophy that yields access to the truth’ (Code, 1991, p.305). This 
was appreciated in the field.  
‘…the exchange of ideas, you tend to get more truth out of it.’ (CAT 12) 
Other feedback was that respondents appreciated the opportunity to be heard (CAT 12; 
CIB 8A, 8C) and to think about why they were doing the work in the way they were 
(Support/Advocate 2) and where they were going with it (Support/Advocate 4). 
Structuring the interviews so that philosophical discussion took place at the end also 
allowed a more relaxed and profitable interchange and gave the opportunity for 
debriefing from the interview itself. 
In addition to clarifying meanings and adding context, in related research site visits have 
been found to increase willingness to help with the research.   
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‘Several directors said they would not have helped us if we had mailed them 
questionnaires, yet many went to great lengths to provide us with the data we 
needed in the interview.’ (Byington et. al., 1991, p.89) 
This is borne out in the contrast between the very few refusals to take part in this research 
and only a third of RCCs responding in the Australian National Data Collection Project 
survey (NASASV, 2000). Also, only half of New Zealand’s support/advocacy agencies 
responded to a 2005 Crime Prevention Unit survey posted to them (network meeting, 21.3. 
2005). As with partnerships between different service organisations, the effort to make 
personal contact is important to effective working relationships between respondent and 
researcher.   
In-depth contact makes it particularly important to observe the requirement for self-
reflexiveness. Inasmuch as study requirements have allowed them, friendships with 
some of those involved with acute support and medical services have developed over 
the last decade during both this and previous research. However, since a shared 
ideology is one reason for rather than the outcome of these liaisons, I do not believe 
these have mediated the research. A much longer-standing and closer relationship is 
with a serving police officer, but this has no direct relationship to the subject matter of 
the research. For methodological reasons - that is, to avoid biasing the responses, no 
mention of my partner’s role was initiated by me on seeking access for police 
interviews. It was unusual to be questioned about whether there was a family 
connection, but if so this was acknowledged and reassurance about confidentiality and 
the independence of the research was given. On completion of two interviews, in which 
it became apparent that this relationship was known, I asked if the connection had made 
a difference. Unsurprisingly police respondents felt they could be more open with a 
member of the Police ‘family’. This response, and the more prolonged contact with 
respondents in other services, strengthened my concern to represent the services 
accurately.  
In respect of the effect of activism on responses in interviews, since most proactive 
endeavour has happened behind-the-scenes it is unlikely to have impacted on the data 
given. In respect of my analysis, activism and prolonged engagement have meant a degree 
of immersion in the field which has occasionally made it harder to critique practices as 
being unhelpful either to victims or to progress. Liking for respondents, gratitude for their 
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time, and sympathy for their difficulties in working in an under-supported field has made 
critical comment more difficult. This risk was accepted when balanced against the depth of 
information gained from the field, and in particular the ability through ongoing involvement 
in activist work to triangulate data and be confident in the fullness of the picture gained.  
To the extent that I have felt disinclination to make critical comment this has been 
managed by keeping the overall research aims, in particular the need for victims to 
receive professional responses, at the forefront of the analysis. I have felt supported in 
this by exhortations in other research.  
‘The interests of the poor and powerless are not usually represented in the 
evaluation. Evaluators should search for and define the views of minority 
groups if those groups are stakeholders in the programme being evaluated.’ 
(House, 1993, p.xiv)  
While the political imbalance described by House affects all women, the primary 
stakeholders are victims since I consider them as those most deeply affected by the 
current capacity and forms of service delivery. Real clients are also those attempting to 
provide effective services in an exacting and little-appreciated field of work. Its 
exacting nature derives in part from the necessity to respond carefully and self-
consciously to those in acute stages of crisis, when every word, facial expression, and 
gesture takes on significance it would not have in ordinary circumstances. Researching 
the requirements of victim-centred responsiveness is one means to improve that 
response and in doing so, support Police.  
The Progression of the Research  
As with contextualising the research decisions, documenting the ongoing progression of 
the research is in keeping with standpoint methodology, since:   
‘…precise documentation of the progression of research has been referred to as 
maintaining a chain of evidence.’ (Wells in Campbell & Ahrens, 1998, p.541)  
Participant observation has been an important aspect of this research. At the outset of 
the literature review during proposal development, I commenced observation of regular 
meetings between community organisations which included Rape Crisis and HELP. 
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Regular meetings between police from the Northshore/Waitakere/Rodney and Auckland 
City Districts, DSAC-trained doctors, and HELP were also attended. During these, 
important topical issues were discussed and systems of responsiveness were refined. 
Access to the meetings was assisted by prior contact with HELP during my evaluation 
of police training for investigating adult sexual assault complaints. 
My attendance at these meetings continued for several months during 2001. In addition 
to ascertaining feasibility of the study, benefits of participant observation at this point 
included familiarisation with the research setting and facilitation of the development of 
a conceptual framework for the study. In addition, information on related seminars, 
conferences, and training sessions was available at these forums and my attendance at 
these increased my knowledge of the field as well as maintaining my awareness of 
recent developments.  
Participant observation continued after moving to Wellington and my formal enrolment 
at Victoria University. My initial observation was of HELP peer review meetings and 
regular meetings between HELP, police, and DSAC. These latter contrasted with 
Auckland meetings in being case management meetings which were frequently 
followed by ad hoc discussion of interagency issues. After several months, attendance at 
these was halted when a new HELP manager determined my attendance to be 
incompatible with privacy legislation. Over the last four years, DSAC peer reviews and 
meetings between various rape-related community organisations have been regularly 
attended. A particular benefit of participant observation in Wellington was my 
becoming aware of regular email resources which detailed contemporary research in the 
sexual violence field.  
This ongoing immersion in the field enabled me to gain a grounded perspective on what 
was important to incorporate in the research. While selection of systemic features to 
review and questions to ask were initially informed by themes teased out of literature on 
the requirements for effective practice, participant observation enabled these to be 
refined and complemented with knowledge of what was important to professionals in 
local systems responses (Edelson & Bible, 2001; Patton, 1987). Interviews were also 
able to be better tailored to each of the different organisations. Based on these two 
sources then, interviews explored many features of responsiveness to victims. Some 
detail sought was factual, for instance in determining what services were provided, how, 
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and by whom. Additional information which was sought due to understandings gained 
from participant observation included material on rotation, experience, debriefing, and 
facilities. Other questions examined features of interagency partnerships. Overseas 
precedents provided the basis for philosophical discussion on transportability of these to 
New Zealand and the new forms of organisation which services might take.  
Constructing interviews simultaneously from the field and the literature also assisted in 
maintaining an open mind and preventing subscription to: 
‘…moral theories [which] close off possibilities of understanding… [and] 
…a suspension of claims on behalf of theory.’ (Code, 1991, p.306)  
Instead of reliance solely on the literature and theory to make the ‘strange familiar by 
slotting it into pre-constructed categories or spaces’ (ibid), in using ethnographic 
measures to make the ‘strange’ familiar such pre-construction was obviated.  
Another important benefit of participant observation was that it facilitated trust through 
a developing familiarity with those working in the field, as well as through making 
evident my commitment. In turn, it shows greater respect than situations in which:  
‘Staff members have known (or heard about) researchers who came to programmes 
to collect data and then never contacted the programme again once the data were 
in hand. One researcher labels such practices 'drive-by-data collection’. This 
results in programme staff feeling that they have been exploited.’ (Edelson & Bible, 
2001, p.77) 
However, I was careful to maintain trust by not taking for granted my presence in any of 
the many forums attended. If I was invited or I requested to attend relevant forums, 
during general introductions at the outset of meetings I usually stated that if there were 
qualms about my presence I was happy to leave. If feasible, I contacted unknown parties 
in advance, stating my interest and role and requesting permission to attend. This rarely 
met with refusal. Trust was consolidated through my assurance that participant 
observation was used only for context, triangulation, developing the research tools, and 
keeping up-to-date with changes. Becoming known to some working in the field is 
likely to have facilitated access for later interviews and may have contributed to 
frankness during interviews.  
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Ultimately then, participant observation has been an invaluable tool in facilitating 
access, as well as ensuring that the research has remained grounded and informed by 
contemporary initiatives. All of these factors have contributed to a greater likelihood of 
accuracy in the findings and enabled me to be more confident in my analysis. These 
advantages of participant observation have been found in other research into sexual 
violence responsiveness. 
‘…this methodological technique can capture multiple perspectives in real 
world contexts…researchers can have greater confidence in the applicability of 
their findings’. (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998, p.542) 
As noted, participant observation gave a grounded perspective on features of the 
New Zealand context which the research needed to encompass and in doing so, it 
contributed to decisions which limited the study population. So too did time and 
resource constraints. These necessitated limiting the study primarily to areas where 
highlighting the need for change could have the most impact. For instance, government 
had the resources to re-examine its services and the broader picture in which these 
operate, if prompted. Since its Police service was the least victim-centred crisis 
intervention organisation, the scope of Police system change which could be effected 
was considerable, particularly if identifiable issues of collaboration were incorporated in 
the research alongside internal Police factors. This necessitated data-gathering on, and 
analysis of, support/advocacy and medical/forensic capacity to partner police as a 
subsidiary focus.  
Further limitation of the study population was dictated by the multiple case study 
requirement of matching respondents from each District as closely as possible by role. 
This made the population sample a ‘purposive’ one. Matching was limited a little by 
District idiosyncrasies in positions both created and filled; respondent availability; and 
the choice of a very few who elected not to participate. District Commanders were 
selected for their control over District operations and their membership on the decision-
making national Police Executive. Only two Districts had officers who even 
approximated the SADC role, so SADC interviews were conducted with District Crime 
Service Managers (CSM) or Area CIB supervisors. Interviews were also conducted with 
frontline CIB investigators. Victim Support managers were selected into the study 
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because I was aware that Victim Support was a police partner in providing sexual 
assault services in some Areas of some Districts.  
 
CAT and CYFS respondents were included in order to provide information about 
responsiveness to child sexual assault victims in New Zealand. There are a number of 
reasons for this data inclusion. Firstly, international literature which provided the basis 
for a comparative analysis of services included descriptions of services for child sexual 
abuse victims which helped to define ideal practice as holistic service delivery (Boles & 
Patterson, 1997; Chandler, 2000; Crimes Against Children Research Centre, 2001; 
District of Columbia, 2001 (a & b); National Children's Alliance, 2000, 2002; Wurtele, 
1999). The same was true of New Zealand literature (Miller Burgering, 1994; Porch, 
1990). Secondly, some New Zealand commentators have suggested that the need for 
comprehensive services for child victims is better recognised than the need for such 
services for adults. For instance, in New Zealand both Jordan and Miller Burgering have 
remarked on the comparative evolution of responsiveness to child sexual abuse victims 
(in DSAC, 1996). Successes enabled by holistic services for children can encourage 
development of holistic services for adults.   
 
‘An initially successful team approach toward one type of crime can lead to 
initiatives to institute similar teams for other crimes.’ (Toth cited in Boles & 
Patterson, 1997, pp.xiii, xiv) 
Thirdly, the literature indicates that legal and psychosocial issues in child and adult sexual 
crime are similar. For instance, some US adult sex crimes investigators were trained in a 
Child Abuse and Exploitation Investigation Training Programme (Epstein & Langenbahn, 
1994). Other links have also been noted in the crossover in personnel (Boles & Patterson, 
1997). 
Given this similarity of issues, the crossover of personnel, and the relative success in 
meeting practice standards in responding to child sexual abuse, New Zealand services 
for children were included in order to provide a within-New Zealand basis for 
comparative analysis. There were three main reasons for this. The first was to provide 
an exemplar of fully government-funded holistic services working for victims of sexual 
crime in New Zealand. The second was to ascertain whether any special New Zealand 
methods or protocols governed interagency liaison or service delivery in the child field 
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which could be transferred to the adult arena. ‘Overlapping personnel’ and the effects of 
this were also of interest. Since child services incorporated many features of ideal 
practice overseas, the third was to demonstrate that this quality of practice could be 
achieved in New Zealand conditions. Services for sexually abused children were 
provided through two government agencies, Police and CYFS, from which CAT and 
CYFS Managers were selected for interview. In finding that CAT/CIB roles were 
occasionally combined (overlapped), only eight discrete CAT interviews were 
conducted.  
Incorporating an examination of central and local government involvement with services 
was based respectively on the need for leadership in coordinating and funding services, 
and on the importance of local level adaptations to local problems through local 
government (Boles & Patterson, 1997; Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Carrow, 1980; MCASA, 
1997).9 These bodies of literature, combined with Wilson and Wright’s (1993) suggestion 
of developing an awareness of the national and regional context of programmes, confirm 
the pertinence of examining the current parameters of official responsiveness. On that 
basis, the need for, possibilities, likelihood of, and official interest in local body 
coordination and support of services if backed by funding from central government, was 
also explored in the current research.  
The population sample was extended then to include the official body which had most 
relevance to coordinating sexual violence responsiveness. Since the Justice 
Department’s Crime Prevention Unit partially funded Safer Community Councils 
(SCCs), and these were affiliated with local city or district councils,10 SCC 
representatives were also interviewed. This was to establish their current involvement or 
willingness to be involved in coordinating or funding responsiveness, and to ascertain 
their views on what benefits might accrue from national and local coordination and 
funding of services. The pertinence of selecting SCCs as the appropriate local 
coordinating body is reinforced by the London example of Police linking with 
Community Safety Units. It has again been reinforced through the first audit of 
support/advocacy services in 2005/2006 being conducted by the Crime Prevention Unit. 
In addition, in 2006 this Unit funded the national meeting of support/advocacy agencies.  
                                                 
9
 See Chapter Seven. 
10
 City and District councils have similar structure and functions. They will be referred to as local 
councils. 
91 
Thereafter, the selection of respondents was dictated by the aim of representing the 
breadth of services. Initially I had considered reducing the size of the study by sampling 
just some Districts. However, the basis for District selection was unclear given their 
idiosyncratic profiles and research suggesting variable sexual assault responsiveness 
(Jordan, 1996). The risk of leaving any District out could have been missing the one 
with the best model of service delivery. The decision to include all Districts was also 
based on my aspiration to make the study a useful resource (Edelson & Bible, 2001; 
Hippensteele, 1997; Renzetti, 1997; Rossi & Freeman, 1987; Shapiro & Rinaldi, 2001). 
The ‘fiefdom’ comment supported my perception that some uptake of research 
suggestions could be decided at District level. This meant that all Districts needed to be 
included for each to perceive there was local value and relevance in the study. In 
addition, since the study included issues of government responsibility and national 
coordination, it was congruent to conduct a truly nationwide study. Not providing a 
comprehensive nation-wide study also risked reducing the perceived status and 
acceptability of the research to the Police organisation as-a-whole, potentially 
jeopardising its employment as a resource. Lastly, keeping all 12 Districts in the study 
was also seen as a way, through cluster analysis, for the findings in each District to be 
reinforced in terms of the credibility of the claims the research might make (Campbell 
& Ahrens, 1998).  
The interview population was extended to achieve depth as well as breadth in the 
findings since service coverage was not expected to be any more standard than that of 
comparative overseas countries. Gaining District-wide perspectives also catered to the 
need to ascertain the impact and importance of ‘contextual conditions’ (Yin cited in 
Campbell & Ahrens, 1998). This was more important since, given the multiple case 
study imperative of replication, the regular District interviews were all in Areas closest 
to District Headquarters. Inevitably then these were conducted in urban areas where 
services were expected to be at their most comprehensive due to fewer population and 
distance-related resource issues. This meant that information from them could not 
appropriately be generalised to Police as-a-whole. In-depth data collection enabled 
ascertaining what differences the rural/provincial/urban divide might make to service 
delivery and whether being at a distance from District Headquarters made any 
difference in practice.  
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An in-depth focus comparing city and rural services was reinforced by the 
acknowledgement that: 
‘While small communities tend to view themselves as resource-poor, they’re 
really not.’ (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994, p.61) 
Although smaller communities might lack specialised facilities, axiomatically they also 
deal with smaller populations and less frequent sexual violence. Research also shows 
that irrespective of size all communities can develop a coordinated response through 
local level adaptations (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). This 
was based on the finding that the most important resource was people who gave their 
time to victims and in knowing the population were able to galvanise the community.  
For all of those reasons, I decided to explore two Districts in greater depth through site 
visits to every police station with CIB capacity. In the interests of balance, I decided to 
include a South and a North Island District. Using the District profiles and map11 on the 
Police website, the Wellington District and the three Auckland Districts were excluded 
on the basis of their predominantly urban character. With a larger geographic spread, 
the Canterbury District was less populated but was similarly discounted due to its large 
urban population. Eventually the South Island District was selected on the basis of its 
geographic spread and having stations at the greatest distance from its Headquarters. 
The North Island District was selected for its rural nature and distance from the Office 
of the Commissioner.12 In the Districts studied in-depth, interviews with CIB, Victim 
Support, specialist support/advocacies and sometimes medical forensic personnel, were 
sought in each station’s Area. 
Many of the decisions outlined above about the content of the study are supported by 
Boles and Patterson’s (1997) determination of the sequential steps necessary in 
achieving holistic service delivery. These included: establishing an interagency council; 
developing a protocol for victim-centred systems; developing an inventory of existing 
services in the community in order to work from these; basing the establishment of 
council services on feedback from former victims; conducting a community needs 
assessment; monitoring and evaluating protocols; and developing training based on 
these protocols.  
                                                 
11
 See Appendix One. 
12
 OoC is renamed as Police National Headquarters. 
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The interagency council recommendation supports exploring SCC willingness and 
capacity to fund and organise a multi-agency community response to rape through 
community councils. The inventory requirement supports exploring what services are 
currently available in the Districts. The community needs assessment recommendation 
supports asking managers what needs to be done differently for rape victims in New 
Zealand and provides an insider-based perspective. The need to develop protocols and 
interagency and intra-agency training supports including questions about both in the 
interview schedules for crisis interventionists. Police training for responding to sexual 
assault victims has already been studied (Beckett, 2000) and informs the current 
research.  
The research design makes it possible then to examine whether and how specialist 
holistic services can be achieved in New Zealand. However, victim testimony about 
services was not included in this research and this is recognised as a limitation. This 
testimony has already been collated, particularly in respect of reporting to Police 
(Anstiss, 1995; Jordan, 1996; Young, 1983). It too informs, and was important also in 
instigating, the current research. Congruent with the aims of this research and since my 
questions might evoke rape’s negative psychological effects, having neither 
qualifications to support respondents nor ability to refer on, I was not prepared to risk 
incurring their secondary victimisation.  
Having decided on the parameters of the study, the first eighteen months after enrolment 
involved ongoing participant observation, extending the literature review, and 
concurrently constructing interview schedules. University Ethics Approvals were also 
sought and on receipt of these, Police and CYFS organisations were approached for 
approvals to contact their personnel for interview. When these were granted, over one 
year from mid-2003 until mid-2004, one police District per month was visited. This was 
preceded by emailing or telephoning District Commanders to: explain the research; seek 
interviews with them; and request permission to interview staff in their Districts.  
Along with District Commanders, those included as respondents in the study were 
selected for their knowledge of existing processes and procedures. I began contacts 
based on my own knowledge from previous research about which police occupied 
relevant roles. When this failed me, District Commanders or their designated 
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representatives supplied this information. Police who were contacted were asked who 
their main partner agencies were and this determined who would be approached in 
support/advocacy and medical/forensic roles.  
A potential disadvantage of using nominated respondents is in the possibility of bias in 
the sample. As a purposive sample, all informants were selected by role which meant 
that in most cases there was only one possible respondent. This was not the case for CIB 
in generalist squads, and it may be that some CIB nominated were those felt to have the 
most acceptable public face. This possibility was limited by police busyness, by who 
was available during my visits, and by staffing levels. For instance, in rural stations 
there was only one officer. In reality, few CIB were nominated as respondents because 
most interviews were simply conducted with the detective who answered the phone 
when I rang to enquire about interviews. Regardless, the population sample of 44 police 
members from all echelons within the 12 police Districts allowed for a varied sample of 
respondents.  
Bias effects were also limited by the descriptive nature of much of the data allowing for 
triangulation through the many interviews in each District. Information about partner 
agencies was also cross-referenced through available directories of the community 
organisations. Often this meant that representatives of other support/advocacy 
organisations were also interviewed even if not currently acting as police partners. This 
was helpful in gaining agency perspectives on why they had never, or no longer, worked 
in this capacity. 
Of the 12 Districts, four District Commanders were absent from their Districts during 
my visits, six granted an interview, and two declined. All District Commanders agreed 
to my approaching their staff to take part. Subsequent to permissions received, District 
by District other potential respondents were telephoned to explain the research and set 
interview dates. The only other refusal received was from the District 10 SCC 
representative. At this point seven SCC interviews had taken place and I decided not to 
seek further SCC interviews. This was due to the combined effects of the refusal and 
SCC representatives being variously receptive to being asked about the possibility of 
becoming involved in coordinating sexual assault services.   
In the Districts, audio-taped interviews were conducted in the workplaces of each 
respondent. If source documentation was suggested or evidently relevant, requests were 
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made for paper or electronic copies. These included: memorandums of understanding; 
training documents; written reports; support/advocacy pamphlets; minutes of meetings; 
founding documents, such as charters expressing mission statements; training videos; 
and workplace correspondence.  
My stay in the District was one week or two, depending on whether the District was 
studied in-depth. For the remainder of each four-week period, the tapes were transcribed 
using dragon voice-activated recognition system. The data from them was analysed and 
written into District case studies and this process was concurrent with making contacts 
for the District which was to come. For several months, that pace was achievable until 
the last few months when the latter part of the cycle of contact-travel-interview-travel-
transcribe-analyse-write was replaced with transcribe, analyse, and write as able. A 
bonus of interview discussions was in being referred more than once to Central 
District’s Kimiora service in New Plymouth because of its ‘best practice’ in having 
integrated service delivery. Although it was not in the original research design, an 
additional site visit and interview were arranged for Kimiora. 
Both during and subsequent to the empirical data-gathering year, opportunities 
presented to gather data by attending related seminars. One such was a two-day 
conference in London in mid-2005. The decision to interrupt the thesis writing for data-
gathering abroad was inspired by two factors. One was Lovett et al.’s (2004) positive 
evaluation of the SARCs and the prospect of seeing these firsthand. The other was being 
able to share a New Zealand officer’s contacts and through them gather data on 
Metropolitan Police service delivery. The two day conference was invaluable as were 
site visits and interviews at: Hendon Police Training College; Project Sapphire 
headquarters; a Project Sapphire operational site; and the Haven Camberwell SARC, all 
of which yielded source documentation. The main importance of this trip to the current 
research was in consolidating the belief that holistic practice based on careful 
collaboration by specialists was the means to provide the optimum care to victims of 
sexual violence. In addition, the trip strengthened my belief that this model was 
adaptable to New Zealand conditions.  
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Data Analysis  
Data from the 113 interviews throughout the 12 Districts was qualitatively analysed and 
triangulated through other interviews, site visits, source documentation, and participant 
observation. In reporting the findings, respondents quoted in the text are referred to by 
their role and through a numerical code given to their District, and where applicable 
Area, based on the order in which these were visited. Departures from codes occur 
where positive effects were seen to flow from District or Area systems management.  
Districts and Areas are also named in the tables because the factual aspects of 
organisational practice which these collate are already accessible in the public arena.  
Multiple case study methodology determined how the factual data was managed in the 
first instance, with findings needing to be written into case studies of each District. This 
enabled discrete analyses which limited losing the sense of each District while data-
gathering continued. While there were few factual discrepancies between interviews, 
case studies also highlighted these, enabling other data sources to be accessed for 
clarifications. The first case study provided a ‘key copy’ in organising the material and 
providing a basic reference point in scanning subsequent case studies for further themes 
(Wilson & Wright, 1993).  
On completion of the District case studies, factual material including that on 
partnerships, services, and adherence to the ASA Policy was analysed through its 
collation into tables organised around the 12 Districts. This also facilitated the 
comparison of Districts on a national basis, enabling features of Districts which might 
contribute to, or correlate with, partnership and service strengths and weaknesses, to 
become apparent. In keeping with the requirement of standpoint methodology to make 
available the basis for findings, some charts used in analysis are presented in the text.  
 
New Zealand services were evaluated against three standards. The first was the 
benchmark of collaborative specialist practice in multi-agency centres. The second 
standard, against which police practice was evaluated, was the New Zealand Police 
Adult Sexual Assault (ASA) Investigation Policy. The study examines the degree to 
which this has been implemented. The Policy was itself evaluated by comparing it with 
the London Metropolitan ASA Policy and other international indices of good practice 
which were collated from the literature. This was to indicate the extent to which Policy 
tenets intended to guide New Zealand practice matched the defined ideal of practice. 
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The third standard against which responsiveness to adult victims was evaluated was the 
standard of services in New Zealand for sexually abused children. Data for this standard 
was gathered empirically during the study. Incorporation of both New Zealand indices, 
particularly the latter, was designed to ensure relevance of the analysis to the New 
Zealand context.  
Central and local government contribution to sexual violence responsiveness was also 
subjected to international comparative analysis. In addition, central government 
responsiveness to adult female victims of sexual violence was analysed in comparison 
to its responsiveness to child sexual abuse.   
Philosophical discussions were also analysed qualitatively. Responses to questions about 
New Zealand practice incorporating some features of innovative practices overseas were 
themed and organised into separate electronic documents. These responses to suggested 
practice ideals inform the discussion on future possibilities in service delivery. Responses to 
questions about local and national coordination of services were similarly analysed. 
Lastly, an open-ended question asked how responses to adult victims should be improved in 
New Zealand. The responses were coded and analysed for prevalence between aspects of 
the responsive systems. Findings are presented in the next three chapters. 
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Chapter Five: Description and Analysis of 
New Zealand Systems 
In Chapter Five, I describe and discuss New Zealand systems, from the time of 
reporting until court, which are in place for women who have been sexually assaulted. 
This discussion identifies the strengths and weaknesses of responsiveness and the extent 
to which practice ideals are both possible and delivered in New Zealand. The provision 
of the descriptive overview is supported by the view that: 
‘If evaluations are to be useful they must provide better descriptions of the 
programmes and their content’. (House, 1993, p.70) 
It is further supported by writers who attempted to comparatively evaluate services for 
rape victims but commented that the sparseness of descriptive data handicapped such 
evaluations and the ability to understand why some services worked well (Campbell & 
Ahrens, 1998).  
I begin with background data on Police and follow this with description and analysis of 
police capacity to provide expertise in services. Following this, medical/forensic and 
support/advocacy organisations are also contextualised and their services described with 
particular reference to factors which affect the capacity to partner police in providing a 
holistic response. As well as the benchmarks of collaborative specialist services and the 
New Zealand Police Adult Sexual Assault (ASA) Investigation Policy, some features of 
police organisation and practice are compared with corresponding features of 
medical/forensic and support/advocacy practice. Since Police is the primary focus and 
Police Districts are the units of study, this is reflected in the organisation of the data. In 
the second part of Chapter Five, I examine the degree to which collaborations on 
national and local levels operate to coordinate and strengthen services.  
Acute Sexual Assault Services: Background and Service 
Descriptions  
In New Zealand, acute phase sexual assault services are provided by: police: specialist 
medical/forensic examiners or Police Medical Officers: and specialist RCCs or Victim 
Support.  
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Police 
As noted, New Zealand’s sole Police service is organised into 12 Districts, 9 of which 
are in the North Island owing to its larger population base.13 Police organisational 
decision-making is conducted through monthly meetings of an Executive which 
includes the Commissioners, General Managers, and District Commanders. District 
Commanders organise their District responsiveness through a management team. This 
includes the Crime Service Manager (CSM) who has administrative oversight of the 
CIB. Districts are subdivided into Areas under Area Commanders who coordinate the 
investigative response to reported sexual assault through CIB supervisors. District 
Commanders’ management styles and priorities for staff deployment, in conjunction 
with decision-making by Crime Service Managers and Area Commanders, all contribute 
to District idiosyncrasies in sexual violence responsiveness. One aspect of this is 
decisions regarding collaboration with partner agencies. 
In addition to this organisational data, the need for demographic baseline data has been 
suggested by Wilson and Wright (1993). Demographic features create a need for local 
level adaptations and therefore a degree of variability in the sexual assault response 
capacity. In particular, travelling time to connect police, expert medical/forensic 
examiners, and victims is an issue in Districts which have a large geographic spread but 
comparatively small population base. This affects South Island Districts, and to a lesser 
extent the North Island’s Eastern and Northland Districts. Population demographics 
such as relative economic disadvantage, when combined with a greater volume of 
serious crime, also impact on response capacity. Counties Manukau and parts of the 
Northland and Bay of Plenty Districts are affected by this. Within Police, staff 
demographics can also affect CIB response capacity. For instance, Eastern and 
Canterbury were said to be popular workplaces and able to keep a settled and 
experienced team (CAT respondent) in comparison to Wellington’s ‘very very young’ 
team (District Commander).  
In responding to reports of sexual violence made by those over 17 years of age, the 
police role and practice standards have been defined by its Adult Sexual Assault (ASA) 
Policy. Acknowledging the destructive consequences of sexual assault, this was 
developed through wide consultation with partner agencies and proposed to be fully 
implemented by 2000 (ASA Policy, 1998). Under the Policy, the police role is to record 
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 See Appendix One 
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and investigate, and in consultation with victims either prosecute, warn, or talk with 
offenders, or refer them and complainants for counselling (NZ Police, Ten One, 1998). 
According to the Policy, the victim-based processes of investigation include: contacting 
support/advocacy personnel; taking initial complaint statements; arranging 
medical/forensic examinations; taking formal complaint statements; deciding how cases 
will proceed on the basis of evidence collated; and case preparation and prosecution. 
The investigative processes with which this research is primarily concerned occur 
during the acute trauma phase and are from the time of reporting until the court case, 
should there be one.  
In setting the standard for New Zealand Police systems of sexual assault responsiveness, 
the Police ASA Policy provides a useful framework for documenting and evaluating 
New Zealand services. Having decided to use the Policy as a framework for evaluating 
operational responses it was necessary for me to first evaluate the Policy itself. In doing 
so, I compared it with the London Metropolitan Policy. I found that while the New 
Zealand Policy is victim-centred, establishes some principles, and defines some practice 
standards, the London Metropolitan Policy does likewise but goes much further in 
detailing procedures in order to ensure that practice meets principles. Procedures 
detailed include measures for implementation, specialisation, training, supervision, and 
coordination of Police services with other services and local boroughs (London 
Metropolitan Policy). Importantly, provision has also been made for the material 
resources necessary to Policy implementation. These resources and thoughtful detailing 
of implementation measures signal Metropolitan commitment to quality assurance in 
sexual assault investigations. A second comparison was with practice recommendations 
from the international literature reviewed, particularly those for maintenance of 
partnerships. Combined, these comparisons demonstrate a need to develop and 
strengthen the New Zealand Policy through more rigour in: determining good practice; 
expressing Policy expectations; and clarifying how expectations will be achieved.  
Because I found that the Policy provided an incomplete framework for evaluating 
practice at operational level, I have augmented the evaluative framework with 
definitions of ideal practice taken from the literature. Figure 1 below depicts the contrast 
between the ASA Policy and international recommendations for mechanisms to develop 
police practice and expertise to specialist standard. The first set of recommendations 
relates to internal Police mechanisms for building expertise into practice, and is the 
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basis for the discussion on police expertise. The second set of recommendations relates 
to the development of collaborative practice, and is the basis for the discussion on 
coordinated practice. Comparisons enabled by Figure 1 highlight Policy gaps and 
missed opportunities to build Police expertise and facilitate the collaboration required in 
holistic services.  
Figure 1: Comparison of ASA Policy with Practice Recommendations in International Literature 
 
Factors which Mediate 
Police Expertise 
Literature Recommendations  NZ Police Policy 
Specialist sexual assault police teams Consider specialist units 
Specialist police training Specially trained officers 
 Police supervision of staff suggested 
Specially selected officers Officers with appropriate attributes 
selected  
 Sufficient staff 
 Look after psychological wellbeing 
of staff 
Collection of statistical data Collection of statistical data 
suggested for  development of 
systems 
Intra-agency Factors  
Evaluation: Define goals and 
missions; Ongoing evaluation of joint 
services 
 
Seamless specialist services Liaise with specialist agencies 
Regular interagency meetings  
Interagency protocols Local agreements 
Social opportunities  
Integrated data collection  
Joint training Joint training 
Advisory committee  
Introductions for new staff  
Joint community education  
Attend conferences together  
Specialist sexual assault police teams  
Providing interagency staff roster  
Providing agency organisational 
chart  
Knowledge of specialist agency 
functions 
Departmental liaison person  
Representatives attend other 
organisation’s meetings  
 
Interagency Factors 
Multi-agency centre Ensure appropriate facilities 
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Police Expertise  
In recognition of the requirement for police expertise, the ASA Policy and overseas 
literature suggest many intra-agency factors which affect Police ability to provide 
expertise in responsiveness. These include staff deployment, selection, sufficiency, 
wellbeing, supervision, special training, data collection, and ongoing evaluation. What 
is not addressed is police rotation although the impact of frequent turnover, not only on 
expertise in sexual assault investigations but also forming relationships in partnerships, 
was often mentioned as important during participant observation. All of these factors 
were examined and findings are presented below.  
The New Zealand ASA Policy recommendation to consider specialist units is in keeping 
with international recommendations. Gaining expertise in these relates to both 
workplace stability and the consolidation of experience and to working consistently 
with other specialists in Police and partner agencies (Crawshaw, 1998). Working in 
specialist squads is also more likely to result in opportunity, time, and interest in 
keeping sexual assault investigation knowledge current. Police themselves recognised 
the need to keep up to date with relevant literature, but that working in generalist squads 
made this unlikely. 
‘I would love to look at some of those books. I would love to. We don't have time 
to read the books.’ (CIB 8C)  
The finding is that most District Commanders have yet to implement specialist units. In 
the 20 Areas visited, there was widespread variation in the way that personnel who 
investigated sexual crime were organised, both within and across Districts. Most usually 
(12 out of 20 Areas), generalist CIB investigated adult sexual assault. At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, five Areas had officers dedicated to sexual assault investigations 
and these investigations included child sexual abuse. Numbers in those teams were 
small which meant that if dedicated officers were unavailable, the default position was 
for generalist squads to investigate. Since officers were on rotation they were also only 
temporarily on specialist teams. Mid-spectrum, some Areas had approximations towards 
specialisation, such as an Area with a ‘Person’s Squad’ which investigated all offences-
against-the-person. In six other Areas, historic complaints by adults who were sexually 
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abused in childhood were investigated by specialist child abuse teams (CAT) instead of 
generalist CIB.  
Since data-gathering, media reports have signalled a limited move to specialisation in 
Auckland. In accord with Ainsworth’s (1995) comments about Police changing only 
when forced by public inquiries, media have linked this move to the initiation of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct. The Inquiry was initiated after negative 
publicity about police conduct in 1980s investigations of other police who had been 
accused of rape (Dominion Post, 29.5.2006).  
A second area where actual practice did not meet ideal practice was in the absence of 
formal screening criteria in the selection of officers who investigated sexual assault. The 
ASA Policy mentions neither personality nor aptitude as desired attributes for sexual 
assault work and this reflects earlier findings on screening (Beckett, 2000). Knowledge 
and skilled-based criteria are mentioned but these were not a feature of selection in 
practice.  
‘I think there has been haphazard approach to adult sexual abuse in places and 
they basically get who they are lumped with as an investigator. We know certain 
investigators are not suitable for the sort of work. One - for experience and two 
- lack of empathy and all sorts of reasons….’ (CAT Manager 1) 
Experience of CIB interviewed ranged from three to eighteen years, and from ten cases 
to ‘hundreds’ of cases. Experience was not a factor in selection for placement in sole 
CIB stations where there was no immediate backup or supervision. The two sole CIB 
stations were staffed with officers who had taken up these positions with only eight 
months and four years CIB experience. Since the ASA Policy mandate to select officers 
with ‘appropriate attributes’ for investigating sexual assault has not been met, this too is 
a lost opportunity to improve investigations.  
Evaluation is important to shaping practice and developing expertise (Hornibrook & 
Myers, 1996). Despite Sexual Assault District Coordinators (SADCs) being mandated 
to assist with victim surveys and to monitor all sexual violence complaint files, regular 
formal evaluations were not found at station or District level. All CIB who were asked 
about formal evaluation replied that there was none. This contrasts markedly with 
London Metropolitan investigations which the Metropolitan Policy mandates will be 
104 
evaluated at three specifically identified points. Although this tenet of the New Zealand 
Policy has not been met, some informal mechanisms for evaluation were found at 
frontline level. One officer mentioned his recent efforts to contact victims after the court 
case. Two officers replied that evaluations were not conducted but would be helpful. 
‘No. For most people that will actually be of use to know what they could have 
improved on. I don't think anybody has actually thought to go down that path.’ 
(CIB 1) 
A further two officers mentioned feedback from support/advocacy agencies, and 
positive correspondence from victims was mentioned by another two officers. If 
consistently obtained and formally collated, these victim evaluations have the potential 
to make investigations more victim-centred through feedback as to how interactions 
with investigators were perceived. In implementing this, it is possible that forms which 
currently register ‘victim contacts’ could be extended to include their responses to those 
contacts.  
Formal training is also limited in its ability to develop Police expertise. Although the 
New Zealand ASA Policy mandates specially trained investigators, it does not define 
‘specially trained’. A point of reference is the three week training for London 
Metropolitan Sexual Offences Trained Officers. For most New Zealand CIB, formal 
training on sexual assault investigation comprises only four hours during their initial 
recruit training and four hours during their CIB Induction course (Beckett, 2000). Some 
CIB have had this training augmented with a week-long ASA course at the national 
Police College. With places for 20 detectives, these courses were held biannually in 
2003 and 2004. In 2005, College courses increased to five and in 2006, extra courses 
were held in Districts. Since approximately 120 CIB are inducted annually, CIB with 
this training remain a minority.  
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A:‘…it is all very well saying that we are introducing a Policy and this is what 
we are going to do, we are going to have training on it, but six months down the 
track the Policy has been introduced, where is the training? 14… It is happening 
but it doesn't happen frequently enough. Like the College, it is looking to have a 
class of 20 and that that is from all over the country. 
Q: There have been three so far? 
A: How many is that? That is 60 out of how many CIB investigators? So it is like 
anything - a lot of the time so they pay lip service to training and capabilities.’ 
(CIB Supervisor 4) 
Notwithstanding its strong victim orientation, the ASA course needs to be developed 
further. For this to happen the course will need to be formally evaluated and trainees 
will need to be examined for knowledge transfer. At present, the only evaluation is 
trainees being asked, prior to departing the College, for their opinion of each session. A 
more useful evaluation of the course would be after CIB have had the opportunity to 
implement the knowledge gained on the course and reflect on its usefulness. In addition, 
the course does not sufficiently convey the social meaning of rape or the significance of 
both the police role and police responses to victims. Further, in contrast to the three 
days training at the Metropolitan’s Hendon Police College there is no practical skills 
training for interviewing victims.  
Rotation also has an impact on expertise in sexual assault investigations. Since it was 
determined by system-centred imperatives such as staffing and the perceived need for 
wide-ranging policing experience, I found that little thought had been given to the 
victim-centred need to build and consolidate expertise. Some police found that too 
frequent rotation impaired even meeting system requirements.  
‘We struggle to comply with the Policy at all times, because we have such a high 
turnover of investigating staff.’ (District Commander 2) 
This ‘high turnover’ was usual. In all Areas, officers were frequently rotated. For CIB-
in-training, rotation through squads was as rapid as six monthly, while annual rotation 
was frequently suggested as usual on completion of training. Two years on Southern’s 
Person’s Squad was the longest rotation mentioned.  
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 The Policy had been in place for five years at the time of this interview.  
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Eastern mentioned staggered rotations as a way to mitigate the effects of loss of 
experience caused not only by rotation through CIB squads, but also resignations and 
transfers. However not all Districts had staggered rotation, as the almost total loss of a 
combined child and adult team shows.   
A: ‘I am getting a new CAT team in the next couple of months.  
Q: The whole team is changing? 
A: All bar one. 
Q: How will that be? 
A: It is difficult getting used to different people that you don't know.   
Q: How long does it take to get a good process up and running with the new 
guys?  
A: A couple of months.’ (CYFS 10)  
This almost total loss of experienced staff has implications for supervision and on-job 
training.  
It was also evident that working in a generalist squad for six months would not give 
individual CIB sufficient experience of sexual assault cases to consolidate the requisite 
skill for specialist sensitive interviewing in particular, or the investigation in general.  
‘It really takes 6 months to 18 months to start getting your head around the 
whole [adult sexual assault] operation. … I couldn't agree to six months myself - 
that it was a realistic rotation period and I can't see a realistic need for it.’ 
(CAT Manager 1) 
This view was substantiated by asking how often individual CIB investigated a sexual 
assault complaint. In Counties Manukau and Canterbury which had the two highest 
sexual assault statistics, both respondents estimated they would investigate sexual 
assault approximately once every six months.   
Caring for the psychological wellbeing of staff is important not only for staff wellbeing 
but is also important in maintaining police expertise. This is because it prevents the loss 
of experienced staff through burnout. Also important is that it contributes to a lesser 
likelihood of victims suffering from police compassion fatigue. In attending to the 
psychological wellbeing of staff, the Policy mandates recourse to the Trauma Policy. 
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However, most CIB reported that the Trauma Policy was seldom or never invoked and 
that psychological counselling was rarely accessed. In addition, police only informally 
debriefed and had no formal peer review. The one exception was in Eastern District 
where Napier’s CIB debriefed after every case with Victim Support’s manager. 
Elsewhere, at the expense of experience and expertise, rotation appears to be used as the 
preferred means of preventing burnout. Surprisingly, Police regularly reported that 
dealing with rape victims was not stressful and as the interviews progressed this raised a 
question for me over the degree to which empathy for victims was felt. 
Q: ‘Rape and working with victims of sexual assault is not thought to be 
stressful? 
A: Well it is not recognised as being. The administration probably don't 
recognise it, other than policies about how long officers should do that sort of 
work…. somewhere there is a direction about transferring people onto other 
types of work….’ (CAT 12) 
There are other ways to avoid burnout. Redefining Police goals can lessen burnout, as 
happened in London where the Metropolitan Police defined successful police 
interventions as those which contributed to victim recovery. Treating victims well 
gained positive feedback from victims as well as small gains in legal successes which 
also provided positive reinforcement for investigators. Other rewards can also be built 
into the job structure, such as assigning prestige to sexual assault work on the basis of 
its rigorous training in evidence gathering (Blair, 1985), and linking this to promotion. 
Lastly, working closely with partner agencies in a team environment provides palpable 
support so that police do not feel isolated in doing the work (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; 
Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994). In this research, partnership maintenance meetings were 
frequently interpreted as outlet forums for police.  
‘Some of those *** meetings that you sat in on really just end up by being 
debriefing meetings for the police.’ (DSAC 2)  
In contrast to police, DSAC, support/advocacy agencies, and CYFS social workers 
recognised that stress management was important and understood the role of support 
and the peer review which is a characteristic of SARTs (Lonsway, 2001). For instance, 
SafeCare crisis interventionists and Napier Victim Support debriefed after every case. 
Wellington HELP reported regular debriefing and Palmerston North Victim Support 
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volunteers received monthly supervision with more available if needed. Even in smaller 
areas, DSAC had established support through rural coordinators, telephone and email 
contacts, and a network of DSAC peers to approach for mentoring. Along with 
normalising appropriate responses and improving quality assurance, this gave an 
opportunity to debrief and was routine.  
‘We are getting stricter and stricter about peer review. So we encourage it and it 
is probably happening with almost all cases.’ (DSAC 11)  
That these safety valves were seldom accessed by police may be a reason for problems 
reported in their responses to victims.    
The findings so far show that not only does the ASA Policy need to be strengthened but 
also that its police-specific tenets have not yet been implemented. Intra-agency 
mechanisms such as specialist squads, specialist training, specially selected officers, 
supervision, evaluation, and caring for the psychological wellbeing of staff are 
important to building police expertise but have not been given a chance to do so.  
Non-Government (Community) Partner Organisations 
Along with intra-agency factors, police ability to develop expertise in responsiveness to 
victims also depends on interagency factors and in particular, the extent to which 
medical/forensic and support/advocacy agencies are able to partner police. New Zealand 
volunteer community organisations have emerged from a focus on improving services. 
Having that motivation, where difficulties existed for agencies in partnering police, 
these were expected to relate to the capacity issues which are perennially problematic 
when women attempt to ameliorate the social conditions in which they live.  
‘Generation of resources has been a long time problem for the women's 
voluntary sector and facing the same problems of over-work and under-
resourcing is a daunting prospect for many groups.’ (Jones, 2004, p.6) 
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Since the history of RCCs confirms longstanding and widespread capacity problems for 
women’s community organisations, these are considered here in analysing their ability 
to partner New Zealand police. Specifically examined are the organisation, funding 
support, staffing, training, and facilities of DSAC and specialist support/advocacy 
organisations.   
Medical Forensic Services - Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care 
(DSAC) and Police Medical Officers  
In contrast to government involvement overseas, New Zealand Government has had no 
role in initiating or implementing coordination, training, or accreditation for the 
medical/forensic work necessitated by sexual violence (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). 
For that reason, a voluntary association of doctors supported by a national office was 
established on the initiative of a few female General Practitioners (GPs) (DSAC, 1996, 
2002, Shand & Milford, 1993) 
‘It was formed in 1988 to advance knowledge and improve the standards of 
medical care of those affected by sexual abuse in response to the fact that female 
doctors were increasingly seeing people who had been sexually assaulted and 
who would present in their surgeries, and who had either had no care, or little 
care, or inadequate care. And then the realisation that there were no standards 
or policies or protocols for the medical profession around the medical care of 
victims of sexual assault.’ (DSAC National Coordinator, 2003) 
Accordingly, DSAC aimed to provide specialist medical/forensic services and expert 
court testimony nationwide.  
In getting started, an initial two-year seeding grant from government departments 
enabled a DSAC National Coordinator to be employed. The seeding grant also enabled 
specific projects including the first edition of From Recognition to Recovery (DSAC 
National Coordinator, 2003). However, since 1990 apart from Accident Compensation 
Corporation (ACC) funding for an updated version of this manual there has been no 
further government funding either for DSAC or any medical/forensic service 
development.  
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‘There is a lack of recognition, particularly I feel from health services - from 
DHBs15 - that this is a health issue and that's where I see most of the funding 
should be coming from…. If we just did the forensic care and not the therapeutic 
care the cases would take half the time, but you know ethically that is not 
possible. You can't separate the two.’ (DSAC 2) 
Yet all aspects of medical/forensic care have an impact on the health of victims. 
Immediate and follow-up physical care has an obvious relationship to health. Less 
obvious is that medical attention informed by the psychosocial consequences of rape 
mitigates later psychological and somatic consequences of rape (Astbury, 2006; Bard & 
Sangrey cited in Winkel et al., 1991; Koss, 1990; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Green, 
1988; McCombie et al., 1976; Roberts cited in Lees & Gregory, 1993). Even less 
obvious is that skilled forensic examinations and expert witness testimony have 
therapeutic potential in contributing to the proving of guilt, thereby restoring the 
victim’s world view and perceptions of safety.  
While the Ministry of Health has yet to understand the need to comprehensively fund 
medical/forensic services, others in official positions do understand this as Health’s 
obligation. 
‘I would still challenge *** District Health Boards and things like that by saying 
that their role is in that field and in talking of preventive health, you are talking 
Health, you know, like you can't worm your way out of that . …and ideally … 
that's where it needs to be picked up and run and coordinated. … Like there 
would be organisations that would be better served by actually pressurising the 
statutory body that they think is the most appropriate for their needs and getting 
them to come on in. …That's were it needs to sit because you know, the statistics 
prove that sexual violence, with women, is a major dollar. It costs heaps.’ 
(SCC 2) 
That ongoing ‘pressurising’ has been forthcoming in ‘hundreds of political meetings 
over the years’, but has been ignored.  
                                                 
15
 District Health Boards 
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‘It [specialist medical/forensic services] is continually at risk until these 
positions for the people that are doing the work and doing the educating and 
supporting the peer review are salaried positions under Health. I mean, we don't 
depend for cancer care on a bunch of doctors having a professional voluntary 
organisation providing a service for New Zealanders. Why should we for sexual 
assault?’ (DSAC 2) 
Rather DSAC's work has been enabled through self-funded projects, registrations, and 
the Geddes Philanthropic Trust (DSAC National Coordinator).  
Many aspects of DSAC work would benefit from government funding. Training is 
comprehensive and includes: regular peer review; a buddy system; access to a teaching 
video; and national seminars at which internationally-recognised speakers address 
medical and psychological care (DSAC, 2002). In addition, the national office provides 
educational and research support through a: liaison directory of sexual assault services; 
journal club; general practice guide; medical manual; and quarterly newsletter. Despite 
this specialist training, District Health Boards (DHBs) appear not to recognise adult 
sexual assault as requiring a specialist medical response. Yet in contrast, Courts 
materially recognise DSAC-trained doctors as expert witnesses and Police fund basic 
forensic training weekends annually (DSAC National Coordinator). Funding for 
associated costs, such as travel, training venue, and accommodation continue to be 
covered by DSAC and its members.  
Accreditation through a subcommittee which meets three monthly is a DSAC member-
funded rather than a Health-funded venture. Yet DSAC members have concerns about 
the ongoing ability to set, maintain, and monitor standards even though these are 
DSAC’s core business.  
‘That requires a lot of work from a small group of people and it's never been 
funded. To encourage our doctors to go for accreditation needs an 
infrastructure to support that and if doesn't get funded sooner or later, we will 
run out of doctors that are prepared to do that for nothing.’ (DSAC National 
Coordinator, 2003)  
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In addition to concerns about ongoing ability to provide training and accreditation 
systems, and reflecting much earlier international concerns (Bryant & Cirel, 1977), 
DHBs have not routinely provided suitable premises and equipment for initial 
examinations or follow-up services.   
‘There is no one responsible for making sure there are doctors trained up to do 
this work or make sure that there are adequate facilities. DSAC are not service 
providers, so the funding of provision of sexual assault services is extremely 
variable throughout the country.’ (DSAC 6) 
‘They haven't got a computer with email. Their camera failed the other day. 
They took photos of injuries to a vagina and they didn't come out all. I think 
because of funding they just have not been able to move into the 20th century.’ 
(CAT Manager 1) 
This was in spite of the Ministry of Health contracting and funding DHB’s sexual health 
services to include medical examinations of sexual assault victims (DSAC 8C; 6; 7; Tier 
Two specifications).  
‘It is actually in the sexual health service specifications that Health Boards put 
out but there aren't many sexual health services which take it on.’ (DSAC 6) 
Only three sexual health services were found to regularly meet their DHB-specified 
obligations. Most doctors reported that DHBs did not provide funding for either sexual 
assault work or specialist facilities for examinations. Only nine of the twenty Areas had 
access to DHB medical facilities. In most Districts GPs still needed to use their own 
rooms for examinations. This meant that in contrast to working with permanently 
accessible equipment as in the specialist SARC premises, DSAC-trained doctors work 
from Police-provided portable medical examination kits. The multipurpose nature of 
premises raises issues of contamination and decontamination when compared with 
overseas practice. Notably SARCS are decontaminated after each patient and 
thoroughly decontaminated every six months (Metropolitan Police Sexual Assault 
Policy). These shortcomings continue despite DSAC’s lengthy and ongoing public 
advocacy and lobbying of government for the premises which would enable holistic 
care in concert with Police and support/advocacy agencies (DSAC, 1996, 2002; Shand 
& Milford, 1993). 
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Since DSAC-trained doctors voluntarily meet the sexual assault service needs which the 
Ministry of Health has neglected, most are paid for only part of the work they do. 
Medical/forensic examinations are financed by Police unless at the time of examination 
a woman is unsure about reporting to Police. In this situation, a contract in place with 
ACC enables funding of examinations by doctors who are ACC-accredited. Paid work 
also includes expert court testimony which is paid for by the Department of Courts 
(DSAC 2). In most Districts, unpaid time includes being on call for medical/forensic 
examinations. Exceptions found in this research were: the three Auckland Districts 
where doctors are paid by the DHB for two and a half days a week; the Eastern District 
where Police Medical Officers are paid a retainer; and Rotorua where Police paid 
DSAC-trained doctors an on-call allowance until DSAC coverage was lost in 2004. 
Unpaid time also includes on-call time for court, court preparation work, and training. It 
is evident that most of the financial support in DSAC’s development of an expert 
medical/forensic response comes from the legal systems rather than the Health budget. 
Notwithstanding the lack of funding and organisational support, operational coverage 
by DSAC-trained doctors continues but with difficulties in the adult field which derive 
from recruitment difficulties. Contributing to these are doctors’ family commitments, 
antisocial hours and nature of medical/forensic work, and doctors’ concerns regarding 
their skills, role, and treatment as expert witnesses in court. Additionally, lack of 
adequate remuneration for: being on call for examinations and court appearances; court 
attendance; report writing; and medical assessments is problematic. Many of these 
concerns are reflected in O’Shea’s (2006) nationally-based study of Ireland’s services. 
In addition, medical/forensic examinations often present as acute issues and create 
conflict with private practice responsibilities. This conflict is mitigated somewhat in 
Wellington, Whangarei, and the three Auckland Districts, where if an examination was 
required during normal working hours this could often be incorporated into sexual 
health service schedules.  
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Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, and Eastern Districts were all reported as having 
DSAC rosters. In other Areas visited, police called through their lists of DSAC-trained 
doctors. Areas which are not able to be covered by DSAC are served by Police Medical 
Officers on retainer to Police. Police Medical Officers often have at least some DSAC 
training, but many are male and this may pose a problem for some women (Jordan, 
1998). When no specialist was available a variety of other medical practitioners were 
contacted through after-hours clinics, GP practices, Family Planning or Sexual Health 
Clinics (DSAC 5A). Coverage relates not only to numbers of DSAC-trained doctors but 
also to distance. Victims of sexual assault were invariably reported as having to travel to 
where doctors were available in order that other patients were not disadvantaged by 
doctors’ travel requirements. In sometimes occupying hours of travel for police, victim, 
and support/advocate, these trips were exhausting for the victim and disadvantageous in 
removing her from familiar surroundings and support base.  
Ultimately, despite DSAC’s endeavours, 24-hour specialist medical/forensic coverage 
has not been possible nationwide. It has been particularly difficult for volunteer doctors 
to respond during normal working hours, and since most DHBs do not meet their Tier 
Two specifications victims are often subjected to lengthy waits. In conflict with their 
Policy, this means police regularly interview before the medical/forensic examination.   
‘If they say they can't be here for a couple of hours, the staff might start a 
statement and then take a break for the medical and then continue it on 
afterwards.’ (CIB 9) 
In contrast to Metropolitan Police practice, interim measures for evidence collection 
were seldom found, meaning that victims were unable to wash, change clothing, drink, 
or urinate while waiting. That police and victims are placed in this position by DHB 
neglect is untenable and indefensible. 
Figure 2 below summarises the funding and availability of specialist medical/forensic 
services and highlights the lack of resource support from DHBs. Rather, specialist 
medical/forensic services are only available because individual doctors have 
volunteered to provide them and had the ability to do so, often at some personal cost.  
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Figure 2: DSAC Coverage and Funding  
 
District Funding Coverage 
Northland Kaitaia   
 Kaikohe  DSAC-trained doctor in Rawene 
or Kaikohe  
 Dargaville  One DSAC doctor in Dargaville. 
Otherwise Whangarei. 
 Whangarei As for Central Two DSAC-trained doctors 
Northshore/ Waitakere/ 
Rodney 
Auckland City 
Counties Manukau 
DHB funding for: 50% working week; 
limited nurse time; daytime premises. 
Department of courts pays for court 
time but not on call for court 
Daytime DSAC cover for 
Monday, Wednesday, and half of 
Tuesday. A/H 10 DSAC on call – 
episodic coverage difficulty  
Waikato  Four DSAC-trained doctors; 
occasionally recourse to DSAC-
trained Police Medical Officers 
Bay of Plenty Police fund examinations; $100 
weekly retainer; some funding for 
training 
Roster. (Since data-gathering, 
Rotorua DSAC capacity lost.) 
Eastern PMOs receive retainer. As for Central Five Police Medical Officers - 
two are DSAC trained 
Central  Police; ACC for non-forensics; 
Ministry of Justice for court time 
No DSAC for adults; two Police 
Medical Officers with some 
DSAC training 
Wellington Police, ACC and Wellington 
Independent Practitioners Association  
Good coverage also DSAC 
nurses 
Tasman Nelson 
 Motueka 
As for Central Two DSAC-trained doctors; two 
pending; not rostered 
 Blenheim  Two DSAC doctors 
 Greymouth 
 Westport 
Police; Sexual Health for non 
forensics; travel and accommodation 
costs paid 
by Police/DHB 50/50; DHB facilities  
One DSAC doctor – otherwise 4 
hour trip to Christchurch or 
Nelson 
Canterbury Independent Practitioners Association; 
Police 
6-8 doctors also DSAC nurses 
Southern As for Central Five DSAC-trained doctors 
rostered; nurse available  
Support/Advocacy Services: Victim Support and Specialist 
Agencies: Partnership Capacities 
In some Areas, sexual assault support work is done by the Police-affiliated Victim 
Support. Victim Support was established in New Zealand in 1990 in response to the 
1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power. This included acknowledgement of the rights of victims to: be treated with 
compassion by criminal justice authorities; be kept informed of occurrences; be duly 
compensated; and have access to the best available support services (Maloney, cited in 
Easteal, 1993). In New Zealand, the declaration also resulted in Victim of Offences Acts 
(1987, 2002) which placed obligations on officials to treat victims in certain ways.  
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Victim Support are located in or adjacent to police stations and coordinate a range of 
volunteer support for victims of all crime, including referrals to other agencies. Victim 
Support was available in all stations visited, although one group had disaffiliated from 
the national organisation and become Support for Victims. However, this organisation 
still worked closely with police and remained housed in the police station.  
Because the argument of this thesis is for specialist services, specialist agency capacity 
to partner police is discussed in greater depth. New Zealand specialist agency origins 
reflect those of their counterparts overseas in being grassroots and resource-poor. As 
Campbell and Ahrens (1998), Gilson (1997), and Harvey (1985) found for agencies 
overseas, these origins have contributed to local level adaptations and variations in 
specialist support/advocacy agencies here. This similarly renders redundant any attempt 
to encapsulate the agencies in one overarching description. The first of many similar 
RCCs formed in Auckland in 1975 aiming to: empower and support rape victims; study 
the nature and incidence of sexual offences; provide education to change attitudes to 
rape; and instigate legislative change (Lloyd, 1976). A separate development was of 
HELP organisations, the first being established in Auckland in 1982 with the aim of 
providing services in conjunction with police.  
While New Zealand specialist agency structures are variable, there is philosophical 
congruence with feminist RCC aims in the US, Britain and Australia. All of 
New Zealand’s agencies aim to prevent rape and to provide cost-free specialist services 
to all women who have been victims of sexual violence, regardless of whether legal 
processes are invoked. Crucially, the specialist nature of these services means that 
support/advocates have knowledge of the range of victims’ reactions. Combined with 
their knowledge of and skilled support through potentially victimising aspects of legal 
processes, this awareness enables support/advocates to mitigate any negative effects 
which might accompany these processes. Although they are only varyingly available, 
the following is a composite of the services which can be provided in supporting victims 
and their supporters through the legal processes. It was developed by asking specialist 
agencies what they do and triangulating this data in interviews with police, participant 
observation, and through source documents describing services. 
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Before the initial statement/report taking, support/advocates explain the legal and medical 
processes, and the assistance and support they can provide throughout these. If support is 
declined, contact details are left to assure later access. If support is accepted, crisis 
intervention, practical support, and counselling skills are available irrespective of whether 
charges are proceeded with. During the medical/forensic examination, assistance includes 
providing moral support and practical assistance, such as organising equipment, if no nurse 
is available. Afterwards, responsibility is assumed for organising replacement clothing. If 
there is stand-down time before the main interview, support/advocates along with police 
ensure that systems are in place to ensure the victim is safe and supported. This can include 
organising transport to safe accommodation and remaining with her until other company is 
arranged.  
Assistance during the formal interview includes moral support and advocacy, and these 
interventions are based on specialist knowledge in interpreting victim presentations and 
statements. Specialist knowledge enables modifications to police questioning or 
proceedings if police and victim are at an impasse or the victim is felt to be under undue 
stress.  
During the ongoing investigation, support/advocates provide support by: accompanying 
the complainant on trips to the crime scene; being available as an alternative contact; 
and fielding enquiries as to case progression. Ongoing physical and psychological safety 
is ensured through counselling referrals and later, checking for compatibility between 
victim and counsellor. Assistance with applications for ACC funding is available, as are 
referrals and assistance with securing other services, for instance through Work and 
Income New Zealand (WINZ) who assist with long-term alternative accommodation 
and income.  
In the event of a prosecution, support/advocates, often in conjunction with police, 
prepare the complainant for Court by familiarising her with the courtroom and court 
processes. During trial proceedings, a supportive presence is provided at court. 
Assistance is also available in preparing Victim Impact statements. Lastly, 
support/advocates prepare the victim for a not guilty finding and help her deal with the 
psychological ramifications when this happens. Regardless of the outcome, they ensure 
the victim is debriefed after court. Ideally, the same support/advocate provides 
assistance at all stages of these processes. 
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The findings on New Zealand’s support/advocacy service capacity reveal that many of 
the funding issues which beset medical/forensic services also compromise the ability to 
offer support/advocacy services. While many agencies offered the full services provided 
overseas, all agencies had the constant funding problems which are still found in 
overseas studies (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). This contributed to difficulty in 
providing a full range of support services throughout the processes. Some agencies have 
had to drop some services, expand beyond sexual assault work, or simply close. 
Consequently, the range of services offered between support/advocacy agencies is wide. 
At one end of the spectrum agency 5A offered: a 24/7 crisis line; information about 
options within the legal process; support and advocacy throughout all  legal processes; a 
go-between for the victim and police; assistance with domestic relocation; victim and 
family counselling; pamphlets; a reference library; and referrals. In contrast, despite 
being based in a large city, agency 6 offered only coordination of and support during the 
medical/forensic examination; coordination of counselling; pamphlets; and a 24/7 crisis 
line.16 
Due to these funding problems, agency crisis lines seemed particularly vulnerable, with 
their loss implying the loss of alternative reporting forums. 
‘With [regards to] funding, we couldn't actually keep the 24-hour crisis line 
going.  So I think that impacted on what referrals we got, and then we only had 
***  in here three days a week trying to get volunteer money to bring in other 
people other days of the week, so it is a matter of being accessible and we are 
not as accessible as we should be.’ (5C) 
This is a persistent finding, also mentioned by Jordan (1998) in commenting on 
difficulties for some victims in being unable to access support when they needed it.  
Other services were also vulnerable, as indicated by the manager of an agency which 
had taken on the work of a specialist rape-responsive centre which had been forced into 
closure. 
                                                 
16
 This organisation has now extended support to encompass other legal processes. 
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‘The thing that underpins the work, which is always a difficulty, is the funding… 
What price the safety of women and children in this country? They will spend 
$3 million on a ticker tape parade for Peter Jackson and $4 million for a whole 
year’s worth of work for Refuge. There is no understanding of it. It is criminal! 
It is frustrating that we could do a better job if we had better funding. We could 
do more. We need an outreach worker. We are only scraping the surface really. 
We are waiting for people to report to us. We are not doing nearly enough 
preventative work, and even our support work [pause]. If we could employ 
another two people, the number of contacts that we make with the women would 
be more [pause] It would be just a far better service, but underpinning the whole 
lot of our ability to become stronger, is the funding.’ (Manager 8E) 
Agencies also spoke of a ‘frustrating amount’ (Manager 1) of time being spent on 
accessing funding. This translated to 50% of one manager’s time (Manager 6), while 
many other agencies reported employing specially designated fundraisers. Having to 
spend this time was frequently reported as impacting on core business.  
A: ‘…we had a discussion yesterday about how much energy and time gets taken 
up with talking about money and how to procure it so that the real work doesn't 
get done…. 
Q: ‘How much agency time is spent in fundraising? 
A: Heaps! We have leadership team meetings once a week and at the moment 
they are stretching to twice a week and often go to seven or eight o'clock at 
night. And they are inevitably about money and how to get more of it. 
Q: Which stops you from doing your core business? 
A: Yep, and we have a Business Manager whose sole function really is to look at 
the budgets and cash flow and all that money stuff, and we have a funding 
person who's job it is to do grant applications so there’s a lot of hours that go 
into chasing money.’ (2) 
Despite the time and energy that went into securing funding sources, funding was 
unable to be taken for granted. 
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‘You never know from one month to the next, or one funding round to the next 
what we will, or if we'll get [pause] Somehow, I wouldn't say they were reliable. 
… Many times over the last 10 or 11 years we've come within two weeks of 
closing…and yet we are the first port of call for schools and colleges, nurses, 
and hospitals.’ (Manager 1) 
One agency described their list of potential sources as ‘pages long’, indicating just how 
piecemeal funding was and how much time was spent trying to access it. These 
difficulties appear unchanged in New Zealand since at least 1983 (Vanderpyl, 2001; 
Young, 1996). The variety of sources were a combination of government and non-
government organisations including: CYFS, ACC; WINZ; DHBs; local councils; Police 
diversion schemes; Police Officers’ Guild 17; lottery board, sausage sizzles, annual 
street collections; Community Organisation Grants Scheme; business donations; 
charitable trusts; suffrage day; mail-outs; telemarketing, Lions; and women’s sporting 
tournaments. These variable funding sources limit the relevance of theoretical concerns 
expressed overseas about funding from government agencies compromising radical 
activity (Campbell & Martin, 2001; Gilson, 1997; Jones, 2004; Mathews, 1994; Mawby 
& Gill, 1987).  
Even the government-mandated Victim Support was expected to find a percentage of its 
own funding.  
‘We provide a 24 hour service seven days a week, and we have got one paid 
person to coordinate all of that [funding] in 5A.’ (Manager) 
Pecuniary issues also led to human resource problems. Although many support/advocacy 
managers had been in their positions for a number of years, finding and keeping volunteers 
was constantly challenging, as has also been found by Ullman & Townsend (2007). Only 
three of the eighteen agencies were fully staffed by fully paid employees, yet the need for 
paid workers in the interests of providing a professional service was acknowledged 
(Manager 4). All other agencies were staffed by a combination of paid and volunteer 
workers. 
                                                 
17
 The Guild is the Commissioned Officer equivalent of the Police Association.  
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Funding issues also affected the ability of some New Zealand support/advocacy 
agencies to remain single function. Concerns have been raised overseas regarding the 
ability of multipurpose agencies and those embedded with other community agencies to 
focus on sexual assault work (Byington et al., 1991; Martin et al., 1992; O’Sullivan & 
Carlton, 2001). For that reason, it was important to examine the issues around 
multipurpose agencies in New Zealand. Blenheim’s Sexual Assault Resource Centre, 
Motueka’s Women’s Support Link, and Kerkeri’s Mid-North Family Support Group are 
the specialist multipurpose agencies. These organisations are all located in smaller 
districts where survival of their services was dependent on broadening of the client base, 
as has happened elsewhere (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). This has been recommended 
in Britain.  
‘Certainly in areas where the number of rapes per year would not justify a 
SARC, consideration should be given to whether a wider remit would garner 
greater supports.’ (Lovett et al., 2004, p.78) 
Correspondingly, Women’s Support Link and Mid North Family Support Group 
broadened to incorporate domestic violence, and the latter has broadened further to 
include other community issues which affect men. However, unlike their overseas 
counterparts, many of which have become embedded with state or other community 
organisations, all New Zealand groups remain independent and community-based.  
In contrast to O’Sullivan and Carlton’s (2001) finding that multipurpose centres heard 
from the fewest rape victims, in incorporating domestic violence Women’s Support 
Link reported that this had resulted in many more disclosures of sexual assault. I had 
expected this because centres which incorporate responsiveness to domestic and sexual 
violence create a net-widening effect as those reporting domestic violence also disclose 
sexual violence as a feature of such violence. Since ‘it goes hand-in-hand with domestic 
violence’, Blenheim’s Sexual Assault Resource Centre had incorporated sexual violence 
into pre-existing domestic violence work when the local Rape Crisis collapsed 
(Manager). Similarly, in District 10 where the specialist agency had folded, a domestic 
violence agency now also responded to many women who made associated complaints 
of sexual violence.   
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Also in contrast to O’Sullivan and Carlton’s (2001) concern about ‘siphoning off’ 
sexual assault resources, comparison between New Zealand’s multi and single function 
specialist agencies showed that these offered a similar range of rape-related services. 
Rather than being siphoned off, multi-function specialist organisations’ services more 
closely resembled single purpose specialist services than they resembled services of the 
embedded and multi-function Victim Support. This is important since in seven Areas, 
four of which have specialist agencies, police access Victim Support’s services even for 
victims of sexual violence. In contrast to Victim Support, Blenheim’s multi-function 
Sexual Assault Resource Centre offered specialist 24/7 crisis intervention as well as: 
practical and crisis intervention support through all processes; written resources; 
counselling for family and friends; information about court and medical processes; and 
referrals to other counselling services. Of particular concern is that no Victim Support 
group offered a 24/7 rape-specific crisis line which meant that there was no alternative 
reporting forum and no readily accessible professional support if victims chose not to 
report to Police. 
With agency resources in question, the ability to provide expertise in responding to 
clients was clarified. Overall, the motivation to improve services and the commitment to 
maintain the organisations against the odds were also manifest in the dedication to the 
training which underpinned those services. Some agencies began the process by 
screening crisis interventionists, and finished induction training by assessing learning 
outcomes. Buddying of new crisis interventionists was common. Topics covered in 
training included: code of ethics; categories of rape; myths; advocacy; crisis phone 
response; grief and loss; support work; gender socialisation; effects of rape; policy; 
philosophy; listening; maintaining boundaries; history and structure of the organisation; 
meeting the police and DSAC doctor; police, medical, and court procedures; debriefing; 
stress management; and supervision. Due in part to this extensive training, many 
support/advocates had ‘textbook’ knowledge in interview. 
Training of support/advocates was also ongoing.  
‘Our training is ongoing. We have to forever up-skill.’ (5A) 
National and DSAC conferences were frequently attended, although limited funding 
compromised attendance at these and other training opportunities.  
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‘We would go to every training that was offered if we could, but the logistics of 
the travel and accommodation….’ (5D) 
For counsellors attached to support/advocacy groups, the qualifications were 
professional and gained in tertiary institutions. Many were also ACC-accredited which 
meant that under 2007 guidelines, the first 30 counselling sessions were funded by 
government.18 In addition, as Vanderpyl (2001) has also found, many crisis 
interventionists were also professional counsellors.  
‘All these women have been to the Auckland Institute of Technology. They have 
paid for the training themselves. The collective has supported them with travel 
and accommodation funding, and for specialised workshops, specialised 
training.’ (5D) 
Other agencies had professional counselling as an integral function which meant potential 
for transfer of knowledge within agencies. As Campbell et al. (1999) concluded RCCs are 
well-placed to train police about the mental health effects of rape and systems interventions.  
In summary, as with medical/forensic services there was substantial dedication and 
commitment to improving support/advocacy services, but also funding issues and 
difficulties in recruiting volunteers which hampered the ability to provide nationwide 
coverage. Although formal national training and accreditation processes were not found 
amongst support/advocacy organisations, training was important, ongoing, and 
conducted at local levels. What needs to be understood now is why, despite their 
longstanding dedication to improving services, these two groups of specialists have 
been unable to achieve the recognition, funding, and support from official bodies which 
is requisite to guaranteeing that essential services are not constantly compromised. One 
answer appears to be in the variable implementation of national coordination between 
the three crisis intervention organisations, and this is discussed next.  
                                                 
18
 Increased from 10 sessions in 2006 
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National and Regional Coordination: Role in Mediating Service 
Provision  
There are two principal arguments for why national coordination of Police, 
medical/forensic and support/advocacy organisations is important in establishing 
specialist holistic sexual assault services nationwide. Firstly, national coordination can 
lead to resource-sharing as well as disseminating knowledge of, and training in, 
standards of service delivery both within and between agencies. As Blair (1985) found 
in the US, without national coordination, in some Areas good practice is unlikely to be 
known, developed, implemented, or evaluated, and the potential for service variability is 
limitless. Secondly, if national coordination is achieved between and within all three 
services, this will provide strong national voices in lobbying for the greater government 
involvement which I have argued as vital in leading development.  
Yet when I examined New Zealand’s services, I found that there was no national 
coordination between all three crisis intervention organisations. However, in 
approaching the Police Executive in October 2004, DSAC have taken the initiative to 
begin coordinating police and medical/forensic services on a national basis (personal 
knowledge). That DSAC is the organisation which has taken this step is due to its own 
exemplary model of national coordination and consequent ability to speak with one 
voice. DSAC have achieved this through establishing: an elected executive with 
president and treasurer; a DSAC national office with a project coordinator and 
secretary; regional coordination in 20 regions; and coverage of most of the country 
(DSAC, 2002). DSACs national coordination is also managed through an annual 
general meeting of the 23 regional coordinators, national peer review, and regional peer 
review meetings. This national model is unique amongst sexual violence service 
providers in New Zealand and internationally. It has been described by an Australian 
doctor at a DSAC-hosted national conference in Canterbury as being the envy of 
Australia’s medical/forensic doctors (conference attendance, June 2003). As such, it 
provides an exemplar of good practice in New Zealand, not only in national 
coordination but also in its training and accreditation processes.  
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In contrast, specialist support/advocacy agencies have struggled in the past and continue 
to struggle to maintain national coordination. A national collective of RCCs was 
maintained for 10 years but its gradual disintegration culminated in formal dissolution 
in 2002 owing to differing opinions over decision-making processes. Motivated in part 
by an Auckland HELP funding crisis, recognition of the need for a national voice has 
inspired initiatives to re-establish national coordination. At the 2005 ‘Heal the Hurt’ 
Conference, agencies agreed to form a national steering committee to establish a 
national alliance, the National Network for Ending Sexual Violence Together (NNEST) 
(personal attendance). While this committee is operational and the process has begun, 
its meetings remain difficult due to the local commitments and limited resources of its 
members.  
Unlike medical/forensic and support/advocacy organisations, until very recently Police 
did not have national coordination of adult sexual assault services. According to the 
New Zealand Police Statement of Intent (2005/2006), the ASA Policy has been the 
‘specific intervention programme’ to reduce sexual violence. However, the Policy has 
never mandated a coordinator to oversee its implementation on a national basis. Rather, 
where coordination has been considered it has been mandated at District level as the 
responsibility of District Commanders.  
District-based coordination has relied on District Commanders appointing the Policy-
mandated Sexual Assault District Coordinators (SADCs). SADC Policy-defined 
responsibilities include: liaising with support agencies and medical staff; ensuring local 
training; ensuring sufficient staff; supervising and evaluating staff; monitoring all 
complaint files and therefore evaluating service; and disseminating information. These 
responsibilities placed SADCs in a strong position to provide District-wide 
coordination. In addition, if the 12 SADCs were to meet regularly, this coordination 
could have provided much of the framework for the national coordination required to 
ensure the ASA Policy and national directives were known and followed. It would also 
have ensured the upward communication of District-based problems with Policy 
compliance.   
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Despite its potential for national coordination, I found that the SADC position has not 
been implemented as mandated. Firstly, there has been only one attempt to bring 
SADCs together. This was through a two day seminar in May 1999 which was intended 
to provide education and information for SADCs. In a wasted opportunity, since few 
SADCs had been formally appointed to the role, the seminar was attended by District 
representatives from a variety of ranks who were simply nominated to attend (personal 
attendance). The failure of the seminar to consolidate the SADC role was apparent in 
2003/2004 when interviews with SADC were sought. In the still regular absence of 
identifiable District SADCs, I was usually referred instead to Crime Service Managers 
(CSMs). Only Counties Manukau and Canterbury had CSMs who operated in a District-
wide SADC role and both did so in conjunction with their pre-existing CSM 
responsibilities. Neither had achieved all eight SADC functions described in the Policy, 
but both had undertaken to ensure at least a degree of partnership maintenance.  
In the 10 other Districts, CSMs varied considerably in their knowledge of the SADC 
role with most acknowledging that no formal attempts had been made to ensure it was 
filled. In these Districts, the SADC role devolved to CIB supervisors meaning that to 
the extent SADC coordination possibilities could be implemented this was only within 
Areas rather than District-wide. Yet it was common for those in charge of local CIB to 
be supervising these staff without having received any Policy training.  
‘I'm not that familiar with the adult Policy it would be fair to say. I guess there 
is no training given on the Policy itself. Well not that I am aware of anyway. I 
have never been trained in the Policy.’ (CIB Supervisor 5C)  
Even CIB supervisors who were nominated as SADC respondents for this research were 
unfamiliar with the Policy.  
Q: ‘How aware are you of what is in the Policy? 
A: It doesn't mean a lot to me. We just [pause] just each crime is taken on its 
merits and its face value. Like, as every woman comes in she is just trusted and 
we go from there and we just use everyone who is available to us to investigate 
her complaint. 
Q: How easy is the Policy to adhere to in that case? 
A: I don't really know the Policy, so I wouldn't know… I don't know the detail of 
the Policy, so I wouldn't know how easy it was to adhere to.’ (CIB Supervisor 7)  
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The SADC role was described in the ASA Policy which meant that those SADCs who 
were unfamiliar with the ASA Policy were also unlikely to know their SADC 
obligations. One of these obligations was to disseminate Policy knowledge. This seldom 
happened and in common with some of their supervisors, many CIB investigators were 
ignorant of Policy expectations.  
‘I am aware that we are supposed to work in partnership in accordance with the 
Adult Sexual Abuse Policy, but with regards to whether individuals or 
investigators are fully aware of that Policy is a different story.’ 
(CIB Supervisor 4) 
This was also clear during the 2005 ASA course for experienced detectives which 
provided the ASA Policy as pre-reading.   
‘I know for sure the protocol has got a lot of people talking because a lot of 
them haven't seen it.’ (CIB 8C) 
Accordingly, I found that only those who had attended the course were versed in ASA 
Policy requirements. Many other CIB appeared not to know even of its existence.  
‘I would hazard a guess and say that a lot of staff here wouldn't even know that 
there is an Adult Sexual Abuse Policy.’ (CIB Supervisor 6) 
In her Commission of Inquiry Report, Bazley (2007) too has commented that ASA 
Policy knowledge was not routinely held.  
Not only has Policy information dissemination not been coordinated nationally, Police 
failure to achieve national coordination of sexual assault services through SADCs 
means that services have never been evaluated nationally. Yet national evaluations are 
necessary to the maintenance of standards and improvement of services (Edelson & 
Bible, 2001; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). There has also 
been no national audit of ASA Policy implementation since its inception. Nor has the 
Policy been evaluated in its relevance or practicability in New Zealand’s frontline 
conditions. In short, nothing has been instituted by Police to inform either progress or 
even the need for progress. Failure to coordinate their sexual assault services on a 
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national basis has had direct and identifiable outcomes for nationwide quality assurance 
in police practice. 
In the absence of government commitment to improving services through national 
coordination, service improvements have relied on the focus, motivation, commitment 
and capacity of individual organisations. These factors are all recognisable in DSAC’s 
systems which were formed specifically from concern for the adverse circumstances 
and effects of medical/forensic examinations and the wish to mitigate these. The failure 
of Police and support/advocacy organisations to replicate the national and regional 
coordination which have assisted DSAC in providing exemplary systems for care needs 
further explanation.  
As already argued, the implicitly caring nature of the GP role lends to the focus on, 
motivation, and commitment to provide a response based on principles of care. GP 
ability to commit considerable personal time to medical/forensic work and advocacy for 
improved systems has been attributed to the relative financial security of medical 
professionals (DSAC National Coordinator, 2003).  Further underscoring the need for 
strong financial support, the commitment to developing not only national coordination, 
but also a specialist body of medical/forensic knowledge, also derives from the paid 
nature of medical/forensic work within the legal system.  
Support/Advocates have had similar focus and motivation to GPs, but in contrast to the 
material recognition of medical/forensic services, support/advocates have not been paid 
for their services by New Zealand’s legal system. This discrepancy highlights the higher 
value placed on medical/forensic work due to its more easily recognisable value within 
the legal system and suggests the legal systems’ continuing system-centred focus. In 
contrast again, support services have not been recognised as crucial to victims and 
therefore often crucial to legal system outcomes. Since there is no direct payment for 
services and since other financial support for support/advocacy services is piecemeal, 
one aspect of their difficulty in achieving lasting national coordination is time and 
material resource constraints. The irony of this is in RCC work being both the catalyst 
for and lynchpin around which legal/forensic service quality has improved 
internationally.  
Additionally, RCC feminist origins have made for organisational decision-making 
processes which have not assisted national coordination, as evidenced in the collapse of 
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New Zealand’s national collective of RCCs. The collectivist style of feminist organisations 
developed in part as a reaction against the uses to which power could be put in hierarchical 
male organisations. Through conflating hierarchy and the misuse of power, feminist 
organisations have unnecessarily lost the leadership possibilities which hierarchical 
structures provide, by attributing to hierarchy the power to corrupt. The misuse of power 
resides within individuals and the corruption of individuals can be resisted by formal 
processes for communication and accountability. As Vanderpyl’s (2001) case study shows, 
in the absence of legitimate power through hierarchy, individuals claim power in 
illegitimate ways. This makes decision-making considerably more difficult, issues harder to 
manage, and decisions harder to implement. In this scenario, within-agency decision-
making is difficult, let alone achieving national coordination. For the very different reasons 
discussed already, Police leadership has also been slow to recognise the possibility of 
hierarchy in developing the structures within which quality assurance in processes can be 
gained.  
In contrast to medical/forensic and support/advocacy services, as a government 
organisation Police are funded and have an inbuilt infrastructure to coordinate 
nationally, and SADCs are pivotal to this. Several reasons were given by police for the 
failure to achieve national or even District coordination in the interests of improving 
sexual assault service responsiveness. One reason for District Commanders failing to 
meet the Policy obligation to appoint SADCs was that the Office of the Commissioner 
had provided no extra funding to enable the Policy to be implemented.   
Q: ‘Any extra resources to implement the Policy? 
A: No. 
Q: What about for staffing allocation? 
A: No. 
Q: It has not changed your staffing allocation? 
A: …For that Policy, no. 
Q: How is it to be implemented with no extra resources? 
A: That's a very good question. That was an issue that we raised when we 
became aware of the Policy and the way it was framed. How do you expect us to 
implement this fully? 
Q: Who raised the question? 
A: Well the Districts did, myself and other Crime Managers. How exactly do you 
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expect us to implement this? And the clear message was, within your resources 
you manage it. So we have carried on managing it within our resources.’ 
(CSM 12) 
‘We don't have the staffing to be able to look at those District coordination roles 
in terms of things like sexual abuse…We have no District view on any of those. 
… I would be interested as to how many Districts actually have Sexual Assault 
District Coordinators.’ (CSM 8) 
Police crafting policy, but overlooking its material requirements, has been reported 
subsequently (Bazley, 2007). In prior New Zealand research on Police, Miller Burgering 
(1994) found similarly that new policy in the child abuse field was not accompanied by 
allocation of resources to enable its implementation.  
Geographic spread was also given as a reason why SADCs had not been appointed 
(CSM 5). It was implied that having a whole-District SADC was unworkable.  
A: ‘It would make sense to me that in a District like this, that each of these Area 
CIBs would naturally assume the role of that liaison person’. 
Q: It is all station by station? 
A: … I would see it more probably at Area level or station level.’ (CSM 5) 
Yet geographic spread creates an even greater requirement for District-based 
coordination of services, particularly if quality assurance is to be achieved in rural 
communities. In Australia, State-wide systems have been argued as facilitating good 
practice while still allowing for necessary local level adaptations (Carmody, 1997). This 
was due to the state-wide data collection which enabled the particular needs of rural 
communities to be known and met (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). This needs assessment 
and follow-up representations for resources is a vital role for SADCs. If this 
coordination is possible in Australia’s much larger states where a ‘tyranny of distance’ 
operates, aided by electronic communication it is also possible in New Zealand’s 
Districts which are all much smaller.  
Lastly, although not stated as such, there appeared to be an element in some Districts of 
just not getting around to appointing SADCs.  
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A: ‘I can't say there has been any major specific work undertaken on that basis, 
although obviously we are aware of the general Policy, and so on…Almost by 
default I suppose I fall into that category of District coordinator role. As the 
Crime Manager the investigation responsibility ultimately rests with me, so I fall 
into that category I guess. 
Q: Was there an attempt to appoint somebody in that role? 
A: Not in the time that I have been here no. 
Q: How long? 
A: Five years. I would expect most likely it would be representatives from the 
three Areas. (CSM 12) 
This tardiness in compliance with policy has also been found by Carbonatto (1997) in 
respect to initial police responses to a new Domestic Violence Policy.  
That Policy coordination requirements have not been implemented comprehensively 
warrants some organisational analysis. Unlike DSAC and RCCs, both of whose origins 
and interest in national coordination derived solely from a focus on improving sexual 
assault services, Police is a generalist organisation with sexual violence as just one 
focus. In accord with the findings of this research, Miller Burgering (1994) found that 
coordination of responses to sexual crime had low priority. Discussing coordination in 
responding to child abuse, her finding was that this too had not been assigned resources 
by Police leadership. Taking this cue, middle management was less likely to perceive 
collaborative practice as important, and given the competition for resources was more 
likely to prioritise practice with more immediately tangible outcomes. As a result, 
development of effective relationships with specialist support services was not a 
standard achieved across the organisation. Similarly, given that the Office of the 
Commissioner has largely neglected the implementation requirements of the ASA 
Policy, this is likely to have given District Commanders their steer on the importance of 
sexual violence.  
That as a prolific and serious crime sexual violence does not feature higher in Police 
leadership priorities is likely to relate to Police prioritising what appear to them to be 
the contemporary public concerns. As Young (1996) has said, rape has not been 
prominent on the public agenda. Making Police prioritisation of sexual violence 
responsiveness even less likely is that at 83.5%, Police has a much higher representation 
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of men, particularly in the top echelons where priorities are set (Police News, 6.2007). 
As the history of the anti-rape movement shows, the awareness and energy which has 
driven improvements has been that of women.  
Congruent with these comments, the negative publicity which culminated in the 
Commission of Inquiry appears to have acted as a catalyst to strengthening coordination 
(Ainsworth, 1995). Recent signs of this are in the interest displayed by the Office of the 
Commissioner in how sexual assault services are coordinated. A questionnaire about 
coordination was sent to Districts in August 2005 and all Districts have again been 
asked to appoint one identifiable coordinator (attendance at meeting). The 2005 creation 
of the national coordinator position gives reason for optimism that SADC positions may 
become reality and allow national coordination of Police sexual assault services. If this 
happens, it will facilitate the national coordination between all three organisations 
which is vital to a shared vision, both of service requirements and the need to lobby 
government to fund and support the upgrading of services. That developing interagency 
liaison is also an aspect of this position bodes well for establishing combined national 
coordination.  
Local Coordination: Factors Which Mediate Service Quality  
Along with national coordination of and between crisis intervention organisations, local 
coordination is necessary in developing sexual assault services. Firstly, local 
coordination enables a shared vision of service requirements and in doing so, stronger 
motivation to push for the means to achieve these. In providing a combined voice, it 
also provides a stronger voice in lobbying for and maximising the support and resources 
of local government bodies in improving service responses.  
At frontline level, local coordination is also necessary in the development of expertise. 
This is through the sharing of specialist agency knowledge and ideas with police, and in 
return the sharing of Police resources with specialist agencies. Local coordination also 
provides the synergy which underpins service development through adaptations to local 
conditions. At its most practical level of advantage, local coordination is vital to the 
provision of seamless victim-oriented services. For these reasons, local coordination 
was examined in order to comment on its current potential in the evolution of 
New Zealand services.  
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Figure 3 below shows the extent to which police work with specialists in coordinated 
services. As the chart shows, the most consistent coordination at frontline level was 
police working with DSAC-trained doctors and Police Medical Officers. In contrast, 
there was wide-ranging District and Area variability in police liaison with 
support/advocacy agencies, specialist or otherwise.  
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Figure 3: Interagency Liaison – Police Working with Specialist Agencies 
District  Interview 
area 
Main partner support agency Specialist 
support agency 
Support regularly  
accessed 
Proactive inclusion 
of support 
Medical partner 
Kaitaia Support for Victims (KSV)  
Fresh Start (FS)** 
No No No As for Kaikohe 
Kaikohe Victim Support (KVS) Kerikeri Mid North 
Family and Support Group (MNFSG)** 
No Yes No DSAC in Kaikohe, 
Rawene, Whangarei 
Dargaville Support of the Sexually Abused (SOS) Yes No No DSAC in Whangarei, 
Dargaville 
Northland 
Whangarei Rape Crisis (WRC) Yes Yes No DSAC 
Northshore/Waitakere
/Rodney 
Auckland City 
Takapuna 
Central 
 
Auckland HELP  
Yes Yes Offered by HELP in 
person 
DSAC 
Counties Manukau Wiri Counselling Services Centre (CSC) Yes Always Yes DSAC 
Waikato Hamilton 
Central 
Victim Support 
(HVS) 
No No ‘We leave it up to the 
victim’ (CIB) 
DSAC 
Bay of Plenty Rotorua Victim Support 
(RVS) 
No Not all processes No DSAC* 
Eastern Napier Victim Support (NVS) Yes # Yes No PMO 
Palmerston 
North 
Victim Support (PNVS) Manawatu Rape and 
Sexual Abuse Centre (MRSAC) ** 
No Often not  
offered 
No Police Medical  
Officer + 
Central  
New Plymouth Taranaki Safer Centre (TSC) Yes Usual but  
victim’s choice 
No DSAC 
Wellington  Central  Wellington HELP (W/HELP) Yes No No DSAC 
Nelson Rape Crisis (NRC) Yes Sometimes No DSAC 
Motueka Women’s Support Link (WSL) Yes Always Yes DSAC in Nelson 
Blenheim Sexual Assault Resource Centre (SARC) Yes No No DSAC 
Westport Westcoast Rape and Sexual Abuse Healing 
Centre (WRSAHC) 
Yes No No DSAC in Greymouth 
Tasman  
Greymouth Victim Support -specific people used for ASA 
(GVS) 
No Yes No DSAC 
Canterbury  Christchurch Safecare Yes SADC - always 
CIB - victim choice 
Automatic callout  DSAC 
Southern  Dunedin Rape Crisis (DRC) Yes No No DSAC 
*DSAC no longer available;   #Manager ex Rape Crisis;   +DSAC now available;   
 **specialist agency available but not accessed by police 
135 
The finding of police inconsistencies in liaison is at odds with the New Zealand ASA 
Policy tenet to liaise with specialist medical/forensic and support/advocacy agencies. 
An important reason why police and specialist support/advocacy agencies in particular 
do not work together at frontline level is because there is very little effort to maintain 
partnerships. In part, this was due to limited attention in this Policy as to how 
partnerships should be developed and maintained. Compared to the many suggestions in 
the literature for partnership maintenance, the New Zealand ASA Policy suggests only 
joint training; local agreements; and knowledge of specialist agency functions.19 These 
suggestions are scattered within the Policy rather than addressed in a discrete section 
underscoring the importance of partnership maintenance. In comparison to the London 
Metropolitan Policy, suggestions are also broad and unaccompanied by procedural 
mandates. As a result, it was possible to ignore Policy mandates when situational 
exigencies such as staffing shortages made compliance difficult. 
‘It is very difficult to arrange interagency get-togethers etcetera for a number of 
reasons. Like I’ve said, staff on leave, staff away on court cases, the nature of 
policing. Sure as eggs if you set an appointment for such and such a time on 
such and such a day … there will be something that you have to rush off to.’ 
(CIB 5B) 
When I explored the extent to which the three relevant Policy tenets were in fact 
implemented, I found that joint training between all three agencies was not regular. In 
four Districts, joint training was reported as not happening at all. One detective 
suggested the ASA course at the Police College was ‘the closest thing’ since this 
included presentations from DSAC and support/advocacy organisations (CIB 3). 
Attending conferences together was in evidence at a conference organised by the 
Australia and New Zealand Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abuse in 2004, but 
at no other New Zealand conference attended by me during the research. Significantly, 
this was the only conference which addressed offender as well as victim issues which 
may signal that police have still to realise the importance of their role with victims.  
Local agreements were found in the form of written protocols with specialist 
support/advocacy agencies in only 3 of the 20 Areas. This minority reflects findings in 
Lievore’s (2005) study. However, as has also happened overseas, little correlation was 
                                                 
19
 See Figure 1 
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found between these contracts and police contact of specialist agencies (Campbell, 
1998; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993). For instance, Areas 8B, 5A, and 5B had the formal 
contracts between police and support/advocacy agencies suggested in the Policy, yet 
individual choice outweighed the force of these. In 8B, the agency was always accessed 
when victims reported, but in 5A, this happened only sometimes. In 5B, since the 
current CIB supervisor had chosen not to honour the agreement signed by his 
predecessor, the local specialist agency had not been called in the three years following 
his appointment (Support/Advocate). In other Areas, police reported informal 
understandings as dictating interaction. Policy recommendations for joint training and 
protocols have been of little use then in ensuring police develop and maintain 
partnerships. 
As well as not meeting Policy tenets, New Zealand practice seldom met other 
partnership maintenance recommendations in the literature. This reflects Lovett et al.’s 
(2004) finding that contact between SARC staff and police was usually limited to the 
practical necessities of individual cases. For instance, during participant observation I 
found that DSAC-trained doctors and support/advocates occasionally attended each 
other’s meetings, but police were never observed doing so.  
In addition, regular interagency meetings between police and specialist organisations 
were reported in only 8 of the 20 Areas visited. The largest cities yielded five of the 
Areas in which formal regular meetings were found. Of these, the existence of SADCs 
in Counties Manukau and Canterbury meant meetings in these Districts had District-
wide outcomes. In the remaining three Areas, common themes of workforce stability 
combined with frequent but incidental contact between personnel from separate 
organisations fostered the positive interpersonal relationships which contributed to 
formal efforts to develop professional partnerships.  
For instance, in New Plymouth all organisations worked from a dedicated location. In 
Napier, police and the Victim Support manager not only had a longstanding partnership 
but also worked in proximity in a relatively small police station. In Motueka, it was the 
small size of the township which allowed the repeated incidental interaction (Station 
Supervisor) and development of the interpersonal relationships which enabled 
development of professional collaborations. The Motueka example is evidence of 
Epstein and Langenbahn’s (1994) claim that although rural communities may lack the 
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specialist resources of cities, they are not resource-poor. As noted, committed 
individuals were able to initiate interest in making the necessary local level adaptations 
to provide specialist services and facilities. In allowing contact beyond professional 
duties, the common denominator between these three Areas appears to be the trust 
which developed from the opportunity to know and respect members of other 
organisations. As Lord and Rassel (2000) have noted, this is a strong argument for 
separate organisations to work in multi-agency centres. 
In contrast, and reflecting Blair’s (1985) finding of a relationship between staffing 
stability and effective partnerships, in the remaining Areas rapid police rotation was 
very frequently cited as problematic to any form of partnership maintenance. 
 ‘…the main thing would be the continuity with detectives. That is probably the 
biggest problem.’ (DSAC 8C) 
In urban Areas, the effects of rapid rotation on partnership maintenance were 
compounded by the size and generalist nature of CIB squads. 
‘CIB who deal with sexual assault or any job, they chop and change so much. 
Every time you have got a different one, so there is no point in going and 
building that rapport with somebody when in two months time they are going to 
be working in a completely different field.’ (Victim Support 9) 
Large generalist squads comprised of a transient CIB population meant that the work 
invested in developing workplace partnerships was seen as meaningless and there was 
little incentive to bother. Amongst other advantages, smaller specialist squads made 
meetings easier to organise: 
‘…because CAT is more specialised you have got a dedicated group. You’ve got a 
much broader range dealing with adult sexual abuse, and it is a lot harder to get 
everyone [pause] a lot more of those people to get together.’ (CIB Supervisor 6) 
One support/advocate in a rural community with a stable Police workforce reacted with 
dismay to the idea of investing time and self in relationship building in urban Areas 
where there was rapid turnover of police staff.  
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‘It would be a heartbreak! … I wouldn't even be interested in doing it I don't 
think. It would be too horrendous! It would drive you mad trying to keep up with 
that!’ (Support/Advocate 8B)  
There is little doubt that building the relationships necessary to effective partnerships is 
hampered by frequent turnover, particularly of police staff, and that if partnership 
maintenance work is to be conducted workforce stability will greatly assist.  
Workforce stability is also important in establishing other partnership maintenance 
measures such as social interactions, integrated data bases, and departmental liaison 
people. The ASA Policy does not mention these measures and I found them to be 
irregularly and infrequently implemented. Joint social functions such as end-of-year 
celebrations, were frequently said to no longer happen because of increasing workplace 
demands. Interdepartmental liaison was found at frontline level but only in the form of a 
Police liaison officer meeting with Victim Support for general concerns. Similarly, 
integrated data bases consisted only of Victim Support daily accessing the Police 
occurrence book in order to make contact with victims in general.  
Due to there being little effort to maintain partnerships, most police knew very little 
about what specialist support/advocacy agencies did. Despite the Policy requirement for 
police to have knowledge of specialist agency functions, some police were unable even 
to give a basic idea.  
‘I don't know a hell of a lot about them.’ (CIB 3) 
Reflecting Mawby and Gill’s (1987) survey results, many understood that support was 
provided but the forms this took were seldom fully known. Since most police have yet 
to appreciate what can be offered, this suggests a likely reason for some police Areas 
choosing not to access specialist agencies  
Figure 4 below shows the extent to which partnership maintenance measures have been 
implemented. Rather than demonstrating the care required in collaboration the findings 
are characterised by lost opportunities for developing and maintaining partnerships.  
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Figure 4: Partnership Maintenance between Police, Medical/Forensic, Specialist Support/Advocacy Agencies and Victim Support 
District/Area Regular 
meetings 
Formal 
protocols 
Interagency training Department 
liaison person 
Social 
occasions 
Joint 
data base 
Northland Kaitaia No Yes - 
police and Fresh Start 
Fresh Start and VS No No No 
 Kaikohe VS attend station meeting No DSAC with VS and 
Police 
Police with VS 
in general 
  
 Dargaville No No SOS train VS; Police train 
SOS about Police role 
No Informal Occurrence 
book accessed 
 Whangarei Rarely No DSAC train Rape Crisis  No No 
NorthShore/Waitakere/Rodney As for Auckland City No ASA Course CIB supervisor No No 
Auckland City Some areas between CIB 
supervisor; DSAC; HELP 
No  Detective Senior 
Sergeant 
No No 
Counties Manukau Yes No – ‘Taken for granted’ Police and  CSC SADC  No 
Waikato No No No Police with VS 
in general  
No No 
Bay of Plenty VS attend general station 
meeting  
No No Police with VS 
in general 
No No 
Eastern Yes ‘Common 
sense’ 
Not for sexual assault Police with VS 
in general 
Yes No 
Central 
 Palmerston North 
VS attend station meeting only No RC train VS. 
Police train VS 
Police with VS 
in general 
No No 
 New Plymouth Yes No    No 
Wellington Some Areas e.g. case study 
meetings  between HELP, 
DSAC, and CIB 
No RC, HELP train police at 
RNZP College 
No No No 
Tasman Nelson No Yes No No No No 
 Motueka Yes Yes Yes Informal Yes No 
 Blenheim No No ‘We have done’ 
(CIB) 
No Offered Occurrence 
book accessed 
 Greymouth Anticipated No No Police with  VS 
in general 
No Occurrence 
book 
 Westport No No No No No No 
Canterbury Yes - with SADC No DSAC train police. Police 
train Safecare 
SADC on 
Safecare Board 
No No 
Southern No No RC train VS No No No 
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Importantly, the minimal investment of time in partnership maintenance corresponded 
with minimal synergy in partnerships and therefore little consideration of how services 
were given or partnerships could be developed. Evidence of stagnation is in the failure 
to develop physical facilities to accommodate the service integration which has been 
argued as very important to service quality. Advances overseas include multipurpose 
facilities which have sometimes been built to victim-oriented specifications (Lovett et 
al., 2004). Had partnerships been more advanced when the ASA Policy was formulated 
in consultation with partner agencies, it is possible that multipurpose facilities could 
have been considered. However, the Policy refers only to District Commander 
responsibility for ‘appropriate’ venues for police interviews and for ensuring medical 
surroundings are: comfortable, adequately equipped, non-threatening, and always 
available. ‘Appropriate’ is not defined in relation to police interview venues and 
support/advocacy venues receive no official mention.  
As noted, site visits revealed that medical/forensic examinations were seldom able to be 
conducted in specialist facilities, let alone specially designed facilities.20 
Support/Advocacy funding difficulties are manifest in their facilities. CIB confirmed 
that interviews were often conducted in their own offices instead of designated 
interview rooms. These were usually also the venue for my own interviews and were 
accessed by approaching the public counter and negotiating various floors and corridors 
past a variety of other offices and common rooms. Some offices had glass walls, in 
which case curtains or blinds could be drawn for privacy. Ironically, this simultaneously 
signalled that a ‘sensitive’ interview was in progress.  
In recognising privacy as a therapeutic necessity, the limited privacy in police 
environments was mentioned by support/advocates.  
                                                 
20
 See Figure 5 
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A: ‘You go back to the police station which is not so good. 
Q: Are they private facilities? 
A: Oh, I wouldn't say that … I guess there wasn't on Monday anyway. It was in 
an office with three desks. The police sat in front of the computer and took her 
through her statement. 
Q: So for the main interview, not necessarily private, people coming and going? 
A: Well, there were, but it was people from the crime scene. 
Q: Not actually sealed off? 
A: It’s a big room upstairs sort of at the end of the building, but the crime scene 
people were coming in and out. …It wasn't terribly conducive.’ 
(Support/Advocacy 1) 
This ‘coming in and out’ has been reported before (Jordan, 1998). 
Some police also acknowledged their concern that the interview rooms mandated by the 
Policy seldom existed. 
‘It is really hard for us to work too. I mean it is not something we like either, 
because for us who are actually dealing with those cases it is really frustrating! 
It is really embarrassing! You take the person into a room like that. It is a 
disgusting room! It is dirty. It is marked. There’s scribble. There’s graffiti. To be 
honest, it is an embarrassment to take people into that room. …’ (CIB 8A) 
As Jordan (1998) has reported before, scant attention has been paid to the physical 
environments in which adult rape victims are processed in New Zealand.  
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Figure 5: Facilities for Processing Sexual Violence Complaints 
 
District/Area Police interviews Medical examination Support/Advocacy 
interventions 
Northland Kaitaia CIB office;  interview 
room; or community 
resource room 
Kaikohe/Whangarei/Kaitaia CBD premises 
 Kaikohe ‘Soft’ interview room Kaikohe medical rooms, 
Rawene (50kms way) or 
Whangarei 
Police station 
 Dargaville CIB Office GP rooms or Whangarei Sexual 
health rooms 
CBD 
 Whangarei CIB office **Sexual health services  CBD premises 
Northshore/ 
Waitakere/Rodney 
CIB office * Auckland Hospital# 17-19 years 
are seen at Te Pururuhau 
Converted house 
Auckland City CIB office *Pohutakawa/Auckland Hospital# Converted house 
Counties Manukau CIB office 
or at CSC 
*Pohutakawa/Auckland Hospital# 
or *CSC 
CSC: Converted 
flats 
Waikato Shabby interview 
room 
Police station or GP rooms Police station 
Bay of Plenty CIB office GP rooms Adjacent to police 
station 
Eastern Some ‘soft’ interview 
rooms 
GP rooms Police station 
Central   
 Palmerston North 
CIB office GP rooms Police station 
 New Plymouth Kimiora *Kimiora Kimiora:Converted 
CYFS house 
Wellington CIB office Private A + E CBD Office 
Tasman Nelson Soft room for 
interview 
Nelson medical rooms Shared community 
house 
 Motueka CIB office Nelson medical rooms Shared community 
house 
 Blenheim CIB office Hospital or GP rooms Converted house 
 Greymouth CIB office Greymouth hospital Police station 
 Westport CIB office Greymouth hospital Community house 
Canterbury CIB office *Cambridge Clinic Converted garage 
Southern Child’s interview 
room 
GP rooms CBD premises 
**now done in GP rooms;   *specialist facility;   +multi-agency facility;   #moving to Greenlane; after 
hours care currently at children’s multi-agency centre.   
 
 
Figure 5 shows that with only two exceptions, the three services worked from separate 
facilities which victims had to travel between. The exceptions, Central’s Kimiora and 
Counties Manukau’s Counselling Service Centre were both standalone facilities and 
could cater for all crisis intervention services. However, both being converted houses 
neither was custom-built to accommodate the particular needs of rape victims. The 
Counselling Services Centre was the permanent location of a support/advocacy 
organisation which had equipped and made their facilities available for police 
interviews and medical/forensic examinations. Although this meant that victims did not 
have to travel between venues, these facilities were not regularly used by police and 
medical/forensic services. In contrast, in the acute phase of adult and child sexual 
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assault investigations, all essential services were regularly called in to Kimiora from the 
outset, although this was only with the victim’s permission.  
In this research, Kimiora was New Zealand’s closest approximation to ideal practice. 
Kimiora houses police on their year-long sexual crimes rotation. It is a specialist 
facility, containing a reception area; interview room with recording facilities; three 
offices; lounge; kitchen; medical/forensic examination room; and showering facilities. 
According to police,   
‘The Policy stipulates a safe environment and that is what we have got here.’ 
(CIB Supervisor)  
The service is also specialist in being provided by DSAC-trained doctors and specialist 
support/advocates. However, police based at Kimiora are not on call so specialist police 
cannot be guaranteed to conduct the initial investigation. This may instead be conducted 
by CIB from two other squads based in the local urban environs.  
Replicating Lovett et al.’s (2004) analysis of the SARCs, I found that given its sole 
function, the Kimiora facility was a far more relaxed venue than the busy stations and 
offices of CIB. This impacted favourably even on me as an interviewer, making me feel 
more at ease. In accord with Quina and Carlson’s (1989) recommendations, privacy and 
safety were integral features since, like the Counselling Services Centre, Kimiora was 
invisible from the road. It was also accessed from a common driveway which meant it 
was not obvious from the road which building was being accessed. In addition, 
offenders were never processed at this site which gave a perception of safety and 
prevented issues of DNA contamination.  
While Counties Manukau’s Counselling Services Centre was visited as part of the 
original research design, my visit to New Plymouth’s Kimiora was recommended by 
two CIB. This suggested their recognition of multi-agency centres as the systems ideal. 
Yet despite this recognition, Kimiora has been neither replicated nor used as a systems 
model by other Districts or even within the District. Rather only ‘the odd one has come 
through’ to see how the operation worked (CIB Supervisor). This is disappointing, but 
not surprising given the lack of national and local coordination which I have argued as 
necessary to recognition and dissemination of good practice. In discussion about why 
Kimiora was the only multi-agency centre, I was told that it had had ‘strong advocates’ 
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in the community (CIB Supervisor). In the absence of a national framework for 
evidence-based practice then, individuals were attributed with making the difference.  
Summary and Interpretation of the Findings 
Across New Zealand Police Districts and Areas, a significant feature of the findings is 
variability in most aspects of sexual assault services. This is the result of limited local 
and national collaboration between the organisations in both the giving of services and 
the building of partnerships. Since partnership maintenance measures have been largely 
neglected, the synergy of collaboration has also been absent and there has been uneven 
understanding across the organisations of the need to develop specialist services. One 
manifestation is that there has been little coordinated push for research and development 
either by putting sexual violence on the public agenda, or by directly encouraging 
government responsiveness from within the systems. As a government entity, Police are 
arguably best placed to achieve the latter, but are hampered by their own lesser focus on 
sexual violence in comparison to support/advocacy and medical/forensic services. 
Without an evidence basis for the need to advance services, variability is a persistent 
theme and this leads to service gaps.   
Many measures which the international literature and ASA Police Policy identified as 
ensuring quality assurance in systems of responsiveness to adult sexual assault victims, 
have not been implemented in New Zealand, including: 
• ongoing Police service evaluation either through solicited victim feedback or 
through established procedures for supervision 
• national coordination of Police sexual assault services 
• national coordination and consistency of support/advocacy services 
• specially selected police officers 
• interagency coordination through: joint community education; advisory 
committees; introductions for new staff; providing departmental liaison people; 
providing an organisational chart of the agency; defining goals and missions; 
and combined statistical databases 
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Very infrequently found were:  
• District coordination of Police sexual assault services 
• specialist police teams 
• knowledge of support/advocacy agency functions 
• looking after the psychological wellbeing of staff 
• specialist police training 
• special facilities including interview rooms 
• specialist support/advocacy accessed at the time of initial complaint 
• integration of the three crisis intervention services in one-stop-shop facilities 
• interagency coordination through: interagency training; formal interagency 
protocols; and regular interagency meetings 
Consistently found were: 
• DSAC coordination; training; and peer review 
• support/advocacy training   
Considerable variability was found within the government organisation - Police. This 
finding accords with Jordan’s (1996) finding of variability in individual police practice. 
Systems variability was significant between Police Districts and between policing Areas 
within most Districts, leading to extremely variable knowledge of officers and practice 
at all levels. This degree of variability signals a failure by Police leadership in providing 
the coordination necessary to support CIB in their professional requirements when 
responding to victims of sexual violence. Setting standards for sexual assault 
investigation, but failing to ensure that the Policy could be complied with has set 
investigators up for failure. Some means for police to develop victim-oriented practice, 
such as training and working with specialist medical/forensic and support/advocacy 
agencies have been explicit within the ASA Policy, but compliance with these measures 
has not been ascertained. Variability was evident but to a lesser degree between 
support/advocacy agencies and related to coordination and funding difficulties. 
Variability was a theme of much lesser importance in relation to medical/forensic 
services, and again related to funding difficulties.  
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Generally, there is an inverse relationship between variability and quality assurance in 
services. To the extent that there is collaboration to establish the philosophical and 
practical aims and requirements of service provision, informed rational organisation of 
services is possible. In the absence of this background work, positive controls such as 
evidence-based policies, staff selection, supervision, training; and quality assurance 
audits are not implemented and services are defined by situational exigencies. Service 
quality can be as variable then as the individuals who give it, and in the absence of 
legitimate controls can be negatively influenced by de facto or situational factors such 
as culture or resource inadequacies.  
Not all variability is problematic. Some variability is created by necessary local level 
adaptations to permanent local features of the New Zealand context and can be vital in 
responding effectively. Rural adaptations, such as some support/advocacy agencies 
becoming multipurpose, allowed agencies to make the best of available resources and 
minimised disadvantage to victims in small communities. Similarly, in smaller Areas 
where CAT teams adapted to fewer complaints by also investigating historic and adult 
sexual violence complaints, this consolidated sexual crime investigative expertise and 
limited the prospect of being seconded for generalist work.  
While some permanent features of the community necessitate adaptations, other features 
causing variability are appropriately subjected to quality assurance processes. Required 
in achieving this regulation is appreciation that some service provision is problematic, 
and being in a position and having the will to correct this. Government has recently 
perceived that the state of services is problematic. However, apart from the largely 
ignored 1983 Rape Study there is still a dearth of research to establish practice 
requirements for New Zealand conditions. As with other countries, there is also a 
paucity of research evaluating contemporary sexual violence services (Astbury & 
Duvvury, 2007). There is also minimal funding and organisational assistance targeted at 
sexual assault responsiveness. Yet as noted, when this funding is available it is 
frequently accompanied by setting of standards (Campbell & Martin, 2001; Mathews, 
1994; Mawby & Gill, 1987). It is also accompanied by the evaluations necessary to 
ensuring accountability to those common standards (Carmody, 1988; MCASA, 1997). 
The very prevalent variability in New Zealand’s services signals that there has been 
little political will to make a difference in rape-responsiveness.  
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In the absence of official involvement, the will to create change has been apparent at the 
level of individuals. It has sometimes been evident on a large scale, as in the formation 
of DSAC by female doctors. On a medium scale, it was evident in two Police Districts, 
where despite having no extra resources to implement the ASA Policy, senior officers 
had committed to District-wide measures to improve interagency liaison. On a local, but 
no less significant scale, a not-infrequent finding was of women who had struggled to 
maintain support/advocacy community organisations, sometimes for decades. Again, 
their development of training meant that standards were set for work in crisis 
intervention. A strong subsidiary theme of the findings then was the impact of 
individuals making a considerable positive difference by developing, strengthening, and 
stabilising services. In Areas which lack the commitment of such dedicated people, gaps 
in both services and service quality remain.  
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Chapter Six: Improving System Responses to 
Victims Through Police Collaboration with 
Support/Advocacy Specialists  
Contributing to the variability in partnerships, a strong theme which emerged during 
this study was of police treating the incorporation of specialist support services for 
victims as a choice rather than an obligation as expressed in the ASA Policy. Only some 
police in some Districts chose to work with specialist support/advocates. This was in 
contrast to police routinely choosing to work with available DSAC-trained doctors, 
having understood their expertise in medical/forensic examinations and court testimony. 
As noted previously, improvements in internal Police processes will only take police 
part of the way to achieving good practice. Also necessary is for police in similarly 
recognising the necessity for specialist psychosocial interventions to work directly and 
consistently with specialist support/advocates in providing services.  
In this chapter then, I discuss the partnerships between police and support/advocacy 
specialists in more depth. Firstly, New Zealand CIB responses to the concept and reality 
of working with specialists are discussed in order to gauge the acceptability of 
expanding and consolidating partnerships. Following this, a synopsis of the ideal 
manner of incorporating support for victims is given and contrasted with the reality of 
how various Police Districts have elected to deal with the issue of support for victims. 
Empirical evidence is then given for disadvantage to victims when police access Victim 
Support rather than specialist support/advocacy organisations. However, there is more 
to gain than the direct benefits of specialist advocacy and support for individual victims 
and for police in their investigations. Synergy has been said to reside in specialist 
holistic systems and since there is evidence of this being similarly the case in New 
Zealand, examples of synergistically-derived advantage are given. The second part of 
this chapter analyses the factors behind some police Areas not working with specialist 
support/advocacy agencies even when these were available to provide victims with 
specialist support.  
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Police Choice over the Support Received by Victims 
Grounds for specialist support and advocacy becoming intrinsic to legal processes when 
these are dealing with acutely traumatised victims are well-established in international 
literature. The need is also recognised in the Police ASA Policy in that the stated 
rationale for police liaising with a specially trained person from a sexual assault crisis 
counselling agency is to enhance protection of the victim and to reintegrate the victim 
into the community. In this study, CIB respondents confirmed the practical applicability 
of incorporating specialist support in New Zealand. Having collated from participant 
observation the support/advocacy functions in New Zealand, and from the literature the 
benefits of partnership with specialists, I discussed these functions and benefits with 
CIB respondents. A large majority of CIB agreed that in theory partnership with 
specialist support/advocates would advantage police and victims in all the ways 
identified in the literature.21 Even more encouraging was that CIB who already regularly 
worked in partnership with specialists confirmed that there were real gains for victims 
and police throughout investigations.  
Benefits for police included extra resources to augment their own services and help 
meet ASA Policy requirements. Overall, the feeling was that: 
‘We can't do it on our own. We need the community to help us there.’ (CAT 12)  
Resonating with O’Shea’s (2006) findings, CIB also agreed that if there was expertise in 
the support, victims were more likely to go through the court processes.   
‘If your victim is supported and well-supported then they are more likely to be 
able to take a case to prosecution. … It is not easy to be able to go to court.’ 
(CAT Manager 9) 
Investigations benefited along with benefits for police and victims. In that respect, CIB 
also agreed that support/advocacy knowledge of repeat offending patterns could be 
formally shared with police thereby increasing crime prevention possibilities. 
                                                 
21
 See Chapter Two 
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That CIB who worked with specialists did indeed feel positively was reinforced at an 
ASA course curriculum meeting where an officer declared that police could not manage 
without HELP (CIB 3; personal attendance). This contemporary police understanding 
reflects the long-held views of others working in the field, both in New Zealand (Jordan, 
1996; Miller Burgering, 1994) and overseas (Bard & Ellison, 1974; Campbell & 
Ahrens, 1998; Carrow, 1980; Ledray, 2001). The discussion which follows underscores 
the benefits to police and victims of working with these specialist support/advocates 
rather than using Victim Support, family, or friends to support victims as remains 
persistent practice in some Districts. Instead, specialist support for victims through 
interventions which are incorporated in a timely and appropriate manner is argued as the 
means to achieve practice ideals.  
Receiving the benefits of specialist support has been noted to depend on how and when 
services are accessed. Early intervention is recognised in the ASA Policy as important 
in ensuring maximum protection for the victim. Ideally, as soon as police receive a 
complaint specialist crisis interventionists are contacted in order to offer their own 
services (Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Jordan, 1998; Gilmore & Pittman, 1993; Lovett et al., 
2004; O’Shea, 2006; Mawby & Gill, 1987). Many factors operate to make this manner 
and timing of offering support ideal. Firstly, when victims meet crisis interventionists at 
the outset of reporting this obviates the necessity for repeat explanations and revisiting 
of the trauma (Bryant & Cirel, 1977). As Bard and Ellison (1974) also established, if 
crisis interventionists are present from the beginning, victims are more likely to feel that 
these interventionists understand what they have gone through. This facilitates the 
building of trust and the later ability to maximise support. This has been empirically 
validated in Scott and Hewitt’s (1983) study with the finding of a much stronger long-
term counselling relationship when the counsellor is involved at first reporting. Ongoing 
engagement with clients went up 30% to 86% due to clients feeling that counsellors had 
been present when they needed them most (Wood in DSAC, 1996). 
Secondly, real choice about receiving assistance is contingent on victims meeting 
support/advocates in order to know whether they can work together (Support/Advocacy 
Managers 8B; 8E). The disclosures and the significant level of intimacy of the 
partnership between victim and support/advocate make it crucial that this meeting 
occurs. Notwithstanding their knowledge, expertise, and commitment to victims, 
support/advocates are as diverse as any other group of professionals. Victims must have 
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a real option to refuse help or request other support if philosophical or other 
incompatibilities exist as have been reported by Jordan (1998).  
Real choice is also contingent on having full knowledge of forthcoming processes, 
options within these, and assistance available. Because most New Zealand police have 
only minimal knowledge about support/advocacy functions, real choice is only possible 
if support/advocates offer this knowledge and their support in person, and victims are 
able to question them further (Support/Advocacy Manager 8E). An added advantage in 
specialists giving this information is that their knowledge and expertise in dealing with 
rape effects enables them to judge when giving information is helpful or traumatising. 
In this study if agency members were not already present when the offer of support was 
made, in accord with O’Shea’s (2006) observation, victims were said to decline having 
someone called in out of reluctance to inconvenience anybody (CIB 3). As Hester and 
Westmarland (2005) have found then, there are many benefits in victims having the 
same advocate over time. These also accrued for police in having a defined point of 
contact and contact details when assistance was required as the case progressed.  
Although the benefits of early and full partnership with specialists were agreed by 
police interviewed, the reality of the incorporation of support services for victims does 
not always reflect this ideal. With the exceptions of Rotorua, Hamilton, and Greymouth, 
I found specialist services to be available in every Area visited. That longstanding 
community-based RCCs were found in most Areas is significant testimony to their very 
need. Yet CIB uptake of their services was variable and appeared to be little related to 
agency accessibility or service capacity. Some agencies which offered all the requisite 
services were either not accessed for victims (5B, 5C, 5D, 7, 9, 10) or seldom 
approached (8A, 8D, 8E, 11), meaning that specialist agencies were only regularly 
accessed in half the Areas visited.  
That this is possible owes to Police leadership failure to ensure implementation of the 
national ASA Policy. This has left Districts, Areas, and stations relatively free as to the 
incorporation of specialist support into the investigation processes, even when signed local 
level agreements exist. This finding reflects earlier British findings where the lack of police 
referrals caused agency frustration, criticism of ‘lax attitudes’ in the referral process, and the 
suggestion that Headquarters should apply disciplinary charges for not referring.  
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‘Our research on the referral process provides unequivocal evidence that 
discretionary referral is an inadequate solution.’ (Mawby & Gill, 1987, p.198) 
Along with whether specialist services were incorporated, I also found discrepancies in 
when and how support, specialist or otherwise, was incorporated as the investigation 
progressed. It was evident that in some Districts, discretion over the timing of 
introducing agencies to victims was retained by police. This is in keeping with 
observations about processes being Police rather than victim-centred (Blair, 1985; Boles 
& Patterson, 1997; Campbell & Raja 1999; Jordan, 1998). At one end of the spectrum, 
in District 1 specialist support was gained proactively and automatically from the outset 
of reporting. This pre-empting of individual police discretion accords with Mawby and 
Gill’s (1987) recommendation for mandatory automatic referral with the onus on 
victims to refuse. In other Districts, police accessed specialist agencies only sometimes 
and at varying points in the legal processes. At the other end of the spectrum, in District 
10 the non-specialist Victim Support was approached only after the initial statement 
taking and only with the victim’s agreement.  
The manner of incorporating support was also controlled by police rather than specialist 
support/advocates in most Areas, with police choosing to offer support to victims on 
behalf of agencies in 13 of 20 Areas visited. This in particular highlights the inequality 
in the relationship between Police and community organisations identified by Campbell 
(1998), and evident in Spott (1980) and Martin et al.’s (1992) writing. Some police 
appeared to believe that giving victims the choice to meet support/advocates equated 
with re-empowering after a traumatic event in which disempowering was a central 
feature. Yet such choice is only truly empowering if it is informed (Support/Advocacy 
Manager 8E; VAWSU, 2005). As Gilmore and Pittman (1993) have explained, 
explanations from a counsellor/advocate at the outset are important to regaining the 
control which is paramount to recovery. This is particularly important because 
profoundly negative long-term impacts are possible from decisions made by victims 
who are immediately post-trauma and still in shock.  
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Other identifiable problems accompany police explaining the functions of agencies and 
benefits of accessing support. As noted already, police respondents were seldom able to 
explain agency functions; the support they offered; or how this was given. In addition, 
the way some police offered support was wanting and likely to be implicated in lesser 
uptake. 
‘We would say, “Well look, do you need any support person here, any 
counselling here? Do you want us to facilitate this through your GP, through his 
surgery nurse?”, or whatever, but invariably we just want to get on with the 
job.’ (CSM 7)  
Given the well-documented increase in victim sensitivity in the acute aftermath of rape 
(Burgess & Holmstrom, 1974), the police impatience expressed above is not likely to be 
missed by victims. Depending on whether police or agencies offered agency services, 
this made a palpable difference to their uptake. Congruent with Lovett et al.’s (2004) 
finding that proactive offers of support were appreciated rather than perceived as an 
invasion of privacy, agencies which offered their own services volunteered that this 
support was very seldom rejected (CIB 3; Manager 8E). This should reassure those 
officers who told me that their decision to offer the services of support/advocates was 
made out of respect for victims’ privacy. Given that support offered by police was more 
likely to be declined, the greater risk to victims was not having specialist support when 
their privacy was lost later in a public courtroom.   
Despite: their own national protocol; local partnership agreements; identified benefits of 
early specialist involvement; and their own limited knowledge of rape effects, I found 
that police also retained control over who supported victims. This finding is in keeping 
with Kelly’s noting of a police tendency not to ‘cede power’ to those who have less 
status, and police abuse of their power in ‘dominating’ multi-agency groups (cited in 
Jones, 2004). The outcome of police retaining choice over who would support victims 
was that in Areas where police did not work regularly with specialists, either Victim 
Support was contacted on behalf of victims, or family and friends were allowed to give 
support. Yet problems have been identified with victims accepting support from within 
their social circle, particularly when this is the primary or sole source of support.  
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Firstly, accepting social support can irrevocably alter the balance in social relationships 
(Manager 8E). As Blythe & Vernon (1992) have stated, it is important that victims have 
control over ‘who knows’. To the extent that information is in the hands of professionals 
rather than friends, the victim retains control over its later release and avoids the 
potentially far reaching consequences of others’ indiscretion. Secondly, family and 
friends often undermine recovery by failing to validate victims’ experiences (Notman & 
Nadelson, 1976). Worse, they can sometimes stigmatise victims for their victimisation 
(Renzetti et al., 1990).  
Difficulties can also relate to family and friends struggling to manage the personal 
impact of victims’ disclosures of intimate rape details (Ahrens & Campbell, 2000). The 
intensive and ongoing support often required in the aftermath of rape may be 
unmanageable for family or friends. The supporter’s time constraints may be a factor in 
this. Not knowing how to help is another (Lievore, 2005). Many of the victims’ family 
and friends will find themselves in the situation I was in, of knowing nothing about the 
psychological ramifications of sexual violence or the forthcoming legal processes, and 
having little to offer other than friendship. For all these reasons, specialist support has 
been particularly valued by victims (Campbell et al., 1999; Lievore, 2005).  
‘Rape Crisis services were perceived by most survivors as far more supportive 
than police, family, or friends.’ (Easteal, 1994, p.196) 
In offering this expertise, specialists also offered an effective alternative to the victim 
needing to disclose within her social circle.  
There are also worrying implications for victim advocacy and support when Victim 
Support is accessed instead of a specialist agency. In respect of advocacy, concerns 
have been raised overseas about the possible domestication of support/advocacy 
agencies if these amalgamated with or accepted funding from state agencies (Byington 
et al., 1991; Campbell & Martin, 2001; Mathews, 1994; Mawby & Gill, 1987). In New 
Zealand, the sustainability of specialist agency philosophies relates to their history, their 
independence, and to specialist training which frequently emphasises feminist 
philosophy in relation to rape victimisation. These safeguards for victim advocacy are 
not available in Areas such as 5B, 5C, 5D, 7, 9, and 10 where only Victim Support is 
accessed. As a government-instigated entity, Victim Support does not have the 
historical basis for the strong ideological commitment to support and advocacy which is 
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the legacy for RCCs of their origins being in community injustice. Given that the 
safeguards of a feminist ideological basis and historical knowledge do not underpin 
Victim Support’s practice, concerns also derive from Victim Support’s location in or 
adjacent to police stations and reliance on police for referrals. Compared to specialist 
agencies then, Victim Support does not have the power which knowledge, ideological 
commitment, and independence confer and this places them at a distinct disadvantage in 
their relationship with Police.  
Importantly, the arguments that historical origins and body of knowledge allow the 
independence of thought which protects victim advocacy are strengthened by findings 
in the Eastern District. In Eastern, an effective victim-supportive partnership between 
Victim Support and police had much to do with the manager’s history with the now 
defunct local Rape Crisis and her extensive knowledge of rape-related issues. In 
contrast to Nelson’s (1995) concerns about the possibility of losing victim-centred 
ideology when agencies work closely together, this underscores the protection which 
historical knowledge gives to victim-centred ideology even when organisations occupy 
the same premises.  
Otherwise, in this study evidence was found of a compromised ability to advocate due 
to Victim Support’s subsidiary position. An essential element of psychosocial support is 
advocacy and this is contingent not only on the ability to recognise secondary 
victimisation in police processes, but also to respond effectively if these are recognised. 
In District 10, Victim Support volunteered that their presence in interview was 
contingent on their silence. 
‘We can't speak or ask any questions …so we are just there to hand her a tissue, 
pat her back, and just let her know that we are there and everything is okay….’ 
(Victim Support Manager 10) 
When asked whether she had ever advocated for a victim during interview the 11 year 
veteran replied: 
‘Only once ever in my time here. She was so tired she couldn't keep on going. 
She had had everything done and I said, [pause] “No no!” He wanted it done 
now.’ (Victim Support Manager 10) 
156 
Overseas literature suggests that police are reluctant to work as equal partners even with 
specialists. Campbell (1998) has reported RCC perceptions of their power disadvantage, 
and the need for the self-imposed restrictions on advocacy which had previously been 
suggested by Spott (1980). Yet in contrast to Victim Support’s acquiescence to police 
dictates, there are several indications of the relative determination of New Zealand’s 
specialist agencies in advocating for victims. For instance, early tensions which resulted 
from disagreements over police interactions with victims were reported by several 
police interviewed. Their comments were sometimes accompanied by the unsolicited 
acknowledgement that RCC interventions had improved responses to victims, and that 
as a result the partnership had improved. 
‘If there have been failures *** are very quick to tell us about it and that is the 
beauty of the arrangement that we have got. … We did go through a period 
probably five years ago where failures tended to be documented. We sort of 
became a little bit confrontational.  … Now we tend to sort things out in a very 
much more pragmatic way for the victim.’ (District Commander 2) 
Contemporary examples of RCCs advocating for victims were readily available. In one 
District, an RCC respondent reported calling for timeout and ‘lots of words’ to be had 
after an officer used an inappropriate tone to a client. The officer’s apology to both 
client and advocate ensured that the partnership remained intact, as was evident in more 
proactive involvement of the RCC by police (Support/Advocacy 5A). In another 
District:  
‘We make sure it doesn't happen here. We do talk quite seriously and severely to 
the police if anything sneaks to our notice if women haven't been treated very 
well. And if she feels that she hasn't we will go and ask for an explanation.’ 
(Support/Advocacy 8B) 
These examples are evidence of Harvey’s (1985) claim that knowledge of historical 
roots empowers RCCs to challenge flawed official decision-making.  
It is also more difficult for Victim Support to support sexual assault victims adequately 
because its volunteers lack the knowledge and skill base of contemporary specialist 
agency workers. This lack of training and expertise was formally acknowledged by 
Victim Support at the 1999 SADC seminar where it was stressed that if approached 
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their policy was to refer on to the most appropriate agency (seminar minutes, May 
1999). Victim Support’s initial preparation for volunteers in supporting sexual assault 
victims was a brief nationwide training conducted in 1998. While source documentation 
suggests that all volunteers currently receive four hours training in supporting sexual 
assault victims (Neale & Gray, 1990), in the current study it was evident that most 
volunteers receive considerably less (Managers 5A, 8E, 10). However in the Areas 
where Victim Support were the only agency accessed to support sexual assault victims, 
the giving of this support was usually restricted to only a few volunteers (Victim 
Support Managers 7, 8C, 10). This allowed some to gain experiential qualifications 
usually, but not always, in conjunction with more training than other volunteers. 
Ironically, this was often from the local specialist agency. In District (9) selected 
personnel received extra training, but only about legal processes in general.  
‘That all comes in, in our initial training. We learn all about that, and it is not 
specifically with victims of sexual assault. It is victims.’ 
Victim Support Manager 9) 
In no District did I find training which even approximated specialist agency training 
about the specific psychosocial consequences of rape.  
Accordingly, in Areas where police only accessed Victim Support, there was empirical 
evidence of disadvantage to victims. In District 9, the manager’s Police counterpart 
expressed little confidence in the support given and acknowledged that while he offered 
it to victims he did not endorse its uptake. The result was that it was declined by an 
estimated 30% of victims (CIB Supervisor 9).  
‘Their personnel vary in ability hugely. Trying to say I would go to this 
organisation in this case doesn't work because their service varies probably a 
hell of a lot more than ours does.’ (CIB Supervisor 9) 
In another District, it was also evident that good practice might not be known by Victim 
Support volunteers.  
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‘The other thing is if the police call in Victim Support for a rape case… they will 
say, “Have a cigarette and a cup of coffee”. The first rule is nothing until after 
the medical, so there they go - lack of training. … It is almost what they don't 
say. …If it is a young woman we will say to her, “Don't discuss it with your 
friends because *** is a very small town and the gossip will go around.” We 
talk to them about all the things that are putting safety barriers around them, 
whereas Victim Support actually just say, “If you don't want to call your mother 
in have you got a friend whose mother you could call?” … It is just managing 
the situation sensitively and downplaying it and a lot of that will in the end affect 
the outcome for the client.’ (Support/Advocacy Manager 8E) 
In this situation, the specialist respondent understood that immediate decisions about 
involving family or friends may be cause for regret later when the emotional response 
was not so overwhelming.  
Others commented more broadly on Victim Support’s difficulty in supporting victims 
of rape.  
‘One of my patients said they did try and be very helpful, but she just didn't think 
she wanted them involved and they didn't seem very experienced in that 
regard…they don't have so much skill.’ (DSAC 7) 
This was similarly evident in Britain after Victim Support’s inception.  
‘In the early days of Victim Support services the victims of sexual assault were 
excluded from the ambit of their work because of the complexity of the issues 
involved…. A network of volunteers of different backgrounds and abilities is 
unlikely to be as skilled in assisting victims to overcome the unique symptoms of 
sexual violation…. ’ (Blair, 1985, p.83)  
Proficiency and advocacy issues which limited Victim Support’s ability to support rape 
victims were compounded by structural issues which made it impossible for Victim 
Support to give continuity of coverage throughout the legal processes. As mentioned, 
continuity is vital to effective support. It also limits the attrition of victims which can be 
caused by their being referred elsewhere (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Lovett et al., 
2004). As a generalist and primarily a referral agency, Victim Support did not provide 
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the comprehensive range of specialist services offered by specialist agencies, including 
the counselling which all but one specialist agency incorporated.  
Victim Support’s lesser expertise and inability to provide a full range of specialist 
services also impacted on police willingness to engage police in the partnership 
maintenance measures which are crucial in establishing effective processes (Edelson & 
Bible, 1998; Carmody, 1988; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Hornibrook and Myers, 
1996; Regan et al., 2004; Waryold, 1996). One example of effectiveness is police 
routinely contacting support agencies to give support from the outset of investigations. 
A feature of all Areas in which there was early proactive incorporation of specialist 
agency support was regular meetings for caseload or partnership maintenance. Apart 
from Napier, these did not take place at all in Areas where Victim Support was the 
partner agency. Congruent with the inroads made by RCCs overseas, this suggests that 
specialist knowledge is the precursor to the ability to insist on the forging of true 
partnership (Harvey, 1985). Again, this analysis is supported by the exception of Napier 
Victim Support’s effective partnership with police which included input into the 
processes through debriefing after cases.  
For police, the corollary of Victim Support’s lesser efficacy in providing services was 
that there was little point in investing time to develop partnerships which would have 
little to offer in improving systems of responsiveness.  
Q: ‘Who does the work to maintain the partnership with Victim Support and 
what is done? Is there a regular meeting or interagency training? 
A: We don't do anything to foster the relationship. … It almost seems like two 
groups that have a common client rather than an involvement in getting to a 
common goal or any thing else.’ (CIB Supervisor 9) 
Since there was no dialogue over good practice requirements, rather than at the outset of 
the complaint, police contacting of Victim Support in particular was made at various 
points during the investigation. In one District, it was reported as:  
‘…only there sometimes, but always at court after the police have decided to 
charge.’ (Victim Support Manager 8C) 
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This meant that not only did victims not receive the positive benefits of early support, 
but there was little protection against negative police practices.  
For instance, in District 10, Victim Support was not brought in for the initial interview 
and this seems to have contributed to police ease in manoeuvring complainants out of 
the legal system. Victim Support’s manager reported that only 4 of an estimated 44 
cases were referred to them. When I asked if family and friends gave support instead, 
the unexpectedly revealing answer was: 
A: ‘Could be or they are not [pause] they can't find, the police can't find [pause] 
They are not happy with the investigation, and they have maybe not had enough 
proof or something, or they don't feel it is [pause] 
Q: Do the police call you for the initial statement? 
A: No. What they do is they listen to the person… her story - if it sounds 
credible, and then go to their senior and then it goes to us.’ (Manager 10) 
Of concern given the credibility comment, is that possibly only 4 complaints out of 44 
were treated as genuine. The loss to victims was not only the prospect of justice, but 
also the prospect of referral for support as has been similarly a concern in Australia 
(Gilmore & Pittman, 1993). The above scenario underscores the need for timely and 
effective advocacy. It also lends weight to the arguments above that police are readily 
able to control input by Victim Support, due to its lack of: an ideological basis; training; 
independence; and ability to provide all needed services. Police partnerships with 
Victim Support not only seem unlikely to achieve ideal collaborative practice but will 
also not contribute to the development of police practice.  
However, not only will these aims not be met when Victim Support is the police chosen 
partner agency but in some Districts where police did access specialist services, they 
resisted regular meetings. This thwarted establishing the grounds on which a combined 
service could be conducted, and rendered unlikely the possibility of establishing 
practice ideals in these Areas also.  
‘The police here tell me that they are too constrained with time and 
commitments already to really get involved with those sorts of things.’ 
(Manager 8E) 
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As a result, in some Areas where specialists could have provided continuity of 
coverage, police chose to irregularly access specialists and good practice was only 
variably approximated. Where specialists were unable to make inroads in partnership, 
again this allowed police to maintain control over the support victims received.  
For some victims, this meant discontinuity of support because police approached Victim 
Support as well as specialist support/advocates, interfering with and compromising the 
comprehensive care given by specialists. In one instance, Victim Support was 
approached to procure a Victim Impact Statement, even when police were aware that a 
specialist agency was already involved.  
‘So that instead of us doing it, again because we know the history and we know 
the case and things, they send another agency just to get the Victim Impact 
Statement. And are so many times I say to them, “Please don't do that. Come 
back to me. We are trained to do it. We will do it well”. And we have done really 
good VIS for the rape case victims. They should be confident in our ability to do 
them properly and they just don't think.’ (Support/Advocacy Manager 8E) 
As also recognised by a Victim Support manager, such discontinuity requires victims to 
repeat details of the assault ‘again and again’ (Manager 7). This has also been 
recognised as problematic in the VAWSU report (2005). The cost of police doing this 
was to the victim’s privacy and peace of mind through having to revisit the rape and 
describe its effects to yet another stranger.  
Evidence presented so far suggests that in the absence of genuine partnership, and 
without the checks and balances brought to investigations by independent specialists, 
generalist police retain control over the processes and outcomes of complaints. The cost 
to victims has been shown to be the possibility of having: no support; discontinuity of 
support; unhelpful interventions; loss of privacy; evidence compromised; and 
unchallenged attrition from the legal system. These findings are supported by 
Campbell’s (2006) research in which reduction of attrition and negativity towards 
victims were found when specialist RCC advocates were involved. It is apparent then 
that women who live in Areas where police have developed working relationships with 
effective specialist organisations may have markedly different experiences of reporting 
rape to those who do not.  
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There is value in police control at frontline level being relinquished in favour of national 
development of the ‘genuine cooperation and coordinated working relationships’ 
evident in some Districts. This national oversight is particularly important because 
Districts which have established holistic services with specialists have seldom achieved 
these District-wide. Neither have they been achieved easily or overnight.  
‘I mean years ago when I was in Auckland City, HELP [pause] we didn’t like 
HELP… We are talking in the early nineties. Nowadays they are a good tool for 
us, and they offer good support, provide good support, and I am happy to get 
HELP in at the first instance with every case.’ (CIB Supervisor)   
Where the foundations for working partnerships have been laid, the predominant 
mechanism has been regular meetings. These have increasingly been appreciated as an 
investment.  
‘I meet with them (DSAC) and the HELP centre once every six weeks …. Any 
problems that are developing, or issues, we are on top of pretty quickly. We have 
a very good relationship with the HELP. It's an excellent relationship with the 
HELP centre actually.’ (CIB) 
Due to these meetings, evolution in the partnership between HELP and police is 
evident. 
‘I want to pick up the phone and I want to sort it out and we have gotten to a 
stage where we have that relationship … And the other thing that has emerged, 
particularly over the last couple of years, we are routinely getting letters of 
praise … And they are referred on to staff and that has helped, I think, cement 
our relationship.’ (District Commander) 
In some Areas then, RCC persistence has led to police understanding of the benefits of 
holistic services and this has allowed police boundaries to become more permeable. In 
Areas where RCCs have gained little traction in forging partnership, Police leadership 
must draw attention to the benefits of partnership with specialists and ensure that these 
become genuine through the partnership maintenance measures discussed in Chapter 
Two.  
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Synergy in Police Partnership with Specialists   
Along with benefits to support and advocacy, in accord with Hornibrook and Myer’s 
(1996) assertion that holistic systems made for a whole that was greater than the sum of 
the parts, synergy was found to reside in police collaboration with specialist agencies. 
For instance, specialist presence during police interviews was both informative as to 
victim presentations and mediating of police style. Partnership with specialists 
contributed positively to police belief in the veracity of complaints. Specialists’ 
partnership with appreciative police also had a positive impact on the viability of 
specialist organisations.  
Impact on the Interview Process  
The formal interview for the main statement has provided many of the documented 
concerns in respect of secondary trauma in New Zealand (Anstiss, 1995; Jordan, 1998) 
and elsewhere (VAWSU, 2005). As an intensive and prolonged interaction between 
police and sexual violence victims, it can also make or break the prospect of taking 
cases to successful conclusions. This has been recognised by many including the 
Criminal Profiling Unit, CYFS Managers, and some CIB who now promote audio-taped 
‘cognitive’ interviewing as a kinder and more effective style of information collection.  
The implementation of ‘cognitive’ interviews has been in abeyance while Police have 
researched and are now attempting to resource ‘best practice’ in general investigative 
interviewing techniques. The provision of an evidence basis is a welcome advance but I 
have some concerns about the processes. Significantly, interviews of sexual violence 
victims have not been distinguished from others despite these victims having special 
needs in interview (Home Office, 2001; Jordan, 1998; Winkel et al., 1991). A related 
concern is that since the core focus group for this research was comprised only of 
police, no specialist support/advocate was included (NZ Police, Ten One, 2005). This is 
regrettable since sexual assault investigations are an important and regular aspect of 
police work and as Bayley has identified, ‘outsiders’ can assist the Police in identifying 
‘best practices’ (cited by Bazley, 2007). Also not included were Criminal Profiling 
specialists who have worked with cognitive interviewing and can be considered 
specialist in this field. The research processes have not been inclusive then and its 
findings have yet to be generally implemented (CIB 6). 
164 
The current research confirms that the interview for the main statement taking can be 
problematic. As with other aspects of ASA investigations, the interview is variably 
conducted. Many statements are taken over several hours by a question and answer 
format, and simultaneously handwritten or typed onto computer (CIB 8). This to-and-
fro nature of the question/answer/clarification style of interview is often cited as an 
exhausting process. In some Areas, interviews were not infrequently undertaken 
immediately before or after the medical/forensic examination despite Police instructions 
to consider waiting until the following day. Not only was the process lengthy, it 
required victims to revisit traumatic memories haphazardly. This might continue over 
subsequent days as police checked on detail with the victim. The style of interview was 
criticised by a former evidential interviewer for children who currently monitors police 
interviews of teenagers.  
‘…I will ask you a question and then I will take you right back to the beginning 
again and then I will write the question down and then I will write the answer 
down. … I wouldn't be wanting to go through that. I want to tell my story once, 
have someone ask me questions to clarify, and then if they don't, write it up. And 
then tomorrow show it to me …. One of the things that I sort of compare is when 
the police consider doing a written statement of the…14 or a 15-year-old victim, 
versus doing an evidential interview. The evidential interview might take an 
hour for the child like from yo to go. It is kind of a low key process. If that same 
child was to be interviewed by the police it would take three, four, or five hours 
because their process for taking the statement is so much slower than doing the 
narrative type story.’ 22 (CYFS Manager 8A)   
Potential for other problems accrued from this interview style. The nature of the 
questioning, in revisiting the event with the victim, invited contradictions between 
accounts which in being discoverable could be used to discredit the victim in court. 
Another problem was that the statement was taken in the form of words able to be 
written while the victim was talking and sometimes these were not the victim’s own. 
This made the finished product the detective’s account of the victim’s account.  
                                                 
22
 Synonymous with cognitive interviewing 
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‘I think they still get written out pretty much in the language of the 
interviewer.… There is an issue there in terms of integrity of what is being said.’ 
(CYFS Manager 8A) 
The language used was not the only way of altering the truth of the victim’s account. If 
the statement was not available verbatim, in being de-contextualised the account could 
be substantially altered in meaning. Replies were also often a product of the way 
questions are asked.  
‘I have sat in with the police while they have taken statements from teenage girls 
and I have just thought my God, you are basically putting the words in that 
child's mouth. … No one knows what question they ask. They just know what 
subsequently got written down. …They are nothing if not leading.’ (CYFS 
Manager 8A)  
Consequently, no matter how professional or sensitive officers were, the prevailing style 
of formal statement-taking provided the potential for immediate or future secondary 
victimisation. 
Other factors compound these concerns. Few officers were sufficiently familiar with 
rape trauma effects to interpret victim presentations; many were influenced by the 
spectre of ‘false’ complaints; and most appeared to be overworked and under pressure 
including at the time of interviewing. These influences made some officers less 
sensitive in their questioning. 
‘There are other ways of finding out the truth without being totally interrogatory 
and threatening. You don't have to shout people down or make out you don't 
believe them.’ (Support/Advocacy Manager 8A) 
That no officers have had practical skills training for sensitive interviews means there is 
little to mediate personal style and therefore the variability which Jordan (1998) found 
in the way rape victims were treated. The expression of personal style in interviews 
defines the absence of professionalism which has also allowed a poorly informed 
interview technique, and an exhausting and sometimes badly timed process to continue. 
Again, this is the result of leadership failure to inculcate professionalism through: 
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interview procedures informed by research; training, and registration of those trained; 
and subjecting interviews to quality assurance monitoring.  
This view is supported by the close attention of Project Sapphire to the detail of 
interviews. The extent of this was evident at the 2005 ‘Tackling Rape Issues’ 
Conference where a senior officer gave evidence of leadership in preventing secondary 
victimisation. While he acknowledged he could not tell officers what to think, he 
asserted his obligation to tell them what they must do. Referred to was the significance 
of even a misplaced sigh or raised eyebrow during interviews. In contrast, Police 
systems-centred processes, suggested by Boles and Patterson (1997) and Campbell and 
Raja (1999), persist in New Zealand.  
‘…Police are still very driven around their own process and their own need to 
get information …I just don't think it is particularly focused on the victim or 
taking care of the victim through the process really.’ (CYFS Manager 8A)  
Yet the difficulties identified with the current format of, and conduct in, formal 
interviews can be mitigated somewhat through police and specialist partnership in 
interview. Such partnership is currently mandated for victims under 17, yet in 
determining the need for support age alone is insufficient as an indicator. As the Home 
Office (2001) has reported, the nature of events which victims are interviewed about 
also heightens vulnerability in interview. Moreover, it is particularly pertinent to 
structure a support role into generalist CIB interviews with sexual violence victims 
since adolescents as young as 14 are reportedly interviewed by generalist CIB (CSM 1).  
The benefits of partnership in these interviews with adults were agreed by many CIB 
interviewed. They were also volunteered by some support/advocates.  
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‘I have helped police officers with statements when they have gotten stuck. I've 
leaned over and said, “Ask this.” … I knew what the officer was trying to get at 
and they are not trained in communication, where I am. He did it and got the 
answer … So I know I could do it and I could do it in a way that supports the 
client. … That sole purpose for that person of Rape Crisis is to train and do 
interviews and support women through that part of that process, because I 
believe statements, police statements and interviews, can be done in a more 
supportive way. And I feel if they are done in a more supportive way, then they 
will get more details in their evidence, …The more the rapport that they build 
with that person, the better it is going to be. …and I think that it would also cut 
down the amount of time that police have what they consider wasted time with 
women …’. (5A) 
This specialist has identified her current role in: recognising distress; supporting and 
advocating for victims; and assisting police with questions. Debriefing after interviews 
has also been supportive of police in reducing stress (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). 
Apart from directly supporting victims, police, and the aims of the interview, where 
these activities do occur their synergy is in transferring expertise and knowledge to 
police (Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Lord & Rassel, 2000; Lovett et al., 2004) and 
improving the quality of investigations (Bard, 1974; Blair, 1985). However, 
support/advocates can play a greater role than some currently do if consideration is also 
given to specialist involvement with planning interviews in conjunction with police. 
Also, although their input has been overlooked in determining best interview practice, 
when this practice is implemented support/advocates may have a role in its fine tuning. 
For other benefits of their inclusion to emerge, this will require a greater investment in 
partnership processes than the regular meetings and occasional interagency training 
found in some Districts. 
Impact on Belief in False Complaints 
Estimations of the prevalence of false complaints range widely between academics, 
DSAC, and support/advocacy organisations at one end of the scale, and many police at 
the other. In this study, some police volunteered figures of up to 85% of complaints 
being false while partner agencies in the same Districts found false complaints to be 
unusual. In academia, the figure of false complaints has been cited as 3% (Young, 
1983). In New Zealand, police belief that many complaints of rape are false has been 
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suggested as influential in the initial evaluation of rape complaints (Anstiss, 1995; 
Jordan, 2001(b), 2004). That the belief in false complaints was important to outcomes 
for victims was also evident in this research. Many police raised false complaints as a 
factor in their willingness or otherwise to pursue rape investigations.  
That working with specialists can moderate police belief that many complaints of rape 
are false has been suggested by Blair (1985) who remarked on the paradigm shift 
undergone by US police when working in multi-agency sexual assault units. Further 
support comes from London where police work closely with victim-supportive agencies 
in the SARCs and Metropolitan Policy cites false complaints at only 3%. My own 
hypothesis that partnership would mitigate police false complaint beliefs developed 
inductively during the research, as it became evident that support/advocacy faith in 
victims had the power to moderate police attitudes in general. Increasingly positive 
perceptions of victims were reported by an agency with a longstanding and increasingly 
close partnership with Police.  
‘I think generally the feedback that I get from  workers that are liaising more 
closely with the police than I do is that they are much more pleasant, respectful, 
even empathetic…More often than not counsellors will come back and  say, ‘He 
was great, she was great - they really listen….’ (Crisis Coordinator 2) 
Police belief is also theorised as having been moderated by understanding of rape 
victimology and victim presentations which has been conveyed incidentally through 
working with specialists. As Carmody (1997) has identified, in being an act of 
resistance to dominant discourses, the presence of RCC advocates has successfully 
challenged a variety of professionals to rethink their beliefs. This is particularly likely in 
Districts where the work relationship is based not only on the caseload, but on 
establishing true partnership through regular meetings which facilitate opportunities to 
discuss cases and work practices. This analysis is supported by others who have argued 
the necessity of formal contact to negotiating the responses which most benefit victims 
(Edelson & Bible, 2001; Carmody, 1988; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994).  
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Evidence that CIB who worked with specialist agencies had comparatively positive 
attitudes to rape victims was available even prior to empirical data-gathering. It was 
notable first when the Royal New Zealand Police College ASA course was being 
developed through consultation in some of the Districts. Where partnerships with 
specialist agencies existed and were valued, victim-supportive ideas were expressed by 
police, and in language congruent with that of their partner agencies. Later, during data-
gathering some CIB directly confirmed having learnt about the psychosocial impact of 
rape through working with specialist agencies. These officers were much less likely 
than other CIB to suggest that the majority of rape complaints were false. For instance, 
in the Wellington District where partnership maintenance meetings were regular, an 
officer was quoted as saying that: 
‘…unfounded allegations were made occasionally, but the vast majority of rape 
claims were truthful.’ (Dominion Post, 3.2.2005)  
Equally important, knowledge transfer meant if complaints were proven false, the 
response to complainants was more understanding of the complex circumstances which 
might lead to such a complaint being made. This understanding replaced the evident 
influence of mythology in the reasons police have given for false complaints. For 
instance, Jordan (2004) has reported attention-seeking, malice, and revenge as reasons 
given by police for false complaints. Greater understanding was evident in a media 
release about false complaints which featured comments by officers who worked 
closely with, and received training from the local support/advocacy organisation. One of 
these officers was also on this support/advocacy organisation’s board. The officers 
commented that:  
‘…false complaints of sexual attacks [were] rarely malicious’.  
(Hutt News, 9.2002)  
Rather, those who made complaints which were deemed unfounded were described as 
possibly naive or vulnerable and often needing police or other help.  
Further evidence for attitude transfer came in the form of comments made by a CYFS 
respondent about the difference in contemporary CAT police beliefs. Having worked for 
years as mandated partners with CYFS, CIB were said to now seldom disbelieve children. 
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A: ‘I think there is some work to be done with the police personnel around adult 
victims because they still hold on to that mythology that people are lying, that it 
is false. There is still a lot of that. 
Q: You can't shake them though? 
A: Well, we have with the children. Like I can't think of the last time a police 
officer said to me, I don't think, a young child is a liar. I mean some of the 
teenagers there are moving into adulthood so some of those teenagers are going 
to get a hard time, but the children…it is not what we are hearing about the 
children…I wonder though if you are asking too much.  
Q: But they have done it for the kids? 
A: Well they have but they are working very closely with interviewers.’ 
(CYFS Evidential Interviewer 9) 
The hypothesis that CIB who were not in a position to absorb the knowledge of 
specialists were more readily inclined to believe that victims lie about being raped is 
also supported by the very different responses of CIB in four Areas where Victim 
Support was the partner agency. Firstly, in a metropolitan Area of District 7, the CIB 
respondent’s comments indicated little awareness of the wide range of victim 
presentations and consequently an apparent belief that women must be ‘perfect’ victims 
in order to be credible. Precedent for this interpretation is in international literature 
(Campbell & Raja, 1999; Independent Police Complaints Authority, 1988; Kerstetter, 
1990; Hanmer et al., 1980; Stanko, 1985; Myers & LaFree, 1982; Sanders, 1980; 
Williams & Holmes, 1981). This officer’s (mis)interpretations of victim presentations 
led to speculations about the veracity of complaints and the victim’s motives in 
reporting.  
A: ‘It is really strange you know, like a lot of woman come in and they are pretty 
collected about it, even what has happened. I look at it and I think by crikey if it 
happened to me would I be that sort of collected. 
Q: Still in shock? 
A: Perhaps. Perhaps they are just nasty. … Yes they do see that the 
consequences of making a complaint is [sic] going to be this and I want that to 
happen. Bugger him! I want it to happen. I want this man. I want blood and I 
want something to happen.’ (CIB Supervisor 7) 
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Such suspicions about victims’ motives have also been found by Gilmore and Pittman 
(1993); Jordan (1998); Katz and Mazur (1979); Myers and LaFree (1982); and Sanders 
(1980). 
However, not only should women be neither angry nor too calm it seemed that women 
who acted ‘really upset’ because ‘that is the sort of perception that women have as to 
how women do react when they come in’ (CIB Supervisor 7), also ran the risk of being 
discredited. This officer’s belief in the existence of response parameters which 
demonstrate that rape has happened is significant, given that the possible range of 
victim responses has been taught in Recruit and CIB Induction courses at the Royal 
New Zealand Police College for at least a decade (Beckett, 2000). The displacement of 
this training with cultural understandings from the field underscores the importance of 
working with specialist agencies in the operational arena.   
In the 5C Area, their own unadulterated practice encouraged CIB belief in false 
complaints. Since the available specialist support was not accessed, not only were 
practices leading to belief in false complaints unchallenged, there was also no direct 
challenge to the resulting police perspectives on false complaints. As with the District 7 
CIB supervisor, 5C’s supervisor had not attended an ASA course. This meant that while 
substantially experientially qualified, he had neither the workplace input from specialist 
agencies nor the theoretical training which might counter his exposure to police cultural 
beliefs and workplace practices supportive of belief in false complaints. At the outset of 
our interview, he initiated discussion about false complaints by suggesting that 85% of 
rape complaints were false and as Jordan (1998) has also found, volunteered that his 
practice was to ask victims early in the investigation if their report was genuine.  
‘I always put to them at the end [of the interview]. I say, “Look, there is going to 
be a huge investigation. There’s going to be thousands of dollars spent. There's 
going to be a lot of time and resources put into it with staff etc. If it is not true 
tell me now before it snowballs and you are going to get in trouble if it is false.”  
And I only ever put that to them if I am… if there are inconsistencies and I am 
pretty sure. I would hate to put it to a real victim, you know, that I don't believe 
them, that you are lying.’ (CIB 5C) 
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This reflects the discouragement of prosecution which has been found internationally 
(Feldman-Summers & Palmer, 1980; Kerstetter, 1990; LaFree, 1989) particularly in the 
way the discouragement has been framed (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). It is also 
evidence of tactlessness in interviews (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1983; Feldman-Summers 
& Palmer, 1980; Katz & Mazur, 1979; Madigan & Gamble, 1989). As Martin has 
shown happens, in this case it related to organisational goals (Ullman & Townsend, 
2007). At my suggestion that such questioning might result in attrition of genuine 
complainants from the legal system the reply was:  
‘I don’t believe so. I really don’t. Usually when they give their explanation or 
when they say, “Yes. It is false.” they usually give a reason for it. So you know it 
is not just attrition. That it is, you know, that it is a false complaint for these very 
reasons, so it all makes sense at the end of the day.’ (CIB 5C) 
With further questioning about shock or tiredness as causal in the inconsistencies 
mentioned, the CIB respondent replied that he did not feel that the ‘inconsistencies in 
their stories’ that he ‘looked for’ could be put down to this. 
‘Well, that is another thing. A lot of them are not in shock. They come in and 
then it's like “Oh I have been raped.” It's not, you know, your classic victim, 
real victim, who is absolutely traumatised and in shock etc, but you have to take 
all that into account.’ (CIB 5C) 
The practice of second guessing victims’ complaints of rape was reportedly common. 
‘They say to them from the start “All that you need to do is tell the truth and if 
you are not telling the truth we would like you to say so now.”, but they are 
never nasty to them.’ (Victim Support Manager 5C) 
The local specialist organisation also noted that it was commonplace to question victims 
about the veracity of their complaint (Support/Advocacy 5C). They had received this 
information from a complainant and from a detective who, in mentioning the practice 
had reiterated the same percentage of false complaints mentioned to me by the 
supervisor. Interestingly, the Victim Support manager had also initiated discussion 
about false complaints but with a very different perspective on the numbers.  
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A: ‘You get to the stage where you just about know whether it is false or… 
Q: Get many of those? 
A: You get a couple, but not often. But mostly they are real.’ 
(Victim Support Manager 5C) 
Dismayed by the suggestion that so many complaints were false, the 5C specialist 
organisation had drawn their own conclusions as to the relationship between this police 
perception and the demand that women acknowledge if they were not telling the truth. 
Their question was: 
‘Do people just retract it because of the system?’  
One respondent went on to say:   
‘…I can't believe that there would be that many false. I can believe that people 
would actually say “I have made a false complaint”, because they didn't 
want…to be going through the system… the court system and waiting years to 
get to trial….  You are already in a crisis situation and then for the first 20 
something hours they have got to make all these decisions that could affect their 
lives for two or three years to come. … So you can imagine a person who was in 
real crisis having that presented by the people that you think would [pause] 
especially as it has been such a big decision to go the police. So you can 
understand that some people would say, “Well no, nothing happened.” 
(Support/Advocacy 5C) 
As suggested, this outcome is likely when police explain the many significant 
consequences of reporting and have led the victim to believe they may doubt the 
validity of her complaint. Research indicates that rape mythology engenders feelings of 
culpability in victims (Shapcott, 1988). Self doubt about their role in ‘causing’ the rape, 
combined with not receiving validation from police, will be destabilising of the 
confidence to proceed through the legal system. When told how costly and time 
consuming an investigation will be, many may also feel they are being told they are not 
sufficiently worthy to incur this cost. The monumental experience of talking about a 
usually intensely private experience during public proceedings, but without feeling 
supported by those in charge of the processes, will prove too daunting for many. Not 
feeling supported, and worse, having confidence in expected support actively 
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undermined, will provide a signal to make a tactical withdrawal. Heightened 
vulnerability and suggestibility has been found in the immediate aftermath of rape 
(Ledray cited in Schneider, 1982). A quick and easy exit by those who are in this stage 
will be to say ‘No, it’s not true because….’ This is rendered more likely by police 
questioning credibility while simultaneously appearing to withdraw support.  
It may be then that police themselves are contributing not only to victims’ withdrawal 
from the system, but also to the method by which victims exit. This line of questioning, 
having given victims an exit strategy, many were said to quit the processes by agreeing 
that their account of rape was false, and in doing so added to the self-fulfilling prophecy 
already in operation for CIB. The outcome of victims withdrawing in this way would 
not only be reinforcement for police in their belief in a high percentage of false 
complaints, but therefore in their belief that this type of questioning was valid.  
Unchallenged police practice also occurred in District 9. There, discussion about false 
complaints was initiated by all three police respondents with the same example given 
independently by two CIB. Given that they worked in different squads, this common 
story suggested the possibility of ‘false’ complaints taking on a folklore quality and 
having an undue influence on general belief about the veracity of complainants. In this 
District, police also challenged victims, but exacerbated the secondary victimisation by 
first enlisting the compliance of Victim Support or a complainant’s family member. 
In ensuring the silence of the victim’s supporter, it may well have seemed to the victim 
as if their support person was colluding with the police or at least held similarly 
sceptical views.  
A: ‘I have been in a position where we have wanted to confront women about 
issues that [pause] where there are conflicts of evidence say. Things don't 
appear to be consistent and often depending on the relationship, what we would 
do is actually brief the support person first. 
Q: A Victim Support person? 
A: Yes, or a relative. Not normally a friend. But yes, I have had several times 
where there has been a relative or official support person, and we have actually 
separated them from the victim and said, “These are the issues. That is how we 
intend to address them.” Just give them a bit of a heads-up before we speak to 
victims so they don't say [pause].’ (CIB Supervisor 9) 
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This practice reflects Martin’s finding of harmful treatment of victims due to unique 
organisational goals (cited in Ullman & Townsend, 2007).  
Such practice needs to be rethought by CIB. The advocacy role should not be 
manipulated by police since it provides checks and balances for police perceptions of, 
and responses to, the victim. In the above scenario, advocacy will be undermined if the 
support person no longer feels able to intervene for the victim when she is ‘confronted’. 
The forewarning may also create the perception of an unworthy complainant and result 
in half-hearted support or withdrawal of support. A traumatised victim is unlikely to 
accurately represent her outrage at a line of questioning which signals that she is 
thought a liar, particularly if there is no reaction from her supporter. Instead, she is 
likely to feel abandoned by her support person and wonder if she also doubts her. 
Potentially, the forewarning places the supporter in the invidious position of becoming 
tacit support for police in challenging the victim, and complicit in the resulting 
secondary victimisation.  
Also important are the possible outcomes for the relationship between the victim and 
her friend or relative. Hardgrove’s (1976) reference to family having to deal with their 
own already ‘conflicting feelings’ underscores the care which is required when family 
members are involved. This reference highlights prior destabilising effects which may 
be exacerbated by the suggestion that a victim has lied. Moreover, depending on a 
support person’s discretion, damage may be done to other relationships. Respectful 
treatment is unlikely to provoke a negative reaction from support people such that they 
need to be debriefed beforehand. If the victim is informed that the evidence does not 
seem to fit with her statement and invited to give clarification, then this is unlikely to be 
met with resistance from a support/advocate.  
The history, knowledge, and preparedness of specialist agencies to confront police if 
necessary, render it less likely this tactic would be sanctioned by a specialist agency. 
From what follows it would appear that through being based in the police station, Victim 
Support was also influenced by the false complaint folklore evident in this station. Yet 
CIB should not take Victim Support’s silent acquiescence as confirmation that all their 
practices are acceptable.  
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A: ‘I don't always agree with how CIB have to question the victims and really 
sometimes how they can hound women. But I do understand that they have to do 
it because you can have girls who come through, or women that come through, 
that made the story up to get back at somebody, and that is that whole, no I don't 
believe you… 
Q: Do they tell them that they don't believe them? 
A: No. Not in those words. Not straight words like that. But you know to really 
bring it across that this victim is legit they have to do quite a bit of hounding and 
quite a bit of questions [sic] …and so when they get a victim who comes in that 
actually has been raped they have to go through that same process because of 
all the women out there that have spoilt it for them. But there is nothing the 
police can do about that otherwise they would end up by wasting a lot of their 
police time, which really, we are lacking so many police these days that they 
haven't got time to be mucked around. 
Q: How does the hounding manifest? 
A: It is just what volunteers have come back to me and said. Or like we have 
actually had victims that have actually gone home and they have had to call in 
to try and coax the victim to come back again, because they have gone, “Well F. 
U.! They don't believe me and I am going home.” Yes, so I am not sure on the 
strategies that they do it. You know, I suppose someone who is that vulnerable, 
someone who has been raped is going to be very vulnerable and they have to 
then come forward and lose even more of their privacy and more of themselves 
and they have to go over it, over and over again. But to be hounded and to make 
it seem like this person who is supposed to be someone to protect you is making 
it seem like they don't believe you is pretty hard.’ (Victim Support Case 
Coordinator 9) 
Having a select number of people from Victim Support sometimes doing sexual assault 
support work, but only if called in with the victims (un)informed permission, does not 
equate with proactive support from a specialist agency knowledgeable in issues of rape 
trauma. Beyond their own personal distaste for unnecessary distress incurred to women 
reporting rape, unqualified supporters are unlikely to be able to define what is wrong 
with the practice described above. 
Lastly, in District 10 police were said to sometimes directly accuse victims of making 
false complaints.  
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‘ “You are lying” – straight out discrediting them, discounting them. Often they 
will come from the police station over there and they will say, “I have just been 
to the police and they don't believe me. They say I am lying.” ’ (Counselling 
Agency 10) 23 
In contrast to these four Areas, all of which accessed Victim Support, these responses 
were never matched in Areas where partnership with specialists was established and 
maintained. 
At the other end of the spectrum, in the Motueka Area the specialist Women’s Support 
Link worked with police on every rape case. This was in a partnership forged from 
goodwill and understanding of the work victims required from both organisations.   
‘We have got a fantastic rapport with the Women's Support Link here. They 
know exactly what they are doing.’ (Station Supervisor) 
Women’s Support Link suggestions, including critical comment, were heard, 
understood, and responded to in a way which fostered communication and showed that 
police were able to incorporate alternative viewpoints. 
‘Because they are so open to our suggestions and our input we could approach 
them any time.’ (Women’s Support Link A) 
‘We have been to police sometimes and just said that we didn't think that was 
very well handled, and they do deal with that. (Women’s Support Link B) 
Significantly, the station supervisor who had worked in this Area for the last five years 
stated that during this time there had been no false complaints of sexual assault. 
Evidently, partnership with specialists makes a positive difference to police knowledge 
about rape and attitudes to rape complaints.  
Impact on Viability of Specialist Organisations 
Not only does effective partnership advantage police and victims, it also accrues 
benefits for specialist organisations. As a fully-funded government organisation, Police 
are in a position to provide logistical, informational, moral, and sometimes limited 
                                                 
23
 This agency had stopped offering crisis intervention when Police chose to use Victim Support instead.  
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financial support for partner organisations. Accordingly, when police appreciation of the 
partnership with specialists in holistic service delivery is translated into tangible 
support, this can make a difference in the services which specialist organisations are 
able to maintain and develop.  
It is pertinent then to identify what has happened to the specialist organisations which 
police did not collaborate with. In all main centres visited, specialist care in the acute 
stage after rape has been offered by community organisations. Yet in three of those 
centres, Hamilton, Rotorua, and Palmerston North, police used only Victim Support. 
Reported as a direct result of police choosing to replace them with Victim Support, the 
Rotorua Sexual Abuse Centre had ceased to operate an acute service. Similarly, the 
services of the Hamilton Victoria Trauma and Recovery Centre have been reduced to 
ongoing care. Respectively, these outcomes substantiate concerns about the loss of 
community-originated services through government channelling funding into its own 
institutions (Mawby & Gill, 1987), and the exacerbation of service variability through 
government redesign of service structures. However, loss of acute services is not always 
the case. An exception has been Palmerston North’s Manawatu Rape and Sexual Abuse 
Centre which remains a strong alternative reporting forum. This owes much to support 
from its local community and local council, possibly through having diversified to 
include care of men and children.  
Of the two Districts examined more intensively, all smaller centres offered specialist 
rape-responsive organisations except Greymouth where the specialist organisation had 
changed its focus. With the exception of Motueka, in these smaller centres police either 
irregularly accessed the support offered by specialists, or, as in Kaikohe and Kaitaia, did 
not access the specialist organisation at all. As a result, the Mid-North Women’s 
Support Group became the more generalist Mid-North Family Support Group, while 
Fresh Start continued in its original form but supported victims at later stages after 
sexual assault. As with Dunedin’s referral through Victim Support, often this was 
through onward referral from the Police-associated Support for Victims.  
A comparison between two Districts which differ widely in respect of partnership 
demonstrates the benefits of collaboration for specialist organisations. Firstly, in 
Auckland where meetings continue to consolidate partnership, having appreciated that 
they cannot manage without HELP the Police Officers’ Guild has made occasional 
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financial contributions (District Commander). In addition, in 2004 when HELP was again 
in straitened financial circumstances, Auckland’s acting District Commander assisted 
efforts to bring public attention to the benefits of HELP’s work yet difficulties in 
surviving (personal knowledge).  
In contrast, in a District where the CSM did not function as SADC, this lack of police 
oversight of sexual assault responsiveness meant potential for support was lost. In District 
9, although oversight of the District’s partnerships was an acknowledged part of the 
CSM’s role, he reported no knowledge of specialist sexual assault agencies and took no 
responsibility for partnerships with them (CSM 9). Yet this CSM was also District Family 
Violence Coordinator and as such volunteered his understanding of the strong link 
between domestic violence and some sexual assault. Notably, in the Area closest to his 
District’s Headquarters, the local specialist agency had reluctantly abandoned its crisis 
intervention services due to the ongoing struggle for funding and associated difficulties in 
finding and retaining volunteers. The limitation of its functions to education and 
counselling left acute responsiveness to Victim Support and removed these specialists 
from partnership with police.  
Had police built a partnership with the specialist agency, withdrawal of its acute 
services may have been avoided, particularly in District 9 where support for partner 
agencies was said to be strong. The CSM’s response to the loss of specialist services 
surprised me since in his District: 
‘… interagency collaboration is well-advanced. If you are looking for support 
for various things, it seems to be much easier to do it down here ….’ (CSM 9) 
In that regard, police collaboration was implemented through Intersect ‘9’ a partnership 
of Regional Managers from the Ministries of Social Development and Education; 
CYFS; Probation; City Council; District Health Board; Housing New Zealand; and Te 
Puni Kokiri which operated to assess, prioritise, and address community risks.  
Police membership on this body provided a potential avenue for lobbying for resources 
on behalf of community organisations. The CSM appeared particularly well-placed to 
achieve this due to his membership on a working party which changed Intersect ‘9’ 
funding allocations from projects to collaboratively-decided community risk factors. 
The reason given by the CSM for not supporting the local specialist agency was that 
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sexual assault was not a District priority, and correspondingly not in focus. 
Significantly, priorities were said to be ultimately determined by government and with 
respect to statistically-based arguments about risk.  
‘We are measured in terms of overall crime and Commissioner’s Risk Indicators 
and sexual crime is not specifically mentioned under that.’ (CSM 9) 
District 9 priorities were offending related to youth, Maori, families at risk, and drugs 
(CSM 9). Reflecting the political will of the day, and in contrast to the un-enforced 
Police ASA Policy which mandated partnership with specialists, police partnership with 
Maori through the establishment of a Regional Intersectorial Forum was mandated by 
statute (CSM 9). Although sexual violence poses a significant risk to women, it does not 
receive this government-mandated level of response.  
Contrasts in outcomes for the support/advocacy organisations between these two 
Districts underscore the truth of Hornibrook and Myers’ (1996) contention that 
collaboration makes for a whole which is greater than the sum of the parts. Strength 
derives from solidarity between agencies, and this applies nationally between similarly 
focussed agencies such as RCCs. From the evidence above, local solidarity between the 
three crisis intervention agencies also has the ability to exert political pressure, an effect 
which has been remarked on overseas (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994; Martin et al., 
1992). This works through agencies gaining central government support to remain 
solvent, and through establishing a culture in which partnership becomes valued and 
standard.  
The continued existence of community organisations as specialists in crisis intervention 
for rape victims is at least partly reliant on their regular uptake by police. Given the 
contemporary difficulty of recruiting and retaining volunteers, the trend is towards 
specialist organisations, especially in urban centres, becoming more professional. The 
funding required to maintain professional specialist organisations makes Police support, 
as in the Auckland example where police assisted in addressing inadequate government 
funding, even more important. As Schauben and Frazier (1995) have reported, systemic 
issues related to funding inadequacies contribute significantly to stress and make it 
harder for agency personnel to work with victims. Police support is one factor of 
importance to agency morale and viability, and may be mobilised through Police 
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understanding that if the losses to specialist services continue as described, the cost will 
be loss of historical knowledge, experience, and expertise (Harvey, 1985).  
Irregular Development of Partnerships: Analysis  
In order to break down barriers to collaboration and improve services for victims of 
sexual assault it is important to identify the impediments to New Zealand police 
collaborating with specialist agencies. Since all but two support/advocacy agencies were 
willing to work with police it is influences on police decision-making which are 
important to understand and these influences are located in both organisations. In 
respect of support/advocacy organisations, capacity issues have been noted and these 
influenced police decision-making. In respect of police, many factors such as the 
continuation of historical beliefs and cultural imperatives are implicated. These factors 
are accessible to change by police. The second category is comprised of current aspects 
of the Police environment which are less amenable to Police-instigated change 
strategies. Important are police workload and the court disposition of cases.  
From my collation of evidence into District case studies, I determined that the biggest 
difference to whether police worked in effective partnerships with specialist community 
organisations was made by within-District leadership. In Districts where CSMs were 
committed to working in aspects of the SADC role, this neutralised the impact of factors 
such as historical beliefs, culture, workload, and court disposal of cases to the extent 
where District-wide partnerships were possible. Correspondingly, in Districts which 
have no SADC, leadership has devolved to CIB or station supervisors some of whom 
have made Area partnerships possible. In Districts which lack this leadership, the four 
interacting variables work against partnership development.  
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Specialist Agency Availability and Capacities 
In contrast to the US and Britain, amalgamation with state or other community agencies 
in order to survive has not been a feature of New Zealand RCCs. Here, the retention of 
independence means that funding issues have slightly compromised the availability of 
support/advocacy agencies on a national basis, leaving police in a small minority of 
Areas without a choice as to accessing specialist services. However since most agencies 
(15 of 18 visited) are at least partly staffed by volunteers, specialist services do remain 
widely available.  
Yet, although New Zealand is well-covered with specialist support/advocacy 
organisations, in the absence of amalgamation the variability which relates to the 
grassroots nature of agencies persists (Campbell et al., 1998, Harvey, 1985; Mawby 
&Gill, 1987). As with overseas this variability relates to agency structures, but in 
New Zealand it has also impacted in limiting the services which are able to be offered. 
The composite of services described in Chapter Five was achieved by some community 
organisations, but only in varying degrees by others. Critical to this, 24 hour 
accessibility remains a problem for some agencies. Adaptive responses include 
operating answer-phones or independent message taking services, for instance through 
the local hospital. When contact is not immediate, some callers including police may be 
dissuaded from waiting or persevering. Others have also found answer-phones 
problematic (VAWSU, 2005). The compromised capacity to provide services was an 
important determinant then of police decisions about partnership.  
Overseas literature describes impediments to enacting partnerships due to RCC 
reluctance to relinquish any degree of autonomy because this might compromise the 
ability to critique state practice (Byington et al., 1991; Campbell et al., 1998; Jones, 
2005; Mathews, 1994; Mawby & Gill, 1987). This is not the case in New Zealand since 
all but two specialist agencies visited articulated willingness to work with police in 
providing crisis intervention services. However, this near universal willingness to work 
in partnership has not been found within New Zealand Police and this requires closer 
examination.  
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Police Cultural Imperatives  
Systemic features of Police contribute to difficulties in building partnerships. Police have 
wide discretion (choice) which is mediated by police cultural imperatives and these 
sometimes override legitimate controls such as policy (Ainsworth, 1995; Goldsmith, 1990; 
LaFree, 1989; Lee, 1992; Malloy, 1983; Mastrofski & Parks, 1990; Van der Heyden, 1997; 
Wasby, 1978). Contributing to this and supporting cultural resistance to change is that 
historically, internal regulation has been able to be undermined by the very low visibility of 
policing at frontline level. In the past, this has resulted in police work being regarded as 
unsupervisable and therefore largely unsupervised (Lundman, 1996). This view is no longer 
tenable, with regular supervision outlined in the London Metropolitan Policy indicating that 
closer oversight of cases is possible (Project Sapphire, 2002). Yet it is apparent that in 
New Zealand Police leadership have failed to displace the influence of culture with such 
supervision. In addition, the failure of Police leadership to train, resource, and enforce 
service provision standards has also been shown in frontline CIB having the option to 
ignore policy requirements.  
Argument about the ability to apply discretion based on cultural rather than bureaucratic 
imperatives during unsupervised work is particularly relevant to sexual assault 
investigations due to the sensitive nature of the disclosures (Police Policy & Planning 
respondent cited in Beckett, 2000). It is also relevant to New Zealand analysis in that the 
lengthy vacuum in standard setting prior to the ASA Policy allowed cultural beliefs to 
develop a strong foothold. This facilitated successful resistance to ASA systems of 
regulation and accountability. In addition, since in the many years following ASA Policy 
formulation, little attention has been given to implementation or auditing of its procedures, 
supplanting longstanding police choice in respect of working with ‘outside’ agencies has 
proven to be a long-term project. Similar police intransigence and circumvention of 
attempts to develop a ‘professional ethic’ have been demonstrated in Australia (Gilmore & 
Pittman, 1993).   
Partner agencies also identified that police culture was implicated in CIB reluctance to 
work with ‘outside’ agencies.   
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‘I actually feel that perhaps Rape Crisis isn't utilised enough by the service here 
and that is because, I think, of the culture that is within the Police Department in 
dealing with community-based organisations, and in particular probably the 
CIB branch. It is really huge especially in small stations…‘I have worked really 
hard in developing a relationship with the team in CIB and some are easier than 
others, but I have had the advantage of being in the station to do that where an 
external agency has a huge difficulty.’ (Support for Victims Manager; similarly 
CSM 5)  
Analysing why CIB are generally reluctant to work with community organisations is 
complex. Goldsmith (1990) has theorised subversiveness to policing ideals through 
adherence to group practices and ethic as enabling the autonomy to get on with the job. 
‘Invariably just wanting to get on with the job’ has been found in this research, 
indicating that system-centred factors take precedence in CIB not wanting to be 
hampered through having to incorporate support.  
This system-centred approach is evident in District 9 and Area 8E. In District 9, the 
explanation for not contacting specialist agencies was that in contrast, ‘Victim Support 
makes it easy’ (CIB Supervisor 9). This related not only to their accessibility in being 
located in the station but also to ease of referrals through Victim Support having access 
to occurrence books and offence reports which recorded reported crime (Victim Support 
Manager 9). Similarly, in 8E police were said to opt for convenience by using Victim 
Support for some interventions even when the specialist group was already involved 
with the complainant.  
‘They will ring Victim Support because they happen to be on the premises … 
It is convenient for them. They don't think about the client.’ 
(Support/Advocacy Manager 8E) 
This police privileging of workplace requirements over victims’ needs resonates with  
Boles and Patterson’s (1997) finding that victim responsiveness was rare, and Martin 
and Powell’s finding that police subjugated victims’ needs to the requirements of 
evidence gathering (cited in Campbell & Raja, 1999). With the strengthening resolve of 
community organisations to ensure victim needs are met, ongoing police system-centred 
decision-making has contributed to interagency tensions, creating partnership 
difficulties at this level also. 
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‘Outside agency’ personnel also suggested that systemic reasons are implicated in 
police decisions about support. Again, some related to work pressure.  
A: ‘We are not always called in and they have an obligation to call somebody in 
and they do not stick to it and that makes me very angry because I think they are 
self-serving. 
Q: Do you know why they don't? 
A: I believe that it is a professional jealousy thing almost. I believe that they 
think they can handle it without anybody else coming in for support, that they 
can be all things to this woman, but in fact they can't. The women tell us that 
they can't. I would have thought that they would not have the time, if they 
haven't got the time to come to the meetings. …They probably only call us in for 
about 50%. We very often read about it in the paper ….’ (Manager 8E) 
In this research, some police appeared to particularly dislike working in partnership 
with feminist agencies. Given the Police role as the ‘legitimate’ funded government 
organisation in contrast to the support/advocacy role as the powerless grassroots ‘other’, 
there was little political imperative for police to work with RCCs. Within this 
framework, the need for support/advocacy organisations to monitor police interactions 
with victims for practice contributing to secondary victimisation was also implicated in 
police reluctance. Officers being challenged in their own conduct towards women while 
investigating other men accused of sexual violence located ‘gendered power relations’ 
squarely between police and feminist agencies and with an ongoing cost to partnership.  
Unsurprisingly, in Areas which were described as more conservative there was evidence 
that earlier radical challenges to mainstream presumptions about rape still featured in 
police perceptions of RCCs. Accordingly, clichéd judgements formed from rape 
mythologies and old circumstances worked against contemporary partnerships with 
some RCCs.  
‘Police officers can tend to be stressed anyway and it is quite easy for them to 
misinterpret and if they shut people out they can be quite good at leaving them 
out for ever and a day.’ (CIB Supervisor 8E) 
In one District, the specialist agency had to constantly dispel myths which contributed 
to their image. 
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‘I'm assuming that I don't have to explain to you that feminism doesn't have to 
equate to man-hating. We have to do that regularly.’ (Manager 7) 
Notwithstanding these ‘regular explanations’, many comments indicated that negativity 
towards feminist RCCs remained a significant feature of this Area.  
A: ‘Some people still have an aversion to the words I think…Rape Crisis. It [the 
aversion] is quite big in the city here. 
Q: Why? 
A: The words that are said back to me are because the women are lesbian. Still! 
…They do a really good job! … We are working really hard at dispelling that 
myth constantly…. We say, “They work very well with male clients”. …That 
doesn't fit the picture. So yes, we still deal with that quite a lot and I guess that 
some of the more long-term CIB staff would live with that too.’ 
(Victim Support 7) 
Such descriptions were commonplace historically (CSM 7; Oerton cited in Vanderpyl, 
2001). In reinforcing cultural differences, they functioned to resolve the dilemma for 
police of having to work with feminist agencies. Their currency impacts on 
contemporary police and is destructive to the possibility of partnerships and developing 
holistic services in some Areas. In arguing for partnerships, it is crucial to identify that 
although a few RCCs may be more critical or separatist in philosophy far more often 
this is not the reality. Progressively, specialist agencies have professionalised their 
services (Vanderpyl, 2001), and relinquished the common ‘Rape Crisis’ label. Most 
agencies are now represented through titles which disclose their particular forms of 
support and advocacy for men, women, and children.  
That the clichés were able to persist was due to the limited knowledge of most police 
about specialist agency functions. This worked against partnership through police not 
only having little information to counteract negative images of RCCs, but also through 
police having few positive messages on which to base inclusion of RCCs in service 
provision. As argued already, occasionally it was police lack of knowledge about victim 
trauma and the interventions required, which caused misunderstanding about 
support/advocacy intentions. This is supported by Gilmore and Pittman’s (1993) 
identification that police lacked the specialist knowledge to assess the requirement for 
crisis intervention.  
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Many factors contributed to police having little knowledge about the wide range of 
support offered by their local agency, even in Districts which regularly operated in 
partnership. Police-related reasons include the frequent rotation which limited the 
opportunity to gain positive information about support/advocacy organisations. In 
addition, the generalist nature of most CIB involved in rape investigations meant that 
individual police were seldom in contact with support/advocacy agencies. These police 
factors meant that in the absence of a senior officer ensuring partnership maintenance, 
support/advocacy agencies would need to make repeated efforts to promote their 
services, yet this was handicapped by time and resource constraints. In one case, it was 
also handicapped by agency diffidence in promoting themselves and their availability to 
police in case this resulted in police, rather than victims, contacting them. Congruent 
with the views of some police, this was for symbolic reasons related to re-empowering 
victims through protecting the woman’s right to choice about support/advocacy 
involvement (Support/Advocacy 11).  
Police knowledge was also sometimes limited by support/advocacy agency ‘patch 
protection’ and reluctance to share knowledge. This appeared to operate in a very small 
minority of agencies, none of which were interviewed in this study. One SCC (2) cited 
‘undermining each other’ as a reason for some RCCs ‘losing credibility with outside 
organisations’ and for some SCCs preferring to support family violence organisations 
(SCC 2). One example in this research was an agency being invited, but declining to 
participate in consultation to build the Police ASA course. Instead, it unsuccessfully 
attempted to undermine this consultation by contacting other organisations to also 
boycott consultations (personal knowledge). If successful, this would have denied police 
a greater appreciation of what this and other support/advocacy organisations offer. One 
explanation is that many support/advocates have longstanding engagement in 
developing service capacity yet have received minimal recognition for this. This meant 
that if new initiatives received recognition, resentment was a possibility. Congruent 
with this analysis, Vanderpyl (2001) too has found ‘inequalities in influence’ to be an 
ongoing issue for the RCC which she had studied. 
In a metropolitan Area which accessed Victim Support only, the CIB supervisor was 
surprised at the comprehensive nature of services that specialist support groups offered 
elsewhere. When apprised of these he acknowledged his support for the concept.  
188 
Q: ‘In other centres one person goes through all the processes. 
A: That would be good! That would be ideal if that was set up and if there were 
enough competent people doing that, that would be far better than the Victim 
Support initial role and contacting the other agencies. Yes I agree. …It builds a 
lot stronger relationship initially. 
Q: So you would be in favour of that? 
A: Yes definitely! …It would be more direct and more consistent.’ 
(CIB Supervisor 9) 
This positive response reinforces the argument for organisations to be brought together 
in order to share information and break down perceived barriers to partnership (Bard, 
1976; Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Hardgrove, 1976; Martin et al., 1992).  
Along with police cultural beliefs about feminist organisations, police belief that there 
are many false complaints also impacts on willingness to work with support/advocacy 
agencies. This ‘belief’ has been recognised by Police psychological services personnel 
as ‘impacting on the energy given to the first interview’ (cited in Beckett, 2000). It is 
similarly likely to impact on the energy given to implementing bureaucratic measures 
aimed at quality assurance, such as the ASA Policy mandate to work with specialist 
agencies. If police feel complaints are unworthy, they are unlikely to want their 
challenges to victims to be challenged in turn by victim-supportive agencies. In some 
Districts then, police chose not to work with specialists, arguably because it was harder 
to dismiss cases as unfounded when working with partners who were likely to recognise 
secondarily victimising police practices and act on those concerns. This view is 
supported by a counsellor reporting in 2001 that police frequently separated women 
from their advocates in order to accuse them of making false complaints.  
The analysis so far is that police wish to ‘get on with the job’ and sometimes to dismiss 
cases and that in specialist agencies rendering both more difficult, some police have 
discredited some agencies and some victims in order to justify avoiding collaboration. It 
is evident then that some police cultural imperatives serve functional purposes.  
Heavy Police Workload 
The question is why police might wish to ‘get on with the job’ and ‘dismiss cases’. 
Examining why the workload needs to be managed in these ways will shed light on 
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situational contingencies outside police control which must be addressed in order to 
facilitate change. In this research, beyond evidence-related issues I found two main 
reasons for police seeking case attrition. Both relate to New Zealand police being 
seldom able to achieve positive reinforcement from working on adult sexual assault 
investigations. This is in contrast to Metropolitan police who do work in holistic 
systems, having redefined success and dropped case wins as their main priority. Firstly, 
heavy workloads render it impossible for police to adequately investigate all cases of 
reported sexual assault. Secondly and related, is that police are seldom able to 
successfully prosecute adult sexual assault complaints.   
In respect of the relationship between workload and need to dismiss cases there is 
considerable evidence that Police has been under-resourced by Government. For some 
time, researchers who have examined New Zealand police responses to sexual assault 
have commented on heavy CIB workloads (Jordan, 1996; Miller Burgering, 1994; 
Young, 1983). More recently, media attention has focussed on insufficient Police 
staffing and government agreement that an extra 1000 police are required (Dominion 
Post, 25.7.2006). Given that at the end of June 2006 the service employed 7763 police 
(NZ Police, Ten One, 2006) this means that government believes Police have been 
nearly 13% understaffed. Some police feel the deficit is greater.   
‘…the comparisons between New Zealand Police, Australian Police, probably 
Britain and the United States. In order for us to be on par with any of them we 
would have to increase our Police force by 30%, so we are grossly 
understaffed!’ (CAT Manager 1) 
Despite British Police being more adequately resourced than New Zealand Police, 
Lovett et al. (2004) have recently expressed concerns about heavy police workloads in 
Britain. This places concerns about New Zealand Police understaffing in sharper 
perspective.   
CIB in particular was frequently said to be still under-resourced and overworked.  
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‘They know if they make it [ASA Policy] mandatory then they are going to have 
to find some more staff. It would be a great day, but we are talking money so 
they are going to have to go back to the government and say listen, “We have 
got this Policy that we have agreed to with other agencies. We need another 200 
detectives”. …Police is a great job. I love being a detective but the resources 
seem to be getting thinner and thinner. It is quite depressing!’ (CIB 8C) 
These comments have been reinforced by the Police Association President, claiming 
that CIB, owing to ‘…growing backlogs of unassigned crime files’ were on the road to 
disaster (Dominion Post, 7.8.2006). The article stated that 60% of CIB surveyed felt 
they were:  
‘…sometimes asked to carry out investigation tasks for which they were not 
adequately trained’. (ibid) 
In the current research, some police related staffing levels to the adequacy of adult 
sexual assault investigations (CIB 8C, 9). Their analysis has recently been endorsed at 
judicial level in a finding that ‘significant resourcing problems’ had contributed to a 
haphazard police investigation of rape (Dominion Post, 19.9.2006).  
While prior research, media comment, and respondent feedback suggest that all CIB are 
overworked, the perception of particularly heavy workloads, often attributed to sexual 
assault complaints, was most regularly volunteered in Districts 10, 9, and 5. In District 
10, the CSM, a CIB supervisor, Victim Support, and CYFS all mentioned high reporting 
rates and understaffing.  
‘They are under resourced … I am sure that ***  had the highest level of 
unallocated and uninvestigated Police cases, the second-highest uninvestigated 
sexual assault cases on children's cases.’ (CYFS 10) 
In 5C sexual abuse was described as ‘epidemic’ (Support/Advocacy 5B; DSAC 5A) 
causing CIB to be ‘…terribly backlogged with historic and child sexual abuse inquiries’ 
(CIB 5; similarly CIB Supervisor 9; Support/Advocacy 5C). This was to the extent that 
CIB needed to be seconded from elsewhere (CSM 5). In another District, CIB general 
workload was such that a senior detective had reported to his District Commander that 
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‘serious criminal investigations, including sex attacks on child victims were shelved’ 
because most CIB had more files than they could manage (Waikato Times, 3.7.2006).   
These three Districts have already been discussed as Districts not working with 
specialist agencies and officers having suboptimal practice in responding to rape 
victims. The more frequent suggestions of heavy workload and understaffing in these 
Districts in particular are suggest another reason for avoidance of partnership with 
specialists. Hence: 
‘The more agencies and the more groups who meet together, the more that we 
are going to realise that we are not doing half the work that we are supposed to 
be doing and there are a lot of people out there who need our help and we are 
not going to have the facility to do that.’ (CIB 8C) 
Harwin and Barron support this officer’s view with their recognition that in advancing 
knowledge of needed responses, multi-agency collaborations would cause ‘dilemmas 
created by increased workload’ (cited in Jones, 2004, p.6).  
There is a relationship then between particularly heavy workload, not using specialist 
support, and suboptimal practice. It is evident that under-resourcing has necessitated 
creative but victimising practice in achieving workload attrition. This analysis is 
supported by Blair’s (1985) identification of sexual assault cases as being particularly 
prone to dismissal since there is often less evidence than for other crimes. As he has 
also noted:  
‘Discretion between cases capable of proof in court and those with insufficient 
evidence…allows police to husband the scarce resources of investigative 
units….’ (Blair, 1985, p.54) 
If support/advocacy specialists are not involved with sexual assault victims there is less 
likelihood of challenges to the negative practices used by police in the dismissal of 
cases. 
In Areas such as 5, 9, and 10, such practice was only possible because senior police had 
not forged partnerships with specialist agencies and as a result were unaware how 
specialist support/advocacy services could instead lighten CIB workload. Police who 
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did not work closely with specialist organisations were also less aware of the 
consequences to victims of such negative practices and less readily able to believe that 
many complaints were false and should be dismissed. Ultimately, the perception that 
partnership will make heavy workloads heavier rather than lighter has influenced the 
choice of these police to avoid using specialist agencies which might mitigate 
unwarranted attrition of cases.   
Court Dismissal of Sexual Assault Cases 
Police have other reasons to wish for attrition and not to be challenged in this by partner 
agencies. From the outset of reporting, investigators are aware of both the considerable 
volume of work required to investigate each rape complaint, and that this will be of 
limited avail. Congruent with this is the view that law enforcement agencies: 
‘…often measure the success of their investigative activities by the number of 
cases that they are able to close. With sexual assault cases this means of 
evaluation does not include the victim's needs and more specifically often omits 
victims whose assaults do not meet the definition of sexual assault established by 
the law enforcement department.’ (Lord & Rassel, 2000, p.69) 
A comparatively low rate for resolution of sexual crime in general means that lesser 
work satisfaction is to be had from investigating rape. In this research, police frequently 
expressed their dislike of working on adult sexual assault investigations. 
‘They are frustrating cases because 8 times out of 10 you are on a hiding to 
nothing.’ (CAT Manager 7)  
In addition, the limited likelihood of gaining sexual assault convictions at court also 
places CIB in an invidious position in bringing prosecutions. In by far the majority of 
cases, police find themselves on the losing side of the adversarial court battle. As found 
by VAWSU (2005), many respondents mentioned the seeming inability of juries to base 
decisions on the evidence alone, particularly in provincial and rural settings (District 
Commander 12; CSM, 10; CAT Manager 7, 9; CIB Supervisor 8B, 9, 12; CIB 8C; CAT 
4, 12; CYFS 9, 11; DSAC 6, 8A, 11, 12). In Dunedin, male students were seldom 
convicted due to the impact a conviction would have on what was regarded as their 
bright future (CSM Southern). In smaller Areas jury fear of retribution, particularly if a 
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gang member was involved, was mentioned as a concern (Support/Advocacy Manager, 
8D; CYFS 11). That this is a valid concern has been recognised in attempts to legislate 
for defendants’ loss of right to jury trials if intimidation occurs (Dominion Post, 
23.6.2004). 
As Young (1983) has noted, police response to the difficulty in gaining convictions has 
been to search for evidence beyond the prima facie case required to charge offenders 
and take a case to court. In that respect, caught between complainants and the court 
system, police operate as apologists for inadequate legislative and court responses to 
rape victims by filtering many victims out of the system.  
A: ‘The police have never been in the habit of taking cases to court where they 
are going to lose it … often we know that victims have been raped but there just 
is insufficient evidence because there is only their story … 
Q: What about putting the human face before the jury? 
A: We often do for the serious cases. I can give you many examples where we 
have and we have lost. 
Q: All of them?  
A: Yes… if she is from a low socio-economic background; they present poorly; 
they are uneducated … They look and judge the complainant as-a-whole instead 
of taking that incident in isolation and say “Okay well she is this or that but on 
this particular night, hey this definitely happened to her and we need to convict 
on the basis of that…We went for about 18 months and lost every child sexual 
abuse case and every adult sexual abuse case in ***.’ (CSM 10) 
The processes required to achieve this attrition discomfort some police.  
‘We don't go to court with something we are not 100% happy with and it just 
seems so hard on the victim to be put through that, but if we weren't doing the 
scrutiny then it would need to be done in court. But it seems pretty harsh for it to 
be done twice.’ (CIB Supervisor 9) 
Acknowledging that police style in achieving attrition can be victimising of 
complainants, the considerable focus on and public criticism of the Police has deflected 
attention from the role of the courts in forcing the police hand in achieving this attrition. 
Most respondents in this study critiqued court processes when asked what needed to be 
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done differently for rape victims. Of the 113 respondents, 100 suggested 401 
improvements ranging over many domains from public awareness to funding shortfalls. 
Of these, 216 (54%) comments were strongly-worded expressions of dissatisfaction 
with the court processes. This was particularly noteworthy since the research was 
introduced as being concerned with systems in the pre-court phase. The accounts of 
victim treatment which accompanied their reasons for suggesting change were 
disturbing. One respondent reported a ‘very negative effect’ on victims whose cases had 
gone to trial, having recognised that ‘a couple of’ clients had ‘flashbacks to the trial 
more than to the rape’ (DSAC 7).  
Defence questioning in particular received resounding disapprobation. According to one 
respondent:  
‘… sometimes it is just disgusting. His lawyer is making out she is a liar… and 
“You liked it … but you enjoyed it didn't you? … It was consensual and then you 
decided that you had changed your mind and it wasn't”. It is sleazy! You go and 
listen. Sometimes they are in tears those girls. … He will ask her one question 
and she will answer it, and he will ask her it again. He might have asked her 
four times and I am thinking … she has answered you. What's the matter with 
you?’ (Victim Support Manager 10) 
Unsurprisingly then, 22% of respondents volunteered that they found defence lawyers 
discourtesy and disrespect to be unnecessary to the legal proceedings and hugely 
problematic for recovery. This treatment has been reported previously by McDonald (in 
DSAC, 1996) and subsequently by VAWSU (2005). Evidently, rape myths which locate 
culpability with victims are still used to justify defence practice despite the intentions 
underlying statutory changes (Davies, 2004; Schwendinger & Schwendinger, 1983). No 
wonder then that court practice has variously been described as ‘particularly devoid of 
empathy for victims’ (Harvey, 1985, p.3) and ‘humiliating and fundamentally lacking in 
justice’ (O’Shea, 2006, p.31). 
Police cannot but be affected in their attitudes towards the veracity of complaints when 
the courts continually find against rape complainants. In addition, the need to reconcile 
cognitive dissonance is an important reason for police needing to believe many 
complaints are false. This is created firstly by the heavy workload and consequent 
inability to respond adequately to many complaints, and secondly by being on the losing 
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side of those cases which are taken on. Cognitive dissonance is also a reason for the 
negative attitudes of some police not only to working on rape cases, but also to 
complainants and their supporters.  
‘Some young ones still have that same attitude. They look at the way they are 
dressed and they make quite sexist comments about the woman…really 
derogatory comments about them. …because it is tough work, there are no two 
ways about that, they have a mechanism of trying to deal with that, and part of 
that is making these sort of comments. They put it up as a protection for 
themselves. …Because they want, and we find that with the children, a 
conviction - that is what they want. That's why they are careful about what they 
take on and what they won't and if they don't think they are going to get a 
conviction they won't go far with it.’ (CYFS Manager 4) 
Reinforcing this analysis, recently there has been considerable negative political and 
media comment about police conduct in sexual assault investigations. As noted, the 
catalyst for criticism was exposure of alleged police corruption in shielding their own 
members from prosecution for alleged rape in the 1980s (New Zealand Herald, 
1.3.2004; Waikato Times, 24.5.2004). As it has been reported, it appears that it is not 
hard to subtly or otherwise dissuade traumatised victims from continuing with a rape 
complaint, let alone when the alleged perpetrator is an officer. More recent media 
commentary has shown greater depth in questioning whether Police has the capacity to 
do the work required and to a standard required (Dominion Post, 16.2; 30.3; 6, 7, 9, 11 
& 12.4.2005).  
Negative attitudes are unlikely to change until Police is adequately resourced and no 
longer required to protect the reputation of the courts by proactively ensuring attrition of 
complaints as argued. Given the propensity for recidivism amongst rapists, victim 
attrition is a very short (sighted)-term solution to resourcing problems, since:    
‘…young offenders are more amenable to change if identified and provided with 
treatment early enough in their sexual offending career.’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2004, p.55) 
As well as missing the opportunity for early correction of antisocial tendencies, police 
abandonment of cases the courts may reject means that the real incidence of rape 
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remains hidden from court and public view. Yet if the courts too are unable to manage 
the flow of cases, they can become a powerful ally for Police in applying pressure for 
government to increase responsiveness to the issues of prevention, services, and redress.    
While heavy workloads and court dismissals are currently outside Police control, in 
some Districts, police cultural imperatives have been set aside, enabling effective sexual 
assault services to be provided through partnerships. Equally important in understanding 
police choice about working in partnerships is analysis of how some Districts have 
achieved this. As the only nationwide fully government-funded agency, Police has 
funding for all the work it does, including advocating for improvements to services. The 
Police voice is therefore currently the strongest and has the most influence over whether 
partnerships happen. In the prior absence of a national coordinator, those police who 
have championed partnerships with specialists have been interested CSMs providing 
leadership through acting in some aspects of the SADC role. Having an effective 
champion for holistic service delivery has therefore operated at District level through 
CSMs and occasionally at Area level through CIB supervisors. If detectives worked in 
Areas where these senior officers had established routine working relationships through 
promoting liaison and regular meetings, organisations worked in concert and offered a 
more seamless service. Otherwise, police partnership choices were influenced by 
situational contingencies and operated at individual level.  
There is some evidence to suggest that a greater volume of sexual assault reports may 
operate to increase CSM responsiveness in the SADC role. In Counties Manukau and 
Canterbury which consistently recorded the highest and second highest figures of sexual 
violence, CSM’s were correspondingly the most active in promoting and working in 
partnership with DSAC and support/advocacy specialists. The relative longevity of both 
CSMs in these roles may also have contributed to effective partnerships in both 
enabling CSM knowledge of how agency services might preserve limited police 
resources and allowing the development of mechanisms for partnership maintenance. 
However, I believe the most important determinant of CSM commitment was the 
personal dedication and commitment of these officers to this work. 
In District 9 where the CSM did not prioritise partnership with specialist sexual assault 
support/advocacy agencies, the CSM cited top level justification in the form of the 
Commissioner’s Risk Indicators.  
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‘If you look at the Statement of Intent that the Police put out every year, that 
gives you a good feel for what the Commissioner is getting as his messages from 
the Minister of Government [sic] as to what to focus on… It is all output driven 
…unless the issue is huge and demonstrable and present then the District 
Commander is obviously going to focus on those things that the Commissioner 
has indicated in the Statement of Intent that he wants to focus on ….’ (CSM 8) 
Other CSMs also offered statistics on sexual crime as the justification for not 
prioritising sexual assault and therefore not building partnership with specialists.  
Yet as an indicator of risk, Police statistics on sexual assault are a superficial and 
imperfect basis on which to plan responsiveness. Firstly, in accord with international 
studies, New Zealand Ministry of Justice victim surveys have consistently indicated a 
large dark figure of sexual crime. Secondly, in Districts 12 and 5 which recorded 
respectively the third lowest and lowest sexual assault statistics, unsolicited comment 
was offered as to the large volume of sexual crime.  
‘I think there is about 20% that would get to the police.’ (Support/Advocacy 5) 
The ability to rely on official statistics in planning was also questioned by an officer.  
A: ‘I think our stats prove that *** District has got one of the higher volumes of 
child abuse. 
Q: That is not reflected in the figures on the net? 
A: Actually I get those stats from the evidentials and the diagnostics … [from] 
our interviewers over in ***. You can read those [official] stats anyway you 
want and they are absolute rubbish…. The Police is far too stats driven. The 
government has got something to answer for there.’ (CAT 12) 
In terms of the real incidence of sexual assault across the country, caution is evidently 
necessary in interpolating from the recorded statistics. This view is endorsed by recent 
Police Association rejection of the ‘statistics-led philosophy of District Commanders’ 
which was said to affect ‘the priority given to investigating serious crime’ 
(Dominion Post, 7.8.2006).  
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There is a seeming paradox then between recorded statistics of sexual violence and 
frequent CIB comment that sexual violence was prevalent and second in seriousness 
only to murder. The latter of these comments indicates that other indices should 
determine how resources are used. The qualitative effects of crime as well as the 
quantitative effects are important in determining whether to work in partnership and in 
respect of rape these have been shown to be enormous in the lifelong physical and 
psychological health consequences to individuals and therefore to society.  
With respect to quantitative measures, as indicated by the comments of one CSM in 
discussing the multi-agency Kimiora, most sexual violence is under the Police radar. In 
accord with O’Shea’s (2006) analysis of higher reporting rates to multi-agency centres, 
his view was:  
‘…they, I think, have a higher reporting regime because they are so much 
better.’ (CSM)   
This would become more evident to police if they regularly worked with the specialists 
to whom victims sometimes report instead.  
Conclusion 
Sexual violence has considerable potential to destroy victims’ lives. However, its 
multitude of destabilising effects can be mitigated through a holistic response which 
incorporates psychosocial support and advocacy. This is possible, but not yet achieved 
because although New Zealand is well-covered by community organisations 
specialising in support/advocacy responses, police do not work comprehensively with 
them. A number of factors are implicated in this. Poor uptake of the various training 
opportunities means that rape mythology still informs police and that many police do 
not fully understand the traumatic psychosocial consequences of sexual violence. Also, 
most police appear not to know what specialist support/advocates do, and how their 
work can limit these consequences while simultaneously assisting police in their 
workload and investigations.  
 
Even though police ‘don’t know what they don’t know, a situation of power imbalance 
between Police and community organisations allows frontline New Zealand police to 
make the decisions about partnership. Police base these decisions not on victim but 
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system-centred considerations such as philosophical incompatibilities with ‘outside’ 
agencies. A more resonant explanation is that some specialist agencies are unable to be 
always available. Yet police leadership can play a role in frontline police using and 
supporting these agencies so that they remain viable. In addition, police leadership can 
achieve professional and equal partnerships with specialist community organisations if 
they ensure that the partnership maintenance measures which redress the power 
imbalances are enacted. Although partnership maintenance measures also close service 
gaps and provide services which met victim needs, currently, in not understanding the 
need for care in collaboration, these are ignored by most police, even those working 
with specialist support/advocates. These factors are all within police capacity to change 
if police leadership take time to consider what policing means in the context of rape 
trauma.  
 
If as a result Police do opt to ‘protect victims from the effects of crime’, police 
leadership must first liaise with government to remedy under-resourcing issues so that 
partnership development is possible. Frontline CIB are unlikely to take the time to meet 
with support/advocacy agencies while they remain understaffed. CIB also resist 
partnership because this compromises the attrition of victims which is necessary in 
managing workload. This suggests their own powerlessness in achieving the systemic 
changes required in responding professionally to all complainants of sexual violence. 
Perceptions of powerlessness were sometimes expressed directly.  
 
‘How many people come around and talk to the police and ask them what they 
think of the job…? The reason why people are talking is because nobody does 
come and ask them. Very few bosses are prepared [to].’ (CIB 8C) 
For police leadership to advocate for improved resourcing they will need to hear and be 
responsive to CIB frustrations regarding systemic shortcomings which affect their 
ability to investigate complaints. Achieving professional satisfaction is their entitlement, 
just as a professional response is the entitlement of complainants. Both are the 
responsibility of Police leadership. 
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Chapter Seven: Confirming The Need for Greater 
Government Commitment to Service 
Developments   
Men’s sexual violence happens in the broad social arena for which governments have 
total responsibility. This has been recognised in UN covenants and is reflected in the 
US, Britain, and Australia where governments have increasingly met their obligation to 
develop sexual assault services by providing the required funding and support. Because 
1990’s research suggested that successive New Zealand governments have not similarly 
kept pace with overseas service developments, in Chapter Seven I discuss aspects of 
current government responsiveness.  
In the first part of this chapter, I identify the various government departments which 
respond to aspects of sexual violence. Following this, I argue for greater government 
contribution. In doing so, I refer to ongoing issues for sexual assault services in 
New Zealand as well as the political responses to these. The possibilities for improving 
responsiveness through central and local governance structures which are well-placed to 
coordinate and support sexual assault services are also discussed. In this the need for 
and benefits of involving local government structures are demonstrated and supported 
with evidence of gains made overseas when, with central government funding support, 
local governance structures have been invoked in sexual assault service coordination.  
In suggesting what government should offer, examining services already provided for 
child sexual abuse victims will enable comment on the level of state involvement which 
is both necessary and possible. Since children’s services are found to be collaborative, 
specialist, and government-funded, these provide a benchmark of what can be achieved 
in New Zealand. The difference in government responsiveness implies discrimination 
against women and needs to be explained. With recourse to feminist theory, 
explanations from respondents will be discussed in arguing against ongoing 
disadvantage, and for adequacy in responses to women.  
Contemporary Service Issues and Government Responses 
In New Zealand, many Government departments have responsibility for the needs 
created by sexual violence. They include the: Police; Ministry of Justice and its Crime 
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Prevention Unit; Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Social Development which is 
currently merging with the Child, Youth, and Family Service (CYFS); and the Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC). As noted, at operational levels problems exist when 
separate organisations interact to provide a holistic service (Astbury, 2006). At the level 
of New Zealand government, the departments mentioned still lack the effective 
coordination which Campbell and Ahrens (1998) have indicated is necessary to 
comprehensively support frontline services.  
‘There is currently no coordinated approach to sexual violence across 
government … Various agencies provide funding for sexual violence services, 
but no one agency has overall responsibility for managing responses to sexual 
violence or reducing sexual violence.’ (Ministry of Justice, 2004, p.62) 
This reflects Hornibrook and Myers (1996), and Jones’ (2005) findings of sexual 
violence responsiveness being passed from one department to another and prioritised by 
none. One respondent suggested that in the adult field responsibility was: 
‘…fragmented, it was all over the place. You know you would think that with 
money that is invested the government would be wanting to have that kind of 
coordination - ensuring that there would be no gaps…. (CAT 12) 
This fragmentation was confirmed during a recent Ministerial address to 
support/advocacy agencies which had met to discuss renewing their national 
coordination. The Minister lamented the difficulties in achieving a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach due to the poor communication between government 
departments. The silos which resulted caused ‘enormous frustration’ for Ministers 
(Tizard, 12.5.2006). This had evidently continued despite a two year old proposal to 
establish an Interagency Steering Group on Sexual Violence with responsibility for 
development, implementation, monitoring and review of a coordinated approach to 
sexual violence (Ministry of Justice, 2004). As a result, anomalous situations have 
arisen such as the Ministry of Justice (2004) identifying RCCs as a collective providing 
support/advocacy and education/prevention services, while police only variably allow 
RCCs to provide that support. Even more anomalous is that the national collective had 
dissolved two years prior to its identification by the Ministry of Justice as a collective. 
In addition, in 2004 the current research was finding prevention activities to be greatly 
curtailed by the lack of government support for RCCs.  
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Lack of interdepartmental cohesion around sexual violence responsiveness has also 
limited the prospect of developing national coordination within and between acute 
service organisations at operational level. Since the need has not been fully appreciated, 
government funding for this has seldom been forthcoming. Consequently, attempts to 
achieve inter-organisational national coordination remain at operational level, and as 
noted, commenced with DSAC’s approach to the Police Executive in order to open 
dialogue. Significantly, DSAC’s own national coordination has allowed this through 
giving a national oversight and enabling its members to speak with one voice. However, 
reaching the maximum benefits of such coordination necessitates the inclusion of 
support/advocacy agencies and this requires them to achieve the national structure 
currently sought.  
Along with slow progress in developing national coordination, without direction and 
oversight from coordinated departments, progress in developing services is slow. Rather 
than through the Ministry of Health, the momentum in medical/forensic responsiveness 
is through DSAC’s research and development initiatives and ongoing attempts to ensure 
specialist coverage nationwide. The Ministry of Health’s contribution, but only in a few 
Areas, is to make DHB facilities available for examinations, yet their use has yet to be 
guaranteed and is currently under review (personal correspondence; attendance at 
DSAC Regional Coordinator meetings, 2005 & 2006). Correspondingly, despite 
longstanding community service, support/advocacy agencies still struggle to gain 
recognition of the destructive consequences of rape to the wider community. Since their 
work is little- recognised, nationwide most also struggle just to survive. This applies 
even to the government-mandated Victim Support. 
‘The work I take home, the work I do in weekends and out of hours. …if you 
want to be able to service the community better then put the funding in rather 
than wait until it becomes a crisis situation and then think, oh maybe we need to 
do something. …How can I consciously take a holiday or a day’s leave even and 
know that I am getting paid for that while I have to ask a volunteer to give up 
even more of their time than they already give to come in and do the office work 
for the day?….’ (Victim Support Manager 5A) 
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In a unique response to minimal government support, another Victim Support had 
disaffiliated from the national body and as with some New Zealand RCCs, now relied 
totally on volunteer input. This was because funding was deemed insufficient for the 
work, yet was accompanied by bureaucratic expectations which displaced time and 
energy for victims. 
‘Victim Support wound up… because basically financially it could not afford to 
carry on. …We personally felt that the time that we spent doing victims’ support 
was better with the client than sitting on the side of the street trying to raise 
some money at a sausage sizzle. The responsibilities that we have under the 
Victim of Offences Act, there has got to be resourcing that goes with it. … It was 
just absolutely ridiculous what they asked and the accountability back… you 
spend most of your time filling out bits of paper - for what?’ (Manager 5B) 
These comments are strongly reflective of international concerns about the trade-offs, 
such as reduction in the time and commitment for original goals, in order to receive 
funding (Byington et al., 1991; Campbell & Martin, 2001; Jones, 2004; Mathews, 1994; 
Mawby & Gill, 1987). In this case, a cost-benefit analysis privileged working for 
victims over meeting the expectations which accompanied inadequate government 
funding.   
A parallel situation has arisen in respect to ACC contributions to counselling sessions 
for victims. Many specialist agencies which include counselling have elected to provide 
services without recourse to ACC funding, due not only to time lost through 
bureaucratic record-keeping requirements but also to the unrealistic and sometimes 
counterproductive expectations of early counselling sessions. 
‘There are no ACC accredited counsellors currently in our town. … Their 
system is abusive to both counsellors and survivors and so this collective 
chooses not to go down that road so far.’ (Support/Advocacy 5D) 
Following a recent review, ACC-paid counselling sessions for victims have trebled to a 
more realistic 30 sessions (Tizard, 12.5.2006).  
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From the foregoing, it is evident that government has yet to ascertain how those 
agencies which provide services manage to do so. That it has yet to establish even 
whether there is nationwide coverage of services, reflects overseas concerns about the 
dearth of evidence-based services (Astbury, 2006; Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Dartnall, 
PlusNEWS, 2007; Gilson, 1997). Since one of the two support/advocacy agencies and 
one District’s specialist medical/forensic service were again compromised respectively 
in 2004 and 2005/2006 (personal knowledge), this indicates ongoing deficits in 
government financial support.  
There are recent signs of government interest in adult sexual violence. This has been ad 
hoc and reactive to issues which the media have made public, validating Young’s 
(1996) thesis that for change to occur sexual assault must be on the public agenda. 
Firstly, there has been the ‘Commission of Inquiry into Police Conduct’. Secondly, in 
2005 the Crime Prevention Unit initiated a national survey of support/advocacy 
services. On this occasion, the issue was the near collapse of Auckland’s HELP due to 
inadequate financial support which happened despite a 2005 pre-election Labour Party 
pledge to ensure ‘sufficient and well-resourced crisis services’ for victims of sexual 
violence. However, despite being designed to establish support/advocacy response 
capacity and funding requirements the survey cautioned support/advocacy agencies not 
to expect funding to accompany any new initiatives. Further research into support 
services was conducted in 2006 through the Police sexual assault national coordinator 
position. This research also surveyed forensic coverage. The Ministry of Health too has 
surveyed DHB provision of sexual assault services. What is evident is duplication of 
resources through the lack of a strategic plan and coherence in some of this research 
(McCall in Bachar & Koss, 2001).  
In March 2005, a New Zealand parliamentarians’ Population and Development group 
held an ‘Open Hearing into the Prevention of Violence Against Women and Children’ 
to consider domestic and sexual violence issues. However, it did so in a manner which 
obscured the difference and therefore significance of sexual assault issues. Community 
agencies which deal with general aspects of men’s violence were asked to address this 
forum but agencies specifically responsive to sexual violence were not (personal 
attendance). This domestic violence overshadowing of sexual assault has been found 
overseas at operational level (Byington et al., 1991; Mawby & Gill, 1987; O’Sullivan & 
Carlton, 2001; Regan & Kelly, 2003; Ullman & Townsend, 2007). Evidence of it at 
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national level in New Zealand is likely to relate in part to the better national and local 
coordination between Women’s Refuge and Police which Lovett et al. (2004) have also 
noted in Britain.  
The reactive and uncoordinated nature of this research will not expose the underlying 
issue of the structural malaise of current service organisation. Until research becomes 
more strategic, until it uncovers the extent of rape’s social costs in New Zealand, and 
until the need for specialist services supported by permanent funding streams and 
structured national coordination is understood, the gaps in responsiveness identified at 
the 1996 Rape Symposium will remain. 
Possibilities for Coordination by Local Bodies 
Along with the need for national solutions to collaboration issues and service gaps, there 
is a need for services to be coordinated and supported at local level and this requires the 
input of local governance structures supported by central government. The need for 
local Councils to act in a coordination role has subsequently been underscored by the 
Ministry of Justice (2004) articulation of the necessity for relevant ministries to work 
with local governance bodies and local crime prevention partnerships in reducing 
violence.  
International precedent exists for researching the possibility of local body coordination 
of services funded by national government and supported by statutory endorsement. For 
instance, US Government funding enabled the Maryland Coalition Against Sexual 
Assault (MCASA) to explore the possibility and requirements for Maryland’s County 
Councils to be involved in sexual assault service provision. The foundation for the 
increasing devolution of service provision from national to state and then to local level 
was that people living in communities knew best how to solve their own problems 
(MCASA, 1997). Benefits derived from developing locally coordinated efforts.  
‘…because it is only through a coordinated effort, an effort that creates within a 
local community an intolerance for violence against women, that this type of 
violence will ever end.’ (MCASA, 1997, p.1) 
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The MCASA research identified specific tasks and functions of council involvement 
and these related to both the provision of services and to preventing sexual violence. 
Essential Council functions included: creating a shared vision; needs assessment and 
planning; information gathering and sharing; monitoring and evaluation; policy and 
procedure development; collaboration on specific projects; and resource development. 
Specific tasks of the Council included: coordination between agencies, departments, and 
systems; promotion of prevention strategies; and improvement of agency responses to 
sexual assault in every agency. Recognising the newness of Council involvement, 
MCASA found that 72% of Councils would not or could not provide leadership. On that 
basis, and underscoring the need for government backing, MCASA articulated the need 
for Councils to have support in capacity building.   
Emphasis on local responsiveness is further supported by Boles and Patterson (1997) 
who theorised that for the criminal justice response to be effective it must also be 
community-specific and community-responsive. This view is mirrored by those of 
New Zealand’s Safer Community Council (SCC) respondents in the current research.  
‘I do believe it is about local communities doing it for themselves. …People 
know their own communities.’ (SCC 12) 
It was differences in communities and the local knowledge of the different solutions 
required which made local coordination important. 
‘What would work in *** would never work in ***. We have a different 
population. We are different socio-economic area. It just wouldn't work.’ 
(SCC 4) 
This implies a requirement for the individual community needs’ assessments suggested 
by Boles and Patterson (1997) and MCASA (1997) in conjunction with inventories of 
existing services in the community such as the Crime Prevention Unit survey. Together 
these studies suggest many benefits in having centrally-funded local body input into 
strengthening and coordinating services in New Zealand. Although the absence of a 
national support/advocacy structure is a problem for inter-organisational national 
coordination, this does not prevent local bodies providing support for local community 
agencies, promoting them, and assisting their coordination with police. As Boles and 
Patterson (1997), Bryant and Cirel (1977), and MCASA (1997) have identified, local 
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bodies have established credentials in harnessing the expertise and resources of 
communities. Accordingly, local council input into addressing violence against women 
has been described in Britain and the US (Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Kelly & Lovett, 2005).  
Local organisations which seem most relevant in these capacities are the 74 local councils 
and the government-established and funded Safer Community Councils (SCCs) which are 
associated with most of these. These SCCs were the product of the 1999 Roper Report 
which also found that crime prevention was best achieved at community level. In some 
Districts, Ministry of Justice funding for SCCs is variously augmented with police District 
and local council funds. This means that the priorities of all funding bodies dictate the 
focus of particular SCCs (SCC 2, 4). However all SCCs have a crime prevention and 
community safety orientation and were established to work within the community in a 
leadership role with the providers of crime prevention initiatives (SCC 7). 
In 2001, Cabinet signed off seven areas of initiative in the SCC crime reduction strategy, 
and subsequently SCCs have been reviewed by the Crime Prevention Unit with a view to 
achieving more quantifiable crime reduction strategies. Frustratingly, none of the seven 
areas deal specifically with sexual crimes, despite national surveys of crime victims 
revealing that an epidemic one in five females endures some form of sexual interference 
or assault (Ministry of Justice, 2004). Rather, sexual crime has been included under a 
broader family violence focus, even though this does not subsume all elements of sexual 
violence. Regardless, there are possibilities in advocating for local councils and Safer 
Community Councils to respond proactively to issues of sexual violence. Along with their 
central government Crime Prevention Unit sponsorship, SCC credentials include local 
council associations and therefore ‘a lot of networks out in the community’ (SCC 4; 
similarly SCC 6). With these credentials, their crime and safer community focus, and their 
knowledge of local community resources, SCCs are particularly well-placed to work 
towards coordinating and developing sexual assault services.  
Findings on existing services confirm that there is a need for and many potential benefits 
in local Councils and SCCs supporting sexual assault service development. This is in 
ways which emerged from this research as well as the various ways suggested by 
MCASA (1997). Firstly, in respect of local councils there is opportunity for these to use 
their resources in assisting with the accommodation needs of support/advocacy agencies. 
The quality of support/advocacy premises is important to recovery. This is premised on 
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the symbolic messages of unworthiness which rape conveys to a woman, and that if 
services are given in facilities which reflect unworthiness the benefits of these will be 
undermined no matter how expert the crisis intervention. On that basis, thought given to 
surroundings is a significant aspect of the consideration required in rape-related responses 
and this has been alluded to by respondents in Jordan’s (1998) study.  
While custom-built multipurpose facilities are pivotal in providing victim-centred 
holistic responses, New Zealand agencies almost invariably worked with insufficient 
resources and in shabby premises. That this can be a barrier even to providing services 
has also been reported by support/advocates overseas (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). 
Here, market rentals were found to be usual, even when the landlords were local 
councils or government organisations. Occasionally rent was lower. For instance in 
District 6, peppercorn rental was paid for council-owned community accommodation, 
but this had a leaking roof, torn carpet, and tissues stuffed into window frames to 
prevent draughts.  
‘None of the windows shut… We do get very very cheap rent but I think in lieu of 
that we get no maintenance…What we have taken to the Council recently is that 
they have made the link between decrepit buildings and community groups.’ 
(Support/Advocate 6) 
An exception to the normal burden of finding and funding suitable accommodation was 
found in one District. Unsurprisingly, in this District local body responsiveness was 
already evident in proactive coordination of liaison between police and community 
organisations (SCC 7; personal attendance at meeting).  
‘I think we pay $2.20 a week and that is for this office, plus the counselling 
room, plus the use of the lounge. … and our children's centre … we pay $12 a 
week for, and that is where we run our children's programme …The Council 
have given us a five-year lease on the building, and this is permanent, and that 
is recognition for the work we do by the Council.’ (Support/Advocacy 7) 
As this Council has shown is possible, rather than taking non-profit and often volunteer 
support/advocacy work for the community for granted, this can be supported through 
provision of appropriate accommodation.  
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Along with meeting accommodation requirements, a function which could be filled by 
local councils working in conjunction with SCCs has been signalled by MCASA’s 
recommendation that councils promote prevention and intervention. A second basis for 
local body involvement then was in using pre-existing networking mechanisms and 
resources to assist support/advocacy agencies in disseminating rape-prevention 
knowledge to the community. Rape education and prevention has been found to be 
difficult for New Zealand RCCs, but as similarly found by Clark (2002), Koss & Oros 
(cited in Harvey (1985), Lievore (2005), and VAWSU (2005), some women do not 
recognise sexual violence for what it is.  
‘The majority of them won't report to the police… because of the spousal abuse 
they don't report…a lot of them are not aware that they are actually being 
abused, and they think it is the norm.’ (Support/Advocacy 4) 
Supporting MCASA’s recommendation that councils also promote intervention, the 
need to disseminate information about the existence, function, and availability of local 
support/advocacy agencies is suggested by a 2001 national survey (Ministry of Justice, 
2003). Since this revealed that only 8% of sexual violence victims accessed victim 
services, assistance in promoting support/advocacy organisations has potential to 
increase victims’ self-referral. Given their networks and resources, local bodies can 
reduce the considerable amount of effort and funding contributed by support/advocacy 
agencies in informing the community about their services. Currently this work involves: 
formal community education; directory listings; direct approaches to Police, Victim 
Support, and other emergency services for referrals; street appeals; posters in hotels and 
restrooms; newspaper advertising; networking with other community agencies; word of 
mouth; street signage; annual pamphlet mail-outs; cinema campaigns; and media 
releases. In addition, pamphlets are placed in doctors’ surgeries, hospitals, libraries, 
police stations, schools, sexual health clinics, and Family Planning offices. Assistance 
with promotion will allow agencies to use their limited human and material resources 
for the core work of rape-prevention and supporting victims.  
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‘What tends to often happen with community groups and organisations, they get 
overburdened with administration tasks, and a lot of them are volunteers that sit 
on boards and things like that. They are being asked to manage employment 
issues. They are being asked to manage a whole lot of financial issues and 
administrative issues. That really can be quite a burden on volunteer members 
in any organisation really.’ (SCC 2) 
In addition to informing the community of their presence, local body involvement in 
promotion of RCC services is likely to encourage self-referral through altering the 
sometimes negative public perception of RCCs demonstrated in this research. Evidence 
for this is in Byington et al.’s (1991) finding that RCCs affiliated with publicly-funded 
mainstream organisations were more likely to be supported by the community. 
Suggesting local body assistance for tasks which are necessary but unrelated to the core 
business of agencies is because the ‘constant state of fiscal uncertainty’ amongst 
agencies is compensated for by ‘constancy of community support’ (Harvey, 1985, 
p.116). 
In respect of SCCs, their safer community function suggests a third possibility for 
official body support. Since in most Areas acute services are provided by three disparate 
and independent organisations with largely unregulated interagency processes, service 
gaps are a finding of this research. Notwithstanding the benefits of partnership 
maintenance, few police, medical/forensic, and support/advocacy personnel manage 
even regular meetings. With better partnership processes, victims are more likely to be 
referred and less likely to fall into service gaps. As O’Shea (2006) has recently found, 
the scope of multi-agency services is also limited without coordination assistance. SCCs 
can assist the development of local sexual assault service partnerships then by regularly 
bringing the services together and in doing so create greater effectiveness and 
efficiencies.  
In particular, as suggested by MCASA (1997), local body assistance can be of 
considerable benefit to police networking with allied community professionals. Many 
factors which make police liaisons with community services more difficult, including 
culture, frequent rotations, and workload, have been identified in this research. In 
addition, Kelly and Lovett (2005) have commented that community organisations find it 
difficult to work with police due to police lack of coordination in respect of related 
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services. Better interagency networking has potential to increase referrals from police to 
community organisations through enhancing police knowledge about their functions 
(Campbell & Ahrens, 1998; Hardgrove, 1976; Mawby & Gill, 1987). This was 
recognised in the Metropolitan Police Strategic Plan which suggested forging links with 
Community Safety Units. Evidence of the need for this here was from an officer who 
had worked in a provincial city for 11 years and in the same role for over three years, 
yet who acknowledged gaps in his knowledge about where he could refer to.   
‘I would like for police to have a greater understanding on how these other 
organisations work.’ (CAT 12) 
In addition, since some police resist working with feminist RCCs, local body 
coordination of Police/RCC liaisons may have positive effects for partnership through 
police perceiving RCCs as having greater legitimacy.  
Integrating police with the local community is also important to ensuring community 
agencies refer clients to police. As noted by NASASV (2000) and VAWSU (2005), and 
found in the current research, victims report sexual violence in many forums other than 
police. Health forums have been found to preponderate amongst these (Astbury, 2006). 
This too is reflected in the current research in the finding that help was frequently 
sought first from: hospitals; GPs; sexual health clinics; support/advocacy agencies; 
student health services; ACC; Women’s Refuge; and counselling centres. Consequently, 
facilitating police liaisons will improve legal system outreach through increasing not 
only referrals to police but also the third party reports which are made with victims’ 
consent (Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Epstein & Langenbahn; 1994; Hardgrove, 1976; 
MCASA, 1997).  
In respect of third party reports, because sexual violence is characterised by recidivism, 
these reports can assist the profiling and resolution of some offending. Accordingly: 
‘They are important in the event that the man is a repeat offender and a 
collective profile or modus operandi can be established to lead to his arrest.’ 
(Carrow, 1980, p.26) 
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Police confirmed that reports, particularly from support/advocacy personnel were 
helpful in this regard. Third party reports by support/advocacy agencies contribute not 
only to profiling of offenders but also to sexual offending statistics and therefore to 
targeting of resources. All support/advocacy agencies wished to do more rape-
prevention work, yet as noted resource constraints prevented even their collection of 
statistics. Given the crime reduction goals of the Crime Prevention Unit and the 
impoverished nature of the support/advocacy agencies, collaboration between these 
agencies, police, and SCCs seems not only workable but necessary in building a 
statistical database.  
In respect of referrals, evidence of the need for better referral rates to police was in CIB 
acknowledgement that ‘not many’ referrals come from support/advocacy sources. 
Support/advocacy agencies confirmed this with estimations of the proportion of their 
clients who were not referred to police. These ranged from ‘probably frequently’ (8B); 
‘the majority of them’ (5B); four out of the four over the previous weekend (10); to 80% 
(5A; 8E; 5D); 70% (7); and 30% (2; 4). Although this information was not solicited 
from doctors, they too believed that many did not report to police.  
‘I would say less than 50% is reported because of what we see here at the sexual 
health clinic.’ (DSAC 5A) 
A frequent reason for victims not reporting was:   
A: ‘Mostly fear, fear of not being believed, fear of court cases quite often, and 
the system. 
Q: The legal system? 
A: Yes.’ (Support/Advocacy 7; similarly 5D) 
These reasons have been suggested by Clark (2002), Lievore (2004), VAWSU (2005), 
and reported by the Ministry of Justice (2004). One implication of both victim 
reluctance to report and low referrals is that medical and support personnel are not 
themselves confident or able to reassure victims that legal system involvement can be 
both managed and a positive step for victims. Yet police discretion as to case 
disposition allows decisions as to case dispositions to be made in consultation with 
victims and this victim input into justice outcomes may assist victim recovery. If local 
bodies facilitate the suggested partnership maintenance measures, regular meetings will 
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improve information flow about both police procedures and community expectations of 
police. Medical and support organisations may then become more confident to reassure 
victims as to their ability to retain control during legal processes and be more prepared 
to refer and make third party reports.  
This confidence is also contingent on regulation and monitoring. O’Shea (2006) has 
advocated for standardising referral pathways and according to Carmody (1988), in 
NSW joint responsiveness is regulated by official interagency guidelines. MCASA has 
also suggested that Council functions should include monitoring and evaluations. If 
local bodies also mediate the drawing up of victim-oriented protocols, and evaluations 
are conducted to ensure that community organisation confidence is well-placed, this too 
will also assist referrals and third party reports becoming more regular. Given the 
factors which have been identified as hampering collaboration in New Zealand, local 
bodies have a significant opportunity to rectify these and reduce underreporting through 
contributing official input to the creation of protocols for interagency liaison. 
Demonstrating the possibilities, an early example of local body coordination of services 
has been described in the US where government funding enabled a Polk County 
multidisciplinary response (Bryant & Cirel, 1977). Enabled by this funding, a Polk 
County Central Administration Board was established to administer a Rape/Sexual 
Assault Care Centre. The Board was able to coordinate a broad base of community 
support for the centre through incorporating the expertise and resources of 75 
community organisations. Through the centre’s work in education, prevention, and 
consolidating the relationships between agencies, improvements were shown in 
willingness of victims to press charges as well as Police clearance and conviction rates. 
The authors credited inspiration for this Polk County response to Iowa feminists who, in 
having strong and established political clout, were able to move local authorities to 
establishing an administrative board which coordinated services and prevention 
activities. Underwriting this possibility were UN covenant-inspired legislation requiring 
government and state funding, included funding for research.  
Given the possibilities made evident by the Polk County example, I decided to replicate 
aspects of the MCASA research in order to ascertain the capacity and willingness of 
SCCs to be a source of organisational support for an integrated community response to 
sexual assault. My interviews with SCC respondents in seven different Districts 
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revealed that without government support and Crime Prevention Unit leadership, there 
was currently little possibility of this becoming a regular nationwide function. Firstly, 
notwithstanding the direction given through political predetermination of focus areas, 
the variability which permeates all other aspects of the New Zealand findings was also 
in evidence in respect of the funding, organisation, and operation of the SCCs.  
‘You don't have to follow the same paths, because each Council is different and 
each city is different.’ (SCC 2; similarly SCC 4) 
Variability also resulted from performance issues. 
‘The Crime Prevention Unit are going through now and doing a review of all 
their Safer Community Councils because some of them just weren't delivering. 
… Some councils didn't do very much at all - took the money and didn't do 
anything in the way of crime prevention, and other councils did heaps.’ (SCC 2) 
As is indicated above, SCCs were not coordinated nationally, although one conference 
organised not by the Crime Prevention Unit but by the Wellington City Council was 
reported (SCC 8).  
Secondly, reflecting the foreclosure on developing sexual assault services which 
resulted from the steer given to Police through ‘risk indicators’, SCC interest was also 
pre-empted by the predetermined areas of focus. Accordingly, no Crime Prevention 
Unit funding was used for specific rape-prevention work or for coordination of the three 
sexual assault crisis intervention services. Instead, the inclusion of sexual assault under 
a family violence umbrella meant that again specific sexual assault service requirements 
were overshadowed. While some communities have SCC involvement in regular 
meetings to address general issues of violence, action on sexual assault was never a 
feature of any of the meetings I attended in Districts 2, 3, 6, 7, or 8. Yet not all sexual 
violence is domestic and community responses to family violence will not totally 
subsume issues relating to sexual violence.  
When I asked about SCC willingness to provide leadership in coordinating the city's 
response to sexual assault if technical assistance were provided, replicating MCASA’s 
findings some replies indicated unwillingness to consider even the possibility.  
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‘No. It is not local body business. It is Police business, and it is Crime 
Prevention Unit business, and by proxy it gets into city council business, but it is 
not there as a core business.’ (SCC 2)  
Since Crime Prevention Unit business is SCC business, this reply indicates that when 
multiple funding streams are involved it is possible to be selective about functions and 
priorities.  
Because the activities of the various SCCs are compatible with funding and 
coordinating rape-related services in at least three respects, the incorporation of a 
specific adult rape focus would not require a paradigm transition. Firstly, some local 
councils and SCCs already work closely with police and others in coordinating services 
and projects (CSM 9; Manager Child Support/Advocacy Agency 1). 
‘The council has $60,000 attached to it, 40 for coordination, 20 for projects. The 
constitutional partnership is the Police, Iwi, and the city council, plus four 
representatives from the community.’ (SCC 7) 
SCC coordination with Police is at the levels of District Commander, Area Controller, 
and Family Violence Coordinator (SCC 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 & 12). Some of these 
relationships already include joint initiatives and, as suggested by Bard (1976) and 
Hornibrook and Myers (1996), the mutual exchange of information and statistics from 
which prevention strategies were targeted. 
Secondly, notwithstanding that responding to violence was said not to be local body 
core business, through Te Rito policy 24 SCCs are responsive to women in situations of 
domestic violence There is precedent then for such responsiveness and some SCCs do 
liaise with Police Family Violence Coordinators to support and coordinate anti-violence 
networks.  
                                                 
24
 Family Violence Strategy 
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‘… we've got the domestic violence centre (District 2) being the key agency that 
we work with, and we deal with the police and Victim Support from the Police 
…because domestic violence is the main driver and we are the funders of it, the 
CPU 25… gives us money. …we oversee the project and give the domestic 
violence centre the money to do the project.’ (SCC 2)  
Women’s Refuge in District 9 is similarly supported, and this had produced quantifiable 
benefits in this and other Districts. 
‘It is great because family violence is now looking good. They have had 100% 
compliance on things and…we have had a 24% increase of reporting in family 
violence in our area…. Family violence is increasing, but people have the 
confidence to report, and that is because the police have picked up their game.’ 
(SCC 7) 
Thirdly, some SCCs had also already coordinated sexual assault services - albeit only 
for children. 
A: ‘It started off as strengthening (Area in District 3)… then went nationwide 
[to] Strengthening Families and that was looking at families that were involved 
with a number of different agencies and how those agencies could work together  
Q: Did that start with the city council? 
A: Mmm.  
Q: So there was rationalisation of services? 
A: There was and somebody was taking responsibility…so I think from there, 
there has been stronger relationships built and better understanding.’ (CYFS 3, 
similarly CYFS Manager 4)  
In some Districts, this involvement had been in setting up facilities specifically for child 
sexual abuse victims. For instance, in Napier the SCC had established the ‘Protect All 
Children Today’ Centre in which the evidential interviews were conducted (CAT).  
The greater involvement of SCCs in children’s issues may be partly due to CYFS 
maximising government expenditure through rationalising resources. To that end CYFS 
partially fund many support/advocacy agencies and at least one network of agencies 
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working against violence in general (SCC 8). Significantly, these links to community 
agencies, and consequent CYFS appreciation and respect for agency work has led to 
Council uptake of the direction given by the antiviolence network. This direction was 
that building partnerships between groups already working in the field would be more 
efficient than adding yet another government layer of services.  
‘We very much tried to focus our attention on those existing organisations that 
have been offering a service for a long period of time, as opposed to actually 
trying to establish new organisations.’ (SCC 6; similarly SCC 8) 
This is in contrast to the British SARCs which sidelined specialist RCCs from 
mainstream acute services (Lovett et al., 2004). The parallel in this research is the 
withdrawal of some specialist agencies after the formation of Victim Support and 
subsequent police uptake of their services. 
When local SCCs already work with police in responding to the sexual abuse of 
children and some forms of violence against women, there is evident arbitrariness in the 
view that it is not local Council business to fund and coordinate local adult sexual 
assault services. There is similar potential then, in SCCs organising networks which 
include liaison with SADCs when police are in these roles. International precedent for 
this is in the Metropolitan Policy mandate for Police liaison with Borough Coordinators.  
Since a paradigm shift was not required, some SCC respondents were more prepared to 
consider a coordination role. 
‘But I think that it is a good idea. I don't see why statutory agencies aren’t 
collaborating more and why local authorities can't play a greater role and be 
forced to play a greater role.’ (SCC 7) 
For this to happen, reflecting Lovett et al.’s (2004) position that establishing SARCs 
outside London would require a strong steer from government, government support was 
said to be necessary. 
‘I still think there is an opportunity to take on that role, but it will be at a 
political imperative.’ (SCC 2) 
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In contrast with Lovett et al.’s (2004) optimism about government support, that 
optimism was not present amongst some SCC.  
‘It won't happen unless the government takes an about-face and I don't think it 
will.’ (SCC 8) 
One reason for this pessimism is that the real parameters and social significance of 
sexual violence have been obscured due to underreporting to the criminal justice 
system. Consequently, the community and those in its governance systems have been 
able to regard official responsiveness to sexual violence as adequately addressing the 
problem. This is reflected in the usual response given by SCC respondents for why 
government and local bodies have not put their weight behind establishing 
comprehensive systems.  
‘Our stats show that it is not a huge issue - reported stuff.  This is where we 
come unstuck. It's like if people would report it then we can get some evidence-
based stuff happening around it.’ (SCC 12) 
This echoes the response of some police, but is only a partial argument for government 
failure to develop sexual assault responsiveness. Police seeking attrition of complaints 
suggests that even awareness within official systems of the real parameters of rape will 
not necessarily trigger an appropriate response until, as Young (1996) has suggested, the 
government’s hand is forced through public pressure. Yet public pressure is unlikely 
without continued vigilance for, and deconstructing of, real and symbolic factors which 
are rape-supportive, prevent rape reporting; and reinforce gender inequality. Women’s 
relative powerlessness and the influence of rape mythology influence police and public 
thinking in respect of the worth of rape victims, undermining attempts to make 
government appropriately responsive. Yet evidence that with government support 
coordination of services in New Zealand is possible and leads to systems which promote 
quality assurance is demonstrated next with reference to the findings on services for child 
sexual abuse victims.  
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Comparison with Services for Children and Youth 
The finding of this research is that when sexual crime against children comes to official 
attention in New Zealand the response is very different to sexual violence experienced 
by women. The following description of children’s services will demonstrate the 
contrast in child and adult services and the comparative benefits for child victims in 
receiving government-funded and nationally coordinated services. In doing so, it will 
counter the usual arguments that New Zealand is too sparsely populated and has 
insufficient reporting to warrant comprehensively structured services. As Miller 
Burgering made clear at the DSAC Symposium:  
‘We need to evaluate the protocols and the practices that we have. I have come 
from the child abuse field for the last 10 years and that has shown us that we 
can do that sort of thing if we put our energy into it, if we have support from our 
hierarchy. Therefore other changes will also have to be made, such as leading 
by example, putting resources where they need to be to make a symbolic 
statement of commitment as well as giving the resources to do the job… .’ 
(DSAC, 1996, p.164) 
The ensuing discussion will evaluate the reasons given by respondents for discrepancies in 
the way women and children are treated. On the basis of the similarities in the psychosocial 
consequences of the crime for these two populations, arguments are put forward for a 
comparative system of responsiveness to replace the variable responses women currently 
experience. Discussing the issue through these steps will indicate what can be achieved for 
New Zealand women if there is political will to match services with need. 
Organisation of Responses  
In contrast to New Zealand governments’ haphazard involvement with funding and 
coordination for adult sexual assault support services, services for children under 17 are 
mandated to the Ministry of Social Development’s Child, Youth, and Family Service 
(CYFS). In addition, in a wrap-around effect, police often work with other government 
departments to ensure that all ongoing needs are met (CAT Managers 1, 2).  
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A national Memorandum of Understanding underpinned by the paramountcy of the 
child governs the partnership between Police and CYFS. The memorandum’s policy 
point six states that: 
'A multidisciplinary approach will be developed and sustained. This approach 
will include a police officer and a social worker as the core members of the 
team.’ (Miller Burgering, 1996, p.9) 
After a CYFS national audit of the CYFS/Police partnership in 2002 this Memorandum 
of Understanding was augmented by mandated local level agreements (CYFS 10), 
although in some Areas I found these to be not yet formalised between Police and 
CYFS. This reflects Lovett et al.’s (2004) finding that a strong steer from government is 
required in implementing national protocols. 
Under the protocols, notification of child sexual abuse is immediate and routine 
regardless of whether the first agency contacted was Police or CYFS. Also by protocol, 
CYFS are expected to provide a Serious Abuse Team response (CAT Manager 7). 
Evidential interviews are conducted by an interviewer and observed by a monitor using 
either video or a one-way mirror. Monitors may discreetly make suggestions during the 
interview. The monitor and interview roles are varyingly occupied by Police and CYFS 
personnel who are trained together on evidential interviewers’ courses at the Royal New 
Zealand Police College. In contrast to adult services, this CYFS involvement means that 
as an integral part of the investigative response, support and advocacy services are 
always available. 
Police and CYFS also work in conjunction with medical/forensic examiners who are 
often DSAC-trained paediatricians and in some Districts, notification to 
medical/forensic services is similarly automatic. An additional feature of the 
medical/forensic examination of children is a general medical assessment (CAT 
Manager 1, CYFS 3). Also, the psychological effects are formally conveyed. 
‘…as far as children go we get reports from psychologists and that sort of thing, 
so you start to learn a little bit about it that way.’ (CIB Supervisor 6) 
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In contrast to examinations of women, government funding covers children’s 
medical/forensic examinations (DSAC 5A, 11). Firstly, the facilities for examining 
children are either included in purpose-built multi-agency centres such as those in 
Christchurch and Auckland, or specially assigned DHB or CYFS facilities. In addition, 
medical/forensic examiners, usually supported by a nurse, are funded by DHBs to do 
the examinations for children and youth and medical follow-up (DSAC 5).  
Serving the three Auckland Districts, a multi-agency centre modelled on US facilities 
houses victim-centred facilities and specialist personnel for responding to all forms of 
child abuse. These include medical, psychological, police, and CYFS personnel 
amongst others (CAT Manager; personal visit). Catchments include Auckland’s 
Counties Manukau District if the abuse is sexual and a medical examination is required 
(CAT Manager). In contrast to other Districts, the multi-agency centre responds to 
youth up to 19 years. Elsewhere although the usual upper age limit for CAT 
management is 17, child victims as young as 14 are occasionally processed through the 
adult system (CSM 1). In Christchurch, the centre houses police and a CYFS worker. 
Along with seamless services for victims, these multi-agency facilities ensure incidental 
interaction and the collegiality and opportunities to communicate which accompany 
sharing premises.  
In responding to child sexual abuse, another example of facilitating communication 
through sharing premises was found in the Northshore/Waitakere/Rodney District. 
Congruent with Waryold’s (1996) recommendation of engaging a departmental liaison 
person, at police instigation a CYFS social worker was relocated on a long-term basis to 
a combined District Headquarters/police station (CYFS, 3). The departmental liaison 
function was augmented by the social worker being involved in regular weekly 
meetings with police, which again resonates with suggestions for facilitating 
communication (Carmody, 1988; Edelson & Bible; 2001; Hornibrook & Myers, 1996). 
In addition, her role in training police achieved the positive results for collaboration 
which have been noted by Littel (2001). Noting the fatal consequences of a child having 
‘fallen between the gaps’ due to prior difficulties in communication, the initiative was 
positively evaluated in its effect on interdepartmental communication by the liaison 
person and another social worker (CYFS 3). The initiative also enabled resolution of 
similar tensions to those found in the adult field, where without such liaison they have 
persisted in some Areas. 
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‘It broke down those barriers of the police spectre of hairy-legged, roman- 
sandled people which they have teased me about … and us thinking of them as 
stereotyped macho men who don't care. So actually having someone physically 
there for that two years has worked really well.’ (CYFS 3) 
In respect of the Police response, in contrast to the usually generalist nature of CIB who 
investigate women’s complaints, all child sexual abuse investigations are conducted by 
CIB in specialist child abuse teams (CAT), the rotation for which is usually two years. 
In some Districts, particularly in Areas where the population base is smaller, the work 
of specialist CAT teams sometimes includes responding to adult complaints. Regardless 
of Area size, in many Areas historic complaints of childhood sexual abuse made by 
women are investigated by CAT teams (CIB 6, CAT Manager 3).  
In contrast to adult sexual violence investigations, evaluation was an attendant measure 
in child sexual assault investigations and, significantly, the need for evaluations was 
linked to the specialist nature of the work. 
‘We don't have performance measures specific to sexual violation. We certainly 
do for child abuse because that is their core business.’ (District Commander 2)  
Others respondents commented similarly on the ability to regulate Police internal 
standards due to:  
‘…the relative priority that child and adult sexual assault is given by Police.’ 
(DSAC Regional Coordinator 12)  
CAT team members have specialist training for investigating child sexual abuse and this 
has been in place since 1999 (course coordinator). This course is comparative to the 
course available for adult sexual assault investigators (personal attendance). However, 
in contrast to just one course in the adult field, two other specialist CAT courses are also 
taught. A week-long CAT Managers’ course incorporates peer review and discussion of 
service-related problems and structured contact between Managers is maintained 
through email in a system similar to DSAC’s support for doctors (CAT Manager 1). The 
third CAT course is an evidential interviewers’ course which is attended by CYFS and 
Police evidential and diagnostic interviewers. All trainees are assessed on their 
interview skills and their degree of readiness to interview is reported to their managers 
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in the Districts. In addition to this, interviewers are expected to be released for one day 
every three months for regional peer tape review. Police and CYFS personnel also 
spend three days on nationally-based peer tape reviews. These are conducted by: 
‘… small cross regional groups to maximise the opportunity for national 
standardisation of practice’. (CYFS Course Coordinator)  
The week-long interviewers’ course and accompanying evaluations are particularly 
significant in the light of there being no specialist training for interviewing adult 
victims. In addition, joint training enabled opportunities to share perspectives and 
understandings of the requirements in improving workplace coordination (Carrow, 
1980; Hardgrove, 1976; Harvey, 1985; Littel, 2001).  
Benefits of government support to formalise partnership between the organisations were 
also in evidence, particularly in the majority of Areas where the mandated local 
agreements had been implemented. Firstly, respondents commented that working 
through this process had enhanced understandings between CYFS and police personnel 
(CYFS 3, 9, 10). This resonates with the lessening of interagency hostility as personnel 
got to know each other which Bard (1976), Hardgrove (1976), and Martin et al. (1992) 
suggested. The process had also facilitated an appreciation of the role, knowledge, and 
experience of the other organisation’s members and this had encouraged further joint 
training and working together.  
‘…they have got a wealth of knowledge over there and let’s share what we have 
got, and it just works so much better when it is a joint approach taken from the 
beginning.’ (CYFS 10) 
Establishment of local level agreements also resulted in more congruence in philosophy 
about what made for a quality service. This benefited the work by creating the very 
ability to establish systems for interagency communication and cooperation (CYFS 3, 
5). One such system was the regular interagency meetings at which recorded 
commitments made to the other organisation resulted in accountability and reduced the 
prospect of clients ‘getting lost between us’ (CYFS 8). Importantly, with this 
information came the comment that:  
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‘I don’t know how you do it with volunteer agencies and counsellors who work 
independently  … It is definitely not the same sort of level of mandate that the 
government organisations can put on themselves.’ (CYFS 8)  
This comment highlights the need for, and positive aspects of, accountability. It also 
suggests that systems of accountability may be easier to implement when services are 
provided by professionals and is another argument for state sponsorship of services. The 
meetings had also created forums where information sharing had become ‘quite 
significant’ (CYFS 8).  
Overall, in accord with Epstein and Langenbahn’s (1994) findings that the partnership 
created more effective and less intrusive services and similarly Hardgove’s (1976) 
finding of less duplication, the partnership was said to create:  
‘…better efficiency, better communication therefore the planning is more 
focused and really how it should be. There is greater collaboration between both 
the police and the social workers and also now …the DSAC doctors and nurses 
… If the police and the other agencies have better liaison, the police will 
obviously be taking those complaints and situations a lot more seriously … 
Police are more focused and motivated. The social workers are more 
motivated.’ (CYFS 5) 
A parallel for this CYFS Manager’s view that police and social workers were ‘more 
motivated’ through sharing caseloads is in Epstein and Langenbahn’s (1994) analysis of 
a re-energising of discouraged professionals.  
While the response to children is far more structured (DSAC 2, 12; CAT 12) and 
reflective of international literature describing practice requirements for both women 
and children, some problems of coordination and staffing are yet to be addressed. This 
was noted by some in the field.  
‘I certainly wouldn't be saying that the process for the children is where I would 
want to see it either. In actual fact, I think there is still much more that could 
happen. That would be for the children as well, so it is not that that goes 
completely smoothly.’ (CYFS 8) 
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A finding in common with the adult field was that in a minority of Districts, the regular 
formal meetings mandated between CYFS and CAT Managers were not always able to be 
held due to time constraints (CAT Managers 1, 2, 7; CYFS 3). For that reason, although 
systems for notification are well-established, ongoing coordination to progress cases 
remained problematic in some Areas. Police and CYFS have no common computer 
database on which updates to cases can be recorded and accessed. Communication was by 
email and phone with ‘telephone tag’ cited as a frustration (CYFS 4, 10; CAT 4, 7). As a 
result, some CAT and CYFS respondents, even those who had regular meetings, 
expressed their unsolicited wish for shared premises (CYFS 5, 12).  
‘If we were working in the same building as Child, Youth, and Family the 
biggest advantage of that would be we could sit down with the supervisors once 
a week and just keep on top of each of these cases … whereas at the moment we 
play phone tag. We expect things to get done, they don't get done. Vice-versa, 
sometimes we are the same.’ (CAT Manager 7) 
Although the Memorandum of Understanding addresses police turnover, this too was 
cited as a ‘huge’ problem by CYFS personnel, particularly when rotation within Police 
was not staggered (CYFS 3). Also mentioned as a difficulty was that in some Districts 
CYFS personnel were generalist rather than from the mandated and specialist Serious 
Abuse Teams (CAT Manager 7). Additionally, although CAT investigators are 
specialist and the Memorandum of Understanding requires CAT work to be prioritised, 
their availability was sometimes noted to be a problem by both CYFS and CAT 
members. This was because it was common for CAT members to be siphoned off for 
major investigations (CYFS 6, CAT Manager 3). Lastly, in many Districts, CAT 
members regularly did other work and were unable to have a total child abuse focus 
(CAT 7, 11, CYFS 5).  
‘I could argue that we should do because there is more than enough work for us 
to be focused on child abuse work, because of the other agencies, the families 
that we are involved with constantly. And we are expected to do other work, 
which we do but sometimes it hinders our ability.’ (CAT Manager 7)  
Occasionally as much as 50 % of time was given to other investigations.  
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Apart from staffing issues, the differences between child and adult responsiveness are 
substantial and include many nationally-mandated features of good practice which were 
not found in adult systems. This view of the findings is reinforced by responses from 
senior government officials working in the field.  
‘I think the services provided to children and young people is [sic] of quite a 
good standard both legislatively and from a fiscal point of view. There is a huge 
gap in my personal opinion, between how we manage the future of this nation, 
which is the young people and what they are confronted with, and those that are 
already there. And one of the driving concerns really for me is around the 
female assaults, where if they have already become victims in one sense and 
then they become secondary victims to process, and I am not sure whether there 
is sufficient funding, one for education and two for awareness and providing at 
least emotional support for victims at the earliest possible point, like in the first 
24 hours.’ (CYFS Manager 7) 
Similar ideas were expressed by other CYFS managers (5, 11) and a CAT manager (1). 
Importantly, although it cannot be said that the Memorandum of Understanding had a 
total uptake, its implementation through two equal government agencies meant that 
variability in practice was significantly reduced and quality assurance more likely. On 
that basis, features routinely facilitating good practice in the child abuse field were:  
• total government funding for services 
• national coordination of government agencies  
• national and local protocols 
• multi-agency facilities or designated purpose-built facilities  
• national specialist training of all three agencies 
• mandated social and psychological support from specialist support agency 
• nationally and locally based specialist joint training 
• specialist teams 
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Found to be variable were:  
• within-District teamwork, meetings, and interagency coordination  
• attention to local protocols 
• staffing levels 
In comparison to the services available for women, for children there is almost routine 
implementation of the services necessary to quality assurance. One notable exception is 
gaps in ongoing counselling services for children. Significantly, responding to a 
question about what other facilities or equipment might be needed many CYFS and 
CAT respondents stated that they had all the necessary resources. 
‘One of the things that we are able to do, it quite surprises me as we learn more 
about services in the adult field, is that we are able to put money to our plans. 
We are able to resource what we are doing in the name of child protection. … 
For children or teenagers we can have a pretty flexible plan and resource it and 
I suspect that it is not the same for adults.’  (CAT 11) 
Figure 6 demonstrates this attention to quality assurance in children’s services. 
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Figure 6: Responsiveness to Child Victims of Sexual Crime 
 
District Children’s facilities 
Local 
written 
protocol 
Interagency 
notification Organisation of interview 
Northland Specialist services unit for 
interviews – includes 
psychologist and therapist  
Yes Immediate 
and routine 
CYFS interviewer  
Police monitor 
Northshore/ 
Waitakere/ 
Rodney 
Multi-agency purpose-built unit About to 
be signed 
Faxed -
Routine 
Combined and conducted at 
multi-agency centre 
Auckland 
City 
Multi-agency purpose-built unit  Yes Routine Combined and conducted at 
multi-agency centre 
Counties 
Manukau 
Purpose-designed rooms in Police 
premises  
Done but 
still in 
type 
Immediate 
and routine 
Multi-agency centre for 
Medical Forensic; CYFS for 
evidential interview 
Waikato Manawai specialised premises 
with  video unit and other 
specialist services e.g. 
psychological services 
Yes Immediate 
and routine 
CYFS do all evidential 
interviews. Police or  CYFS 
monitor 
Bay of 
Plenty 
Video unit leased on independent 
premises until CYFS renovations 
completed  
Yes Routine  CYFS interviewer 
Police monitor 
Eastern Specialist PACT Centre  Yes Immediate 
and Routine 
CYFS interviewers  
Police Monitors 
Central Self-contained purpose-designed 
rooms in CYFS premises, aimed 
at providing for privacy and 
ensuring confidentiality. 
Yes Routine but 
sometimes 
delays 
CYFS interviewer 
Police monitor 
Wellington As for Counties Manukau About to 
be signed 
Routine Police interview and 
monitor evidential 
interviews 
Tasman Evidential interviewing suite in 
CYFS premises 
Yes Immediate 
and routine 
Variable combinations 
CAT/ CYFS 
Canterbury Multi-agency purpose-built unit Yes 
 
Fax -
immediate 
and routine 
Combined CAT/CYFS 
Southern Two separate designated CYFS 
facilities. Also special video unit 
at police station. 
Yes Immediate 
and routine 
CYFS interviewers 
 
Analysis of services shows that in contrast to systems for women, thoughtful planning, 
partnerships between organisations, and official resourcing of services have greatly 
benefited the systems of responsiveness to sexually abused children in New Zealand. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses respondents’ explanations for discrepancies 
between official systems’ responses to women and children.  
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Analysis of System Discrepancies  
The development of systems of responsiveness for sexually abused children suggests 
recognition within New Zealand of the need for holistic services for sexual crime. It 
also confirms that New Zealand has the ability and the structures to provide effective 
and comprehensive services. Yet Government has abrogated its moral obligation for 
leadership in respect of both research and services for adult victims. In this, it has 
abandoned victims to the vagaries of situational responses by police, many of whom 
have been unable to respond as they would have wished.  
That the will to implement needed systems improvements does not exist for women 
who have been sexually violated was raised during the current research by CYFS 
managers and police. These respondents recognised that children have CYFS and Police 
but in contrast women sometimes only have police who in ‘purely looking for evidence’ 
(CYFS 10) were not about ‘welfare’ or the ‘human element’ (CYFS 7, 10; CIB 4).  
‘The problem I see if you talk about funding adult women and adult men, adult 
men and adult women aren't really represented by a Government agency, but 
CYFS aren't there for them. They just get to fend for themselves, except for ACC 
maybe. (CAT Manager 1)  
While not suggesting that CYFS take on a support/advocacy role for women, as a Child, 
Youth, and Family Service, the family aspect of CYFS brief suggests an obligation to 
contribute to a woman’s recovery when she is a primary caregiver. The effects of sexual 
violence can be severe and can impact on women’s ability to adequately focus on and 
care for their children. In addition, the constraints of the mothering role make it far 
more difficult for women to seek out and use support services. If these women are not 
adequately supported, this can have later repercussions on children and costs to the 
community.  
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‘That has always been a concern to me. …I mean, so often, they are therefore 
using drugs and alcohol and other strategies to block out and to lessen the 
impact of their experiences …. They aren't able to parent, and they are kind of 
classed and tagged, if you like, as dysfunctional, and as not being able. … CYFS 
and the police and everybody - we all seem to be reluctant to become involved 
with the adults…. You know the police are all about prosecution. They are not 
about welfare … If there was the funding and the support possibly those adult 
victims wouldn't become [pause] it wouldn't reach the stage where they become 
so low, so dysfunctional.’ (CYFS Manager 5A) 
Some CYFS managers understood that it was appropriate for CYFS to contribute to the 
care women received after rape so that children were not simultaneously victimised by 
their mother’s experience.  
‘We do see a lot of mothers of children who have been raped …which has a 
major impact on their parenting, and I mean, even though we are there for the 
child you have got to look holistic - at the bigger picture. And when you are 
dealing with the parent who might not be providing adequate parenting because 
they are stuck on their own issues, that is very real… and while the majority of 
our resources are for our children, we should be able to look at putting more 
resources into helping the parent as well - the rape victim or the abuse victim.’ 
(CYFS 11 Similarly CYFS Managers 5A, 6, 7; CIB 5D) 
Pertinent to this argument is that CYFS is mandated to protect children by all possible 
means. Recognising this CYFS already partly fund many supportive community agencies. 
Until other government departments combine to structure accessible holistic responses, it 
may be that CYFS can also support women in accessing and using both these community 
support services and government support services such as ACC and WINZ.   
It should also be remembered that CYFS support for children may need to be more 
direct than supporting a parent. That children can also be direct or indirect witnesses to 
marital rape was raised in 2005 at the Tackling Rape Issues Conference in London. In 
this respect their ‘fears, anger, sadness, confusion, terror, worry, guilt, and loss…’ 
needed to be addressed. (Cited were Epstein & Keep, 1995; Hendessi, 1997; McGee, 
2000; Mullender et al., 2002)  
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The necessity to augment human rights arguments for totally government-supported 
services for women is disturbing in its implication that the value of women-as-people is 
secondary to their value when objectified as the primary caregivers of children. This is 
particularly when agencies are established to advocate for women, as in the following 
US example. 
‘The program’s services to child victims have helped to legitimize the Lexington 
RCC to the larger community and enabled it to raise the issue of rape and 
sexual violence generally in community education, professional training and 
preventive education programs.’ (Harvey, 1985, p.75) 
The need to further legitimise RCCs and the discrepancy in implementing practice ideals 
both necessitate analysis of official decisions made, or neglected to be made, in 
responding to adult victims. What does seem apparent is that current discrepancies 
between services for children and women in New Zealand reflect the evolution of service 
developments overseas.  
‘Over the past decade there has been widespread formation of multidisciplinary 
teams to address child abuse in the community. In fact most multidisciplinary 
protocol in this country was developed to address crimes against children.’ 
(Boles & Patterson, 1997, p.36) 
Correspondingly, in New Zealand the multi-agency Kimiora was originally established 
to meet just the needs of children. 
‘Primarily I think it was for the children for the interview because they needed 
the interview facilities for the kids and I think that is how it all came up. Back 
then there was, particularly in the child sexual abuse, there were some strong 
advocates here in New Plymouth for that and I have no doubt they were behind 
getting things moving … this was mid to late eighties and early nineties.’ (CIB) 
Along with other evidence which has shown the difference individual champions can 
make in improving services, this suggests that increasing the awareness of service 
deficits will contribute positively to the pace of improvements to adult services. Yet as 
argued in Chapter Three, more awareness of deficits is only a first step in emulating 
overseas efforts to close the gaps between the quality of child and adult services. Since 
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women in general and rape victims in particular remain at some distance from power, it 
is also necessary to persuade the broader community, and through them government, to 
care about what happens to adult victims. 
That was evident in the grounds which were given in this research for adult female 
victims not having equal entitlement to the quality of care established for child victims. 
In an attempt to understand where the barriers to achieving effective services for women 
lay, I asked respondents why they thought sexual assault responsiveness was only 
comprehensively defined for children and why there was a discrepancy in government-
provided services. Three main themes were apparent in the responses. The first was of 
the perceived greater vulnerability of children to predatory sexual behaviour (CIB 5A, 
7, 8, 8B, 8C, 8D, 12; CSM 8, 11; CYFS 3, 7, 9, 10, 11; CAT 11, 12; DSAC 2). Size was 
one reason given, as was children’s greater ignorance of threatening situations and 
inability to handle and extricate themselves from these. These are real reasons for 
rigorous attempts to protect children and rightly considered. However, these answers do 
not suggest women’s invulnerability or lesser requirement for effective responses. 
Alternative discourse around women’s suggested lesser vulnerability is possible and 
necessary in achieving understanding that women too are vulnerable to men’s violence, 
and that the need for effective systems interventions does not stop at 17. Although age is 
a factor in determining who a perpetrator will choose as victim, the reasons for 
aggression do not reside within victims. Rather, the agency for forced sexual activity 
and its outcomes resides in men (Griffin & Griffin, 1981; Kelly, 1989; Lonsway, 1996). 
As a result, vulnerability is constantly fluctuating and defined by individual 
circumstances. Apart from limiting their experiences of life, women have little control 
over that vulnerability.  
Adolescence, at which the cut-off point for mandated support is placed, is a time of 
heightened vulnerability. Evidence of this is in the 2001 National Survey of Crime 
Victims in which 26% of 17-24 year olds, compared to 14% of under-17s reported 
having been victimised, causing the Ministry of Justice (2004) to acknowledge that 
sexual violence is more often experienced by youth. Similarly, in Britain 16-19 year 
olds were reportedly over four times more likely to be raped than females from any 
other age group (Myhill & Allen, 2002).   
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There are many explanations for adolescent vulnerability. One is that gender 
socialisation practices act to limit female agency while simultaneously promoting male 
sexual assertiveness (Henderson in DSAC, 1996). In addition, experimental 
relationships with males are beginning at a time when adolescent females are adjusting 
to their developing sexuality and just beginning to define their own authentic wishes in 
relation to sexual activity. At this point, they are also critiquing their own family’s 
values but often without the maturational development to have replaced those values 
with their own. With skill also yet to be developed for avoiding or managing the many 
forms of sexual coercion, this too means there is greater risk of having personal agency 
overridden (Gavey in DSAC, 1996). Exacerbating adolescent vulnerability are 
diminishing parental protection; loss of the protection afforded symbolically and 
otherwise by statutory proscriptions of sexual activity; and peer pressure to experiment 
with drugs, alcohol, and sex.  
Unsurprisingly then, reflecting New Zealand Ministry of Justice 2001 findings, in this 
research adolescents were reported to comprise a large proportion of complainants (CIB 
8A; DSAC 5A, 11; Support/Advocacy 1). Given the relatively greater confusion which 
surrounds the newness of their sexuality and the development of their own social mores, 
significantly some respondents suggested that most false complaints emanated from 
adolescents.  
‘Teenage girls can tend to [pause] seem to perhaps fabricate things … but that is 
the only group that I would say in particular, where we might find complaints 
that we think are not necessarily completely true.’ (CAT Manager 9) 
What this may signal is that when adolescents report being coerced into sex, police with 
their primary focus on applying the law in an either/or paradigm, are an exceedingly 
blunt instrument in dealing with such complaints. Legal processes which are abandoned 
before court may confound adolescent confusion by consolidating the message from the 
rape experience that the right to decline sex is not to be respected. At this vulnerable 
stage of maturation, debriefing from this experience is an important reason to mandate 
specialist support. Assisting police to view adolescent complaints within a different 
paradigm is a reason to provide specialist advocacy.  
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On all of these grounds, mandated support is inappropriately withdrawn when a girl 
reaches 17 years of age. The arbitrariness of relating this decision-making to age rather 
than need is highlighted by the reality that services in New Zealand are variously 
apportioned depending on geographic location. Although most Districts have a cut-off 
point of 17 years of age for CAT responsiveness, in some situations children as young 
as 14 years are dealt with by the same structures which respond to women. Such 
practice presumes that a girl who has been raped can manage the legal system without 
the quality assurance in responsiveness which accompanies specialist support and 
advocacy. 
‘17 is the demarcation line, but 14, 15, 16-year-olds, depending on how they 
present could be picked up, and are usually picked up by regular CIB staff.’ 
(CSM 1) 
In the three Auckland Districts, the converse is true with the multi-agency centre 
responding to adolescents up to 19 years of age and recently temporarily housing 
examinations for women (DSAC 2). Reflecting services described overseas (Boles & 
Patterson, 1997; Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994), often the same police, medical/forensic 
and support/advocacy systems were found to respond to women and children. This 
reinforces the argument that service provision is arbitrarily determined. 
Arguments of entitlement to effective holistic services on the grounds of vulnerability 
can also be applied to adult victims, as indicated by the prevalence of women’s 
experiences of sexual violence. However, women’s vulnerability is for different reasons 
which as noted, have little to do with women themselves. The vulnerability of 
contemporary women relates to patriarchal power to define not only social reality, but 
also woman through rigorous application of rigid gender roles. A tool in this power is 
the negative definitions of women which fit them for men’s purposes by impacting on 
ego maintenance in a manner which can limit resistance. In respect of rape particularly, 
these negative definitions are now understood as the rape mythology which has had 
profound impact in mediating legal redress and preventing understanding of the need for 
effective responses.    
Men have also attempted to control women through controlling resources.  
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‘One of the big things that I find is that financial dependence has a huge impact. 
You say to women, “You need to move out of this relationship.” “Well I can't 
afford to. Who is going to pay the mortgage? Who is going to pay the power?” 
And for the initial few months, they can't see past that. It is not until later that 
they think, yes I can do these things on my own.’ (CYFS 4) 
Other factors can make some women more vulnerable to sexual violence. Rothschild 
has also identified as an at-risk group those women who have been sexually abused in 
childhood, and due to a constantly heightened flight arousal response have learnt to 
distrust their instinctive reactions to situations of danger (Rothschild seminar, 2004). 
Some of these women are doubly at risk having removed themselves early on from 
sexually abusive homes, but having been sexualised, using prostitution as their means of 
survival (Chesney Lind & Shelden, 1992; Dobash & Dobash, 1992).  
Commonalities in the experience and aftermath of sexual offending justify a similar 
quality of response. Importantly, since features such as control and disempowerment are 
intrinsic to sexual violence irrespective of the victim’s age, aspects of the psychosocial 
consequences can also be similar. As predominantly an event between people known to 
each other (Dobash cited in Gordan & Riger, 1989), sexual violence can cause 
psychosocial issues in close relationships, related for instance to loss of trust. 
Respondents with experience in both child and adult services volunteered that their 
experiences had taught them that:  
‘In terms of the impact on the victim and the type of offending there is not a hell 
of a big difference obviously.’ (CAT Manager 1)  
This is not to suggest that all issues affecting women and children are the same or that 
there are no maturational differences in coping mechanisms.  
As already noted overseas, where adult sex crimes investigators received training from 
the Child Abuse and Exploitation Investigation Training Program this was also:  
‘…because of the similarity in the issues and laws concerning child sexual abuse 
and adult sexual assault’. (Epstein & Langenbahn, 1994, p.22) 
Respondents in this research agreed. 
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‘I think the investigation of adult sexual violation, and believe you me I have 
done hundreds of them, is really no different.’ (CAT Manager 7) 
For this reason, in New Zealand and overseas responsiveness to adults and children was 
often by the same teams.  
‘In some communities the child abuse multidisciplinary team and the 
interagency council will consist of many of the same agencies and have 
considerable overlap in personnel.’ (Boles & Patterson, 1997, p.36) 
The second theme in the explanations for privileging of children’s services was the 
perceived greater innocence of children. In this argument, children could not be 
responsible for, or lie about, their victimisation. Therefore, if claims were made these 
were to be believed and children supported throughout the processes. This argument for 
a more vigorous support of children indicates the persistent effects of the dominant rape 
mythology discourses which blame adult victims and encourage belief in a 
preponderance of false complaints. Some respondents understood that mythology was 
causal in the service disadvantage for women (Child Support/Advocacy 1; CYFS 3). 
Other respondents conveyed the influence of rape mythology on themselves by replying 
that women ‘put themselves’ in risky situations (CIB 5A, 7, 12; District Commander 4). 
Yet Kelly (1989) has argued a continuum of male violence which places women in 
many situations of risk in everyday social life, and that without overt signifiers of risk, 
women have little information about which men may be harmful to them.  
What was not stated explicitly, but which is argued as a conclusion to be drawn from 
the contrasting beliefs surrounding innocence, responsibility, and credibility, is that 
children’s value-as-people is more evident. Lending to this argument was the frequent 
response that working with adult victims was not as stressful as working with child 
victims (CIB 5A, 5B, 8B, 8E, 10, 12) which suggested the possibility of more feeling 
for violated children (CYFS 10).  
The efforts of patriarchal systems in devaluing women-as-people have been discussed, 
and these continually evolve. Contemporary challenges for feminists are in 
deconstructing messages through mainstream media which, in continually portraying 
young women as sexually available devalue women-as-people by indicating that their 
principal value resides in this availability. At societal level, official systems which 
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respond inadequately to women’s sexual victimisation reinforce the messages that 
women-as-people are less worthy than women-as-sexual-beings. In other words, 
women’s value-as-people and the corresponding right to say no is in conflict with their 
role and apparent obligations in relation to sexual availability. The low conviction rate 
of the few who are tried is evidence of the apparent appropriateness of overriding 
women’s choice in sexual matters. This has been endorsed by Justice Morris’s 
comments about a woman’s ‘NO!’ adding to the interest value of sex and merely 
signalling the need for a man to keep trying (New Zealand Herald, 06.1996).  
Unsurprisingly then, the third theme emerging from responses to the question about 
privileging of children’s services, related to the symbolic and educational effects of that 
privileging by government. In something of a circular argument some respondents 
replied that children were entitled to quality services because official systems had 
recognised the need and supplied them (CIB 7, 12; CYFS 10, 12; CAT 11, 12; CSM 11; 
Support/Advocacy 7).  
‘Possibly because there is CYFS. CYFS exists as a statutory agency for child 
protection. There is not an agency that parallels that for adult and so however 
good or bad we do it there is an agency there that is set up for children. …and I 
think apart from Child, Youth, and Family being there, there is also the 
Children's Commissioner. So there are a lot of agencies set up for specifically 
children.’ (CYFS 10) 
Family Courts were also mentioned in this regard (CAT 11). The valuing of children 
who have been violated is argued then as a flow-on effect of prioritisation by official 
systems, and in itself is an argument for greater government involvement in improving 
all forms of responsiveness to women.  
For governments to understand this, their longstanding tradition of reinforcing gender 
inequality by overlooking women’s needs in public policy must be deconstructed. As 
Carmody (1997) has identified, exploration of the gendered nature of social policy is 
very recent. This has been reinforced at official levels, with comment that ‘orthodox 
economics is often gender-blind’ (Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 1996). Accordingly, 
the argument that government and local councils contribute to perceptions of women’s 
lesser worth is supported by noting that the regular imbalance in public spending 
operates as a symbolic discourse about women’s worth.  
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In New Zealand, examples of public expenditure on sport and recreation which greatly 
privilege men’s activities are readily apparent in gendered analysis. As noted by a 
support/advocacy manager (8E), in 2002 government expenditure on a homecoming 
welcome for an Oscar winner was $3 million. This was in comparison to the $4 million 
for Women’s Refuge for the whole of 2002 and the $1.75 million contributed to sexual 
assault support services in 1996 (Minister of Justice in DSAC, 1996). In addition, $25 
million of taxpayers’ money has been spent on the latest America’s Cup campaign 
(BYM News 12.5.2007), and $175 of a $385 million proposal to upgrade a rugby park, 
is expected to come from taxation and rates (Dominion Post, 28.11.2006). Comparative 
spending on women’s sporting facilities which would lift the profile of women’s sport 
and bring comparative commercial gains is not in evidence. Unsurprisingly then, Article 
13 in the sixth CEDAW report  on the status of women in New Zealand states that 
women and girls participate in physical activity at a lesser rate than men and boys 
(Ministry of Women’s Affairs, 2002/2003).  
Services for men are markedly privileged over services for women in New Zealand, even 
when services for women are necessitated by men’s antisocial behaviours. For instance, 
public hospital and ACC expenditure is heavily weighted towards treating men’s injuries 
arising from sport, aggression, and road trauma (Ministry of Justice, 2006; Spier, 
Luketina & Kettles, 1991). In contrast, most DHBs have not met their Tier Two 
specifications by providing sexual assault services for female victims of men’s violence. 
The question then is why Health resources are not equally available to respond to the 
immediate physical and psychological consequences of men’s sexual aggression towards 
women. This is particularly important given the health consequences to individual women 
and long-term costs to the community, financial and otherwise, of women’s incapacitation 
through sexual assault when inadequately responded to (Koss, 1990).  
Similarly, throughout the criminal justice system, including at Police, Court, and 
Corrections levels, funding is drained by the need to address men’s offending. For 
instance in 2004, 82% of all convictions involved male offenders (Ministry of Justice, 
2006). The largest inmate category is comprised of those convicted of violent crime, and 
men predominate in this category (Corrections New Zealand website, 2007). While I 
would not argue against the punishment, deterrence, and denunciation roles of the court 
and corrections processes in respect of sexual violence, there is a taken-for-granted 
prioritisation of police, court, and corrections processes over prevention and services for 
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victims. Public spending on these is of more worth to women, particularly when police 
and court processes seldom benefit women and sometimes cause great harm.  
Articulating these imbalances consolidates the argument that appropriate targeting of 
resources to address social problems is unlikely until funding decisions are no longer 
obscured by gender-neutral language, and funding decisions which prioritise men’s 
activities lose their taken-for-granted nature. Given the imbalance in spending on men 
and women, to demand that funding is targeted to preventing men’s sexual violence and 
addressing its effects is a modest demand. It is modest because in the demand being 
reactive to social injustice, it does not begin to address the equal funding for women’s 
leisure and sporting activities which would signal social equity.  
In case women’s human rights still do not qualify them for a more equal return from 
taxes, a pecuniary argument can be made for greater government interest in sexual 
violence.  Internationally, the cost of rape is enormous. For example, New Zealand costs 
for 2003/2004 were estimated at $1.2 billion with each rape costing $72,130 (Roper & 
Thompson, 2006). An Irish Government paper has conservatively estimated that rapists 
cost the Northern Ireland economy at least 30 million pounds a year, with each rape 
costing 79,000 pounds (McGuigan, Belfast Telegraph, 4.2.2007). Proactively funding 
both rape-prevention and effective service interventions would therefore benefit society 
as-a-whole.  
‘Where Government can exercise control is over whether expenditure takes 
place within a policy framework directed towards a more effective, integrated 
and preventative response. There are short and long-term savings to be made if 
interventions protect from subsequent abuse and/or the impacts of 
victimisation.’ (Kelly & Lovett, 2005, p.12)  
Notwithstanding these human rights and efficiency arguments, overseas research indicates 
that strong and influential champions are still needed in effecting that government 
response (Ahrens et al., 2000; Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Campbell & Martin, 2001; Gilson 
1997; Kelly & Lovett, 2005; Lord & Rassel, 2000; O’Sullivan & Carlton, 2001). 
In London, my speculation is that one behind-the-scenes champion has been the 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, whose 1985 comparative evaluation of 
US and British investigative services concluded strongly for the benefits of specialist 
holistic services. The SARCs have been promoted and partially sponsored by 
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Metropolitan Police, whose Policy advocates and sets out the groundwork required for 
partnership. In New Zealand also, the value of such championship was apparent in Miller 
Burgering’s (1994) finding that the impetus for a comprehensive New Zealand-wide 
multidisciplinary approach to sexually abused children emanated from pressure groups.  
In the current research, police also identified the importance of influential champions to 
future sexual assault service developments (CAT Manager 1; District Commanders 2, 6; 
DSAC Regional Coordinator 12).   
‘I think adults generally have to take responsibility for themselves so it is more 
individual. Whereas for children, I think groups, whether it be social workers or 
whoever, even in non-government organisations, probably fight for more stuff 
for the children.’ (CYFS 9)  
This gives further support to Young’s (1996) suggestion that sexual violence towards 
women is characterised by relative public silence. So too does the view that sexual 
assault services would improve:  
‘As soon as we get someone saying this is an outrage that [adult] sexual abuse 
victims aren't getting the same resources thrown at them, it's an outrage because 
burglary is getting them. If they say burglary is mostly about property and here 
we have rape victims, not being given sufficient resources and things aren't 
investigated in a timely way … I imagine that the Police would refocus and that 
is what we're always doing is we are refocusing as we need to.’ 
(CAT Manager 1) 
The state of adult services indicates the need for championship. Placing adult rape on 
the public agenda is unlikely to be victim-instigated since rape mythology and criminal 
justice responses have persuaded women that to be raped is to be responsible for this 
and undeserving (Clark, 2002; Ministry of Justice, 2004).  
241 
A: ‘I have been involved in this area for 13 years, and have been scrapping for 
kids’ rights for a long time through that, whereas I am not sure how adult 
woman would actually do it. Rape is a very individual secret thing so would you 
want people to know that you belong to that group of people who have been 
raped trying to [pause] 
Q: Are you saying that adult woman are not necessarily going to align 
themselves because they will be seen as victims? 
A: You would have to be a very strong person to reach that point where it is 
okay to do that.’ (CYFS 9) 
Rather, most are silent, even to the point of not reporting to Police.  
In New Zealand, exposing the variable quality of the services which victims encounter 
has been undertaken by academics, notably Jordan. That Police have had no role in this 
at national level relates to many things such as: having insufficient national 
coordination; being generalist and system-centred, and despite an ideology of 
independence, taking their steer from government. This contrasts with Britain where 
having comparatively analysed US and British systems and recommended adapting US 
systems to London, Blair’s later role as London Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
placed him in a powerful position to enact change.  
DSAC has also attempted to place the unmet needs of adult sexual assault victims on 
the public and government agenda. Given that advocating for patients’ needs is the 
ethical duty of doctors, it is regrettable that those members who are also employed by 
DHBs are, like police, limited in social change activities. What this manifests is the 
concern expressed by RCCs about working within state services (Byington et al., 1991; 
Campbell & Martin, 2001; Mathews, 1994; Mawby & Gill, 1987). Other attempts to 
contain DSAC’s political advocacy for appropriate victim services have been made by 
suggesting incorrectly that this alters the appearance of objectivity when giving 
evidence (Criminal Law Symposium, 2004). This suggestion is based on not 
understanding the difference between advocating for the provision of appropriate 
medical/forensic care and advocating for victims at trial. 
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Since improvements overseas have related significantly to RCC advocacy, the role of 
New Zealand’s support/advocacy agencies will be discussed in more detail. Advocacy 
to improve responsiveness can be conducted both at national level and at the level of 
individual organisations. At national level, the disunity which has been discussed has 
prevented agencies from becoming a government lobby group. At individual level, 
funding issues have made it difficult not only to lobby government directly for funded 
service improvements but also to place sexual violence on the public agenda in order to 
create the momentum for social change.  
On being asked about political and preventative work most agencies expressed 
awareness of the need and their desire to be involved, but also frustration at their 
inability due to both funding and volunteer shortfalls. Although many agencies did rape- 
prevention work through education, only a very few agencies did some monitoring of 
the judiciary and effects of legislative change but this was only ad hoc. No agency was 
proactive in the field of further statute revision, although some agencies made 
submissions to Select Committees on request. The range of activities which have had to 
be abandoned is evident below. 
A: ‘We had a program called CAP that went into schools, but it died from lack 
of funding four years ago. 
Q: Does this organisation give feedback to the Victims’ Task Force or central 
Government agencies? 
A: We have done in the past, but not so much now. Again, because we don't have 
the manpower - comes down to funding. If we had funding for another part-time 
Manager, or whatever, we could do just that.  
Q: Any advocacy come from here for legislative change? 
A: Not really, and that's probably because of lack of time.  
Q: What about judicial monitoring? 
A: We would certainly be watching and saying that's dreadful, but we probably 
wouldn't be doing much about it. It comes down to sheer person power. If I 
could get a trustee on board, who would do that it would be wonderful! We 
would love to, absolutely love to!’ (Support/Advocacy Manager, 1) 
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Interwoven with funding issues and making a palpable difference to support/advocacy 
agency ability to advocate for systems improvements was whether agencies worked 
with police in acute service provision. Analysing the impact of this on RCCs’ social 
change activities has been complex given the variety of support/advocacy organisational 
structures and their forms of partnership with police. Of the 21 specialist agencies in the 
Areas visited, 19 made themselves available to work with police in providing acute 
services. Police chose to work with 13 specialist agencies of which only 6 were always 
accessed to provide support. Only 7 of the 13 partnerships benefited from partnership 
maintenance measures, albeit limited. Nonetheless, all 13 agencies reported similarly 
low levels of engagement in social change activities, suggesting that once in partnership 
the degree of closeness made little difference.  
However, seven of the eight agencies which never worked with police were at the 
politically active end of the spectrum. At the other end, in being generalist and 
government-instigated, no Victim Support accessed by police for crisis intervention 
work with rape victims was found to have a social change function. That one of the 
eight agencies not working with police, the Mid-North Family Support Group, is not 
involved to a similar degree in rape-related social change activity is also likely to be 
because they are the most generalist specialist agency. What can be said then is that 
social change activities were most often generated by community-instigated specialist 
organisations which never worked with police in delivery of acute services.  
Since agencies which work in partnership with police are aware of the need for social 
change activities and regret that they cannot be more involved, their lesser social change 
activity has little to do with domestication and attendant loss of radical perspective as 
has been the concern (Jones, 2004; Mawby & Gill, 1987; Vanderpyl, 2001). Instead, it 
relates more to the time and resources which are lost when working to legal system time 
dictates alongside police. Campbell and Martin (2001) and Mawby and Gill (1987) have 
found too that immediate service commitments take priority over rape-prevention and 
other political work. Rather, not providing support and advocacy through the initial 
police investigative processes enables agencies to use their limited resources in social 
change activities instead. As Campbell et al. (1998) and Mathews (1994) have 
suggested there are benefits in at least some agencies ‘standing outside’ in order to 
remain radical.  
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In New Zealand, only two specialist agencies have chosen to ‘stand outside’ by not 
working alongside police during legal processes. Accordingly, while also supporting 
victims Wellington Independent Rape Crisis reported the broadest base of political 
activities. These included: media releases; community, school, police, medical, 
criminology, and law school education; monitoring judicial rulings; advice to 
government departments on request; and feedback to the Broadcasting Standards 
Authority about media presentations. Similarly, the Auckland RCC had a radical focus 
in being involved solely with education. Notably however both agencies have another 
specialist support/advocacy organisation in close proximity working and maintaining 
partnership with police. This renders sustainable their decisions to maintain separation 
and have a major or total focus on social change activities, an option not available in 
most places.  
Ultimately, due to: only two agencies electing to remain separate; many others who 
police ‘push outside’ becoming more generalist; inadequate resources and 
support/advocacy disunity, New Zealand’s agencies in being less politically active than 
their overseas counterparts have had little traction in improving services. Reflecting 
both the degree of activism and the early contrast in US and British government 
responsiveness noted by Blair (1985), the inability of most agencies to engage in radical 
work may be one factor in government neglect to develop responsiveness in this area. 
However in contrast to advances in some US States, the corollary of all New Zealand 
RCCs being grassroots, independent, and funded by a variety of sources is that along 
with being able to choose their involvement with police in giving services, they are also 
at a distance from power. For those groups who are politically active, this means that 
their voices are muted, lending to the argument for feminists to occupy positions at top 
level in state organisations and influence decision making.  
Despite there being minimal political activity from the three crisis intervention 
organisations, there was considerable support from respondents for government to 
accept its moral obligation to develop services. Respondents were asked their views on 
the transportability of the dual government responsiveness model to the adult sector. All 
but two (CIB 9, 10) were positive, and significantly neither worked with a specialist 
agency. Many replied that government support would enable a full range of 24-hour 
support/advocacy services to be available (CYFS 3, 7). Others suggested that 
government itself should mandate, support, and professionalise support/advocacy 
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services (CIB 8A; CSM 8, 9; CYFS 3, 7; 9; CAT 12; District Commanders 2, 4) in 
conjunction with a memorandum with Police (CYFS 3). 
A: ‘I just see the value in two statutory agencies working together. 
Q: Because they are equally powerful? 
A: Yes absolutely. They are probably the two most powerful agencies and that 
are actually working together for the better [pause] good of victims - in this 
instance children and young people. Why could that not translate across into 
adults, they are equally of value in this society?’ (CYFS 7) 
The vulnerability of support/advocacy agencies was another reason given for 
government support.  
‘Police may be reluctant to begin to build up a relationship with a group which 
may not be there next year, so I think if it is going to work then in fact some 
organisation, whether it be government or whatever, needs to take the 
responsibility for funding the agency permanently. …If they were going to be 
realistically funding an agency so it could be permanent then I think you may get 
more of a cooperation or collaboration with the police, so the funding is vital.’ 
(CYFS 9) 
Amongst the community of those directly involved with services for child and adult 
victims, it is apparent that greater government input would be welcome.  
Conclusion 
Governments in the US, Britain, and Australia have made sexual assault service 
development possible by providing research, funding, and support. When victims’ needs 
are considered and responses are structured around these, the move is toward holistic 
care and this has been positively evaluated. Unlike some government and local body 
systems of responsiveness overseas, and unlike its responsiveness to children, the New 
Zealand government has yet to respond with structured holistic services for women who 
have experienced sexual violence. It is possible that this owes much to the belief that all 
issues of men’s violence to women are addressed through the growing attention to 
family violence, even though sexual violence occurs in forums outside family. Feasibly, 
the greater political influence of children’s issues also operates to keep family violence 
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on the public agenda. Given that it is not addressed by government as a discrete field, 
the unique consequences of sexual violence are yet to be understood and to receive 
comprehensive attention.  
In June 2006, family violence overshadowing of sexual violence was analysed at a 
community network meeting. Drawing a circle within a circle the STOP member 
represented apparent official belief that sexual violence issues are subsumed by those of 
family violence. In contrast, her depiction of two overlapping circles representing some 
shared interests is closer to the reality of the relationship. What this highlights is that 
before improvements to sexual assault services can occur, that which is necessary to 
change must be clearly defined in order to be targeted.  
Very recent New Zealand Government initiatives such as new funding for research and 
a Sexual Violence Task Force have specifically targeted sexual violence. If these 
initiatives translate into developing permanent structures for research and 
responsiveness, Safer Community Councils could be pivotal in developing 
responsiveness at both national and local levels. As with the national coordination 
possibilities of Police Sexual Assault District Coordinators and DSAC Regional 
Coordinators, with their links to the Ministry of Justice at national level and to councils 
at local level, SCCs are critically placed as coordinators in a national framework. Given 
their safer community role and their pre-existing collaboration with Police and 
community agencies, an extension of their current function also makes local 
coordination of sexual assault services a strong possibility without much of a paradigm 
shift. With central government funding and tactical support, these SCC structures are 
ideal coordinators of holistic practice.   
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Chapter Eight: Summary, Recommendations, and 
Conclusion 
Chapter Eight brings the many elements of this research together in responding to the 
contrast between literature on good practice in sexual assault responsiveness and 
empirical findings in New Zealand. In this response, the meaning and significance of 
the findings are considered, and recommendations are offered which suggest how the 
barriers to implementing effective structures can be overcome through a government-led 
response.   
Summary of Findings  
In New Zealand, it is clear that an anomalous situation has arisen in which official 
responses to sexual violence are nationally coordinated and becoming increasingly 
structured - but just for children. In contrast, overshadowed by family violence, sexual 
violence against women has been only sporadically at the forefront of political 
consciousness and Government has only recently acknowledged its ownership of the 
problem. This in spite of New Zealand’s acceptance of its obligations under UN 
covenants which demand effective prevention and adequate systems of care should men 
not be able to be prevented from raping women. It is also in spite of New Zealand 
governments’ own surveys showing that 20% of females report sexual victimisation. 
Lastly, it is in spite of repeated attempts by medical/forensic professionals to make 
government responsive to service shortfalls.  
Since government leadership in this field has been lacking, government departments 
with responsibility for the various outcomes of sexual violence have never combined to 
develop a national strategic plan around this issue. Individual departments have also not 
been led in developing national strategies for their own responsiveness and some 
departments have ignored their responsibilities. There is no permanent research capacity 
to provide evidence of New Zealand’s requirements or to ascertain what works well 
overseas and could be adapted to conditions here. Consequently, there has also been no 
attempt to fund or support comprehensive structures for regional coordination of 
services, let alone develop multi-agency centres. In comparison to the thoughtfulness 
given to some services overseas and to New Zealand services for children, systems 
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addressing sexual violence remain variable and ad hoc rather than comprehensive and 
rationally structured.  
Because sexual violence has only recently arrived on the current Government’s agenda, 
it has not previously been signalled to Police leadership as a priority area. This is 
tangible in Police leadership having yet to finalise a national structure to coordinate 
their own responsiveness or to audit Policy implementation in the interests of quality 
assurance. Options to improve services at local level which were available internally 
and through partnership possibilities were seldom taken up. In the presence of factors 
such as heavy workload and court dismissals of complaints, shortcuts were taken and 
variability and gaps in services were very evident.   
Since successive governments have had minimal evidence basis on which to respond to 
service gaps, the community organisations which have responded to these gaps by 
developing medical and support services have not been comprehensively supported in 
this. This has meant service gaps as specialist agencies have struggled to provide services. 
The lack of official standing of support/advocacy agencies has enabled police, some of 
whom were already influenced by philosophical differences, to overlook partnership 
possibilities and deny victims specialist support. Nonetheless, improvements are evident 
in the three separate crisis intervention systems and these have been achieved by 
committed individuals.   
In New Zealand’s recent history the strongest push for better coordination of and 
support for services has been from DSAC. DSAC has also provided an exemplary 
model of both national coordination and quality assurance in responsiveness. This 
model is particularly important to succession planning. Remembering that many of the 
advocates for systems improvement have long-term involvement, some since the 1970s, 
of concern is their likely departure over the next decade. Without well-established and 
well-maintained structures such as the DSAC model, the risk is the loss of knowledge 
and expertise as women move increasingly into the paid workforce and the pool of 
volunteers diminishes. Of equal concern is that attrition of committed advocates will be 
accompanied by reduction in the impetus towards improving systems. Accordingly, 
government must act promptly to safeguard the systems and expertise already 
developed by activists. A permanent evidence-based national structure is needed to 
future-proof sexual assault responsiveness.  
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The Way Forward 
In achieving this national structure, the following recommendations take the suggestions 
of each chapter and in building on them are more prescriptive in relation to service 
development. The recommendations were guided in their construction by Wilson and 
Wright’s (1993) analysis of what makes for usefulness.  
Firstly, responding to the need for recommendations to be realistic and based on the 
findings, and congruent with fourth generation naturalistic enquiry, recommendations 
are informed by the views of those working with child and adult sexual assault victims. 
Stakeholder views were solicited through an open-ended question about what needed to 
be done differently for adult victims. Further underscoring their feasibility, 
recommendations are also informed by overseas precedents in service developments. 
These were discussed with respondents who were asked whether elements of overseas 
practice could usefully be adapted to New Zealand conditions. Discussions included the 
suitability of incorporating ‘ideals’ such as: national coordination; the SARCs; 
specialist police teams; combined child and adult sexual assault police teams; and local 
interagency councils into New Zealand practice. Given these discussions, 
recommendations aimed at addressing gaps derive from filtering literature-identified 
practice ideals through the views of practitioners. It is a combination then of literature, 
data-gathering, consultation, and analysis which has produced recommendations aimed 
at comprehensively implementing specialist holistic victim-centred responses in New 
Zealand.  
Wilson and Wright also suggest that recommendations must be action oriented; 
politically aware; influence policy within and beyond the service; and provide strategic 
directions. These suggestions confirm the need for recommendations to indicate the 
leadership which governance structures should provide. Having argued the futility of 
trying to comprehensively implement specialist holistic practice without the structures 
which support its development, the necessary central and local government input is 
discussed first and followed by recommendations for Police systems. Structuring the 
discussion around these frameworks also accommodates Wilson and Wright’s 
suggestion that recommendations be grouped and prioritised according to wishes.  
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Achieving National Coordination  
As Kelly and Lovett (2005) have argued, a long-term government-led national strategy 
is necessary in responding to sexual violence. Figure 7 below suggests a minimum 
framework in creating an effective system of responsiveness in New Zealand. 
Figure 7: Proposed Structure for National and Local Responses to Sexual Violence 
 
 
251 
New Zealand Council for Sexual Violence Responsiveness (NZCSVR)  
Since New Zealand services have developed ad hoc and outside the auspices of 
government (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996), a major finding of this research has been 
variability in responsiveness. Some service variability has been the product of necessary 
local level adaptations, but much simply reflects neglect to ensure that adequate systems 
are in place. Unnecessary variability needs to be addressed at national level through the 
national coordination and funding of at least the three systems which respond to victims 
in the acute crisis phase. O’Shea (2006) has recommended similarly in suggesting a 
National Steering Committee for Ireland. Importantly, this has been the foundation for 
the incorporation of other related systems as has happened with some SARTs overseas 
(Littel, 2001).  
As argued in Chapter Seven, if an effective rape-centred rather than systems-centred 
response is to be achieved on a national basis, government must facilitate this issue-
centred response. While overseas governments have been comparatively proactive, no 
country has achieved national coordination or a national standard of integrated sexual 
assault services through government oversight. Given our: small population base and 
geographic size; national and local governance structures; national Police and 
medical/forensic structures; nationwide community organisations; and the will to take 
advantage of these, New Zealand Government has the opportunity to be the first to 
provide a nationally-structured response.  
As Hornibrook and Myers (1996) and Jones (2004) have ascertained, the achievement 
of an issue-centred response is contingent on establishing which government 
departments have responsibility for sexual assault services. It is also contingent on 
bringing these departments together so that sexual violence is addressed on an issue-
centred basis.  
‘Seems to me to be the better way to manage things in the future is to have a 
more coordinated response [provided] by government agencies under one roof. 
… Hopefully, it is not going to take us 10 years to catch up on that and the 
policy advisers at the highest level and the ministers should be keeping an eye 
on that sort of thing, saying this is good practice, this is a great model.’ 
(CSM 8A) 
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Suggesting stronger issue-based interdepartmental liaison around sexual assault has 
precedent in international study (Victoria Health Department study cited by Smith, 
2004). It also has precedent in the Inter-Ministerial group on sexual violence which was 
established to develop national protocols in Britain (Lovett et al., 2004).  
Interdepartmental liaison will require within-department ownership, as demonstrated by 
permanent positions occupied by departmental appointees whose sole focus is 
addressing sexual violence. Managing interdepartmental liaison between appointees will 
necessitate appointing a New Zealand Council for Sexual Violence Responsiveness 
(NZCSVR) under the auspices of an Ombudsman. Without an NZCSVR, government 
response to sexual violence as a discrete issue is unlikely. The lack of departmental 
collaboration confirmed by Labour Government Minister Tizard (2006) and more 
recently, Maori Party Member of Parliament Harawira (Dominion Post, 5.2.07), will 
limit the prospect of coordinating sexual violence responsiveness and inhibit the 
prospect of service development.  
Maintaining a grounded responsiveness will necessitate representation from national 
coordinators of the three crisis intervention organisations on the NZCSVR. 
Consideration should also be given to having direct victim representation. At this top 
level of planning police, medical/forensic, and support/advocacy representation is 
necessary to safeguarding of empirically-derived historical knowledge and accessing the 
accumulated wisdom of those working in the field. Those with direct experience know 
what already works, where gaps remain, and where interventions are counter-
productive. Their representation on the NZCSVR may enable future protection against 
problematic by-products of government interventions and changes to funding streams. 
Past problems include changes to funding distribution to RCCs, which have been 
identified by them as having a divisive effect. Competition for funds has had a similar 
effect elsewhere (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). As found in this research, also 
problematic has been the loss of some specialist groups which accompanied a new layer 
of responsiveness in the form of Victim Support. Preventing such duplication is an 
expressed goal of the 2004 Ministry of Justice Action Plan. 
An important role of the NZCSVR will be to mobilise Health responsiveness since as 
O’Shea (2006) too has determined, the Ministry of Health has a significant role to play 
within a coordinated government response. This is because sexual violence has potential 
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for significant physical and psychological health consequences which last well beyond 
criminal justice system involvement. Since secondary victimisation can delay or prevent 
recovery, it is in the Ministry of Health’s economic interests to ensure that DHBs 
provide dedicated and standardised facilities for examinations (Ministry of Health, 
2006). Currently adult facilities are provided variously by GPs and only occasionally by 
DHBs. Standardising physical facilities under Health auspices will ensure that all sexual 
assault interventions can take place away from busy police stations and within a care-
based paradigm, as has been increasingly achieved in London Havens.  
Timely access to specialist medical/forensic personnel remains problematic. One option 
is to pilot having permanently designated additional physician hours in selected 
emergency departments with the proviso that medical/forensic examinations for victims 
of sexual violence are prioritised if there is prior notification. From my own work 
experience in emergency departments, the lengthy waiting times mean that while 
specialist examiners are not employed in this work, other patients will benefit. Implied 
in this is that Health funding will be necessary in training emergency medicine 
professionals to the level developed voluntarily by DSAC and currently funded by 
them. Consideration can also be given to making medical/forensic examinations a 
regular part of emergency medicine training. Permanently designated facilities are 
crucial and having permanently available physician time does not imply that these must 
necessarily be located in emergency departments. 
Precedent for Health to lead the way in developing sexual assault services is in 
Australia, where services have developed under the auspices of the Government Health 
Service (Hornibrook & Myers, 1996; Lovett et al., 2004). In the Eastern District, the 
Ministry of Health has indicated willingness to provide leadership in achieving 
collaboration between Health, Police, Education, and the local Council in respect of 
family violence (DSAC Regional Coordinator; SCC). The Ministry’s recent request for 
DHBs to outline their sexual assault services may signal that the need for similar 
leadership in the sexual assault field is also understood (Ministry of Health, 2006). The 
Ministry may yet take responsibility for developing medical expertise for these 
specialist examinations and subsequent expert court testimony. 
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Other government departments with representation on the NZCSVR are those which 
have an operational role in responding to issues of sexual violence. These include: 
Police; MSD; Justice and its Crime Prevention Unit; and CYFS. In addition, the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs has a role in research and policy development. In time, as 
with some SARTs, departments which are offender-focussed, such as probation and 
corrections, may also collaborate to plan services.  
The work required of the NZCSVR is extensive. The role of these combined 
government departments and national organisations is to fund and plan the dual 
requirements of responsiveness to sexual violence - prevention and services. Prevention 
activities are multilayered and include alertness to and eradication of sexist beliefs in 
society in general and in the justice system in particular. They also include determining 
the many possible venues for anti-rape education, and developing and ensuring its 
implementation. NZCSVR planning and implementation of services includes assisting 
the Crime Prevention Unit to establish and support local interagency councils through 
SCCs. In this respect, NZCSVR functions include building SCC capacity in the manner 
identified by MCASA (1997) and for the specific functions and tasks which it 
proposed.26 MCASA’s proposal for monitoring, and evaluating a national protocol for 
multi-agency victim-centred systems to operate under will need to be preceded by the 
NZCSVR writing of this policy.  
Precedent for a joint training centre for all organisations has been set in the US in the 
form of the Florida Interdisciplinary Rape Science Training Institute (Harvey, 1985), 
and in a more limited fashion, through joint CYFS/police training at the Royal New 
Zealand Police College. During the research period, a support/advocate (2) suggested 
combined training for police and adult support agency personnel at this college, an idea 
which has support overseas in Kelly and Lovett’s (2005) suggestion of linked training. 
The NZCSVR could consider implementing a national training centre, possibly at the 
college by extending its resources and facilities. Since CYFS and police personnel 
already undertake joint training at the college, there is evidently no logistical reason for 
joint training at national level not to be held for crisis intervention organisations which 
respond to adults. This has been suggested overseas as being part of the maturation 
process of agencies (Ullman & Townsend, 2007). If national training and accreditation 
in crisis intervention can be achieved, the opportunity may present for specialist 
                                                 
26
 See Chapter Six. 
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support/advocacy assessment of the effects of the trauma on the victim to be presented 
as expert testimony in court.  
Continuing the training theme, another potential for the NZCSVR is in ensuring that 
collaboration and knowledge-sharing are facilitated through funding and organisation of 
regular rape-specific conferences in New Zealand. O’Shea (2006) has recommended 
that Ireland holds such conferences biannually. DSAC, the Taranaki Safer Centre, and 
the Australia and New Zealand Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abuse have 
organised conferences during this research period. Initiatives such as these need 
support, since as noted they take energy and resources from the core functions of these 
community organisations. The conferences which I attended in Melbourne and London 
were invaluable and continue to pay dividends, not only from the knowledge gained but 
more particularly from the networking enabled. New Zealand networking is crucial as is 
developing responsiveness to New Zealand’s idiosyncratic features.  
Appointing an Ombudsman/Commissioner 
As with the advantages of having one identifiable body with oversight of the single 
issue of sexual violence, there is a need for leadership in the field from identifiable 
individuals with authority to effect change. The virtues of having an influential 
champion have been highlighted by Bryant and Cirel (1977). As noted, New Zealand 
RCCs have been too far from power, too impoverished, and too disconnected to 
successfully advocate for the degree of responsiveness achieved through the activist 
work of RCCs in the US. DSAC advocacy for service improvements has been energetic 
but as noted, occasionally undermined for others’ political reasons and hampered by the 
employment issues of individual doctors. Although New Zealand’s Kimiora was the 
result of strong local advocacy, this was originally established only for children. 
Accordingly, respondents identified that while many issues have patrons, sexual 
violence has no single identifiable influential champion such as the Children’s 
Commissioner who, although independent, was said to work very closely with CYFS 
(Victim Support Manager 7; SCC 7; District Commander 4, 6).  
There is much potential in having a Sexual Violence Commissioner/Ombudsman and 
many roles are possible. For instance, overseas precedent exists for having one 
identifiable overseer for all relevant services. Littel (2001) recommended: 
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‘…pooling resources to hire a person who oversees multidisciplinary efforts to 
create statewide policies, or jointly advocating for the expansion of local victim 
services’ (Littel, 2001, p.27)    
In New Zealand, this policy development could be achieved through pooling 
Departmental resources to create a Chief Executive Officer of the NZCSVR. Littel’s 
advocacy suggestion could be expanded to championing rape-prevention and adequate 
resourcing of effective interventions at national levels. This would incorporate proactive 
monitoring of quality assurance through ensuring protocols are negotiated, 
implemented, and observed between agencies. In addition, respondents suggested a 
‘Complaints Authority’ role through an independent Ombudsman with specialist 
knowledge having oversight of individual victim’s complaints.   
Creating a National Research Body and Suggesting its Future Research 
Evidence-based planning has not been a feature of New Zealand’s sexual assault 
responsiveness. At frontline level, statistics have not been collated individually let alone 
collectively (DSAC National Office; CAT Manager 9) and government has had little 
knowledge of the parameters of sexual violence. Service gaps were recorded in a 1983 
Rape Study but were noted in 1996 not to be addressed and this remains the case. In 
subsequent research, government has reacted to issues without a cohesive research 
strategy, causing costly duplication and with the exception of the Commission of 
Inquiry findings, no identifiable outcomes. Kelly and Lovett (2005) have expressed 
similar frustration with the style and outcomes of some British research.    
However, Government has just established a Sexual Violence Task Force and made 
$900,000 available for sexual violence research (NZ Press Association, 28.2.07). This 
will be led by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and conducted over the next two years in 
conjunction with Police and the Ministry of Justice. While it aims to establish effective 
interventions, significantly, prevention is not a focus of the research (Key Informant, 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs). It is heartening to note that the Task Force includes 
significant support/advocacy representation but disappointingly, DSAC is not yet 
represented. Since the Task Force has had just an inaugural meeting, this oversight may 
be remedied in time for DSAC to contribute its existing overview of New Zealand 
services and role model of effective national coordination. This latest initiative shows the 
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beginnings of understanding that the needs of stakeholders, including governments, are 
better met employing finite resources in providing a structured evidence basis of need.  
For permanent and rational advances to be made, the recent reactive research initiatives 
must be just the beginning of phasing in a proactive and permanent research capacity. 
Challenges in sexual violence responsiveness develop and change over time and the ability 
to accurately articulate and remedy evolving issues is contingent on always having a 
contemporary New Zealand-wide evidence basis for these. These arguments for a 
permanent national research body are bolstered by the 1993 UN Declaration recommending 
government research. National data collection has also been identified as a priority in 
Australia (NASASV, 2000) and Ireland (O’Shea, 2006). New Zealand falls behind 
Australia and the US in not having the permanent sexual assault research capacity which 
has advanced rape-responsiveness in those countries.  
Beyond its research capacity, there are synergistic advantages to developing a 
permanent research body focussed specifically on sexual assault. A New Zealand Centre 
for the Study of Sexual Violence (NZCSSV) is a potential focus point for networking 
between relevant government agencies and community organisations. A specific sexual 
assault research capacity will also contribute towards countering the overshadowing of 
sexual assault issues by domestic violence issues. Correspondingly, contemporary 
knowledge will assist in maintaining government interest in ongoing development and 
sustaining of effective systems (Lovett et al., 2004). Lastly, a designated single-focus 
research body will make a symbolic statement about government’s intention to 
safeguard women’s right to public and private safety.  
NZCSSV collaboration with overseas research bodies such as ACSSA will enable: 
information-sharing around recent research; new prevention initiatives; and the means 
for improving responsiveness. An examination of Australia’s ACSSA format, capacity, 
and contribution to sexual assault responsiveness is suggested as a first research 
endeavour in developing our own research body. Regular ACSSA and Sexual Violence 
Research Initiative email correspondence provides notifications of contemporary 
research and international conferences. Along with conducting New Zealand research, 
the NZCSSV can tap into these conferences by sending representatives to assess the 
transportability of new ideas and practice. The potential for actively collaborating in 
international research is exciting and endless.  
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The practical function of a permanent national research body on sexual crime is in 
providing the data which is required in planning services, allocating resources, and 
developing policy (NASASV, 2000). Having all data collected by one body will provide 
opportunities for cross referencing information and working out connections which 
might otherwise not become apparent. As O’Shea (2006) has said, lack of comparable 
data makes this important. The role of the NZCSSV will be to make decisions in 
conjunction with the NZCSVR on what needs to be known, and to plan and coordinate 
the collection of new data. In addition, it will be involved in conducting pilot studies 
prior to the implementation of initiatives suggested by the data. For instance, the 
NZCSSV could monitor and evaluate a pilot study of a District-wide SCC-led board 
which provides coordination of services in the Wellington Police District. Auditing 
policy implementation and monitoring the effects of policy will also be NZCSSV 
research functions. What needs to be known is considerable and some suggestions for 
NZCSSV research are considered next.  
Most importantly, the NZCSSV needs to undertake research into the parameters of 
sexual violence in New Zealand. At present, Police crime statistics are of major 
importance in determining Police services, but given its underreporting, rape is unlikely 
to be represented in the Commissioner’s Statement of Intent. Since adequacy of services 
relates to the articulation of need, the parameters of both sexual violence and 
underreporting need to be known. Surveys such as New Zealand crime victim studies 
will indicate parameters of unreported rape but as noted by the Ministry of Justice 
(2004), for data to be relevant surveys should be more frequent than five yearly. 
Regardless, as NASASV (2000) has identified, the incidence of sexual violence is not 
accurately reflected by either Police statistics or victim surveys. Kilpatrick and 
Ruggiero (2004), in noting the difficulties of research aimed at establishing 
underreporting rates, suggest that RCCs collate statistics of those who only use their 
services. These statistics could be augmented by DSAC data collection, and this will 
require NZCSSV analysis of the support required by both organisations to do so.  
In order to effectively target prevention initiatives and services, the NZCSSV must 
isolate variables associated with sexual violence, such as age; location; 
perpetrator/victim relationship; and the part played by alcohol and drugs. Data on 
complaints which are held to be untruthful, or not held to meet the legal definitions, is 
necessary in understanding and managing these. Also necessary is New Zealand data on 
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the social, long-term health, and pecuniary costs of sexual violence. Once understood, 
this is likely to spur proactive efforts toward rape-prevention.  
In conjunction with the parameters and patterns of rape, and as has been achieved in Ireland 
in 2007, the NZCSSV must evaluate service capacity. The current research and recent 
surveys provide only a partial picture of New Zealand’s services and are only a beginning 
point in what must become regular data collation on service capacity and this information 
must be regularly collated. Service capacity must also be evaluated in comparison to 
established principles of best holistic practice and improved accordingly, rather than limited 
by current facilities and equipment. For instance, if through the current Wellington pilot 
project it is determined that a recorded narrative ‘cognitive’ interview is good practice, 
recording and transcribing equipment are not routinely available to implement this (ASA 
Course Coordinator; CIB 8C). Of concern then is that resource deficits may work against a 
decision to incorporate the cognitive interview or like format.  
NZCSVR planning of prevention activities should complement current educational 
endeavours in schools and the community. This requires the NZCSSV to conduct an 
inventory on what is already done and to ascertain what works well. At present, 
prevention work in schools is done by police, support/advocacy agencies, and stopping 
violence organisations. However, as found by Campbell et al. (1998), this education is 
currently contingent on schools’ permission and this is sometimes declined to 
support/advocacy agencies (Support/Advocacy 8D; CYFS 11). This warrants NZCSVR 
research and analysis. One possibility is to examine the ‘legitimising’ of RCC education 
endeavours by including them in the contemporary Ministry of Women’s Affairs review 
of sexuality education for secondary school students (website, 2006).  
Lastly, the unfavourable comment about courts made by the majority of professionals 
interviewed warrants NZCSSV enquiry as to how to improve court experiences and 
outcomes both for victims and professionals. This is necessary since analysis in this 
research indicates that the decision-making of professionals at earlier points in the criminal 
justice system is negatively affected by the belief that ‘it all falls down in court’ (CYFS 
Manager 9). Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1983) suggest that conservative court 
practice consciously undermines the victim-protective effects of legislation. A starting point 
in improving courtroom conduct is similar analysis of the extent to which legislation 
governing it in New Zealand is implemented in the intended spirit.   
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Amongst other benefits, recommendations of a New Zealand Centre for the Study of 
Sexual Assault, Commissioner/Ombudsman, and New Zealand Council for Sexual 
Violence Responsiveness will facilitate national coordination between the three crisis 
intervention services. National coordination of each of the services will strengthen their 
ability to advise the NZCSVR as to service gaps, its NZCSSV as to research 
requirements, and simultaneously strengthen the NZCSVR in its ability to support and 
develop the services. An NZCSVR will provide further inspiration for support/advocacy 
agencies to expedite their national coordination in order to have a voice at this forum. 
This interplay is necessary to reducing service variability and enabling the markers of 
quality assurance to be identified and disseminated.  
Local/Regional Coordination of Services 
Recommendations so far have focused on the national framework necessary to effect 
improvements in services. Local or regional coordination of services also needs to be 
addressed. Paradoxically, this became clear during discussions about national 
coordination when many respondents expressed strong belief in the need for local level 
adaptations. As demonstrated in the creation of DSAC regional coordinators and the 
attempt to create Police Sexual Assault District Coordinators, local coordination 
structures are pivotal. These not only have a function in ensuring effective interventions 
at local level, but also enable national coordination and thereby central accountability. 
Their value to upward and downward communication flow is underscored in DSAC’s 
successful national coordination and dissemination of information and training 
standards in comparison to findings in relation to Police.  
Motivated again by the benefits of working from pre-existing structures, New Zealand 
Police Districts are a viable basis for determining the parameters for local service 
coordination. As the only totally government-supported entity responding in the acute 
phase, District Commanders’ sphere of influence has official sanction and funding. 
Within each District, Police has District-wide within-Police networks, as well as 
District-wide coordination with other local organisations. Basing local partnerships 
around Police Districts also reflects the reality that when rape is reported to Police, all 
crisis intervention collaboration occurs around Police-based procedures. Victim 
complaints to police can have more far reaching consequences than those made in the 
first instance to medical and support personnel, yet Police do not have inbuilt support 
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mechanisms for complainants. For that reason also, it is particularly important to ensure 
that a support system for victims envelops police processes.  
The structure of other organisational networks does not conflict with accommodating to 
the pre-existing Police structure. Along with Police District Headquarters, local councils 
are also located in the bigger centres of each District. This allows the option of both a 
government-funded or council-funded permanently accessible location for meetings 
between local/regional coordinators from SCCs, Police, support/advocacy agencies, 
DSAC, and other relevant regional managers. DSAC’s regional/local coordination 
structure currently does not match geographically with Police Districts, but there is no 
logistical reason why DSAC regional coordinators could not be those DSAC doctors 
based in the same cities as Police District Headquarters as is often the case already. 
These suggestions do not imply that the processes become police-centred so much as 
they imply that pre-existing government facilities are appropriately used in processes 
which facilitate quality assurance.   
In bringing the relevant parties together, Interagency Councils have also been suggested 
as the means to both gain a broad base of community support and tailor the response to 
local community need (Bryant & Cirel, 1977; Boles & Patterson, 1997; MCASA, 
1997). Bryant and Cirel suggested very wide membership but this should be tempered 
by the need for effective decision-making processes. Membership should include all 
local organisations to which the victim may report, or be in contact with for follow-up 
services. Irrespective of the possibility that those who have traversed the justice system 
as victims are represented amongst these organisations, it is crucial that independent 
victim/survivors are also members of Interagency Councils. Victim/Survivors are 
primary stakeholders and their independent representation symbolises the importance 
of, and respect for, their voices. All organisations which might be involved in 
prevention must also be incorporated. Particularly important are the media. Their 
representation on the Interagency Council will expose the media to rape-as-a-serious-
social-issue as well as improving understanding of the real issues faced by victims. This 
media education may lead to more balanced and considered reporting and this will help 
to counteract rape mythologies.  
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In addition to the more specific suggestions made by MCASA (1997) and Boles and 
Patterson (1997) bringing frontline level organisations together is aimed at: facilitating 
the referral process and limiting gaps; contributing information on the real incidence of 
rape and the range of services offered; and assisting in the growth of partnership. 
Bringing regional/district managers of government departments together is aimed at 
ensuring that local service requirements are known and resourced. In this research, I 
found partnership maintenance measures to equate with investment in service 
improvements. Formalising these through an SCC-coordinated interagency council 
which incorporates specialist crisis interventionists will reduce service gaps within and 
between organisations, respectively by developing specialist care and improving referral 
processes. Both mechanisms, in limiting the long-term health consequences of rape and 
secondary victimisation will enable time and financial savings at all levels. 
Establishing Multi-Agency Centres  
MCASA (1997) also identified the need for policy and procedure development; 
collaboration on specific projects; and resource development. In being premised on 
victim-centred rather than system-centred requirements, the development of multi-
agency centres would facilitate the implementation of these recommendations at local 
level. Precedents for these is found in some US states (Littel, 2001; CSM 8A), British 
SARCs, the Victoria Centre Against Sexual Assault (Attorney General Media Release, 
26.04.07); New Zealand’s Kimiora, and the children’s multi-agency centre in Auckland 
(personal visits to Haven Camberwell, Kimiora & Te Pua Waitahi).  
There are useful additions to multi-agency facilities which have not been mentioned in 
descriptions so far. Firstly, a meeting room is needed for the recommended interagency 
meetings and training. Secondly, with the proviso that all three agencies have their own 
confidential programmes for sensitive agency-relevant complainant details, a combined 
computer database is suggested. This idea was endorsed in discussions. 
‘That would certainly speed things up. I don't think it would be that hard to set 
up.’ (CAT 4) 
All three organisations can then access and update individual files and monitor the 
contemporary status of actions taken on these. This would better manage agency 
communication in the hiatus between regular caseload meetings and reduce reported 
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frustrations with inability to make contact. Strong and enforceable protocols which 
protect victim privacy will be required if this is to be implemented. Lastly, a resource 
library which includes internet facilities will assist in meeting the need for evidence-
based practice. Collaboration with like research bodies overseas such as ACSSA can 
also be conducted through communication and consultation over internet at multi-
agency centres.  
During discussions about whether and how multi-agency centres for adults could work 
in New Zealand, including all six District Commanders, the vast majority of 
respondents agreed with developing such centres in New Zealand. Respondents 
suggested multi-agency centres would result in improvements in: interagency 
cooperation; reporting rates; pooling of ideas and knowledge; training and support for 
new personnel; job satisfaction; and protecting sensitive information by keeping it 
within four walls. Other suggested advantages were: a more victim-centred system; 
fewer work distractions for police; the comprehensive facilities provided by one-stop-
shops; and that such facilities would encourage other professionals into the work. 
Reflecting my own view, respondents also believed that multi-agency centres were 
advantageous in being user-friendly systems away from police stations and uniforms.  
Other respondents initiated discussion of the efficiencies created by being able to access 
partners in the same building (CYFS 3, 4, 6, 7; CAT 7). Most worked in the child abuse 
field in mandated partnerships and understood the requirement for systems which 
facilitated rather than hampered communication with partner organisations. These 
respondents spoke of their frustrations with ‘telephone tag’ and acknowledged too the 
difficulty of separate computer systems which meant that a common file could not be 
accessed by both organisations. One CSM was particularly strong on this. 
‘The best way to achieve the lessening of revictimisation is making people feel 
that we are on top of our game [pause] that they are getting a decent deal, is 
multi-agency under one roof where they can go through a chain of specialists… 
Look at us at the moment, you have got four different agencies, four different 
intelligence databases, four sets of recording systems, one piece of information 
that goes in one end and doesn't get to the other partner that really needs to 
know about it. …we need every agency under that one roof talking to one 
another around the table.’ (CSM 8A)  
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This CSM also listed other advantages such as: saving the victim from having to repeat 
her account; reducing the risk of revictimisation; rationalising funding; reducing police 
rotation; and less conflicting information given to the victim by different parties. 
Combined, these respondents’ comments echo many of the practical and synergistic 
advantages to multi-agency partnerships which have been identified in prior research.  
Findings specific to the current research indicate other advantages. For instance, ease of 
communication with other agencies was one important factor for police in deciding who 
to be partnered with. This will be no contest in specialist multi-agency settings. In this 
regard, the antipathy of some police toward feminist organisations is likely to fade as 
ongoing contact and mutual influence breaks down barriers when organisations are in 
closer partnership.  
‘The more we talk and the more we have to do with each other the better we get 
along.’ (CIB 8A) 
Feminists and police may also find that their ideological distance has lessened over the 
intervening years, as predicted by Bard (1976), Hardgrove (1976), and Martin et al. 
(1992). Acceleration of ideological compatibility is more likely to happen within 
government-supported national structures where there is greater accountability for 
bringing unprofessional responses to any aspect of the professional arena. As suggested 
by respondents, venues for interagency coordination will also contribute a community 
of professionals able to advance practice through shared experience. This has been 
demonstrated empirically. 
‘… by the end of the evaluation period the three SARCs were exploring ways to 
learn from and integrate the good practice of the others, partly facilitated by the 
evaluation process and interim reports. This has culminated in the three SARC 
Managers recently setting up a regular discussion group where expertise and 
good practice are shared.’ (Lovett et al., 2004, p.71) 
Importantly, such networking will facilitate professionals in advocating nationally and 
locally for improvements to related structures such as the courts which are currently 
failing both victims and the crisis intervention services.  
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There is also symbolic value in providing separate multi-agency premises. Firstly, in 
removing interventions from the impoverished premises of support/advocacy 
organisations and from busy police stations, most of which have yet to provide suitable 
interview rooms, a positive statement is made about the worth of those who have been 
victimised. In addition, sexual violence has been described by one DSAC regional 
coordinator as ‘yukky work and no one wants to do it’ (12), which he qualified by listing 
the many difficulties of working in the field. It is also apparent that an important reason 
why Police do not prioritise sexual violence responsiveness is because successive 
governments have not proactively given this steer. Government recognition of the 
serious problem of sexual violence through provision of an NZCSVR and NZCSSV, 
combined with coordinated local level responsiveness in specialist multi-agency centres 
will alter the status not only of victims but also of work conducted in the field. Official 
attention to coordination, funding, and facilities will contribute to the desire to work in 
this field (CIB 8C; CYFS 6). This is particularly important given the currently volunteer 
nature of much of the work and the contemporary comments from support/advocacy and 
DSAC-trained doctors about difficulty attracting and retaining volunteers. There are 
many synergistic properties and practical advantages to multi-agency centres then.  
However, in the need to consider all issues when setting up multi-agency centres a very 
small minority of respondents raised issues with implementing these, only one of whom 
was in outright disagreement with their implementation. This respondent rejected the 
concept because multi-agency centres might not offer sufficient downtime between 
processes, causing victims to feel that they were on a conveyer belt. Although three 
positive respondents (Support/Advocacy 7; CIB 3, 5D) also expressed this as a potential 
problem, the combination of victim-centred environment and protocols will counter this 
possibility in most cases. The other five of the six respondents who disagreed with 
multi-agency centres did so based on their perception that there were insufficient reports 
to justify such centres for adults, rather than on factors intrinsic to the multi-agency 
concept (DSAC 8A, 10; Support/Advocacy 8B; CIB 10, 12). However, Kimiora’s 
location in a mid-sized city indicates that multi-agency centres are viable even outside 
large cities if they adapt, for instance by catering for both children and adults.  
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Continuing with this theme, several respondents suggested variations of the multi-
agency model. For instance, some suggested that multi-agency centres incorporate a 
fourfold service in responding to women and children who were victims of sexual and 
domestic violence (District Commander 2, CIB 5C, 8C; CSM 8A, 9, 11, 12, SCC 7, 
CYFS 3, 7; DSAC 7; Victim Support 8C; Support/Advocacy 8E, 10). This was based on 
their view that the issues of sexual and domestic violence were closely interlocked. In 
New Zealand, variations on this four part model exist. Some support/advocacy agencies 
combine to provide adult and child sexual assault services (2, 5E, 6, 7). Other 
organisations combine adult sexual assault and domestic violence responsiveness (5E, 
8B, 10). Likewise, CYFS combines child physical abuse and sexual abuse 
responsiveness.  
In considering this, a WHO project analysed Malaysian, British, Canadian, and 
American multi-agency centres which respond to adult and child victims of sexual and 
domestic violence. The WHO finding was that such integration was strongly supported 
in areas where there was low reporting of rape, but only cautiously supported where 
rape statistics were higher due to concerns about losing a specialist focus on sexual 
violence (Kelly, 2000). In New Zealand, I found that domestic violence overshadowing 
of sexual violence services operated at political level and influenced attention to, and 
resourcing of, services. However, at frontline level, I found that some rural centres have 
only remained viable through having a dual focus, and that net-widening has been 
another benefit. Finite resources mean that a dual focus is a pragmatic adaptation to 
lower reporting rates in smaller areas. No matter the area size, a specialist sexual assault 
focus is protected by providing sufficient resources for responding to needs created by 
both domestic and sexual violence, and by defining and adhering to suggested 
structures. Congruent with the argument for local communities to make decisions about 
services based on their own needs assessments, Interagency Councils are best positioned 
to decide which combination of multi-agency services is suited to the community.  
The location of multi-agency services is also an Interagency Council decision. O’Shea 
(2006) has suggested that this decision should be based on sustainability, travel times, and 
reporting rates. Reflecting the health implications of sexual violence, many multi-agency 
centres are hospital-based. London’s Havens are located in hospital grounds. Many US 
SARTs are hospital-based (Littel, 2001). Australia’s CASA House is in the Royal 
Women's Hospital in Victoria (Gilmore & Pittman, 1993). Given Australia’s distance 
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issues, a suggested adaptation was a geographically mobile satellite service for crisis 
counselling and follow-up of complaints from more isolated communities (Hornibrook & 
Myers, 1996). Auckland’s multi-agency centre is very close to the grounds of a main 
hospital but Kimiora is a separate facility altogether. In addition to O’Shea’s suggestions, 
the location of services should also be based on local need and the need to have multi-
agency centres which are separate from Police premises, private, and safe.  
A significant proviso in the development of multi-agency centres is that services already 
developed by community organisations are incorporated. These should not be replaced 
with a new level of services engineered by Government as has happened in the creation 
of the British SARCs. Preserving local level adaptations is supported at theoretical level 
by post-modern discourse highlighting the multiplicity of social realities, and at 
empirical level by the finding of variable Police Districts comprised of different 
communities. Local adaptations enable rather than prevent quality assurance by 
mobilising resources from the local community and in ways best suited to the 
community. Official support for DSAC and RCC work to be ongoing within multi-
agency centres is evidence of respect for both these community-based organisations and 
the community from which they originate. Importantly, DSAC work is evidence of the 
possibility of maintaining quality assurance in the presence of local adaptations.  
Not only do RCCs and local doctors know their own community requirements, original 
support/advocacy organisations are the keepers of victim-protective foundational 
philosophies and knowledge. Particularly as the state becomes more involved in service 
provision, a feminist and victim-centred perspective will be necessary in maintaining 
the philosophies which underpin rape-responsiveness in multi-agency centres. Another 
consideration for multi-agency centres to incorporate the original service providers is 
practical and concerns the waste of resources if specialist skills and knowledge are lost 
to multi-agency centres.  
‘The bottom line is you get a good agency that is doing good work in the 
community and they are priceless. They are priceless to us. They are priceless to 
victims.’ (CYFS 12) 
It is also important at the initial level of multi-agency centre development and in 
ongoing consultation during meetings to consolidate service provision. The joint 
formulation of protocols between Police, DSAC, and RCCs and the ongoing evaluation 
268 
which accompanies these, is the best means of ensuring that processes are not only 
appropriate but that there is quality assurance within them. Meeting on neutral ground 
places the crisis intervention organisations on a more equal basis for negotiating how 
services are organised. Protecting the involvement of these original service providers 
may be achieved by Kelly and Lovett’s (2005) suggestion of a ‘National Service 
Agreement’ between statutory and community service providers.  
Improving Police Systems 
The recommended structures for funding and support discussed above will significantly 
advance and consolidate the medical/forensic and support/advocacy processes which 
already receive a considered response from DSAC and support organisations. Notably, 
in respect of these processes, respondents’ recommendations focussed almost 
exclusively on the need for them to be better funded and supported. In contrast, 
recommendations aimed at improving police responsiveness focussed predominantly on 
improving Police systems and processes. Respondents identified that attention was 
necessary in a wide range of domains including: policy; leadership; coordination; 
facilities; partnerships; and staff selection, supervision, training, accreditation, and 
allocation, especially in terms of rotation and specialist squads.   
For improvements to be instigated, Police leadership must understand the need to 
professionalise the response to sexual violence. Re-examining the ASA Policy both in its 
contribution to policing philosophy and in its comprehensiveness is timely and a first step. 
A second step is a much more in-depth audit of Policy implementation than has been 
conducted by Police to date. The current research has begun this in 20 Areas in respect of 
SADCs, training; specialist squads; facilities, debriefing; evaluation; and partnership 
implementation. The recent appointment of a national coordinator should assist with these 
steps. However, of concern is that the hierarchical Police organisation advertised the 
national coordinator position at the rank of Senior Sergeant. Had the Executive sought a 
more senior officer, this would have given greater confidence that it understands the 
significance of sexual violence and will address deficiencies in professionalism. 
As signalled by the Inspector rank of the national family violence coordinator, the 
national sexual violence coordinator will need to have substantially more traction than 
the rank of Senior Sergeant might allow. This is because SADCs, through whom 
District coordination will be conducted, are expected to be Inspectors (attendance at 
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consultation forum, August 2005). It is also because the National Coordinator must be 
able to implement at least some decisions on a national basis. In addition the 
coordinator rank needs to be appropriate not only to accessing top levels of the Police 
structure, but also to regular top level liaison with current national representatives of 
DSAC and future national representatives of support/advocacy agencies. In this regard, 
Mawby and Gill (1987) have identified that having a Chief Superintendent in the liaison 
role enhanced the working relationship between police and volunteers. National 
Coordinator effectiveness will need to be closely monitored then to ensure that unlike 
the Policy, the new role is not merely ‘window dressing’.  
If an NZCSVR, NZCSSV, SCC-implemented Interagency Council, and multi-agency 
centres are implemented, police responsiveness will be improved through the gains 
made in national and local leadership and research endeavours. In the interim, Police 
must take the initiative by building its own effectiveness in the following ways.   
Fulltime Sexual Assault District Coordinator (SADC) Positions 
To a considerable degree, Policy-mandated SADC duties are unattended due to having 
simply been added on to the pre-existing duties of some police. This was evident in this 
research, and in two Police audits (ASA Policy Progress and Evaluation Report, August 
2005; May 2006). In the latter report, three Districts have still to nominate District-wide 
representation. Until the potential of this role is understood, it is likely that Areas will 
continue to conduct their own limited coordination activities.  
Beyond enabling the eight policy-mandated duties, there are many reasons to develop 
and consolidate SADC roles. Most importantly, the national coordinator will be 
powerless to achieve national coordination and Policy compliance without local 
structures to enable oversight of Policy implementation in the Districts. One respondent 
pointed out that the current situation allows for devolution of standard setting within the 
Police, making it very difficult to achieve a national standard. This position is well-
supported by the findings of this and other research (Ainsworth, 1995; Goldsmith, 1990; 
LaFree, 1989; Lee, 1992; Malloy, 1983; Mastrofski & Parks, 1990; Van der Heyden, 
1997; Wasby, 1978). As the respondent understood:  
270 
‘In the end there has to be some kind of a standard that the CIB commanders 
are accountable for and they need to be performance-managed against that 
standard and that would need to be agreed obviously at a national level. 
…What is the point of having the Policy if you are not going to audit it?’ 
(DSAC Regional Coordinator 12) 
Importantly, the enforcement of national standards is compatible with protecting local 
level adaptations since both operate differently on practice. National standards are 
intrinsic to practice and define both professional practice and the parameters of local 
level adaptations. Ideally local level adaptations operate only to support good practice 
by defining local need and harnessing local community resources in ensuring that it is 
met. This signals another role for SADCs, in conjunction with other Interagency 
Council members, in analysing the need for and impact of local level adaptations. 
Transparency around the factors which create the need for adaptations will protect 
necessary adaptations. It will also expose where resource shortfalls have created the 
need for renegade local level adaptations which disadvantage victims, and this can pre-
empt resource allocation reviews and alternative constructive responses. SADCs’ local 
knowledge will also support other research which is done under the auspices of the 
NZCSSV and this has been recognised in the Borough Coordinator role articulated in 
the London Metropolitan Policy. SADC effectiveness in this pivotal communication 
role will be assured if SADCs do this work from the position of District or Area 
specialist squad supervisor when these squads become reality. 
Developing the expertise of CIB and uniform police is another potential role for SADCs. 
Along with CIB training, training for uniform police to whom the initial complaint of 
sexual assault is made is mandated by the Policy. Until recently, uniform police have had 
only four hours training in dealing with sexual assault complaints and this was during 
recruit training. SADCs can oversee the District-based training for dealing with initial 
complaints which was developed in late 2005 for delivery to communication staff, watch-
house staff, and uniform police (personal involvement). In respect of CIB training, this is 
in constant catch-up mode, partly because of the difficulty in releasing investigators for 
the week-long course in Wellington (Course Coordinator, 2005). This could be 
ameliorated by having SADCs coordinate specialist CIB training in the Districts at 
intervals which fit with local workplace commitments. Incorporating local specialist 
partners for this training was suggested by me in respect of the frontline staff training 
271 
package and has been adopted in theory if not always in practice. Its benefits include: 
developing police knowledge of local specialist resources; extending training resources; 
tapping partner agency knowledge; and promoting a closer relationship with partner 
organisations. Maintaining quality assurance in training has been raised as a potential 
problem in respect of the devolution of some training to the Districts (ASA Course 
Coordinator). This can be managed through annual SADC courses at the Royal New 
Zealand Police College and by setting nationally-based examinations for investigators. At 
present, little is done to assess training outcomes (personal knowledge). Annual courses 
will provide opportunity for networking and peer review between SADCs as well as the 
opportunity for networking with the national: coordinator for sexual violence 
investigations; Crime Manager; and Training Commander.  
Practice variability is evidence of the need for supervision. The London Metropolitan 
Policy has set case supervision at three mandated intervals and this is another potential 
function of SADCs as specialist squad supervisors. Beyond supervision of cases, 
supervision should also encompass caring for the welfare of staff involved in sexual 
assault investigations and troubleshooting of problems. The need for this is evident in 
reported comments which have suggested that upward communication is rarely solicited. 
Essential in establishing the SADC office is to provide a forum for feedback from 
victims who may have some unease about the conduct or disposition of their cases. An 
overarching Complaints Authority has been suggested as part of the 
Ombudsman/Commissioner’s role. Whenever possible, hearing local dissatisfactions 
within-District will allow for more timely and effective resolutions. In the absence of an 
official avenue for hearing grievances, at present both the media and Police partner 
organisations are the repositories of information about unresolved dissatisfactions. This 
situation is unhelpful to police relationships with the community and their partners. 
Having no structured complaint process also does little for victim recovery from 
secondary victimisation. Given the volume of very public criticism which has been 
directed at Police in respect of rape investigations, Police need to consider whether in-
house procedures would be a more efficacious arrangement. Complaint forums are a 
vital aspect of service evaluations, although notably the latter are not currently intrinsic 
to Police systems of responsiveness to sexual violence.  
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The value of harnessing Police support for community organisations has been suggested 
in this research. Where through their needs analyses SADCs find that local police have no 
support/advocacy partner or a struggling partner agency, they may have a supportive role 
in the development of new agencies, or the resurrection of agencies which have 
withdrawn from crisis intervention. There is potential for this to happen under the 
auspices of the District Interagency Council, and through SADC consultation with 
geographically proximate support/advocacy organisations or local agencies with a 
compatible focus. Similarly, where DSAC-trained doctors are unavailable, SADCs can 
actively support approaches to DHB representatives on the Interagency Council to fund 
recruitment and training.  
Given the many opportunities for SADCs to improve service delivery, this role is 
pivotal and worthy of the total focus of an officer in each District. At present, there is no 
Policy requirement for Police to create SADC as specialist positions, yet this research 
has shown that Crime Service Managers to whom the role has fallen are already 
preoccupied with very busy roles.  
‘I don't interface. I am dealing with a high-level overview. I don't know of any 
difficulties and I have certainly had none advised to me by the staff of any 
difficulties (sic)…’ (CSM 8) 
It will require senior police to develop District sexual assault services and attend to 
problems of service implementation. Without the weight and influence of rank, it is 
unlikely that solutions will be implemented and accepted.  
‘It has got to be somebody with District-wide influence? 
It does. … The District Crime Manager is the logical choice.’ (CIB 8C) 
Replacing generalist Crime Service Managers with specialist sexual assault squad 
supervisors means that SADCs will be experienced senior detectives with a total focus 
on sexual assault investigations. This experience and seniority will be necessary given 
the duties which are expected to comprise the SADC role. These are: implementing 
policy by ensuring the provision of adequate staff and physical facilities for interviews; 
reviewing files; conducting research, collecting statistical data, and providing feedback 
to the national coordinator; taking feedback from rape victims; implementing District 
training; supporting partner agencies; and eventually, running specialist squads. 
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Given this overview of SADC role possibilities and that currently there is no provision 
for totally focussed SADC positions, this explains the many gaps in Police service 
delivery.   
Specialist Squads 
Specialist squads have already been suggested for New Zealand conditions (Crawshaw, 
1998; Jordan, 1996), but while approximations were found in this research, they are not 
yet a regular District feature. Precedents for them are in Britain, the US and Australia. In 
the US:   
‘Without exception every person interviewed in the US during the course of this 
study was quite certain that the specialist unit was the ideal model for the 
investigation of sexual crime.’ (Blair, 1985, p.75) 
If these are implemented, other necessary changes will be addressed simultaneously 
including: less frequent rotation; debriefing; improving training and supervision; service 
evaluation; and working with specialist partners (Crawshaw, 1998; Harvey, 1984). A 
pilot in the Auckland District has already been positively evaluated on the grounds of its 
ability to achieve improvements in investigative results, and to enhance relationships 
with partner agencies in part through combined training (New Zealand News, 
16.8.2006, Stuff.co.nz). These same benefits have been identified previously by 
Detective Chief Inspector Sturman in Britain (Orr-Munro, 2001). 
Efficiencies are created by having all sexual violence investigated by specialist teams. 
If rotation through these teams is slowed and staggered, investigative expertise will 
develop through mentoring, peer review, and debriefing with police peers. Debriefing 
with other agency personnel already happens in some Districts. Specialist teams also 
have the opportunity and motivation to develop and use District-based libraries 
complete with computer databases. This need became evident during the research when 
in building a court case, a senior officer asked me about research on ‘normative’ post-
rape victim reactions. Another officer, in lamenting his lack of time to develop 
theoretical knowledge about sexual violence, noted this would be less problematic in 
specialist teams. The evident commitment of both officers should be supported through 
Police commitment to ensuring the resources and opportunities which will allow 
officers to become more conversant with available research. Sexual offending databases 
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can also be developed and monitored for offending patterns in local communities in 
order to improve prevention possibilities. Respondents also commented positively about 
the idea of specialist sexual assault teams. Ideas not already mentioned included 
reducing the error rate and wastage and improving output quality (District Commander 
2). Specialist squads were also thought to reduce distractions onto other work (District 
Commander 12; CSM 12) and increase the reporting rate. 
Specialist teams too can be adapted to local conditions. In Districts with a smaller 
population but a wider geographic spread, there are variations which may be more 
appropriate to these conditions. One is a core group based in the same city as District 
Headquarters, but with satellites in smaller cities which are closely monitored by the 
SADC and accountable to this officer. Another alternative is to retain this core group 
but to include within it a geographically mobile squad, as suggested by Hornibrook and 
Myers (1996) in relation to support services.  
A third variation for smaller Districts is specialist teams which respond to both child 
and adult victims of sexual violence, as recommended in the London Metropolitan 
Police Strategic Plan and now implemented in Victoria, Australia (Attorney General 
press release 26.04.07). This combination is suggested here for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the main reason for some police respondents expressing opposition to specialist 
adult sexual assault teams was that Police statistics indicated the volume of work was 
insufficient. This argument has been rebutted, but until the NZCSSV presents its 
evidence on the parameters of adult sexual violence, a compromise position is to inject 
CAT teams with generalist CIB and create a specialist sexual violence responsiveness 
which is not age-dependent. Precedent overseas is in the Thames Valley Police Child 
Protection Unit which became a joint Child Protection and Sexual Crime Unit (Lovett et 
al., 2004).  
In some Areas in New Zealand, combined teams have already been shown to work. In 
other Areas, historical complaints by women who have been molested in childhood are 
conducted by the CAT team. Further, in some Districts complaints by those as young as 
14 are investigated by generalist CIB. Many medical/forensic and support/advocacy 
specialists deal with both children and adults. These practical examples indicate that the 
decision to divide services is arbitrary rather than evidence-based.  
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There are also theoretical grounds for addressing sexual violence holistically. Firstly, 
adult victimisation experiences and presentations to police may be affected by 
childhood experiences of sexual violence (Rothschild seminar, 2004). Having greater 
understanding of the effects of childhood sexual violence may assist in investigating the 
adult sexual assaults of those traumatised in childhood. Also, although age-related 
interview skill sets are different, similar sensitivity is required for responding to 
complaints of sexual crime. Sensitivity towards victims was said to be well developed in 
CAT teams, along with the empathy and positive beliefs about complaints which were 
an identifiable feature of responsiveness to children. Since more attention has been 
given to interview skills in the child abuse field, it would be advantageous to have these 
skills and accompanying sensitivity extended into the adult field.  
‘If there is serious sexual offending going on you use those CAT teams because 
they are trained for the interviewing for the kids. Their interviewing skills are 
very very good, to bring that woman out of her shell to tell you everything.’ 
(District Commander 6) 
That expertise used for adults also meant a greater conviction rate.  
‘You will lose cases if you are not using the best practices because there are so 
many areas to challenge on. … We didn't get a conviction, because we didn't 
have a specialist or a really good trained officer.’ (CAT Manager 1)  
Lastly, having CAT detectives working directly with adult complainants alongside 
generalist CIB may achieve attitude transfer.  
With only two exceptions, police who were asked their views on injecting CAT teams 
with additional CIB to make up specialist sexual assault teams were positive about the 
idea. One of the respondents who expressed opposition simply preferred the status quo 
(CAT 11). The other based his opposition on pre-existing court rules, and the different 
style of interviews (CSM 4). Positive views were universally forthcoming from CYFS 
respondents. Other reasons were contributed by CYFS and police respondents for why 
specialist teams should cut across age. Firstly, the work was ‘very similar’. Combining 
the responses to sexual violence would also ensure sufficient investigative staff and the 
viability of a CAT specialist response by increasing the numbers dealt with by one 
team. Again, this made it more likely that CAT members were not siphoned off onto 
276 
other investigations. In addition, extending the benefits of the ‘significant expertise 
within the CAT team’ (CSM 11) would not only benefit women but simultaneously 
benefit children, especially when the sexual violence was domestic. Finally, one 
respondent suggested that such a combined team represented an ‘ideal world’ scenario 
(CIB Supervisor 6). In developing police responsiveness then it appears that combined 
adult and child specialist sexual assault teams are a viable option. 
Conclusion 
 
Particularly since the early 1970s, feminists have identified sexual violence as 
obstructive to women’s self-actualisation, undermining of its individual victims, and 
costly to society-as-a-whole. Since its effects are compounded by inadequate or 
inappropriate interventions, feminist researchers have also provided evidence that 
specialist holistic services, preferably fully integrated, can improve rape interventions 
and mitigate rape’s serious impacts. What has now also been identified is that if this 
level of intervention is to be achieved, state leadership is necessary since the state alone 
has the ability to inspire, structure, resource, and coordinate the multilevel systems 
response required.  
Disappointingly, New Zealand’s sexual assault services have not benefited from the 
state leadership which has advanced services in comparative countries overseas, and 
accordingly frontline services remain largely unstructured, fragmented, and variable. 
Yet if state leadership can be mobilised, our small size and preexisting governance 
infrastructures place us particularly well to achieve specialist holistic services on a 
national basis. That being so and using this governance infrastructure as a basis, I have 
identified the minimal framework within which practice ideals can be achieved and 
without which specialist holistic practice is unlikely to develop regionally let alone 
nationally. However, because New Zealand has not even kept pace with international 
service developments, not only do the technicalities of systems development need to be 
identified, so too do the factors of our political and social environment which have 
prevented governments’ development of such a model.  
 
Developing an effective national model of responsiveness will depend on the ability to 
persuade government not only of the need for reform but also the political possibility of 
implementing it. Factors which have obscured the need and undermine the political 
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possibility are historical, and to do with men’s control over women being achieved in part 
by misogynistic definitions of women. These definitions have left a deep imprint on the 
(sub) consciousness of society-in-general which will take some work to erase. But not 
only are women-in-general devalued, men’s definitions of rape continue to devalue 
female victims. Although exposed among some audiences as rape mythology, in broader 
society these definitions appear more influential than hard evidence of the serious 
psychosocial harms and social injustices which accompany rape. The blunt truth is that 
policy in existing systems actively prioritises men’s agency, and in undermining women’s 
sexual autonomy maintains woman-as-sexual-resource for men. Preventing state-led 
reform then is politicians’ own susceptibility to definitions which diminish women and 
minimise rape. Occasionally too there is political awareness that until the constituency, 
women included, cast off the shackles of misogynistic thinking, implementing feminist 
reforms is not conducive to remaining in power. Accordingly, reform will require 
government confidence that policy contributing to women’s equality is politically safe to 
implement 
In order to counteract discourses which imply women’s lack of entitlement to the effort and 
expenditure in developing a national model of responsiveness, there must be appropriate 
valuing of women and greater awareness of the mechanisms in their continuing 
disadvantage. Greater public awareness of New Zealand government’s obligations under 
United Nations covenants, and that under these international covenants governments 
elsewhere have implemented reforms, will encourage women’s confidence in their equal 
right to state-provided services. Reinforcing this will be the understanding that current 
failure to resource effective systems is contemporaneous with the taken-for-granted 
privileging of men in public policy and expenditure. Also persuasive is that contributing 
state resources to ensuring effective prevention and interventions would substantially 
obviate the massive pecuniary and social costs which accompany the long-term effects 
of sexual offending. It is unlikely that the state will lead reforms in rape-responsiveness 
until it perceives that such issues are widely known and understood in the community as 
warranting considerable government input. 
Yet the history of the anti-rape movement shows that it is only when feminists are 
strongly aligned and strategically placed that rape becomes an issue of significance for 
the community to take up and government to respond to. Again, the reasons that 
feminists are unable to achieve traction on their own are historic. Men’s early monopoly 
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over definitions of social reality has had the ongoing effect of relegating women’s 
alternative definitions to an ‘other’ or illegitimate status and this continues to undermine 
contemporary feminist voices. As successive government responses to the Rape Study, 
United Nations covenants, and the Police ASA Policy show, it is possible to make yet not 
implement policy even when this affects women’s safety. That the recently-established 
Sexual Violence Task Force has interdepartmental government and community 
representation gives hope that this Task Force can bridge the gulf between feminist 
ideals and political pragmatism, and between writing and implementing policy. In this, 
the Task Force must first consolidate feminist attempts to make the effects of rape and 
rape mythology well-known in order to gain public and political acceptance of the need to 
publicly fund structured and effective systems of sexual violence responsiveness.  
 
Overall, it will take the right people with the right knowledge at the right time and in the 
right place not only to translate current government interest into fully-funded, 
permanent, sustainable, and accredited systems, but also to fill the substantial service 
deficits at frontline level. Combined with recent public exposure of systems 
inadequacies, New Zealand’s much touted government surplus (New Zealand Herald, 
18.05.2006) makes now the right time to put public resources into comprehensive 
services. If the state takes the lead in developing the structure and providing the resources 
which support holistic systems, its Police organisation will have no legitimate reason not 
to comply with new systems initiatives, including working in partnership. When 
government is considering how gaps are to be filled, regardless of the restructuring 
required to progress this pre-existing community services must be the basis for new 
services so that these are built on a foundation of knowledge and expertise. Moreover, 
when the state formally recognises the value of specialist community organisations and 
places them alongside its Police organisation, as has increasingly happened between 
police CAT and CYFS social workers, equal partnership is more likely.  
In her Commission of Inquiry postscript, Bazley (2007) expressed concern that 
highlighting knowledge of systems difficulties might dissuade women from reporting 
sexual violence to the criminal justice system. If reporting sexual violence is indeed 
held to be necessary, there is urgency to improve systems so that women’s cost/benefit 
analysis of reporting allows them to make that choice. Women will feel safe to report 
and feminist suspicion about patriarchal motives will abate when the state is known to 
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be collaborating in holistic systems with the community specialists who have identified 
ideal practice.  
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Appendices 
Appendix One: Maps of Police Districts 
(a): Map of North Island Police Districts  
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Appendix One (b): Map of South Island Police Districts  
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Appendix Two: Sample Interview - CIB 
Background of CIB Experience 
1. How long have you been in the CIB? 
 
2. Which different geographic areas have you worked in while investigating sexual 
assault crimes? 
 
3. How many cases of adult female sexual assault have you investigated or had a part 
in the investigation of? 
 
Client management 
4. If you are aware of the way in which the victim has come into the system, could 
you tell me how this has happened? 
 
5. Could you tell me about the Police procedure in this district for dealing with rape 
victims from the moment of reporting? 
 
6. What physical facilities are available to use throughout your investigation?  
• for the reporting of the attack 
• for the forensic and medical exam 
• for the main interview 
• for liaising with the woman thereafter  
 
7. I'm aware that in some Districts effort is made to give the victim some recovery 
time before the formal interview. Is this practice in your Area?  
 
8. Could you tell me if there are any processes in place to support victims during this 
time and to bring them back in to the system and whose responsibility it would be 
to provide this support? 
 
9. Given that this can be a stressful area for Police, do you have an automatic debrief 
or peer review for each case? 
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10. Do you receive or solicit formal client or any other evaluation in respect of how 
they felt about the handling of their case?  
 
11. Could you tell me what you know about the kind of services support/advocacy 
offer victims of sexual assault from the time of reporting until their involvement 
finishes? 
 
Liaison 
12. During sexual assault investigations have you collaborated professionally with any 
groups who work in a victim support/advocacy role? 
 
13. Could you tell me about the points during the investigation at which you work in 
partnership with other agency personnel?  
a. DSAC               
b. support/advocacy agency 
 
14. If you are aware of the general feeling in respect of the policy requirement for 
partnership with the agencies, could you tell me how this requirement is 
perceived? 
 
15. Are you aware of any problems that have arisen due to police not being able to 
meet the Policy requirement to liaise with a specialist support agency? 
 
16. Could you tell me what protocols are in place to govern your interagency liaison? 
 
17. Do you routinely call in a support/advocate or would you seek the victim's 
permission first? 
 
18. In your experience, what percentage of women would you estimate agree to have a 
professional support person present? 
 
19. Do you know what range of services the support and medical agencies provide to 
victims? 
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20. Could you tell me which of the agencies does the work to maintain the partnership 
at the local level and what does this entail? 
 
21. Could you tell me if you are aware of any regular consultation between any of the 
sexual assault services at national level?  
 
22. Could you tell me what benefits the victims receives from your partnership with a 
specialist support person? 
 
23. How do you feel having a specialist support person for the victim might work to 
the Police advantage/disadvantage? 
 
24. Are you aware of any problems with respect to Police liaison with DSAC or a 
support/advocacy agency? 
 
25. Can you see any potential for hiring a fulltime forensic examiner, rather than 
approaching a DSAC-trained doctor or Police surgeon? 
 
26. There are overseas examples of all agencies working together in 'Rape Suites', 
where every intervention that the victim requires is carried out in one place. How 
do you think that would work here?  
 
27. What could be done differently to improve how rape victims are being treated by 
the legal, medical, and support systems? 
 
Comparison with Child Sexual Abuse Investigations  
28. Have you ever worked in the child sexual abuse team (CAT)?  
 
29. Could you tell me what the major points of difference are in how you investigate 
child sexual abuse as opposed to adult female sexual assault? 
 
30. Can you tell me whether there is any crossover in the work done by CIB in this 
District or others between child and adult sexual crimes investigations?   
 
31. Could you describe the kind of liaison that you have with CYFS? 
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32. How do you think the kind of liaison that you have with CYFS would work if 
applied to adult sexual assault?   
 
33. Could you tell me why you think the multidisciplinary approach for children’s 
complaints does not apply to adult female victims?   
 
 
